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INTRODUCTION - and declaration under Regulation 14-9_(e) 
This report is not a thesis for the degree of Ph. D. but is an 
"exposition" referred to in Regulation 14-9 of the Institute, which 
allows the presentation of published work on one particular theme, 
instead of an original thesis. The publications submitted with this 
exposition are the reports of four studies of the evolution of concentra- 
tion in the United Kingdom - (i) in paper manufacture and conversion, 
(ii) certain parts of the textile industry, (iii) selected vehicle 
accessories and (iv) press and general publishing. These studies 
were undertaken under contract for the Commission of the European 
Communities and form part of an extensive research programme directed 
by the Directorate General for Competition. The four projects were 
undertaken over the period April 1974 to November 1977. 
For the first of these projects a full-time research associate 
(Mrs. W. Hull) was employed. She was responsible for most of the 
data collection and prepared the first draft of much of this report. 
The other three projects were my own exclusive responsibility and the 
texts of the reports were entirely written by me - assistance being 
confined to clerical staff for data collection and a research assistant 
for data processing. Mr. Robert Cornu negotiated the first two of 
the contracts and assisted in communication with the predominantly 
French-speaking liaison staff in Brussels but he was not involved in 
any of the actual investigations. 
The four projects were undertaken in accordance with guidelines 
prescribed by the Directorate General for Competition. These guidelines 
changed over the 1974-7 period and this is reflected in the reports. 
Because the statistical framework and methods of analysis were defined 
by the Commission, the investigations and the reports do not entirely 
reflect my own views on the analysis of concentration. For this 
reason this exposition of the work is of somewhat greater length than 
that which Regulation 14-9 appears to imply. 
Chapter One contains an explanation of the Commission's interest in 
concentration as an aspect of market dominance, followed by summaries 
of the relevant literature and of empirical research into the effects 
of concentration. The objective of this chapter is to place the 
studies financed by the Commission into the context of economic 
theory and recent research by industrial economists. Chapter Two 
examines problems of definition and of sample design in investigations 
of this kind. Chapter Three presents and compares indices of con- 
centration based on the entire sample of firms. Chapter Four is 
concerned with the statistical analysis of oligopoly and concentrates 
particularly upon the innovative parts of the Commission's methodology. Chapter Five is a preliminary assessment of the value of the studies 
and contains some tentative suggestions for changes in the existing 
approach. 
Throughout this exposition I have drawn evidence from the four 
reports but have only occasionally quoted from any, of the large 
number (over 100) reports completed by other research organisations 
in the nine member countries of the European Economic Community. I 
have estimated the total cost of this research programme at December 1977 
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CHAPTER ONE: CONCENTRATION, COMPETITION AND DOMINANCE 
A. THE REASONS FOR THE COMMISSION'S INTEREST IN'CONCENTRATION 
Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome 1957 states as one of the activities 
of the Community: - 
"the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common 
Market is not distorted" 
The principles of this system are set out in Articles 85 and 86 of the 
same treaty (see Ref. 5 for a lucid exposition). 
The first paragraph of Article 85 reads as follows: - 
"The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common 
Market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices, which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their objective or effect the preven- 
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common 
Market... " 
The second paragraph of Article 85 describes any agreements prohibited 
under paragraph (1) as automatically void but the third paragraph 
provides for exemptions to be declared where an agreement can be shown 
to contribute "to improving the production or distribution of goods or 
to promoting technical or ecönomic progress... " Such exemptions are 
subject to the further conditions that the consumer receives a "fair 
share of the resulting benefit, " that no restriction is imposed which 
is not indispensable to these objectives and that competition is not 
eliminated. 
Article 86 relates to what economists have usually described as 
"monopoly power. " The first sentence reads as follows: - 
"Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the Common Market in so far as it may affect trade 
between member states. " 
This article then cites as particular examples of abuse "unfair" prices 
and trading conditions; restriction of production distribution or 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers; discrimination in 
any aspect of trading which might place other traders at a competitive 
disadvantage; the imposition of supplementary obligations on other 
trading parties which have no connection with the transaction to which 
they are attached. 
Most of the cases considered by the European Court of Justice in the 
area of competition policy have arisen from appeals against decisions of 
the Commission under Article 85. Fewer cases have arisen under Article 
86. The upholding by the Court in 1973 of an appeal by the Continental 
Can company indicated that there is onus of proof on the Commission to 
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identify the sections of the market in which a dominant position has 
been abused to the'. detriment of Consumers. Commenting on this. decision, 
Walsh and Paxton (Ref. 6, p. 127) pointed out that it left the defini- 
tion of a dominant position vague and undefined. The decision, accord- 
ing to these authors, "focuses'attention on the conflict between the 
greater degree'of concentration of industry needed in the Community, 
to enable it to compete in the advanced technology markets and. -the 
obvious dangers of creating dominant positions through mergers. " 
The conflict is one long-recognised by economists. The Court of 
Justice has interpreted Articles 85. and 86 so as to presume collective 
agreements to be a priori against the. -public interests but to adopt no 
such presumption about dominant firms. This principle is broadly in 
line with-British legislation. One effect is to compel the Commission 
of the European Communities to collect more information about market 
structure and behaviour, so that positions of dominance and abuse of 
those positions can be identified. 
The programme of studies into the evolution of concentration in indus- 
tries throughout the Community was begun in 1970. For a few years 
before that, the Commission had been studying the relationship between 
concentration and "dominance. " In 1967, this relationship was among 
those considered by a committee of experts charged with the design of 
the methodology of the studies. Their report (Ref. 7) emphasised the 
need for data and for consistent statistical methods but some of the 
contributors pointed out that concentration indices cannot be inter- 
preted directly as measures of the absence of competition. Houssiaux 
(Ref. 7, pp. 37-8) wrote "information about the structure (of an 
industry) is not sufficient to determine the actual behaviour of 
companies engaged in markets and its effects on competition. " 
In its First Report on Competition Policy (Ref. 8) published in April 
1972, the Commission stressed as the main purpose of the studies the 
collection and analysis of information, "viewed from the angle of 
competition. " In spite of the limitations stressed by the 1967 commit- 
tee experts, the studies are predominantly concerned with structure. 
It may be argued that the quantitative study of industrial structure is 
a rational first stage of investigation by those responsible for anti- 
monopoly po icy, for example Pickering (Ref. 9, p. 11). The value of 
the concentration studies in the formulation of policy under Articles 
85 and 86 depends on how much complementary research will be undertaken 
into other-, aspects of restriction. 
B. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE OR POWER OVER THE MARKET 
"It is a sign of the immaturity of the science of economics that the 
notion should persist that the competitiveness of the economy or a 
sector of the economy can ultimately be characterised by some single 
number or set of numbers" (J. B. Miller, Ref: ; 10, p. 119). 
1. 'Measurement and'Definition of*Mönopoly Power in'an'Industry 
Although this topic has attracted the attention of economists for many 
years, some of the issues remain unresolved. The fundamental principles 
-3- 
of cardinal measurement are the existence of a zero'value and a consist- 
ent unit. If the variable has more than one dimension then there must 
be a way of combining these dimensions so that-the combination can be 
measured cardinally. 
Most traditional attempts at measurement of monopoly power (or "market 
power" or "dominance") imply that a zero value is to be found in the 
theoretical model of perfect competition. This model has four basic 
assumptions: 
(a) A very large number of independent, equal firms have identical 
costs of production and supply. (The horizontal demand curve 
implies an infinite number but this is inconsistent with the down- 
ward movement of price which is assumed to follow the entry of new 
firms. ) 
(b) These very numerous firms supply identical products,, which are 
recognised as such by perfectly informed consumers who have equal 
access to each and are completely indifferent between them. 
(c) There is complete freedom of entry and exit. Freedom of entry 
implies that firms entering an industry may sell their products at 
the same prices and with-the same costs of production, distribution 
and selling as existing firms. If there were previously n firms, 
each with 1/n of the market, then the entry of one more firm would 
reduce every share to 1/(n+l). 
(d) There is neither collusion between firms within the industry nor 
any agreement with potential entrants. 
From this summary of the theoretical zero, it is clear that monopoly 
power has many dimensions. The main elements can be classified accord- 
ing to the assumptions of perfect competition: 
(a) seller concentration, a term which is used to describe both a 
reduction in the num er of firms and inequality of size. Diversity 
of operating conditions and costs is a factor in this concentration. 
(b) heterogeneity of product, in terms of physical quality, of access 
to the consumer or of perception by the consumer. Product differ- 
entiation, by advertising or other means of creation of brand 
preference, is an important influence on heterogeneity. 
(c) barriers to entry, which have been examined empirically and clas- 
sified by Bain (Ref. 11 ). Among these are product differentiation 
(especially with consumer goods), economies of scale and the owner- 
ship or control by existing firms of essential supplies or outlets. 
(d) collusion between firms and/or agreementf%with potential entrants 
tome industry. 
Although seller concentration is only one element in this concept of 
power over a market, it is closely linked with some of the other 
elements. Economies of scale in relation to market size lead to a 
reduction in the number of production units and usually in the number 
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of companies. Product differentiation is easier when the number of 
firms is small-oligopoly, at least in a segment of a market, is a 
necessary condition for an advertising war. Reduction in the number 
of firms and growth in the absolute size of each increase both the 
facility and motive for collusion; the increased motive follows from 
interdependence. Growth in the size of firms is likely to lead to 
some vertical integration which affects (b) and (c). The implications 
of concentration in an industry for market dominance depend also on 
the structure of the customer group. Countervailing buying power can 
be of great importance, as was shown in the report on textile concentra- 
tion (Ref. 2, p. 34-6). 
Seller concentration is not, as some authors suggest, for example 
Ornstein (Ref. 12), merely a proxy for collusion in models of market 
power; it affects many of the other elements. The intertwining of 
seller concentration and the other components of monopoly make attempts 
at measurement very difficult. Authors have proposed measures of each 
of the different components: numerous measures of seller concentration; 
use of price-elasticity of demand for the individual firm's product 
relative to that of the industry (Ref. 13 ) or some index based on 
cross-elasticities (Ref. 14) to measure product differentiation; 
several alternative measures of barriers to entry (Ref. 11 ). These 
measures of the different components cannot be added or combined in any 
weighted average because of their interdependence. 
Monopoly power therefore tends to be measured and indeed defined by 
reference to its effects rather than its component characteristics.. 
Evely and Little (Ref. 15 ) defined it as the long-run ability to choose 
price or influence market price without forci ng sa es to zero, which 
combines the product differentiation and barrier to entry assumptions. 
This definition does not cover the degree of monopoly. The best known 
and apparently most used definition of monopoly remains that of Lerner 
(Ref. 16 ): price-marginal cost 
price 
This is based on the well known equilibrium of perfect competition where 
price = marginal cost and, in the long-run, price = long-run marginal 
cost = long-run average cost. 
This theoretical definition of "monopoly profits" has been used in a 
number of studies published in recent years which have examined the 
relationship between concentration and profits. (The findings and the 
validity of these models are described in the next sub-section). An 
interesting attempt to approximate to the Lerner formula was made by 
Qualls in 1972 (Ref. 17 ). Empirical research had shown that long-run 
average cost (LRAC) is flat for a substantial range of output. Since 
long-run marginal cost (LRMC) is equal to LRAC over this range, * the 
Lerner formula is equivalent to 
(i) P- LRAC and, if one multiplies both numerator and denominator 
by the volume of output this-is equivalent to. the average over a number 
* dC 
-C when 
d (. ý) 
= T+q (q) 
- C. - 
of years of 
(ii) Sales'turnover - Total Costs 
Sales turnover 
Qualls pointed out the need to include in total costs the long-run 
opportunity cost of equity capital. Qualls' approximation to the 
Lerner measure of monopoly profits was 
(iii) Net profit after tax -"6%: return on equity 
Sales turnover 
This is a definition of monopoly profits resulting from exploitation 
of monopoly power, not the existence of such power. It has some 
conceptual defects, quite apart from measurement inconsistencies, 
which may. arise because of diversity of accounting procedures and 
distortions due to company taxation policies and the effects of 
inflation. 
One conceptual weakness is failure to allow for vertical integration. 
This applies also to some of the ratio analysis prescribed by the 
Commission for the E. E. C. concentration studies. Two textile weaving 
firms may have similar sales turnover but if one also spins most of 
its own yarn it may be expected to earn higher profits. This defect 
can be overcome by the replacement of sales turnover in the denominator 
of the Qualls formula by value added. Average "monopoly profits" in 
an industry are then measured by 
(iv) Total net profits after tax -C (total equity capital) Total value added = Net Output) 
C represents the long-run opportunity cost to shareholders; equity 
capital = shareholders' funds, including retained earnings., 
Because of difficulties in definitions of net profit and equity capital, 
greater consistency might be obtained by using gross trading profits on 
the numerator, even though. this fails to adjust for capital intensity. 
This measure was used in a recent study by Hart and Morgan (Ref. 18): - 
(v) Value added - labour costs Value added 
This last formula demonstrates the second defect of the Lerner measure, 
of any ratio derived from it or indeed of any attempt to use profits 
as an indicator of exploitation of monopoly power. A monopolist or 
oligopolist-is also likely to be a monopsonist or oligopsonist. 
Concentration in the product market will often be accompanied by 
concentration in the factor market. Little research appears to have 
been undertaken into the relationship between concentration and wage- 
rates. Phlips (Ref. 19) gives two main reasons for expecting wage-rates 
to be higher in oligopolistic industries - reward for higher productivity 
associated with economies of scale and part of a strategy of protection 
against new competition. A third might be added - the ability of 
organised labour to obtain a share of the "abnormal" profits. Gains 
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from dominance may be divided between shareholders and employees. 
This introduces a third defect of the profit-margin concept: potential 
monopoly profits may be dissipated not only by payment of higher wages 
but also by "discretionary" expenditures by management and by the 
tolerance they provide for managerial inefficiency. Antipathy towards 
high profits among some powerful sections of political opinion may 
encourage "satisficing" policies. Under these, potential profits beyond 
the level required to satisfy shareholders are diverted to expenditures 
on promotion, research, welfare or even prestige. In the United Kingdom 
in 1970s, labour reduction is more difficult for larger than for smaller 
firms, because of the larger absolute numbers involved; part of any 
potential monopoly profits may be transferred to the cost of over- 
manning. 
A fourth defect is perhaps the most obvious and the most important. 
Concentration usually (though not necessarily) implies large plant size 
or large-scale production operations, which may bring economies of 
scale and greater efficiency than would. be possible in a more atomistic 
structure. To return to the Lerner formula, the excess (P > MC) may be 
due not so much to a rise in P through exploitation of monopoly power 
but to a fall in MC through greater efficiency (Phillips, Ref. 20, 
p. 247). The gains from greater efficiency maybe distributed among 
shareholders (profits), employees (higher wages), management (greater 
discretionary expenditure and "slack") and consumers. What represents 
abuse of monopoly power. as opposed to just reward for efficiency becomes 
a matter of value judgement. 
The definition and measurement of power over the market has long 
attracted the attention of economists but the results of these delibera- 
tions leave most issues unresolved. Nowhere in the documentation 
provided by the Commission for the series of concentration studies is 
an attempt made to define dominance. In a paper given to a five-day 
seminar in Bruges in 1977, devoted entirely to E. E. C. competition policy, 
(Ref. 21 ), Schriter made it clear that no dogmatic definition is 
appropriate. Power over the market is perhaps more easy to recognise 
than to define or to measure. 
2. Concentration, Size and Profits - Empirical Studies 
(a) Inter-industry comparisons 
In spite of the conceptual difficulties described in the last sub-section 
plus possible inconsistencies in the financial data used, certain English 
language journals have reported a. remarkably large number of statistical 
investigations into the relationship between concentration and profits. 
Most of these have been on an indust basis, usually on U. S. data and 
referring either to 2-digit or 3-digit classes of the United States 
Standard Industrial Classification, equivalent. ýto Orders and Minimum List Headings of the U. K. classification. 
The method adopted in most of these studies is comparison of average 
profit rates in each industry over a period of time with a number of independent variables including concentration, barriers to entry (or some 
proxy measure) and, in most studies, growth of demand. The statistical 
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technique most generally used is multiple regression with a single 
equation. 
Average profit rates have been measured in various ways: 
net profits plus interest, 'netý rofits, gross profits 
net asse s equity sales turnover 
net profits -6 per cent'of'equity (Ref. 17) and even average. share 
saes turnover price (Ref. 12 )-. 
In most cases the average rate is total profits earned by major 
companies divided by the total denominator. 
Concentration has usually been measured in the American studies by'the 
percentage eoof industry sales accounted for by the four largest companies. 
(C4)" or by the eight largest (C ). Some authors, for example Miller 
(Ref. 22 ), have included both (C4) and (C- CO as explanatory 
variables in their models on the grounds tg hat the ability of the four largest firms to dominate depends on their size in relation to that of 
the next largest group of firms. (This principle is closely connected 
with the Linda index described in Chapter IV of this report. ) 
Barriers to entry were grouped in the pioneering work by Bain (Ref. 11 ) 
and a coon irmatory investigation by Mann (Ref. 23 ) into three classes: 
very high, substantial and moderate to low. The criteria for classifica- 
tion were the ratio of minimum economic plant size to the total market; 
product differentiation and absolute advantages of existing firms. The 
qualitative and discrete nature of this variable is clearly unsatisfac- 
tory and subsequent investigators have tried alternatives including the 
advertising-to-sales ratio (Ref. 24); * average or median plant size 
(Ref. 18 and 25); average size of largest plants accounting for 50 per 
cent of employment (Ref. 26). 
The majority of U. S. studies have shown that concentration has a 
statistically significant but small effect on profit rates. Bain 
(Ref. 11) and Mann (Ref. 23 ) showed that Cg and barriers to entry 
each had an independent effect on profits and that in each case the 
influence occurred only after a threshold level of the independent 
variable had been exceeded. Their results have been challenged by 
other writers and there has been a series of papers, some of them 
remarkably polemical, devoted to the existence or non-existence of 
critical levels of concentration and entry barriers. The results of 
Qualls (Ref. 17 ), Duchesneau (Ref. 27 ) and Dalton and Penn (Ref. 28 ) 
provide stronger statistical proof of the Bain-Mann hypothesis than 
that provided by either of the original authors. 
The results of British studies have been even less conclusive than 
those based on U. S. data. A study by Phillips,.. (Ref. 25) based on 1951 
Census of Production data showed a very weak but statistically signif- icant correlation between gross profit. margi n.. on . sal. es". and. the""three-.... 
* This last variable has also been used as a separate independent 
variable in equations with a different measure of entry-barriers. 
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firm sales concentration ratio, C3. - He used multiple regression 
analysis which also took into account average plant size, as a proxy 
for barrier to entry, advertising to sales ratio, growth of output 
and a number of discrete factors represented by dummy variables. A 
study by Shepherd (Ref. 29 ) related gross margins to capital intensity, 
absolute size of the industry and growth of output as well as C3. The 
influence of the concentration variable was found to be statistically 
insignificant. 
Both of these studies encountered problems of multicollinearity and 
this was also evident in a detailed analysis by Holtermann published 
in 1973 (Ref. 26 ) and also based on the 1963 Census, together with 
Ministry of Labour data on net assets. Analysing gross profit margins 
for 113 industries (Minimum List Headings) Holtermann was able to 
explain 45 per cent of the variance in an equation with the following 
independent variables: C5 (based'on weighted averages of product 
sub-groups), the ratio of net assets to gross output, growth of sales 
1958-63, advertising-to-sales ratio, capital expenditure in 1958 and 
1963 as -a percentage of 1963 sales and a measure of entry barrier based on average size of large plants. Neither concentration nor entry 
barriers emerged as significant influences. Holtermann reported the 
full correlation matrix and although she described multicollinearity 
as low, six of the fifteen coefficients of r were significant at 
the 1% level. Three of the six were between xe53 and one of the other 
variables. 
Although multicöllinearity may have reduced the partial regression 
coefficient between the gross profit margin and C5 (the five-firm 
concentration ratio), Holtermann showed that the other variables in 
total explained only 28 per cent of the variance of CS. She explained 
the statistical insignificance of C5 by weaknesses in data and also a 
number of other factors, some of which are highly relevant to the 
studies of concentration sponsored by the EEC: - 
(i) The 113 MLH industires are defined more according to physical 
similarities of products or similarity of factor inputs than 
homogeneity of end-use. Holtermann referred to the pooling of 
domestic glassware and car windscreens; in the Cranfield study 
of paper conversion (Ref. 1,: p. 3) we referred to cardboard 
boxes and paper handkerchiefs. (This problem is discussed more 
fully in Chapter Two. ); 
(ii) The five-firm concentration ratio is a poor measure of market 
concentration because it disregards asymmetry between market 
shares of leading firms. This leads towards the Linda approach, 
described briefly in Section C below and in greater detail in 
Chapter Four. * 
......... ............................. 
(.............. 
...... ............... ...... .. 
* Holtermann referred to a. measure of concentration by'Mann which' 
reflected'this asymmetry. I could not-find this either in the article by Mann referred to by Holtermann (Ref. 23) or in a number'of other 
papers by this author. 
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(iii) The influence of concentration can be mitigated by availability 
of imports. This is particularly relevant to the paper and 
textile studies, where oligopolistic-structures in the U. K. 
industries do not imply market power, since'imports-of some 
products account for over 50 per cent of U. K. sales. 
(iv) There is no way of identifying how far high profits result from 
efficiency rather than market power or to what degree low profits 
result from protected inefficiency rather than competitive 
pressure. 
When all the conceptual and statistical problems are considered, itis 
remarkable that significant relationships between concentration and 
industry profits have been observed. This means either that the influence of concentrdtion on profits is so strong that it transcends 
all the factors which might obscure it in a statistical study or that 
the results are spurious. The second view was taken by Phillips in 
an article published in 1976 (Ref. 20 ). any of the criticisms he 
presented have been made by other writers and have been summarised 
above but he added a number of new points. He criticised the calcula- 
tion of industry profit ratios by the adding of profits for individual 
firms and then net assets, sales turnover or value added and division 
of the first total by the second. The result is equivalent to an 
average of company profit rates weighted by the dimension used as the 
denominator. This means that greatest weight is attached to the largest firms. Greater size is likely to be associated with greater gross 
profits in relation to sales and, where there are economies of scale, 
to greater net profits also. This identification problem, which I have 
already described on p. 6,. is aggravated by the greater weight given 
to large firms. 
Another of Phillips' criticisms concerns the linear specification of 
the regression equations used in most of the previous studies. For 
example, some authors have tested equations of the form 
Total Profits =a+ b(Sales of largest 4) + c(Average'plant'size) +.. TotlSales `ý"' ( Total sales j( Tots sales 
d(Advertisin 
(oa sales) 
Since total sales appears on the denominator throughout we can express 
this equation as 
Total profits = a(Total sales) + b(Sales of largest 4) + c(Av. plant size) 
+ d(Advertising) 
The likelihood that the coefficients a, b, c and d will be'constant must 
be low. The linearity of the relationship had:: been questioned and 
indeed rejected in other studies; results derived from linear equations 
must be suspect. 
Phillips concluded "Better theory, better data and above all, better 
econometrics are needed before policy can be based on anything other than in-depth studies of particular markets. " (Ref. 20, p. 248) 
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Hart and Morgan conclude their recent study of market structure and 
economic performance (Ref. 18) with a slightly more positive view 
than that of Phillips. Although the familiar problem of multicollinearity 
affects their-results they di'd find, from 1968 Census of Production data 
a significant, though small, correlation between concentration and gross 
profit as a percentage of value added. Because of the doubts about 
identification and specification expressed by Phillips they then used a 
lagged-change model, following earlier work by Cowling and Waterson (Ref. 30). For each industry, the dependent variable was the change 
in gross profit margins between 1963 and 1968 and the independent' 
variable the change in concentration between 1958 and 1963: - 
Log Gross profits) Lo9(Gross rofits 2a+b 
SLog H Log H 
sales )1968 sa es 1963 l 63 58ý 
where H is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for each. industry, explained 
on pages 61-2 below. The coefficient of b was not significant, 
although Cowling and Waterson had derived a marginally significant 
result with a slightly different sample and the use of 1953 to 1963 
as the time-period for concentration increase. 
It is clear that attempts to measure the effects of concentration on 
profits by econometric analysis of industry data face very large 
difficulties - resulting from data unreliability, statistical weaknesses 
and conceptual problems. Hart and Morgan conclude that such attempts 
must continue because, compared with the costly, labour-intensive 
alternative of detailed empirical study, they are very cost-effective. 
They may help us "to distinguish the wood from the trees which may be 
extremely important for purposes of economic policy. " - 
(b) Inter firm comparisons 
Much of the discussion about the desirability of action by public 
authorities to intervene to markets with high seller concentration 
concerns the existence of economies of scale. The advantages of cost- 
reductions achieved through these economies may offset any adverse 
consequences for society of oligopoly or monopoly. 
The inter-industry comparisons of average profits and concentration have 
been criticised because any positive relationship could be the result 
of economies of scale rather than exploitation of market dominance. If 
economies of scale exist at company level, and at the same time large 
companies are more likely to find themselves in positions of market 
dominance then one would expect a positive conrrelation between size 
and rates of profit. 
Previous research into this hypothesis includes that of Hall and Weiss 
(Ref. 31) and Marcus (Ref. 32) for the United., States, Samuels and 
Smyth (Ref. 33) for the United Kingdom. 
Hall and Weiss used data for 1956-62 for 341 of the largest companies 
to check the following hypothesis attributed to Baumol (Ref. 34): - 
Net rofit'after'tax =a+, b + .,, Equity tog (net assets) 
-1', - 
The hypothesis was also tested with net assets as the denominator of 
the dependent variable. Because the 341 companies were in different 
industries, Hall and Weiss included industry variables in their analysis- 
concentration and a weighted average of the growth in each of the 
previous five years of industry output. They also included as an 
independent variable the ratio of equity to total capital employed. All 
their multiple regression equations showed a significant (l%) negative 
value for b. The influence of industry concentration was less certain. 
The relationship between size and profits in the U. S. A. was examined 
by Marcus (Ref. 32 ) in an industry-by-industry comparison over the 
three financial years 1959-60,1960-1 and 1961-2. He used as the 
dependent variable the ratio of (net profits before tax plus interest) 
to total capital employed, which, as he pointed out, avoided variations 
due merely to different debt-equity ratios. He also used data for a 
wider range of firms - he did not confine the analysis to appropriate 
companies among the 500 largest. Another change in his approach, not 
explained in his paper, was the re-specification of Baumol's hypothesis 
by use of the logarithm of net assets instead of the reciprocal of the 
logarithm. The total number of firms included in his analysis appears 
to have been about 960 and these were divided into 118 industries; for 
each industry the number of observations was 3 (years) times the number 
of firms. Because each regression equation related to one industry 
and because the debt-equity ratio could now be omitted, Marcus could 
use simple regression equations. In 35 of the 118 industries he found 
significant positive correlation between profitability and size, in 
nine significant negative correlation and in 74 there was no correlation 
at the 5 per cent significance level. 
These studies appear to have a common statistical weakness. Hall and 
Weiss used data for 341 firms, took six years of data for each and 
treated the sample as one of over 2,000 independent observations. In 
the course of our research on textiles, paper andpublishing this 
approach was considered because it provides an attractive number of 
degrees of freedom! In all three cases I decided that rather than 
include data for individual years, it would be better to use the means 
of each company's rate of profit and size over these years. The 
principal objection to inclusion of observations for m firms in each of n 
years and regarding the mit values as independent is the relative 
consistency of the size variable. For each firm i, (xi - x) is likely 
to have the same sign in eäch. of the n years. Similarly, the distribu- 
tion of the residuals from the regression equation is unlikely to be 
random since a special factor for firm i may be repeated in each of the 
n years. Although the regression coefficients might not be seriously 
affected with a large sample, the implications for standard errors are 
difficult to assess. The number of degrees of freedom for tests of 
significance with k independent variables surely cannot be regarded as 
the usual (mn -k- 1), which is what the authors of both articles have 
assumed. {, ý r 
The doubts expressed in the previous paragraph apply more substantially 
to the work of Marcus than to that of Hall and Weiss because of the 
small samples within his industry groups. There is another statistical 
problem in both studies, the inclusion of the size variable on both 
sides of the regression equation. This problem is discussed on page 13 
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below. The main conclusion to be drawn'from the two American studies 
is that there appears to be'some positive correlation overall between 
size and profitability of American firms but the statistical evidence 
is weaker than it might first appear; correlation between size and 
profitability within industries remains unproven. 
Samue. ls and Smyth (Ref. 33 ) used a sample of 186 companies drawn from 
manufacturing, distribution and mining. This sample was chosen at 
random from companies within each of ten size-groups. For each of the 
ten years 1954-63 the authors calculated the coefficient of rank 
correlation between size group and mean for all firms in that size group 
of (net profits before tax as a percentage of net assets). They carried 
out the same test on the averages over the ten years. Of the eleven 
rank correlation coefficients, two were significant at the ten per cent 
level (including the ten-year average), two at five per cent and four 
at one per cent or lower. All eleven were negative. 
Samuels and Smyth went on to compare variability of profits with company 
size and found a negative relationship - larger firms showed greater 
consistency over time. They also examined the relationship between 
concentration and profit variability and concentration in an industry 
and found again that there was greater constancy in more highly 
concentrated industries. These further conclusions are much less 
surprising than their first. 
Negative correlation between company size and profits is difficult to 
explain, particularly when'it is derived by classification and ranking - 
the possibility that skewness within groups could distort the comparison 
of averages cannot be overlooked. The comparison of net profit before 
tax over net assets with net assets is also questionable because it can 
be distorted by variations in gearing, a point mentioned by Samuels and 
Smyth (Ref. 33, p. 128) but not checked statistically. The problem is 
demonstrated by the following example: - 
fEquity capital 








(3) Net assets 10,000 . 509000 
4 Net profit before tax + interest . 1,000 
5,000 ý ý 
5 Interest payments (8%) 80 ... 
1,200 
(6) Net profit before tax 920 3,800 
4 as % of 3 +ý{ 10.0 10.0 
6 as % of 1 10.22 10.86 
6 as % of 3 9.20. 7.60 
One can argue that Firms A and B have achieved the same return on 
total capital employed; 10 per cent. Firm B has obtained a higher 
return on equity because of its higher debt-equity ratio; Firm A has 
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obtained a. much higher rate of profit according to the Samuels-Smyth 
definition. If larger firms generally have a higher debt to equity 
ratio then this could account for at least part of the negative 
correlation found by these authors. 
The concentration tables for textiles and publishing both show that net 
assets are more concentrated than equity capital, which implies that 
gearing is correlated with size. Without repeating the Samuels-Smyth 
research and including this factor, it is not possible to state how far 
their findings can be attributed to this distortion. 
In the three industries in which sample sizes were sufficiently large - 
paper, textiles and publishing we computed regression equations between 
size and profitability. In no case was there any indication of 
significant correlation. When the results are compared-in chronological 
order: - paper (Ref. 1,. p. 63), textiles (Ref. 2, p. 73) and 
publishing (Ref. 4, p. 22) it appears that diminishing attention was 
devoted to this topic. This is not the case: there was merely a 
declining propensity to describe insignificant results. 
The absence of any statistical correlation in any of our three studies 
is so complete that it cannot be attributed to statistical mis- 
specification. However, the question of specification should not be 
ignored. The previous studies described above used equations of the 
form 
,r=a+ bS it =a+b1 og S and ,r=ab Togs 
(Samuels & Smyth) (Marcus) (Hall and Weiss) 
it = profit 
S= size variable 
The Samuels-Smyth form is the one which we first tested in the course of 




and the test is whether profits are related to the square of the size 
variable, e. g., net assets. 
Marcus' equation becomes 
n= aS + S(b log S) 
and that of Hall and Weiss 
n- aS+"bS 
log 5 
> ý, ' a 
Each of these three hypotheses'is too restrictive., 
r 
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All we really wish to test is whether. '. profit varies other than propor- 
tionately with size, that is whether'dZn differs significantly from M. 
zero over any range of S. One way to do this is to order the observa- 
tions according to S, fit the equation r= "aS and test for the random- 
ness of residuals. My own calculations on the textile and publishing 
data revealed remarkable randomness. 
In considering the absence of a relationship in any of three studies 
it is important to recognise that economies of scale are most frequently 
found at the level of the plant. George Ref. 35, p. 114) and 
Pickering (Ref. 9, p. 45) have suggested that "multi-plant" economies 
of scale, in management, marketing, research and development are 
limited. ' 
Technical economies of scale usually require a threshold level of output 
beyond which there may be few advantages of increased plant size. In 
the textile industry of North-West industry, family businesses continue 
to remain profitable by concentrating on a narrow product range with 
volume just sufficient for least-cost production methods. The risks 
are high, because fixed costs of equipment bear a similar ratio to 
output as those. in larger, more diversified plants, while because of 
specialisation orders show greater fluctuations. Profits are earned 
through the small companies' ability to exploit urgent requirements 
for sub-contract work or urgent customer orders. 
In all three industries in which no correlation between size and profit- 
ability was found, the largest firms have wide product ranges within 
and, in some cases outside the industry. Even when size is linked with 
horizontal integration, as in textile weaving or paper manufacture, the 
large firms continue to operate a large number of comparatively small 
plants. The four largest firms in cotton and man-made fibre weaving 
in 1968 had average establishment size of 239 employees; for the next 
61 largest firms the average size was 189 employees. In paper and 
board manufacture the eight largest firms have average establishment 
size of 567 employees, for the 20 next largest the average was 439, 
(Ref. 50, Table 42a). In publishing the reasons for the absence of a 
size-profitability relationship are more complex: the largest groups 
specialise in the production of large-volume popular newspapers and 
periodicals, sales of which have declined in recent years. This factor, 
combined with well-publicised labour-relations difficulties on the 
part of some of the larger firms, appears to have offset any economies 
. of scale which may exist. 
Besides the doubt regarding the extent of economies of scale in multi- 
plant and diversified firms, the absence of any relationship between 
size and profitability can be explained by the same factors listed above 
(p. 9) in connection with the concept of monopoly profits. These 
include the transfer of part of any gains from size to employees (higher 
wages or overmanning) or to discretionary expenditure by management (promo- 
tion, research, welfare or prestige). It is possible that potential 
gains from size may be partly dissipated in reduced efficiency. Publica- 
tion of high profit figures by large firms may attract the attention of 
government departments (Price Commission or the Department of Fair 
Trading) or of political critics. 
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The main weakness of all the empirical studies into concentration and 
the level of industry profits, or size and company profits appears to 
be the use of profits as the dependent variable. Power over consumers 
in a market might be defined as the long-term excess of consumers' 
expenditure on the product over what that expenditure would be if more 
numerous and/or closer substitutes. were available and if new competitors 
could enter the market more easily. This excess payment might result 
from higher prices or (in the case of deliberately restricted product 
life) from greater volume of purchases. The additional revenue to 
companies could be absorbed in many ways; only a small part of it might 
ultimately be included in "net profits before tax, " as published in 
company accounts. 
The statistical and conceptual difficulties surrounding studies of the 
relationship between profits, concentration and company size are 
well-known. Why then do such studies continue, with very rare method- 
ological improvements? Econometric analysis has almost become a 
diversion away from the problems of measuring the multiple-dimension 
concept of market power. Although case studies and other empirical 
research into existence of market power are more labour-intensive and 
cannot be used for general policy formulation, a critical examination 
of the econometric analysis suggests that its contribution to such 
formulation has been very little. 
C. THE COMMISION'S APPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY 
1. Linda's Perspective on Competition 
The methodology prescribed by the Commission of the European Communities 
for the concentration studies includes the calculation of indices which 
relate particularly to oligopoly. These indices are described in 
Chapter Four. In this section I shall explain the view, which underlies 
this methodological innovation, that analysis of oligopoly requires a 
different approach from that traditionally applied to market structure. 
This view was expressed by Linda in two articles the first published 
in 1967 (Ref. 36 ) and the second in 1972 (Ref. 37 ). Both these 
articles were in French and seem to have attracted comment only in 
French-language circles, at least until 1975. The 1972 article is 
considerably longer: the title is "Oligopolistic Competition and 
International Competition Policy" and the sub-title, "A New Approach 
to Competition and Concentration" demonstrates the author's view that 
his was a major analytical innovation. 
Linda rejected the use of perfect competition as the theoretical 
maximum of competition. The existence of a very large number of equal 
firms producing identical products with no barriers to the entry of 
new competitors precludes major forms of competition - product differentia- 
tion and innovation. Analysis of market structure and behaviour based 
on departures from perfect competition is based on the false assumption 
that perfect competition would be ideal for consumers. However, this 
theoretical situation is inconsistent with economies of scale, with the 
earning of profits to finance product improvement and innovation and 
with the consumer's inability to choose between more than a limited 
- 16 - 
range of substitutes. "The perfect market can only be an oligopolistic 
market" (Ref. 37, p. 344). 
By regarding product differentiation as a competitive strategy Linda 
was, as he acknowledged (Ref. 37, p. 328) adopting a diametrically 
opposite view from that of most other writers in this field. A similar 
contrast of view is to be found in his attitude towards freedom of 
entry. The erection of barriers to the entry of new firms is one of 
the strategies of modern oligopolistic competition (Ref. 37, p. 357). 
The existence of barriers is in some industries a powerful stimulus 
to substitution, innovation and technical progress. Barriers to entry 
need to be seen in a dynamic context, their creation is proof of the 
existence of competitive strategies. 
In his discussion of barriers to entry Linda also questions the theory 
that prices are kept low by oligopolists to dissuade entrants, the 
theory of limit price" or "entry-forestalling price" (Bain, Ref. 11, 
p. 242-5). Linda sees as the major barrier to entry the existence of 
deliberately created excess capacity which can be used by existing 
firms to take advantage of any expansion of the market or to defend 
themselves against new competitors. High prices, required to finance 
excess capacity, may therefore be part of a company's defence against 
the threat of competitors rather than an indication of the absence of 
any threat. 
In his 1972 paper he not only abandoned but reversed the traditional 
criteria for measuring the degree of competition in an industry. The 
traditional view is that competition increases with the number of firms 
in the market; Linda states that oligopoly is a necessary condition 
for many forms of competition. ("Atomistic market structure is not 
to the advantage of competition, nor of those engaged in economic 
activity nor of society. It benefits nobody; it is harmful to all, " 
Ref. 37, p. 342. ) The traditional view is that product differentiation 
represents a departure from competition; Linda sees it as a competitive 
strategy; heterogeneity of products is not an imperfection but a sign 
of competition (p. 328). The traditional view sees barriers to entry 
as a third dimension of restricted competition; Linda sees their 
existence as evidence of, and stimulus to competition. These differences 
from the traditional view may not be so fundamental as they appear (see 
p. 60 below) but they do mean that a new definition of monopoly or of 
absence of competition is required. 
The deployment of oligopolistic strategies will benefit the consumer 
only if they do not lead ultimately to rigidity. There is probably an 
optimal structure in each industry within which competition will be 
greatest. When the structure becomes too concentrated or too atomistic, 
there is a danger of reduced competition and rigidity. "Monopoly" (that 
is the absence of competition) may be recognised, according to Linda by 
absence of change in the market structure (Ref. 37, p. 341-2). His 
system of indices relates to this novel perspective of monopoly and 
competition. 
In designing a statistical description of oligopoly Linda emphasises 
three features: interdependence, inequality and dynamism. The first 
feature is partly determined by the number of large firms; the second 
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depends on their relative sizes and embraces the concept of dominance; 
the third relates to changes in the first two features. Dynamism appears 
to reflect the degree of competition, although the three features are 
interrelated'- some structures lend themselves to dynamism more than 
others. 
2. Some Comments on Linda's Approach to Oligopoly 
It has already been pointed out that seller "concentration" is commonly 
used to describe two different features of market structure - the number 
of firms and the degree of inequality between them. Let us compare two 
different hypothetical industrial structures: (A and B): both have 
the same barriers to entry and in neither is there significant product 
differentiation. In industry A there are 40 firms of equal size and in 
industry B four, also of equal size. How is competition likely to vary 
between these industries? 
The principal difference between A and B is the greater degree of 
interdependence in B. The consequences of this and the associated 
theories of oligopolistic behaviour have been widely discussed 
(Pickering, Ref. 9, Chapter 14 provides a comprehensive survey of 
the discussion). Before taking any action which might affect its 
market share, a firm in B must consider the reaction of its competitors. 
If it took action which would increase its share of the market by half, 
from 25 to 37.5 per cent, then its competitors must lose on average 
one-sixth of their market share - from 25 to 20.83 per cent. If all 
four firms are of equal size and equal resources and all have excess 
capacity then such action by any single firm is unlikely. If it were 
to occur then competitors could well follow suit, market shares would 
be the same as before but all would be incurring the costs of the 
strategy adopted by the initiator. 
This reasoning is best known in the form of the kinked demand curve 
hypothesis, used to explain absence of price competition under oligopoly. 
The equilibrium of the kinked demand model is an unstable one with 
respect to downward price changes under conditions of excess capacity. 
Once price wars begin they can be difficult to terminate without a 
formal agreement which, with anti-cartel legislation and more public 
vigilance about price agreements, may be hard to enforce. A good 
example of this is currently observed in the retail petrol market. 
Because this danger is obvious, a firm is likely to initiate price- 
cutting only if it believes that it has some advantage over its 
competitors - in costs, available capacity or long-term resources. 
Although the kinked demand curve is usually applied to price an analogous 
relationship can be applied to any other competitive strategy. Expend- 
iture on advertising or sales promotion, introduction of improvements 
in product design or quality, vertical integration via acquisition of 
outlets or supplies - each of these is subject to the kind of relation- 
ship represented by the kinked demand curve. 
The tyres report (Ref. 3) illustrates some aspects of this, though 
the example is not archetypical because the firms are not equal. 
Advertising of tyres by'all companies fell sharply between 1973 and 1974, 
but Dunlop more than doubled its advertising expenditure in 1975. This 
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was followed (Ref. 3, p. 34) by an increase on the part of all but 
one competitor; the exception was a firm in apparent financial dif- 
ficulties. Again in tyres, there is no doubt that the consumer has 
gained from the product improvements of recent years, including much 
greater length of life. This has undoubtedly been stimulated by 
oligopolistic competition; in the report on tyres (Ref. 3, p. 33) 
attention is drawn to the call by one of the largest firms for 
curtailment of research into longer tyre life. This plea for an 
armistice in the product-improvement war is equivalent to a plea 
for no further movement down the kinked demand curve. 
There is a close link between the kinked demand hypothesis and Linda's 
analytical framework, which takes into account interdependence, 
inequality and dynamism. The greater the degree of interdependence, 
then the greater will be the pressure on other firms to follow a 
competitive action adopted by any of the oligopolists; the greater 
therefore will be the degree of deterrence against competitive actions. 
Let us consider an industry with a captive total market and virtually 
prohibitive barriers to entry. If (i) each of the very small number 
of firms is absolutely equal in every respect - shares in this particular 
market, total size an resources, profitability, access to customers, 
access to equally good advice on product design, production and 
distribution technology and marketing and (ii) each pursues the same 
objective or set of objectives, then one would expect competitive 
action to diminish towards zero as the number of competitors approached 
two. Even in the absence of collusion, which is itself facilitated 
and stimulated by the existence of fewer firms, one would expect 
rigidity. "The inequality of the firms and the diversity of their 
motives, their environment and their level of information ... (inter-alia) 
... are the most powerful stimulant of competition. " (Linda, Ref. 
37 , 
p. 328). 
Few students of oligopoly would disagree that the nature and intensity 
of competition between the firms is influenced by their number (and 
therefore interdependence) and relative strengths. However, all firms 
do not have the same objectives. Although different industrial structures 
imply, with assumptions of profit or sales-maximisation, greater 
likelihood of particular forms of competition, actual behaviour in the 
market depends upon human decisions. These may not be consistent with 
objectives presumed by external observers. 
One controversial aspect of Linda's analysis of oligopolistic structure 
is the minor role he assigns to the smaller firms which form the "fringes" 
of an industry. He appears to view them as existing only on the 
sufferance of the large enterprises who, besides having recourse to 
acquisition or merger, can often control small firms by the effective 
use of sub-contracting, (Ref. 37, p. 353), Utton (Ref. 38, p. 70) 
is among those who see small firms as having a disproportionate 
influence on the character of competition in oligopolistic industries. 
The retreading companies in the tyre industry (Ref. 3, p. 29-31) appear 
to confirm Linda's view but the low-price battery producers continue 
to compete with and influence the policies of the largest firms (Ref. 3, 
pp. 90 and 97). Unlike batteries, tyres are seen as a "concern" product 
and product differentiation by the large firms is more effective. 
- 19 - 
Although the relationship may not be as close as he appears to suggest, 
Linda might find widespread agreement that interdependence of and 
inequality between firms are the major influences on competitive 
behaviour in an oligopoly. The notion that the degree of competitive 
behaviour can be measured by changes in-structure is open to doubt. 
Such changes can be taken as a priori evidence that competition has 
taken place but near-rigidity does not imply absence of competition; it 
may reflect mutually offsetting competitive strategies. Even a 
prolonged price war could leave market shares little changed if reaction 
by competitors were sufficiently fast. The changes in shares of the 
U. K. replacement tyre market have been gradual (Ref. 3, p. 37) but 
there has been no absence of competition. Heavy advertising by 
manufacturers and their distributive subsidiaries, price cutting at 
the retail level, competitive product improvement - all contributed to 
intense competition. Market shares changed only slightly because these 
competitive actions were pursued by all the major firms and compensated 
for each other. 
There are two other aspects of oligopolistic behaviour which Linda 
referred to in his 1972 paper (Ref. 37, Part III) as important for 
society but which are not reflected in measures of interdependence, 
inequality and dynamism. The first concerns the form-of competition. 
Whereas society may benefit from certain forms of oligopolistic 
competition such as genuine product improvements or better distribution, 
there may be a net loss from waste of resources on minor product 
embellishments or heavy mutually-compensating sales promotion. 
Provision of information about the forms of competition does not form 
a major part of the statistical investigations required for Commission's 
concentration studies. Although the terms of reference for each study 
refer to the forms of competition, this aspect is not discussed in 
detail in the Commission's published methodology (Ref. 39). 
The second aspect, not necessarily covered by analysisof interdependence, 
inequaltiy and dynamism in oligopoly is degree of collusion. This may 
be effected not through agreements but through common decisions to use 
the same signals for changes in policy. The most easily recognised 
example is price leadership, which usually occurs where firms are 
unequal in size. The leadership of Dunlop still exists in principle 
in the tyre industry but abolition of resale price maintenance and 
widespread discounts make this difficult to detect. Barometric pricing, 
where some external factor is used as a signal, is found in certain 
industries. Interdependence, particularly when the combined market 
is fairly captive, implies likelihood of collusion but search for 
evidence of collusion as such receives comparatively little emphasis 
in the Commission's recommended methodology. 
How far apart are Linda's approach to the analysis of monopoly and 
competition and the more traditional approach described in Section B? 
The differences clearly necessitate his new definition of absence of 
competition ("monopoly") but do not represent a complete break with 
previous thinking. The argument concerning the relevance of perfect 
competition to analysis of a world in which oligopoly predominates is 
familiar. As long ago as 1947 K. W. Rothschild wrote that attempts 
to analyse oligopoly "have been hampered by being too much influenced 
by the models of perfect and monopolistic competition and pure monopoly. 
- 20 - 
Yet neither of these theories can be expected to form a sound basis for the study of duopoly and oligopoly prices. " (Ref. 40, p. 24) 
Rothschild went on to recommend that a new methodological framework 
for analysis of oligopoly based on analogy. with military warfare. 
He quoted a number of other authors with the same view. Numerous 
writers have urged the application to oligopolistic behaviour the 
analysis of military strategy, of games theory and the psychology 
of conflict. These concepts are not far removed from Linda's use 
of wrestling terminology, following the analogy used by F. Perroux 
(Ref. 41). ' 
The argument that an atomistic industrial structure would not be 
ideal even if it were possible has also been frequently advanced. 
For many years, economics students have read Schumpeter's view that- 
the existence of oligopoly and even short-term monopoly not only 
leads to economies of scale but also encourages technical progress and 
expansion (Ref. 42, pp. 40-66). Commenting on this view in 1969 
Hunter (Ref. 43, p. 69) stated: "Economists are properly appreciative 
of economies of scale and the importance of adequate finance for 
technological research and economic innovation but they are equally 
aware of the dangers of foreclosure of entry into an industry, and 
of arbitrary pricing, the empire-building propensities of businessmen 
and the risk of simple stagnation where no competition is there to 
stimulate. " 
The words in-italics show close affinity to Linda's concept of 
dynamism: within oligopoly there is a danger of rigidity. The 
policies pursued by firms to try to establish a protected position 
form part of the competitive process. Attempts at product differentia- 
tion can lead to competitive quality improvements; certain actions 
to prevent entry can similarly benefit the consumer in the short 
term and can stimulate search for substitutes and product development. 
However, if such policies are effective in creation of long-term 
protection than competition will disappear, technical progress may 
e retarded and prices may be higher than under more competitive 
conditions. Linda's concept of dynamism brings his approach closer 
to that of the more traditional micro-economist. 
For the purpose of analysing oligopoly industries, Linda's approach 
is seen by some as more relevant than those which start from the 
premiss of perfect competition. (See for example Morvan in Ref. 44, 
p. 188-192 and de Bandt in Ref. 45, p. 44-461. In my view it 
represents a step forward from the conceptual y ill-founded and 
rather sterile studies of the relationship between concentration 
and profits described in the previous section. It may be viewed as 
an attempt to bring into the study of concentration some of the 
concepts of those who find the traditional continuum from perfect 
competition to monopoly (a continuum with several dimensions) 
irrelevant to analysis of oligopoly. However, as I have attempted 
to show, indices of interdependence, inequality and dynamism may be 
insufficient to describe behaviour in an oligopolistic industry. 
Not all of the aspects of oligopoly which demand the attention of 
bodies like the Commission's Directorate General for Competition 
will be revealed by summary statistical indices. We shall return 
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to the indices and their limitations in Chapter Four. Here, it is 
important to emphasise the dangers of trying to summarise complex 
industrial structure and behaviour in one or two statistical measures. 
In heading for such dangers, designers of new indices are following 
a well-trodden path. 
D. AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION - DOES IT RECEIVE SUFFICIENT ATTENTION? 
Before leaving the wider issues surrounding concentration studies, we 
should recognise that, in adopting a "sectoral" approach to concentra- 
tion the Commission is reducing the emphasis on aggregate concentration - 
the increasing share of total economic activity accounted for by a 
limited number of conglomerate groups. In his 1972 article (Ref. 37), 
Linda referred frequently to the importance of these large diversified 
often multinational groups whose power in society threatens to 
outstrip that of governments. Emphasis on studies in individual 
industries means that this wider "aspect" receives less attention. 
One reason for this may be a shortage of aggregated statistical data 
in other E. E. C. countries. One of the papers prepared for the 1967 
committee of experts, by Phlips (Ref. 19) was devoted to problems of 
quantifying aggregate concentration. In the United Kingdom, data 
are available and they reveal increasing aggregate concentration over 
time. Recent work by Prais, (Ref. 46), based on Censuses of 
Production showed that the share of total net output in manufacturing 
accounted for by the 100 largest companies rose from 22 per cent in 
1949 to 41 per cent in 1968 (a later figure for 1970 is not strictly 
comparable). Further analysis of the 1968 Census data reveals that 
the 38 largest firms, with over 20,000 employees accounted for 
nearly 29 per cent of all value added in manufacturing in this country. 
These 38 include some of the largest companies in the industries 
covered by the Cranfield studies for the E. E. C. and also the parents 
of some of the smaller units. 
Diversification tends to cut across market structure. Concentration 
ratios or indices of inequality based on single-industry figures no 
longer reflect concentration or inequality of strength. Diversified 
companies can adopt competitive strategies based on the possibility 
of cross-subsidisation. Empirical studies show, not surprisingly, 
that profits are stabilised by diversification and some studies also 
show that the average level of profits is increased - for example 
Morvan (Ref. 44), R. A. Miller (Ref. 47). In his April 1972 
paper (Ref. 35) George outlined the substantial effects of diversifica- 
tion on power over the market and warned of the dangers of insufficient 
attention on the part of anti-trust authorities to the formation of 
conglomerates. 
Our own studies suggest that the conglomerate enterprise may 
occasionally find its facility for cross-subsidisation a disadvantage. 
In textiles and in publishing, the availability of funds from other 
sources has prevented the implementation of labour-saving measures. 
Yet on balance the very large firm with activities in many industries 
must have advantages over its more specialist competitors in each. 
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Aggregate concentration is also of great interest to political 
economists. The greater the degree of overall concentration, the 
fewer the individuals with which governments have to treat in order 
to exercise economic policy. Conformity may be easier to enforce 
until the enterprises become so large and their international activities 
spread so widely that governments can no longer control them. 
Without evaluation of aggregate concentration, the Commission can 
obtain neither a complete understanding of competitive strengths 
in individual industries nor a comprehensive picutre of the economic 
power of major international groups within the Community. 
E.. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission's interest in concentration is derived from its 
responsibility to identify and check the abuses of dominant positions 
by undertakings within the Common Market, in so far as these affect 
trade between member countries. The major purpose of the series of 
concentration studies is the collection and analysis of facts. 
Concentration is only one aspect of dominance or power over a market; 
other elements include product differentiation, barriers to entry of 
new competitors and collusion between firms. These elements are 
closely interrelated and it is impossible to combine them in a single 
measure. Attempts to measure dominance by reference to monopoly 
profits are unsatisfactory, because the effects of dominance may be 
reflected in profits only to a slight degree. 
Econometric investigations into the relationship between concentration 
or size and profitability have been numerous. Their value is reduced 
by problems of data consistency and doubt about the validity of the 
statistical methods applied. The weak statistical conclusions of 
most of these models may be attributed to the unreal nature of the 
hypothesis which they have tested. Concentration may be an important 
component of dominance but the gains from dominance may be absorbed 
in higher labour costs, greater discretionary expenditure by management 
or by inefficiency and "slack. " 
A major part of the methodology prescribed by the Commission represents 
a break from the traditional view of market imperfections. The new 
indices introduced by Dr. Linda, the director of the Commission's 
research into market structures, are designed for analysis of oligopoly. 
They measure interdependence, inequality and dynamism. Monopoly power 
or dominance is defined by rigidity of the oligopolistic structure. 
In rejecting the view that monopoly power should not be measured in 
terms of departure from the atomistic structure of perfect competition, 
Linda is following a fairly well-trodden route. His measures of 
interdependence, inequality and dynamism cannot reflect the full range 
of oligopolistic behaviour. Excessive reliance upon them might leave 
the Commission unaware of certain aspects of that behaviour which 
might be against public interest. 
Because of the decision to collect and analyse data on a "sectoral" or industry-by-industry basis, the methodology of the Commissions pays 
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insufficient attention to aggregate concentration and the power of 
large conglomerate undertakings. Their size and diversity of interests 
enhances their competitive strength compared with that of specialist 
producers in any single industry. Aggregate concentration is also of 
macroeconomic interest: it may increase a government's ability to 
intervene but when international companies become very important in 
any single country, the government of that country may find it much 
harder to control the economy. 
The relationship between concentration and abuse of dominance is not 
simple. Its existence cannot be disproved by the econometric work 
which has adopted naive hypotheses and tested them with inadequate 
single-equation regression models, Analysis of concentration and 
identification of possible areas of dominance remains a logical first 
step in a search for abuses of monopoly power by a body with respon- 
sibility to find and check such abuses. It is important that sectors, 
variables, and "firms" should be appropriately and consistently defined. 
The measures of concentration should also be appropriate for identifica- 
tion of industries or markets where abuse of dominance is most likely 
to be found. 
- 24 - 
CHAPTER TWO: DEFINITION OF SECTORS-; UNITS AND VARIANCES 
A. DEFINITION OF SECTORS: CONCENTRATION WITHIN WHAT? 
Theoretical Background 
For concentration measures to have any meaning it is important to 
define appropriately the sector of economic activity in which the 
degree of concentration is examined. The basis of definition should 
vary according to the purposes of the research. For example if one 
were interested in concentration among employers of a particular type 
of labour or among purchasers of a raw material then the sector would 
be best defined according to technical or physical criteria. Where 
the interest is in market dominance, the appropriate criterion is 
partly related to the end-use of the product. The appropriateness of 
various classification criteria for different research purposes was 
discussed by de Bandt (Ref. 45 , pp. 16-20). He concluded that 
for 
determination of market power the basis of classification should be 
homogeneity of product, "considered as a means of satisfying needs. " 
Holtermann wrote "in theoretical terms an industry is a group of 
firms producing a single commodity or ones that are close substitutes 
in consumption. " (Ref. 26 , p. 122). 
The definition of an industry in terms of cross-elasticities of demand 
has a long history. Some theorists such as Triffin (Ref. 14 ) have 
questioned the concept of industry because every product is to some 
extent competing with every other for the consumer's expenditure and 
the degree of substitutability is a matter of degree, measured by a 
panopoly of cross-elasticities of demand. Others have argued that an 
industry might be defined in terms of discontinuities in cross- 
elasticity relationships - products of the industry should be much 
closer substitutes for each other than for any products outside the 
industry. The view that commonsense will enable us to define a 
market in these terms was implied by Adelman (Ref. 48 ) who deplored 
the "fatuous over-elaboration" of the market concept. 
A paper presented to the 1977 Bruges seminar on E. E. C. competition 
policy by de Jong (Ref. 49 ) questioned the cross-elasticity of 
demand criterion for definition of the sector in which concentration 
is examined. He raised a question of principle, in addition to the 
usual objection about the practical impossibility of measurement. In 
definition of an industry as firms in competition with each other, 
we should consider cross-elasticity not only of demand but also of 
supply. 
De Jong's argument is illustrated by a continuation of the above 
quotation from Holtermann (Ref. 26, p. 122): "A very broadly defined 
industry like textiles will include many commodities not substitutable 
at all. For this reason the results of testing the hypotheses (about 
concentration and profits) at this level of aggregation would be 
expected to be weak. " The general principle of Holtermann's argument 
is widely recognised and supports the comments in the first of the 
Cranfield reports for the E. E. C. (Ref. 1, p. 3). The example, 
textiles, is inappropriate. A textile firm can use the same machinery 
and skills to make products to meet a wide range of end-uses. In this 
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industry it is more meaningful to group products by homogeneity of 
manufacturing methods than of end-use. This means that divisions 
within textiles are important but, they are based on supply flexibil- 
ity - not on proximity of end-uses. Even so the cross-elasticity of 
demand remains highly relevant to the study of individual markets - the demand for textile handkerchiefs, and towels is related to that for 
paper substitutes. 
........ .................................. 2. 'The Practice-Adopted'by'the'Cömmission 
Like most other studies of concentration the sectors chosen by the 
Commission are generally defined by the equivalent of the British and 
U. S. Standard Industrial Classification - the Nomenclature Industrielle de la CommunauteEuropeene (NICE), which was recently replaced by the 
Nomenclature d'Activites dans la Communaute Europeene (NACE). 
The first of the Cranfield studies covered NICE categories 271 and 272 
exactly equivalent to Minimum List Headings 481 to 484 of the Standard 
Industrial Classification, covering the manufacture and conversion of 
paper and board. The second study covered the spinning and weaving 
of wool (NICE 232, SIC 414); spinning and weaving of cotton and of man- 
made fibres on the cotton system (NICE 232, SIC 412 and 413 except that 
the SIC classes also include linen) and hosiery and knitted goods (NICE 
233, SIC 417). The fourth of our studies covered the press and other 
publishing (SIC 485,486 and part of 489). Both the NICE and the ' 
Standard Industrial Classification are based essentially on production 
rather than end-use characteristics. 
It may be observed that the third of our studies was not related to an 
industrial sector as defined by NICE. Three individual products were 
chosen - tyres, sparking plugs and accumulators for motor vehicles. This was because of a particular interest on the part of specialists 
within the Commission in these product markets. 
The problems of aggregation are of course recognised by the Commission. 
In his 1972 article Linda defined a market as being "constituted by a 
group of relatively distinct products which are suitable for more or 
less the same basic uses. " (Ref. 37, p. 339). The prescribed 
Methodology of Concentration Analysis, published in 1976 (Ref. 39, p. 77) 
repeats the emphasis of earlier documents on the need to supplement 
industry studies with analysis of markets within them. The requirement 
to measure and study the consequences of concentration at the industry 
level is derived partly from an absence of data from any source about 
product markets, especially in the case of financial variables (ibid, 
p. 78). Another reason is that concentration relates to undertakings 
and the industry represents the common enviroment in which similar 
undertakings operate. Concentration analysis must approach the causes 
and effects of concentration; analysis at the industry level is 
essential to this (ibid, p. 96). 
Some doubt must surround the view that an industry represents a common 
environment because some quite large firms do not compete with each. 
other to any significant degree but happen to be classified to the 
same industry. For example the Tilling subsidiary, Pretty Polly, derives 
most of its turnover from sale of women's nylon tights. It is included 
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in the textile sample but in no sense can be seen as a competitor of 
Dunlop Textiles which produces a large volume of tyre Fabrics, or of 
some of the large Yorkshire worsted producers. In the publishing 
industry, as I pointed out in our fourth report (Ref. 4, p. 18) only 
four of the 61 largest firms had significant sales of both books and 
newspapers and within these four firms the activities were undertaken 
by completely separate subsidiaries. In these cases, cross-elasticities 
of supply are also very Tow: the required technology and expertise are 
completely different. 
Although one may thus criticise the resort to conventional industrial 
classifications for the study of concentration, in practice the use of 
these classifications in published background data dictates this policy. 
In most cases they contain undertakings with recognisable affinities - 
either via demand or supply factors. The Commission have throughout. the 
Cranfield studies insisted on the study of product markets as well as 
analysis of industry figures. It is important to remember the basis of 
classification when interpreting concentration ratios but otherwise the 
three-digit industrial classification is probably the best available 
system for studies of this kind. 
3. The effect of narrower definition on concentration and its 
signi icance 
One of the best recent expositions of this topic is that by de Bandt, 
which unfortunately lies hidden in a French pamphlet unavailable in this 
country (Ref. 45 , pp. 14-23). * De Bandt stated that a priori the degree of concentration increases with the degree of homogeneity imposed 
for purposes of definition but at the same time the significance of the 
concentration for power over the market diminishes, because substitution 
from outside the group increases. The increased degree of homogeneity 
also reduces the size of the sample of firms and may make it more 
difficult to derive statistically meaningful results. 
De Bandt went on to show through hypothetical examples that the degree 
of concentration can be greater in the total sector than in the sub- 
sectors. From an unpublished paper of 1950 entitled "Is concentration 
greater the finer the product classification? " de Bandt quoted 
Herfindahl as stating "The common assertion that concentration is 
greater for separate products must be true only if reversals are 
sufficiently numerous. " (Ref. 45 , p. 22). ** 
From further quotations by de Bandt it is possible to obtain a 
definition of "reversal" which is perhaps best explained symbolically: 
Let xi and xq = value of sales of product X by firms i and j 
yi and yj = value of sales of product Y by firms i and j 
Reversal means that xi > xi but yi < yj. 
*A copy was borrowed from Nanterre and a photocopy can be supplied to 
the examiners. 
** Words are my translation from de 3andt, not necessarily Herfindahl's 
own English original. 
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If (xi xj) > (yj y1) but 2(yß y1) then 
xi" yj 'Xi + yi 
xi +xi yl+yi x1+Ai+y1+yj 
The industries which were the subject of our own investigations may be 
used to illustrate the effects of narrowing of the base for concentration 
measurement. 
(a) Paper 
Although this study included a detailed analysis of product groups, 
certain of the criteria used for classification now appear to have 
been unsatisfactory. (This is discussed on p. 31 below). More 
meaningful information (though not conveniently presented) can be 
obtained from the 1968 Census of Production. 
In the manufacture of paper and board the eight largest enterprises 
accounted for 53.6 per cent of employment an presumably a similar 
proportion of sales turnover). The five-firm concentration ratios for 
four different categories of paper were all higher than this. 
For converted paper products, five-firm sales-concentration ratios 
varied from 89.7 per cent in the case of wallpaper to 38.7 per cent 
for cardboard boxes and only 32.2 per cent for manufactured stationery. 
On the evidence of our own figures (Ref. 2) it would appear that 
the five-firm concentration ratio for paper conversion was between 
50 and 60 per cent. 
(b) Textiles 
By combining the results of our textile study with Census data, it is 
possible to show four-firm concentration ratios in the three sub-sectors 
investigated and in the combination of the three. In this industry, 
the importance of the large oligopolists with interests throughout 
textiles is evident in the combined figure, although it is partly 
understated by the exclusion from our survey of man-made fibre 
production (ICI and Courtaulds) and the fact that concentration ratios 
do not reflect minority shareholdings between firms (p. 34-5 below). 
Table II-1 Four-firm Concentration Ratios in Textiles 1968 and 1973 
of all sales revenue as reported by Business Statistics Office 
1968 1973 
t4oollen and worsted 20 27 
Cotton etc. spinning and weaving 41 47 
Hosiery and knitwear 42 . 
47 
Three sub-sectors combined 34 41 
Sources: Ref. 50, Tables 14 and 21 
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In the textiles case it should be noted that the sub-sectors as 
defined by the British Standard Industrial Classification and the 
Nomenclature Industrielle de la Communaute Europdene both follow a 
historical distinction between cotton and wool which has now become 
arbitrary. In Table 6 of the textile report (Ref. 2) it is shown 
that in 1968 over 54 per cent of fibre used in the U. K. textile 
industry was man-made and by 1973 this proportion had risen to 70 
per cent. The traditional boundaries between cotton and wool remain 
but the distinction has become more one of geography and conventional 
trading affinity rather than production methods or differentiation of 
end-use of product. 
(c) Publishing 
This is another sector in which breakdown into more narrowly defined 
product markets does not consistently increase the degree of concentra- 
tion. Only four companies have significant interests in both the Press 
and the publishing of books. Three of these four are the largest three 
companies in the industry. For this reason the four-firm concentration 
ratio in 1975 was higher for publishing as a whole than for the Press. 
At lower levels of aggregation the degree of concentration changes 
again. The figures in Table III-2 are again based on combination of 
our data for individual firms with aggregate information published for 
each sub-sector. 
Table 11-2 Four-firm concentration ratios 1975 
Variable % 
ALL PUBLISHING Sales revenue, inc. 48 
advertising 
PRESS - Sales revenue, inc. 45 
advertising 
PERIODICAL SALES Retail sales value 53 
NEWSPAPERS Total copies sold per week 60 
(U. K. ) al 
Regional circulation 
London and S. E. Total copies sold per week 67 
Wales and S. W. Total copies sold per week 70 
Midlands Total copies sold per week 68 
North-West Total copies sold per week 58 
North and N. E. Total copies sold per week 60 
Scotland Total copies sold per week 69 
SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS Retail sales value 46 
(1976-7) (based on direct 
survey) 
The results of our own studies show that although more narrow definition 
does tend to increase concentration, the existence of large groups with 
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interests in most sections of an industry can result in exceptions to 
this general tendency. 
4. The importance of'foreign trade 
Most of the statistically significant measures of the influence of 
concentration have been derived from United States studies (see 
Chapter One). Researchers into this subject in the United Kingdom 
e. g., Koltermann (Ref. 26, p. 137) have pointed out that, because 
concentration ratios derived from sales turnover of domestic firms 
ignore imports, correlation with economic performance is much less 
likely in a country with relatively important foreign trade. Hart 
and Morgan (Ref. 18) did not find that the ratio of imports to 
domestically produced sales significantly affected profitability when 
this was included in an equation with the concentration ratio as 
another independent variable. This finding which the authors do not 
explain but describe as "surprising" could be due to their use of a 
single regression equation. In any given situation of market demand, 
profits of domestic firms might be negatively correlated with imports. 
However, if some importers concentrate on those segments of the market 
where profits are to be earned, this will lead to a weakening of the 
negative correlation. In simpler terms, imports may depress profits 
but profits attract imports; the absence of correlation reflects these 
compensating influences. 
The documentation supplied by the Commission to research institutes 
participating in this series of E. E. C. studies makes little reference 
to imports, though they are required to be included in the field- 
research projects now being undertaken in connection with product 
markets (Ref. 39, p. 78). A good deal of information about imports 
was included in our report on vehicle accessories and the concentration 
ratios relating to market share for sparking plugs and batteries included 
imports. This is exceptional: treatment of imports as though they were 
from one firm can clearly distort concentration indices when imports 
account for a substantial proportion of the market. 
In two of the three complete industries studied, paper and textiles, 
foreign trade was so significant that proportions of U. K. industry 
turnover could not even approximately reflect market share. In 1972 
only 250 billion tonnes of paper were exported (5.8 per cent of U. K. 
output) but 3050 billion tonnes were imported, equivalent to 43 per cent 
of U. K. paper consumption (Ref. 1, p. 29). Textiles and clothing 
combined have a comparatively small net trading deficit (Ref. 2, 
pp. 12-14) but exports and imports are large in relation to domestic 
production. Table 3 of the textiles report shows that 55 per cent of 
U. K. domestic purchases of woven cotton fabrics and 42 per cent of those 
woven from man-made fibres are imported; for made-up clothing the 
proportion is 20 per cent and for hosiery and knitwear 27 per cent. 
Because of imports at intermediate levels (e. g., of foreign yarn for 
U. K. knitting factories), a better indication of their significance may 
be given by the ratio of the weight of imported man-made fibre to that 
of all man-made fibre incorporated in textile products sold in this 
country. In 1974 this ratio was 52 per cent. 
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When imports reach this level of penetration, the interpretation of 
concentration ratios which ignore them is difficult. Such ratios may 
indicate relative power within the industry or sub-sector but how can 
they relate to dominance of the market? How can oligopolies of the 
kind formed in the textile industry, partly through the action of fibre 
producers eager to safeguard their markets, be compared with similar 
structures in industries where import penetration is low, as in the 
national Press? This is a basic defect in the definition of the 
sector in which concentration is examined. Concentration in the 
total supply of the products of an industry is much more difficult 
to measure than that of domestic production but is surely more 
pertinent to the identification of dominance, which must be the 
ultimate objective of these studies. 
B. DEFINITION OF UNITS OF CONCENTRATION (ENTERPRISES) 
1. The 1976 Guidelines of the Commission 
Two of the most difficult problems encountered in the E. E. C. studies 
concerned the definition of an independent unit and the criteria for 
a firm's inclusion in an industry sample. Precise guidelines were 
not laid down by the Commission for the paper study and although 
greater guidance was given for the subsequent studies difficulties 
remain, apparently because British law relating to the disclosure of 
company information differs from that in certain older member countries 
of the E. E. C. 
The guidelines were set out in 1976 in "Methodology of Concentration 
Analysis... " (Ref. 39 , pp. 10-11). * Units are specified at three levels: - 
(a) Group of enterprises: - "is an association of enterprises held 
together by legal and/or financial arrangements such as holding 
companies, cartels, consortia etc. The group may comprise more 
than one source of decision-making - particularly as regards 
policy on production, sales, profits etc. It can bring together 
certain aspects of financial management and taxation matters. 
(b) The enter rise: - "is a legally-defined organisation which 
(a) has its own balance sheet, (b) is subject to a directing 
authority (which may be either a natural or a legal person) and 
(c) has been formed to carry on in one or more places one or more 
activities for the production of goods and services. " 
(c) The "kind-of-activit units (KAU)": - which we have called EAU** - 
"those enterprises or part thereof (whether spatially separated 
* The quotations are taken from the official English language version. 
** We used the French language documentation before the official English 
translation. We translated "Unite d'activite economique" as "economic 
activity unit. " The official translation, though linguistically 
unpleasant, probably has more meaning. 
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or not) that carry on a single activity which is characterized by 
the nature of the goods and services produced or by the essential 
identity of the production process employed, this activity being 
defined in terms of a standard classification of activities. " 
There is a difficulty in the U. K. in distinguishing between (a) and 
(b). Where a company has a controlling (50% +) interest in another 
the accounts of the controlled subsidiary are usually consolidated 
into those of the parent, payment to minority interests being deducted 
from profit after tax. Sales turnover of the subsidiary, excluding 
sales to other companies owned by the parent, is included with that 
of the parent. Where ownership is less than 500 consolidation does 
not occur. Sales turnover is not aggregated. For all practical 
purposes it is impossible to combine data for groups of enterprises 
where these groups do not involve majority shareholdings. 
The methodology of the Commission as set out in 1976 (Ref. 39) calls 
for "two distinct econometric calculations. " The first is based on 
the enterprise and includes values of variables relating to all 
activities of the enterprises included in the sample. The crTerion 
for inclusion is that at least 50 per cent of the total turnover of 
the enterprise must be derived from operations within the specified 
industry. The second is based on activity units and includes data 
on operations within the industry and within the country. Any 
enterprise with significant operations within the industry is included, 
even if its main activities lie outside. The distinction will be made 
clearer with the description of how the two sets of criteria affected 
the composition of our samples for the textiles and publishing studies. 
2. The Paper Industry/ Study 
Partly because of communication difficulties and partly because the 
Commission's methodology was still evolving, the first of our four 
studies conformed with neither the enterprise nor the activity unit 
approaches, as now defined. We were asked by the Commission to regard 
the enterprise as the unit which produces its own balance sheet. This 
meant that if a conglomerate company produced separate accounts for 
subsidiaries engaged in different activities, these accounts were used 
for data purposes. In some cases where this policy was not followed 
by the company then the smallest "enterprise" for which a balance 
sheet was produced might encompass a number of activities and if over 
50 per cent of turnover was outside paper manufacture or conversion, 
the firm was omitted. 
The procedure adopted for the paper industry study differed from that 
subsequently followed (in line with the methodology described above) in 
three ways: - 
(a) Only the paper-making or paper-conversion activities of the large 
groups were included, although the approach was ostensibly at the 
enterprise level. Estimates were made for certain variables which 
were not broken down into different activities. Because of the 
use of subsidiary accounts some intra-group sales were inevitably 
double-counted although we tried to exclude these and were helped 
in this respect by some of the companies. 
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(b) Paper-making activities of some firms which did not publish 
subsidiary accounts were excluded completely from our analysis. 
We were well aware of the defects in our sample and data construction 
(Ref. 1, pp. 7-10). Similar difficulties were met by some of the 
other researchers working for the Commission at that time. Development 
Analysts Ltd., (Evely, Hart, Prams et al) devoted three pages of their 
report on the Food Industry (Ref. 51, pp. 101-3) to difficulties in. 
sample construction and possible distortions which resulted from 
ad hoc decisions. They used essentially an enterprise approach 
adhering to consolidated accounts but had to depart from this in the 
case of Unilever and admitted also that the 50 per cent rule led to 
some unfortunate exclusions. 
3. The Application of the Guidelines to the Textiles Study 
During the course of this work the guidelines described in sub-section 
1 were made available. The statistical analysis was carried out at 
two levels -. the enterprise, with data from consolidated accounts of 
ultimate holding companies and the economic activity unit with data on 
activities falling within each of the three sub-sectors: - spinning 
and weaving of cotton and of man-made fibres on the cotton system; 
woollen and worsted spinning and weaving; hosiery and knitwear. The 
principal source of data for the three sub-sectors combined was 
analyses included in the consolidated accounts; breakdown into 
individual sub-sectors was based partly on examination of subsidiaries 
and partly on detective work, by ourselves and previous researchers. 
Discussions within the industry in 1978 regarding the 1973 figures 
suggested that these were reasonably accurate. 
The enterprise anal sis did not include those firms whose world-wide 
activities in the three sub-sectors did not exceed 50 per cent of 
world-wide turnover in all activities. This led to one very large 
anomaly - the exclusion of Courtaulds Ltd., the biggest textile firm 
in Europe. Man-made fibre production fell outside the activities 
defined by the Commission, and the spinning, weaving, hosiery and 
knitting activities accounted consistently for just under 50 per cent 
of group turnover. 
Another issue arose in the case of Carrington-Viyella Ltd. This 
company was formed through the action of Imperial Chemicals Industries 
Ltd., in 1970. ICI then owned 64 per cent of the equity of 
Carrington-Viyella, reduced to 49 per cent in 1977. Normally, 
Carrington-Viyella would be treated for accounting purposes as a 
subsidiary of ICI and, since textiles would be only a small part 
of ICI's total activities, neither Carrington-Viyella nor ICI would 
appear in the Enterprise analysis. There is an outstanding commitment 
on the part of ICI made to the Government at the time of the formation 
of Carrington-Viyella. This is an undertaking to reduce its holding 
in Carrington-Viyella to 35 per cent as soon as practicable and 
meanwhile to use voting power equivalent to only 35 per cent. For this 
reason Carrington-Viyella was.. included in the enterprise analysis. 
The textiles example shows that the value of the tables of concentration 
based on enterprises can be substantially reduced by anomalies arising 
- 33 - 
from the 50% criterion. The activity unit data cover the sixty firms 
with the largest turnover of products within each of the three sub- 
sectors and, to the case of the three sub-sectors combined the sixty 
firms with the largest combined turnover. Analysis of these data is likely to be more meaningful. 
4. The Application of Guidelines. to the Publishing Study 
The 1976 guidelines were again applied and a serious anomaly occurred 
which was similar to the exclusion of Courtaulds from the Enterprise 
analysis in the textile study. This was the need to exclude Reed 
International Ltd., on the grounds that publishing accounted for only 
41 per cent of Reed turnover (Ref. 4, p. 22). Since Reed is the 
group with largest publishing sales in the U. K. this seriously reduces 
the value of the concentration tables. 
The newspaper industry (and associated publishing interests) is 
generally very open about breakdown of sales turnover etc. - there 
are some well-known exceptions. This means that the activity unit data 
for this study are nearly all taken from published accounts. 
5. The Report on Tyres 
The principal distinction of this activity from those described above 
is the importance of overseas owned companies. I decided in this case, 
with the consent of the projects director in Brussels, to depart from 
the guidelines and to analyse concentration at two levels: - all 
activities in the U. K. (in practice tyres accounted for over 70 per 
cent of each company's turnover) and all activities world-wide. 
6. Some Comments on the Enterprise and Activity-Unit Approaches 
It is obvious from the textiles and publishing examples that the 
"activity-unit" approach yields more useful information about concentra- 
tion of domestic output of the products of an industry. There are two 
disadvantages in this approach: - 
(a) Although U. K. companies with diversity of activities are obliged 
to provide a breakdown by activity of sales turnover and trading 
profits, the published breakdown does not always correspond to 
categories of the Standard Industrial Classification (or NICE). 
In the case of large conglomerate enterprises it is usually 
impossible to obtain data on the application by industry of other 
variables - employment, wage-bill, equity capital or net assets. 
Indeed, any such breakdown might be artificial - it would require 
arbitrary allocation of totals relating to combined activities. 
In the paper industry study, we attempted to do this by analysis 
of accounts of subsidiary companies but not all large groups 
consist of autonomous subsidiaries which publish their own accounts. 
Even when this practice is followed, technical questions arise: 
for example should a loan by a parent to a subsidiary be regarded 
as equity capital? If so, what about profits from a subsidiary 
which are held as retained earnings by the parent - do not these 
reserves also equate to equity capital associated with the individual 
activity? 
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In both the textiles and publishing studies, activity unit 
analysis was confined to sales turnover and net profits. 'When the 
particular products accounted for less than 100 per cent of sales 
turnover, the estimates for "activity units" (that is sales 
revenue and net profits derived from activities within the 
sector) were derived from the consolidated published accounts of 
the parent company or from information supplied to us by that 
company. 
(b) One may argue that the comparative strengths of competing enter- 
prises depend partly upon their overall financial resources. A 
large diversified company may be able to dominate in the long run 
a specialist concern with equal sales turnover in one industry. 
The enterprise approach is therefore highly relevant to the 
study of oligopolistic competition (Perroux's "wrestling match" - 
Ref . 41) . 
The principal weakness of the enterprise approach is the use of 
the criterion that at least 50 per cent of sales turnover in a 
selected year should be derived from the sector concerned. This 
criterion is unsatisfactory: - first because sales turnover is 
not the ideal variable for such a judgement, value added would be 
a better measure for such ratios if it were available. Secondly 
the distortions which can result from the exclusion of a very 
large company for which the ratio is slightly under 50 per cent 
and the inclusion of another with just over 50 per cent can be so 
great as to make resulting concentration measure practically 
meaningless. How can one use such a measure for textiles which 
excludes Courtaulds, or one for publishing which excludes Reed? 
We were not alone in finding such anomalies: the London Business 
School research team were obliged to omit I. B. M. from the enter- 
prise tables of their office machinery study (Ref. 52, p. 20). 
The principles of the enterprise analysis appear to require 
redefinition if destructive anomalies are to be avoided. My own 
view is that inclusion in the sample must be based on the absolute 
value of sales turnover - "a sample of the 60 largest enterprises 
in an industry" means to most people the 60 firms with the 
greatest combined sales of the industry's products. Financial 
variables like net assets, equity capital, group net cash flow 
would have to relate to the total activities of these firms but 
by inclusion of certain additional information the danger of false 
comparisons could be avoided. It is the desire of economic 
statisticians to simplify presentation to summary statistics which 
leads to excessively simple criteria like the "50 per cent of 
turnover" principle. The resulting statistical measures can be 
dangerously misleading. 
7. Inter-company links 
A problem which affects all concentration ratios is the existence of 
financial and other links between companies. The interpretation of 
the ratios in applied economics is usually based on the assumption 
that firms are independent, competing units. At what level of equity 
ownership does this assumption become invalid? 
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For the paper industry study a figure of 90 per cent was suggested by 
one of the Brussels coordinating staff. In that industry partly-owned 
subsidiaries were found to be very exceptional. In the one case where 
a company had a holding in a significant subsidiary which only just 
exceeded 50 per cent, we decided not to include the subsidiary as a 
separate firm. For the other three studies submitted with this report, 
a company was included in the sample (for either activity-unit or 
enterprise analysis) only if it was not ultimately controlled (by 
virtue of an absolute majority of voting equity) by another. When 
companies within the sample held majority holdings in other companies 
within the sector then consolidated accounts were used. When two 
companies within the industry were both owned by another firm with 
wider activities, data for the activity-unit analysis were taken from 
the published breakdown of operations in the accounts of the ultimate 
holding company. When the form of presentation of these data was 
inappropriate, advi ce was sought from the company and/or estimates were 
made on the evidence of the subsidiary company accounts. This last 
method was used only in a very few cases. 
The problems created by minority holdings are more complex. Appendix 
E, sub-sections (4 to 5) of the textiles report (Ref. 2, pp. 179-183) 
lists minority holdings among some of the largest firms in the sector. 
Courtaulds and ICI each held 8 per cent of the equity of Tootal and 
each was represented on the Tootal board of directors until December 
1974, when the Courtaulds representation appears to have ceased. By 
December 1974 Courtaulds held 29 per cent of the voting equity of 
Highams Ltd. (but see Ref. 2, p. 180 for details of subsequent 
government interventions); ICI held 20 per cent of the ordinary shares 
of Lister Bros: Illingworth Morris had substantial minority holdings 
in six other large woollen and worsted firms, as well as a2 per cent 
holding in Tootal. 
In the publishing industry the distortions due to minority holdings 
are more significant. Details are set out in the report (Ref. 
p. 75). They include substantial holdings by major companies in 
other important concerns - the S. Pearson company holds 28.5 per cent 
of the West Midland provincial newspapers group BPM Holdings Ltd. 
The Daily Mail indirectly holds 24 per cent of the main publishers 
of newspapers in Bristol and adjacent counties. The Economist 
Newspaper which is included in our press sample as an independent 
competitor, is 49.9 per cent owned by the Financial Times, a 
subsidiary of S. Pearson. 
Financial ties, common directorates and family links are all listed 
in the reports and the staff in Brussels with responsibility for the 
studies ensure that such connections between firms are identified and 
listed. In interpretation of concentration ratios and financial 
performance analysis such links may be overlooked. Overall concentra- 
tion may to some extent be understated and measures of inequality 
between enterprises may also be misleading - this is another (less important) example of the 50 per cent rule as described in sub-section 
6. Certain of the financial statistics and concentration ratios 
prepared in accordance with the Brussels methodology may be distorted. 
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Distortion may arise because certain of the variables specified by the 
Commission and described in the next section cannot be added when there 
are financial ties between enterprises. This is best demonstrated by 
a numerical example. Suppose company A owns 40 per cent of the equity 
of company B. Assume company B has sales worth £1,000,000 and net 
profits of £100,000 and that £40,000 is paid to company A. This will 
be included in A's net profit before tax. If company A also has sales 
of £1,000,000 and net profits associated with those sales of £100,000 
then the net profit before tax figure in its accounts will be £140,000. 
By adding profits together, we would double-count A's share of B's 
profit; by expressing profits as proportions of sales we would distort 
comparison between the performances of A and B. 
The problem described in the last paragraph can of course be overcome 
but not simply. If, for example, we compared net profits as propor- 
tions of net assets then the £100,000 and £140,000 figures would be 
appropriate. Besides net profits, double-counting of intra-sample 
minority interests affects some of the other variables included in 
the Commission's series of studies and described in the next section. 
These are cash flow (gross and net), equity capital and net assets. 
In the four studies undertaken at Cranfield, intra-sample minority 
holdings were not so widespread as to substantially overstate the 
totals of the variables concerned. (If they did., the result would be 
to distort the concentration ratios. ) There remains a danger of such 
distortion in the application of the Commission's existing methodology 
to other sectors. 
C. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES - CONCENTRATION OF WHAT? 
Throughout the literature survey in Chapter One and for most of this 
chapter "concentration" has been used synonymously with "seller 
concentration" to mean concentration of sales turnover or occasionally 
of sales volume. This usage is common practice but the E. E. C. studies 
examine concentration of ten or more variables. 
1. The Recommendations of the Commission and Variables Used in 
Cran ie Reports 
The Commission requests the application of concentration indices to 
as many as possible of the following variables: - 
Code number used Variable 
by Commission 
01 Sales turnover 
02 Employment 
03 Total employee remuneration 
04 Net profit before tax 
05 Cash flow = Net profit + depreciation 
06 Gross investment = Additions to fixed assets 
07 Equity capital = Paid-up capital + reserves 
08 Exports 
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(a) In the Raper study, we were unable to include data for variables 
O and03ý(employment and employee remuneration) because of the 
use of accounts of subsidiary companies to construct the industry 
sample. (See section B. ) We added to the Commission's list of 
variables net cash flow = net profit + depreciation - tax. 
(b) In the textiles study we also excluded variables 02 and 03 from 
the enterprise analysis because the enterprise tables related to 
world-wide activities of multinational companies among the sample 
but data on employment and employee remuneration relate only to 
the United Kingdom. We included net cash flow and also introduced 
net assets (= total assets minus current liabilities) 
as an addiitional variable; this modification to the Commission's 
normal methodology was also introduced by Development Analysts 
Ltd., in their study of concentration in the food industry 
(Ref. 51). For "economic activity units" we were able to include 
only. sales turnover and net profits because, as explained on p. 33 
above, companies normally publish breakdown by divisions of 
activity only for these two variables. 
(c) In the study of certain vehicle accessories financial data were 
available only for tyres. Only one of the major companies 
operating in the United Kingdom, Avon, derives more than 25 per 
cent of its total world-wide turnover from British sales. For 
this reason the analysis of concentration was carried out at two 
levels: - 
(i) U. K. activities: - sales turnover, employment, wages bill, 
net profits and advertising expenditure. 
(ii) World-wide activities of the six/seven companies: - sales 
turnover, net profits, cash flow, equity, 
net cash flow and net assets. 
The introduction of advertising expenditure (details of which were 
compiled from MEAL surveys - Ref. 53) reflected the importance 
of this variable as an influence on market share in the replace- 
ment market for tyres. The reference to holding company accounts 
for the main financial variables was necessitated by differences 
in transfer pricing arrangements and methods of financing by 
each of the international companies. 
For the other two vehicle accessories - sparking plugs and 
batteries we were able to use only estimated shares of market 
volume as a variable for the study of concentration. 
(d) For the study of publishing we used more variables than in the 
earlier research. For the enterprise analysis we included all 
variables specified by the Commission plus net cash flow and net 
assets. The value of this analysis was much reduced by the 
exclusion of the Reed group, the largest publishing company, (see 
p. 33 above). In activity-unit analyses of the publishing 
sector as a whole and of the press we used turnover and net 
profits. For analysis of sales of periodicals and of school 
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textbooks retail value of sales was used as the variable. We 
also produced concentration tables based on circulation of 
newspapers, at national and regional level. 
2. A criticism of the Commission's Choice of Variables 
The variables included in the Commission's methodology or added after 
consultation with its representatives fall into three distinct groups: 
dimension, net results and discretionary expenditures. 
(a) Dimension variables: sales turnover, employment, wages bill, equity 
capital, net assets, sales volume 
(b) Net results: profits, cash flow, net cash flow 
(c) Discretionary expenditure: gross investment, advertising. 
The distinction between (a) and (c) is more practical than theoretical. 
The variables in (c) are likely to vary much more over time for any 
single firm. In any one year the degree of inequality in these 
variables is likely to be greater than in any of the dimension 
variables. 
This is borne out by an examination of the Gini coefficient, which is 
essentially a measure of inequality (see p. 52 below), for gross 
investment in the four sets of enterprise tables for which it was 
computed (paper manufacture, paper conversion, textiles and publishing). 
In 22 cases out of 24 the Gini coefficient for gross investment 
exceeded that for sales turnover; the two exceptions were in paper 
1968 and 1969 conversion and I have reason to doubt the validity of 
some of the data for those two years in that particular study. * 
Comparison of concentration in discretionary expenditure with that in 
the size of companies is relevant to the study of the process of 
competition, because discretionary expenditure is part of that process. 
If some firms consistently devote higher proportions of sales turnover 
and net assets to investment and/or promotion then their market shares 
might be expected to increase. This process will not be identified 
by comparisons based on single years if the pattern of discretionary 
expenditure is highly variable over time. There may be a greater 
degree of concentration in investment or advertising than in any of 
the dimension variables simply because of their greater instability 
over time. 
Another important problem affects comparisons of concentration in (a) 
and (b) variables, that is in size and performance. Such comparisons 
are one of the objectives of the EEC studies, for example see Linda's 
discussion in the 1976 Methodology document (Ref. 39, p. 45-6). 
* The figures were collected by casual labour. They include a number 
of "estimates" for smaller firms - as usual in such cases the 
"reasonable" figures show too little variance. 
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Linda draws major conclusions from the observation that profits in 
most industries are more concentrated than sales turnover or equity. 
It will now be shown that profits, defined as turnover minus costs, 
must generally be more concentrated than turnover and that occasional 
exceptions reported in the EEC concentration studies arise partly from 
the decision to treat losses as zero profits. 
Let us define profit as Revenue (sales turnover) - Costs 
i=R -C 
Assume that revenue and costs have the same coefficient of variation, 
that is the ratio of the standard deviation (a) to the mean (u) is the 






uR PC CR uR 
It can be shown (Ref. 54, p. 180) that 
(i) '7R-C2 ° QR2 + QC2 - 2V RQC 
where p is the coefficient of simple correlation between R and C. 
Substituting kaR for QC equation (i) becomes 
(ii) a7r2 = aRl + (k"R)2 - 2pQR(kQR) 
="R2(1+k2-2pk). 
The coefficient of variation of profits A is defined in (iii). 
(iii) Vi = ar = QR 1+ k2 
-w 2pk = QR k2 - Zak 
us OR - uC NO - k) 
If p=1, that is if costs and revenue and perfectly linearly 
correlated then 
QR(1 - k) vR 
11R(1 - k) uR 
If p<l then alT aR 
uR 
It is reasonable to assume that in many sub-sectors the revenue and 
costs of companies will have approximately the same coefficient of 
variation and, if so, this algebra proves that the coefficient of 
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variation for profits cannot be lower than that for turnover and, in 
the absence of perfect correlation, it must be higher. 
Concentration ratios are closely correlated with the coefficient of 
variation (see Chapter Three) and this seems to suggest a priori that 
these ratios will be greater for profits than for turnover. 
A simple numerical simulation shows this quite clearly. Columns 1 and 
"2 in Table 11-3 represent revenue and costs of ten firms in Time 
period 1; columns 4 and 5 are derived by applying to columns 1 and 2 
a percentage increase chosen at random (by a random number generator) 
from the range 0.1 to 9.9; columns 7 and 8 were similarly derived 
from columns 4 and 5. 
Table 11-3 Simulation to show concentration of turnover and profits 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Revenue Costs Profits Revenue Costs Profits Revenue Costs Profit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
10000 9000 1000 10340 9864 476 10764 10614 150 
9000 8100 900 9414 8270 1144 10064 8303 1761 
8000 7200 800 8728 7646 1082 9025 7837 1188 
7000 6300 700 7385 6344 1041 8094 " 6401 1693 6000 5400 600 6420 5546 874 6523 5995 528 
5000 4500 500 5265 4689 576 5486 4853 633 
4000 3600 400 4120 3942 178 4202 4309 -107 
3000 2700 300 3168 2838 330 3254 2915 339 
2000 1800 200 2028 1937 91 2152 2067 85 
1000 900 100 1074 964 110 1170 971 199 
The objective of this process is merely to generate some numbers such 
that the correlation between profits and turnover is close but not 
equal to unity, while not imposing any particular distribution on the 
data. 
In period 1 costs for each firm are equal to 90 per cent of revenue- 
_ and O RC =1 
uR ; 5500 uC = 4950 u7r = 550 







uR u0 uir 
a= 287.23 it 
The four largest values of turnover represent 61.8 per cent of the 
total and the corresponding four=firm ratio for profits is also 61.8 
per cent. 
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In period 2 the correlation between revenue and costs is no longer 
perfect, at 0.9959 
uR = 5794.20 




uC = 5204.00 









It can be seen that comparatively small random disturbances in revenue 
and costs produce a much larger coefficient of variation in profits, 
while leaving those of revenue and costs virtually unchanged. The 
four-firm concentration ratios for revenue and profits are now 
respectively 61.9 and 70.2 per cent. 
In period 3 the correlation between revenue and costs has fallen to 
and the random disturbances have been sufficient to produce a 
loss for one of the ten units. 
uR = 6073.40 u0 = 5426.50 uir = 646.90 




= 0.5254 it = 0.9859 
uR PO uTr 
The four-firm concentration ratios for revenue and profits are now 
respectively 62.5 and 81.5 per cent. 
In the Commission's methodology concentration of profits refers to 
concentration of positive values only. The negative figure in period 
3 would be ignored and the mean and standard deviation would be 
derived from the nine positive values. In this case the coefficient 
of variation crý would be reduced to 618 = 0.8458, the four-firm 
uIr 730.7 
concentration ratio for profits would fall to 72.2 per cent. This 
exclusion of negative values is necessary for the computation of some 
of the indices described in Chapter Three; the interpretation of a 
concentration ratio exceeding 100 per cent would be difficult. 
I think it is probably the non-negativity assumption which causes some 
of the exceptions to the rule that "concentration" of the performance 
variables must normally be greater than that of dimensions. In certain 
cases (e. g., in publishing in 1971 and 1972) the degree of dispersion in costs must have been much greater than that in revenue. Without 
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more detailed statistical analysis it is not possible to compare the 
indices for performance and dimension variables in the way that the 
Commission appears to approve. 
3. The choice of a variable for measurement of dimension 
Most previous analysis of concentration has been based on comparison 
of company dimensions. Among variables most often used are employment, 
to which the greatest volume of published information relates, capital 
employed, net output or value added and sales turnover. 
Employment, and the occasional substitute wages-bill represent one 
part of inputs to a production process. J he use of this variable as 
a proxy for size of firms' activities would be valid only if 
production functions were linear throughout the sector. This means 
that a firm with double the output of another would employ twice the 
number of workers and double the amount of all other factors-of 
production, including capital. This assumption ignores variations in 
capital-intensity with volume of production and also ignores economies 
of scale. These points were made by de Bandt (Ref. 45, pp. 24-5) and 
the capital-labour substitution problem was also mentioned by 
Pickering (Ref. 9, p. 4). 
Net assets or equity ca ital are unsatisfactory as measures of 
imp ens on for _571s same reason, quite apart from the practical problems 
of valuation. Ratios based on these variables tend to overstate 
concentration because larger firms tend to be more capital-intensive. 
In addition, larger firms may have purchased assets more recently so 
that these are relatively highly valued, in part because of general 
price inflation. 
Sales turnover is the most widely used variable as an indicator of 
dimension For assessment of "dominance" of a market, sales may well 
be the most relevant variable. The principal disadvantage to its use 
as a measure of size is distortion by differing degrees of vertical 
integration. Power in relation to competitors, to suppliers and to 
labour and capital markets is more accurately reflected in value 
added - sales minus purchases from other firms. Value added is-equal 
to gross trading profits plus employee remuneration. The use of this 
variable in the EEC concentration analysis would avoid some of the 
double-counting which occurs with the sales variable. 
The double-counting of sales turnover and consequent understatement of 
concentration ratios (because denominators are inflated) occurs when 
sales of intermediate products and final products are included, for 
separate firms, within an industry. For example in textiles many of 
the knitwear and weaving firms obtain yarn from spinning companies. 
Whereas the relative importance of Courtaulds can be represented by 
an inverted triangle - its share of yarn production is greater than 
that of weaving which in turn is greater than that of finishing, the 
structure of Tootal is the reverse. When sales turnover of firms 
like this is added together, double-counting is inevitable. 
The use of value added overcomes this difficulty. Pickering describes 
it as preferable to sales turnover (ibid. ) and de Bandt describes it 
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as "definitely the most valid indicator of size" (Ref. 45, p. 26). 
It has a drawback, mentioned by both authors, in that it includes 
"not only the value of resources employed but also the degree of 
su. ccess achieved in that employment" (Ref. 45,, p. 27). In other 
words it includes profits. If we are interested in the relationship 
between profits and size then by using value added as a dimension, 
we would include profits on both sides of the equation. 
In spite of this objection, value added appears to be the most 
appropriate variable for measurement of concentration. Estimates of 
this do not appear in U. K. company accounts and, except for companies 
with no overseas operations, it cannot satisfactorily be estimated by 
adding gross profits to wages bill, because published information on 
employment relates only to the United Kingdom. Linda has proposed 
that in future studies there should be an attempt to include value 
added as an additional variable (Ref. 39, p. 31); statistical 
problems may make this impossible for the United Kingdom. 
D. A POST-SCRIPT TO CHAPTER TWO 
In this chapter I have analysed at some length problems of definition 
of sectors, units and variables. Such analysis is tedious - it is far 
removed from the potentially more exciting exercise of trying to 
discover consequences of concentration. Unfortunately some of the 
problems of definition are so great as to affect the validity of 
measurements of concentration. Some of the solutions adopted by the 
Commission, though perhaps necessary to by-pass an analytical impasse, 
can occasionally lead to distortions so serious that the resulting 
concentration statistics have little practical meaning. These tedious 
subjects demand more attention from economists if concentration is to 
assist the formulation of policies on monopolies, mergers and 
competition. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION 
RELATED TO THE TOTAL SECTOR 
A. INTRODUCTION - THE TWO ELEMENTS OF CONCENTRATION 
The most common measure of concentration in an industry or market is 
simply the proportion of the total value of sales, or other dimension 
variable which is accounted for by the k largest values. In the 
United States the Census of Manufacturers reports four-firm concentration 
ratios (k = 4), while in the United Kingdom Census of Production five- 
firm ratios (k = 5) have been reported since 1963. 
The limitations of such a ratio (or percentage) are obvious: it tells 
you nothing about the distribution of values within the k firms nor 
about the number and size of other firms in the industry. Concentration 
ratios based in a single value for k can be misleading when two 
different structures are compared; this is shown in Table III-1: - 
Table III-I Sensitivity of k-firm concentration ratios to choice of k 
Strºrrtººra & 
k Sales of firm k Ck Sales of firm k Ck 
1 300 30 240 24 
2 250 55 220 46 
3 100 65 200 66 
4 80 73 180 84 
5 75 80.5 60 90 
6 70 87.5 50 95 
7 65 94 30 98 
8 60 100 20 100 
TOTAL 1000 1000 
Fellner (Ref. 55, p. 115) suggested that the best way to describe 
concentration in an industry was a composite summary based on simple 
concentration ratios. As an example he gave: - 20-3-52 (s), which 
indicates that the largest firm has a share of 20%, that the total 
number of firms with a share of more than 10% is three, that the 
joint share of these three firms is 52% and that small firms account 
for more than 10% of the total". The obvious disadvantage of a 
descriptive composite of this kind is that it cannot be used in further 
statistical analysis: but no single statistical measure may provide 
a complete description of concentration. 
There are two elements in business concentration which are reflected 
in varying degrees by the numerous index numbers which have been 
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proposed: - (a) the number of firms and (b) the inequality of their 
sizes. "Absolute" concentration measures, which include the simple 
concentration ratio are those which take into account the number of 
firms; "relative" measures are those which relate only to dispersion 
of size (Refs. 45 and 55). 
Some writers, following R. A. Miller (Ref. 22) add a third dimension 
to concentration - described by Vanlommel, de Brabander and Liebaers (Ref. 53) as "coalition potential. " This concerns the degree of 
inequality between the very largest firms and those which fall 
outside this group. The importance of a "power threshold" is 
recognised also in the methodology of Linda and will be discussed 
mainly in the next chapter. Most previous work on concentration - indices has related to number of firms and inequality in the 
industry as a whole. 
The distribution by size of companies within most industries has a 
large positive skew. A small number of firms are above the arithmetic 
mean size and the vast majority below. Recognition of this skewed 
distribution has led to a distinct split in the approach towards 
measurement of concentration. 
Some authors have suggested that the skewness might be eliminated by 
transformation of the size-dimension into logarithms so that inequality 
may be described by the variance of size or measures related to it. 
This approach is most closely associated with Gibrat. (Ref. 58), 
Hart (Ref. 56 and 59), Prais (Ref. 56 and 46) and de Bandt (Ref. 45). 
It should be emphasised that all of these authors also stressed the 
need to examine separately the number of firms. For example Hart and 
Prais (Ref. 56, p. 152) stated: "It is difficult to see how any 
entirely satisfactory judgement on changes in monopolistic tendencies 
in an industry can be made without a knowledge of the changes in the 
number of firms engaged in that industry". 
Other writers have suggested that the logarithmic transformation is 
inappropriate because it increases the relative importance of smaller 
firms. Adelman (Ref. 48), Blair (Ref. 59), Marfels (Ref. 61) and 
Linda (Ref. 39, p. 16) all argue that the study of concentration 
requires examination of the dominance of the few large firms. All 
are emphatic in support of the view that "it is the dominance of 
the few, quite apart from the number of sellers, which tends to 
influence the market". (Blair, Ref. 59; see also Ref. 60) 
The indices prescribed by the Commission of the European Communities 
will be examined in relation to the two aspects of concentration - 
inequality of size and number of firms. * 
* Before reading the detailed analysis which follows, those unfamiliar 
with the indices may find it useful to consult pages 12-23 of the 
report on the paper industry, where the principal indices are defined. 
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B. MEASURES RELATED ONLY TO INEQUALITY 
]. The Coefficient of Variation 
This is defined as a/2 =n EX _A 
EX Y, n 
The standard deviation (Q) simply reflects absolute differences 
from'the mean (see footnote **). 
The standard deviation can be used as a measure for comparison of 
the absolute inequality of two distributions of X and Y only_when 
the distributions of the standardised deviates (X-X) and (Y-Y) 
ex °y 
are identical. 
This would clearly be the case if both X and Y were normally 
distributed but this last assumption is not necessary for the 
comparison. For example: - 
10 values of X: 22,30,36,38,39,40,42,47,52,54 
ax = 9.154 X= 40.0 V=0.229 
10 values of Y: 14,30,42,46,48,50,54,64,74,78 
ay = 18.308 Y= 50.0 V=0.336 
The values of Yi are such that (Yi -Y) = 2(Xi- X) and this is 
reflected in the standard deviation. 
The coefficient of variation (V) relates the inequality to the 
overall dimension of the distribution. Provided the standardised 
deviates are identically distributed, this coefficient provides 
an acceptable measure for comparison of relative inequality. 
The preference of some authors for example Van Meerhaeghe (Ref. 62) 
for V2does not appear to be consistent with the numerical logic 
demonstrated above. 
The condition that the standard deviates should be identically 
distributed is not usually fulfilled. One danger inherent in 
the use of the coefficient of variation for comparison is that 
two widely differing distributions may have a similar coefficient 
of variation: - 
10 values of X: 22,30,36,38,39,40,42,47,52,54 
(as before) = 9.154 X= 40.0 V=0.229 
10 values of Y: 68,69,77,73,75,76,77,78,79,134 
= 18.308 Y= 80.0 V=0.229 
** In the explanatory text of the reports the denominator for 
calculation of the standard deviation is defined as (n-1), 
because sample data were being used to estimate the population. 
The Commission's own computer programme uses n and the statistical 
results in the reports follow this approximation. 
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A more common danger is that comparatively small percentage 
differences in the size of the largest firms can lead to substantial 
changes in V. In the last distribution (Y) the largest unit 
accounted for 16.75 per cent of the total. If this were increased 
to 19 per cent by the addition of 18 to that unit and the sub- 
traction of 2 from each of the remaining nine, then the 
distribution would appear as follows. - 
10 values of Y: 66,67,69,71,73,74,75,76,77,152 
(revised) ay = 24.261 Y= 80.0 V=0.303 
The coefficient of variation has increased by 32 per cent of 
its previous value although each of thq nine other units has lost 
only 0.25 per cent of the total to the largest unit. This 
instability of the coefficient of variation is due to its 
derivation from absolute numbers. With positively skewed 
distributions small changes in relative sizes affecting the 
largest units will have a disproportionate effect on this coe- 
fficient. 
2. Transformation to Logarithms, the Lognormal Distribution and the 
Lorenz Curve 
Any positive skew must be substantially reduced - or even reversed - 
by any transformation of the variable (provided all values are 
positive) to logarithms. The reasoning behind the use of the 
logarithm of size in analysis of business concentration is much 
stronger than this. An a priori argument suggest that the 
distribution of the logarithms of size will tend towards normality. 
This argument is based on the "law of proportionate growth", 
first formulated Gibrat (Ref. 58), quoted by Hart and Prais 
(Ref. 56), and more fully explained by Prais (Ref. 46). - 
Weiss (Ref. 63) summarised it as follows: - 
If Fit = logarithm of variable for firm i at time-period t 
then E (Fi, t+l - Fit) is unrelated to Fit 
Randomly distributed changes in Fi over time will cause the 
distribution of Fi to tend to normality and its variance will be a 
sufficient measure of the inequality of the distribution. 
In simpler terms, the law of proportionate growth requires 
percentage changes in size to be random and independent of size. 
Under such conditions the logarithms of sizes would become normally 
distributed. 
This effect can easily be demonstrated by a numerical example. 
Suppose that over each time-period half the firms in any size 
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group remain unchanged in size, a quarter rose by the ratio 
e0'1 (or just over 10 per cent) and the other quarter declined by 
e0'ß (or just under 10 per cent). This process would be as 
follows: - 
Time 0 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Loge 
9.7 256 
9.8 1024 1536 
9.9 4096 4096 3840 
10.0 16,384 8192 6144 5120 
10.1 4096 4096 3840 
10.2 1024 1536 
10.3 256 
After seven time periods this distribution becomes as shown 
in Table 111-2. 
Table 111-2 Effect of Law of Proportionate Growth After Seven 
Pe''riods 
Loge No. of Units Loge No. of Units 
9.3 1 10.1 3003 
9.4 14 10.2 2002 
9.5 91 10.3 1001 
9.6 364 10.4 364 
9.7 1001 10.5 91 
9.8 2002 10.6 14 
9.9 3003 10.7 1 
10.0 3432 
This distribution is shown in Figure III-i and the emergence of a 
normal distribution is already apparent. 
When the values of the 
distribution is obvious 
Under 15,000 
15,000 - 20,000 
20,000 - 25,000 
25,000 - 30,000 
Over 30,000 
variable are anti-logged and re-grouped the 
sly skewed: - 
470 
6006 (Arithmetic mean based on 6435 
ungrouped data = 22415) 3003 
470 
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FIGURE III. -1 LAW OF PROPORTIONATE EFFECT AFTER 
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If the distribution of company sizes were lognormally distributed 
this would have important consequences: - 
(a) Many of the indices of concentration would be mathematically 
related to the standard deviation of the logarithms. These include 
the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, the 
Herfindahl -Hirschman index and the Entropy measure. 
The formulae set out on pages 21-22 of the report on the paper 
industry are based on work by Aitchinson and Brown (Ref. 64) 
and unpublished work by J. C. Hull of the Cranfield School of 
Management. 
(b) There would be a symmetrical Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve 
was named after its originator who applied the concept to the 
distribution of wealth in 1905 (Ref. 65). 
It shows on the horizontal axis the cumulative proportion of the 
total number of units and on the vertical axis the corresponding 
cumulative proportion of the total of the variable when the units 
are arranged in ascending order. 
The distribution presented in Table III-2 is insufficiently 
unequal to demonstrate clearly the properties of a Lorenz curve 
for a lognormal distribution. Instead let us consider a normally 
distributed variable X with mean 2.0 and standard deviation of 
1.0. If we now examine the distribution of ex and calculate 
the coordinates of points on the Lorenz curve, the symmetry of 
the curve becomes apparent. The calculation is shown in Table 111-3 
and the curve itself is shown as line 1 in Figure 111-2. 
Table 111-3 Calculation of Lorenz curve coordinates for ex 
where X is normally distributed with mean 2.0 
and standard deviation 1.0 
No. of firms Value of variable Cumulative variable 
(ascending order) For Group Cumulative as % of total 
10 14.41 14.14 1.15 
20 26.77 40.91 3.33 
30 38.27 79.18 6.44 
40 50.40 129.58 10.54 
50 66.79 196,37 15.97 
60 82.97 279.34 22.72 
70 107.63 386.97 31.48 
80 143.87 530.84 43.18 
90 210.83 741.67 60.32 
100 487.78 1229.45 100.00 
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FIGURE III- 2 LORENZ CURVES OF LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
CURVE I: MEAN LOG. 2.0, STANDARD DEVIATION 1.0 
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From the graph this symmetry is evident - if x per cent of the firms in ascending order account for y per cent of the variable, 
then y per cent of the firms in descending order account for x 
per cent of the variable. 
The Lorenz curve for a distribution of ex where X is normally 
distributed is determined exclusively by the standard deviation 
of X. Line II in Figure III-2is derived from the antilogged 
values of a distribution with mean 2.0 and standard deviation 1.5. 
3. The Gini Coefficient 
This is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 
450 line in Figure 111-2 to the total area of the triangle formed 
by the 450 line and the axis. The 450 line represents equality 
of size where p per cent of the firms account for p per cent of 
the total variable. If all firms except one were of negligible 
size then the Lorenz curve would almost follow the axis. The 
Gini coefficient can therefore vary between 0 (when the Lorenz 
curve corresponds to the 450 line) and (n-l)/n. In Figure IV-2 
the Gini coefficient corresponding to curve I is 0.527; that 
corresponding to curve II os 0.728. 
Gini himself (Ref. 66) pointed out that a measure of concentration 
may be derived by taking the mean difference irrespective of sign 
between all possible pairs of firms. 
v D= EiEj xi - xj I/n2 
and that the Gini coefficient g= D/2X 
This interesting feature of the Gini coefficient is discussed 
by de Bandt (Ref . 45, pp. 48-49) and, in less detail but in English by Hart and Prais (Ref. 56). Both sources refer to a 
formal proof by Kendall (Ref. 67, p. 44). 
The main hazard in use of Gini coefficients to compare distribu- 
tions is that, as with the coefficient of variation described 
above, the comparison will be distorted if the distributions differ 
in shape. In the case of the Gini coefficient it is necessary 
for the distributions of the standard deviates of logarithms to 
be identical. If one is to compare two lognormal distributions. 
then the danger does not arise: the Lorenz curves are symmetrical 
and a given Gini coefficient describes a unique Lorenz curve. 
Once the assumption of lognormality is dropped and the distribu- 
tions differ in shape then the Gini coefficient ceases to be a 
reliable measure of degrees of inequality. This can be demonstrated 
by a numerical example with two different distributions of firms. 
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FIGURE III-3 LORENZ CURVES DESCRIBED IN TABLE DI-4 
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Table 111-4 Two different distributions with the same 
Gini coefficient 
Cumulative 
of firms Cumulative percentages of total sales 
A B 
10 0.8 3.0 
20 2.4 6.8 
30 4.8 10.8 
40 8.9 15.0 
50 14.5 19.5 
60 22.6 24.8 
70 33.. 1 31.5 
80 47.6 38.0 
90 67.7 50.6 
100 100.0 100.0 
In both cases the Gini coefficient (based on the decile values) 
is 0.500, the area enclosed by the two Lorenz curves, here 
simplified to a series of ten straight lines, is half the triangle 
under the 450 line. Yet in distribution B the largest 10 per cent 
of firms accounts for 49.4 per cent of total sales. whereas in 
distribution A the corresponding proportion is only 32.3 per cent. 
Figure III-3 shows these two Lorenz curves: the Gini coefficient 
is the same for each curve because the area between the curves to 
the left of the intersection is equal to the corresponding area 
to the right. 
Certain authors, for example, for example Morvan (Ref. 44) and 
de Bandt (Ref. 45) tend to reject the Gini coefficient on the 
grounds that in most practical cases the Lorenz curve is not 
symmetrical - the values of the variable considered are unlikely 
to be lognormally distributed. Before assessing the conclusion 
that symmetry of the Lorenz curve is necessary for use of the 
Gini coefficient, the validity of the lognormal distribution 
(which implies symmetry) will be examined. 
4. The Lognormal Distribution in Statistical Studies of Concentration 
In order to test whether the distribution of the logarithms of 
company sizes is normal Hart and Prais used the tests set out by 
R. A. Fisher (Ref. 68), who defined coefficients of skewness (gj) 
and of kurtosis. For the purposes of testing the symmetry of 
the Lorenz curve, the skewness coefficient is more important. 
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nE X- X)3 
/(z(X)2)3 
n- n- ( n- ) 
which is a sample estimate of the third moment of the distribu- 
tion divided by the cube of the standard deviation. 
The standard error of gl = 6n n-1) 
(n- n+ n+ 
Hart and Prais (Ref. 56, p. 159) found a statistically significant 
positive skew in the distribution of the market valuation of 
quoted companies in 1907,1924,1939 and 1950 but found no signifi- 
cant skew (g1 was in fact negative but was exceeded by its standard 
error) in 1885 and 1896. They attributed the positive skewness 
from 1907 onwards to the "artificial" dividing line between quoted 
and unquoted companies. The quoted sector might represent the 
upper part of the lognormal distribution and without the left- 
hand tail skewness is inevitable. 
The argument that the distribution of companies in U. K. industry 
is lognormal appears to rest on slender evidence. Hart and Prais 
provided a reasonable explanation of the positive skewness in the 
logarithmic distribution of sizes of quoted companies but could 
not prove that a distribution including unquoted comapnies would 
have been lognormal. Prais (Ref. 46, p. 193) recently applied 
the lognormal distribution to the distribution by employment of 
all manufacturing companies in the U. K. including those employing 
fewer than 25 persons. Although the percentages correspond fairly 
well, my own attempt to repeat this test revealed statistically 
significant positive skewness but the calculation is very sensitive 
to the assumption about the distribution of firms within the open- 
ended classes. 
In practice, a lognormal distribution is unlikely to be found 
in 
surveys conducted for the E. E. C. studies mainly because a 
lower 
size limit is prescribed which might lead to the exclusion of 
the 
majority of companies, which are very small. Table 111-4 shows 
the numbers of companies excluded from the samples for the three 
studies in which numbers of companies were reasonably high 
(the 
vehicle accessory study was concerned essentially with 
highly 
oligopolistic markets). 
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Table 111-4 Cranfield studies in concentration series - numbers 
of enterprises compared with 1968 Census of Production 
Census Cranfield 
(Enterprise tables) report (EAU) 
Paper and board manufacture 170 64 
Manufactured stationery 245 14 
Non-board packaging 124 27 
Board packaging 480 108 
Miscellaneous paper products 222 21 
Cotton etc. spinning 259* 
weaving 410* 
5` 
Hosiery and knitwear 867 60 
Wool and worsted 965 60 
Newspapers and periodicals 715 35 
All publishing n. a. 59 
* The figures cannot be added because of vertical integration. 
The sample sizes were determined mainly by the need to have a 
sector total of 60 firms, the limit of the Commission's own 
computing capacity. Because we undertook our own computing this 
limit was not universally observed. In certain cases the sample 
was reduced to well below sixty; because this reduced number 
accounted for the vast majority of the sub-sector, extension of 
the investigation would have been expensive and of marginal 
benefit, particularly since it meant reliance on accounts of 
private companies. For example, the 35 Press companies accounted 
for over 85 per cent of added value from newspaper and periodical 
publishing and 92 per cent of newspaper circulation. 
Since we were examining only the upper part of the distribution of 
company sizes, it is not surprising that tests for lognormality 
showed significant departure from this theoretical model. 
In the paper industry study (Ref. 1, pp. 51-3) the distributions of 
turnover from paper conversion (179 firms in 1968,171 in 1970 
and 145 in 1972), and from board packaging in particular (108 
firms in 1968,105 in 1970 and 102 in 1972) were compared with 
theoretical lognormal distributions. These were based on the 
standard deviation of the logarithms of the sample. All six 
distributions shared positive skewness and the difference from 
lognormality was shown to be significant by the x2 test. 
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Similar tests for the textile industry were not reported because 
they added nothing of methodological interest and proved little 
because of the exclusion of a significant proportion of industry 
turnover. 
The Fisher test quoted on p. 55 above was applied to the publishing 
turnover data for alternate years 1969-1975 and revealed significant 
positive skewness (g1 was significantly different from zero). The 
35 observations of Press turnover showed neither statistically 
significant skewness nor any kurtosis but the absolute value of 
gl was higher than that for all publishing and it was insignificant 
only because of a high standard error. 
An alternative test for the exis, tence of a lognormal distribution 
may be the subject of further research. If we know, as for 
example, in hosiery and knitwear, that our sample represents 
60/867 or 6.9 per cent of the total number of firms in an industry, 
then if the total number were lognormally distributed, the standard 
deviation (s) of that lognormal distribution could be calculated 
from the 60 observations and the use of the co-ordinates of the 
normal distribution. 
For example the logarithm of the turnover of the 22nd largest of 
the 60 firms (0.025 x 867.22) would be approximately m+ 2s; 
that of the 58th firm (0.0668 x 867 - 58) would be m+1.5s. 
Hence s=2x (Log sales22 - Log sales58). By use of other pairs, 
the effect of statistical inaccuracies could be averaged out and 
the validity of the lognormal hypothesis could finally be tested 
by X2. This will be the subject of further research - it lies 
beyond the purposes of this present synopsis. I am surprised not 
to have found this suggested approach in the literature. 
Because statistical investigations of concentration normally include 
only a small proportion of a total number of business units (but 
a large proportion of total output) they are unlikely to find that 
the sample is lognormally distributed. 
5. Asymmetrical log-distribution and its consequences 
The previous sub-section reported that distributions of sales 
turnover in all of the Cranfield studies were significantly 
different from lognormal and that the logarithms of sales showed 
a positive skew. This could well be because the samples might 
represent the upper tails of lognormally distributed popula- 
tions - but this still requires empirical proof. 
If the distributions being compared had the same degree of skewness 
and kurtosis then the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve could 
still be used as unambiguous measures of inequality. This can be 
shown by reference again to the two distributions described in 
Figure 111-2 in which 100 values were distributed lognormally 
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with a mean logarithm of 2.0 and standard deviation of logarithms 
of 1.0 (distribution I) and 1.5 (distribution II). 
If we plot the Lorenz curves for the first 20 values of these 
distributions, as shown in Figure 111-4 it is apparent that these 
have the same degree of asymmetry. The proportions of the area 
between the 450 line representing equality and the Lorenz curve 
which lie left and right of the broken 450 line are the same for 
both distributions. Provided (a) the proportion of total firms 
included in the sample is constant and (b) the totality of firms 
is lognormally distributed, the Gini coefficient remains an 
unambiguous measure of inequality. The first condition is almost 
impossible to fulfil in practice, the second condition remains 
unproven. 
This does not mean that transformation to logarithms or the use 
of the Gini coefficient is invalidated. The distribution of 
logarithms of sizes of firms has been found in our own and other 
studies to have a positive skew; the distribution of the anti- 
logarithms must be even more skewed. This means that the Gini 
coefficient, while it can reflect more than one distributive 
pattern, is likely to be more reliable than the coefficient of 
variation. It is also likely to be more stable, being less 
affected than the coefficient of variation by small proportionate 
changes in the market shares of the largest firms. 
This greater stability of the Gini coefficient can be demonstrated 
from our own reports. Table 111-5 compares the variation over 
time of (i) the coefficient of variation and (ii) the Gini coeffici- 
ent of sales turnover. 
Table 111-5 Comparative Stability of Coefficient of Variation (V) 
and Gini coefficient (G) for Sales Turnover 
Industry or sub-sector 
No. of VG 
years High Low V(V) High Low V(G) 
Paper manufacture 5 2.10 2.03 . 013 . 736 . 715 . 
011 
Paper conversion 5 
Textiles (EAU) 6 
Cotton etc. 5 
Wool & worsted 6 
Hosiery & Knitwear 6 
4.09 3.49 . 055 . 831 . 
823 . 004 
2.15 1.94 . 052 . 653 . 616 . 
018 
2.12 1.80 . 054 . 707 . 663 . 021 
1.72 1.38 . 067 . 595 . 
560 . 021 
2.61 2.39 . 028 . 698 . 684 . 007 
Publishing (EAU) 8 2.27 1.86 . 082 . 705 . 656 . 027 
* V(V) and V(G) are the coefficients of variation of (i) the co- 
efficient of variation and (ii) the Gini coefficient respectively. 
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FIGURE III -4 TWO LORENZ CURVES WITH SAME 
DEGREE OF ASYMMETRY 
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Table 111-5 shows that in all seven cases the Gini coefficient 
was more stable than the coefficient of variation and, except in 
the case of paper manufacture, this difference in stability was 
quite pronounced. 
6. Concluding remarks on measures based only on inequality 
The coefficient of variation, the variance of logarithms and the 
Gini coefficient are unaffected by the number of firms as such. 
For example, the Lorenz curve based on deciles would take the same 
shape irrespective of the number of units within each 10 per cent. 
All of those who advocate the use of such measures also refer to the 
need to consider separately the number of firms. 
How important is inequality throughout the industry and how 
satisfactorily is it described by the coefficients? The coefficient 
of variation has been criticised in this section because it can be 
used as an unambiguous measure to compare distributions only when 
these are identical in terms of standard deviates. Because it is 
based on absolute numbers it is unlikely that this condition will 
be met (differing degrees of positive skewness) and it has been 
shown to be very sensitive to minor changes affecting the upper 
end of the distribution. Transformation to logarithms reduces 
but does not eliminate positive skewness - the Gini coefficient 
can be used as an unambiguous measure for comparison of distributions 
only when these are identical in terms of standard deviates of 
logarithms. This condition is more likely to be approximated 
to than is the case with absolute numbers but it is unlikely to be 
fulfilled either precisely or universally. 
There are a priori grounds for expecting a lognormal distribution 
of company size but the empirical evidence remains tenuous. 
Statistical tests based on large-firm samples are likely to show 
positive logarithmic skewness when the total population is 
lognormally distributed, because the lower tail of the distribution 
is cut off. 
Reference has already been made to the views of authors, including 
Linda of the European Communities Commission, who regard the study 
of all-industry inequality as of minor relevance to business 
concentration. Practical arguments, for example those put forward 
by Linda in the Commission's Methodology (Ref. 39, p. 16) concern 
the need to collect data for a very large number of firms, including 
units which may not always produce the information required. The 
effect of transformation to logarithms is to increase the relative 
importance of smaller units so that reliability of information is 
necessary. In principle, a finding that the 120th firm is double 
the size of the 150th, (if they have 0.02 and 0.01 per cent of 
the market) is unimportant compared with observation that the five 
largest firms have 20,17,18,15 and 8 per cent. The measures 
based only on inequality are probably only of peripheral signifi- 
cance in studies of the kind pursued in this series. 
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C. OTHER MEASURES BASED ON THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
This measure is named after two authors who developed a very similar 
measure - Hirschman in 1945 (Ref. 69) and Herfindahl in 1950 (Ref. 70). Herfindahl's formula is now used: - 
n 
)2 H=E (Xi/EXi 
i=1 
(Xi/Z Xi)2, the square of each company's share can be inter- 
preted as the probability that any two separate and equal purchases 
would be placed with the same firm. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index combines the coefficient of 
variation (V) and the number of firms included (n): - 
n 
H=E (Xi/ Ex1) = Xi2/(Z Xi)2 
i=1 
It can be shown by substitution for V that H; V2 +1 
n 
Thus defined, the maximum value of the index is 1 (where one firm 
controls the entire industry) and the minimum is 1, when all the 
n 
firms are of equal size, so that the sum of the squares of market 
shares is (n/n ). The Commission of the European Communities 
follows a convention whereby the Herfindahi-Hirschman index is 
multiplied by 1,000 (to vary between 1000/n and . 
1000). 
Strong support for H as a measure of concentration was provided 
by Hall and Tideman (Ref. 71). They proposed six properties which 
a measure of concentration "ought to have": - 
(i) The measure must be unidimensional, capable of showing 
that one distribution is more concentrated than another 
(ii) Contrary to Adelman (Ref. 48) they argue that the concentra- 
tion measure should take the whole industry (or as much as 
possible) into account, 
(iii) An increase in the share of a higher ranked firm at the, 
expense of that of a lower ranked firm should increase 
concentration 
(iv) If industry A has k times the number of firms in industry 
B and for each firm of size pi in industry A there are k 
firms of size pi/k in industry B then the concentration 
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measure for A should be 1/k times that for 8 
(v) When there are n firms of equal size the index should be 
equal to or related to 1/n 
(vi) The index should, for convenience, vary from 0 to 1 or be 
capable of transformation to this range. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman (H) was seen as having all six properties, 
though (vi) appears to me to be violated - the minimum cannot 
easily be transformed to zero. Hall and Tideman preferred to 
modify it because it is more sensitive to inequality than to 
numbers of firms. This can be shown by using the formula 
containing the coefficient of variation and the number of firms. 
Because VZ is in the numerator and n in the denominator a doubling 
of the degree of dispersion accompanied by a doubling in the number 
of'firms would lead to a rise in the index. 
An interesting conclusion of Hall and Tideman's paper is the very 
close correlation between H and four-firm concentration ratios 
for 446 industries in the U. S. Census of Production 1968. The 
coefficient of rank correlation was 0.995 and the simple linear 
correlation coefficient 0.976. 
Hall and Tideman accepted that H and their modification of it 
(which has not been more widely used and is not discussed further), 
because they are affected both by the degree of inequality and the 
number of firms, can represent widely different distributions. 
The same index can summarise a distribution with wide inequality 
but a large number of firms or one with a few firms more equal in 
size. They regarded this as inevitable but "we should expect 
that under some situations the trade off between numbers and 
inequality would be such as to allow industries with different 
size distributions to be viewed as equally concentrated". 
The ambiguity of the Herfindahl-Hirschman (H) measure is greater 
than this. In the discussion of the coefficient of variation (V), 
it was pointed out that the same coefficient could represent widely 
differing distributions and was particularly sensitive to small 
proportionate changes affecting the largest firms. Since H is 
a function of V2, these criticisms apply fortiori to it. 
The two distributions shown on page 46 above with the same 
coefficient of variation also have the same H coefficient, 
0.105 or, in the Commission's terminology 105. In one case the 
size of the largest unit is 2.7 times that of the smallest; in 
the other the ratio is less than 2.0. 
Since the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is related to the coefficient 
of variation, de Bandt rejected it (Ref. 45, p. 51) as a measure of 
concentration because of the skewness of the distribution of 
company size. He proposed a revised version based on a weighted 
geometric mean of market shares. 
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whereas H=E Xi2 =1 
EXi2 
E( Xi)2 EXi (EXt) 
de Bandt's modification =1 Xi log X. 
EXi txi 
De Bandt's modification restores to smaller firms a greater 
contribution to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The latter can 
be estimated fairly closely on the basis of the largest firms; 
inclusion of all companies is unnecessary. Nelson (Ref. 72, 
p. 19) stated-"the contribution to the total index of units ranking 
below 50th in size is so small as to have virtually no effect on its 
absolute value". 
Vanlommel et al (Ref. 57, p. 15) view the high correlation between 
H and C4 (the four-firm concentration ratio) as encouraging for 
those preferring to use the latter, simpler measure. Their 
Belgian studies related to establishments and the lower value of 
rHC4 = 0.80 may reflect this. A selection of our own results 
confirms the correlation: - 
Table IV-7 Four-firm concentration and H coefficient (turnover) 
Sector/market and date Variable H(1000) Rank 
C4 H 
Paper manufacture 1972 Sales 49.0 78.9 11 11 
conversion 1972 Sales 53.0 91.1 8 10 
Cotton, etc. 1973 Sales 56.0 103.5 7 8 
Wool & worsted 1973 Sales 41.6 62.3 14 14 
Hosiery & knit 1973 Sales 52.1 111.8 9 7 
Tyres U. K. 1975 Sales 89.2 279.8 2 2 
Tyres worldwide 1975 Sales 87.4 214.3 3 4 
Accumulators 1975 Volume 75 182 4 5 
Spark plugs 1975 Volume 96 459 1 1 
All publishing 1975 Sales 45.1 73.2 13 13 
Press 1975 Sales 50.7 97.3 10 9 
Newspaper 1975 Circ. 64.1 121.5 6 6 
Periodicals 1975 Retail sales 73.6 264.5 5 3 
School texts 1975 Purchases 45.8 76.3 12 12 
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The simple correlation coefficient between C4 and H is 0.910 
and the coefficient of rank correlation = 0.952. I have not included more than one observation for each sub-sector (over time) 
because these might not be independent observations. With 12 
degrees of freedom both coefficients are very significantly 
different from zero but the sample size is too small for calculation 
of a reasonably accurate lower confidence limits for the correlations. 
Enthusiasm for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index appears to be 
based on its ability to reflect large-firm dominance while taking 
into account all units in the industry. Its critics state that 
it is unduly influenced by larger firms in the skewed distribu- 
tion generally found. This is obviously the reason for its 
correlation with the four-firm concentration ratio. Final 
evaluation of this measure depends upon how far the users of 
concentration indices wish them to reflect the position of the 
largest units rather than describe the entire distribution. 
2. The Entropy Measure 
This concept has its origins in information theory and its 
application to business concentration was suggested by Theil et al 
in the mid- 1960's (Ref. 73 and 74). It is the weighted total of 
the logarithms of market shares 
n 
E'= cE PilogePi where P. = Xi/ 'Xi 
i=1 
Since Pi <1 the entropy measure as defined here will always be 
negative. Some authors prefer to reverse the sign and normal 
practice is to set c=1. This presentation is followed in 
certain of our explanatory notes in the reports for the E. E. C. 
The Commission prefers to set c= 100 and accept negative values - 
our statistical results reflect this. Its maximum value is zero, 
when one firm has a 100 per cent market share so that Pi =1 and 
log Pi = 0. The minimum value of E occurs when all firms are of 
equal size 1/n. In this case Pilog P. = clog n)/n and the 
total of n values is c log n. 
The entropy measure is more sensitive to the number of firms than 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. For a lognormal distribution 
E=c (S2 - logen), One important property is cardinal consistency 
2 
in response to a change in the number of firms. 
For example, if there were 32 firms of equal size in an industry 
then the-entropy index would be: - 
E= 100 x 32 x . 03125 x loge . 03125 = -346.6 
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If the number of firms fell by a quarter to 24 then 
E= 100 x 24 x . 04167 x loge . 04167 = -317.8 
If it now fell by another quarter to 18 then 
E= 100 x 18 x . 0556 x loge . 0556 = -289.0 
On each occasion the value of E has changed by 28.8, which is 
100 times the change in the logarithm of market share. 
The entropy measure has attracted relatively little attention 
in the literature on concentration. Hart in 1971 (Ref. 75) 
suggested. an entropy-related measure: - 
"Redundancy" = Emin -E=c logen -E 
Since in a lognormal distribution E=c S2 - logen Redundancy = cS 
2 
22 
and, with the arbitrary (and unnecessary! ) constant set equal to 
unity, Hart's measure becomes half the variance of the logarithms. 
This means, in the light of that author's favour towards the log- 
normal distribution and its variance, that the "redundancy" 
measure is declared redundant by its creator. 
Vanlommel et al (Ref. 57) showed that for their Belgian data the 
entropy measure was almost perfectly correlated with the four- 
firm concentration ratio C4. Substituting entropy values into 
Table 111-7 in place of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, it appears 
from our studies that the simple correlation with C4 is 0.984 and 
the rank correlation is 0.943. Our own results provide support 
(only tentative because of the sample size) for the thesis of the 
Antwerp group, that the entropy measure is even more closely 
correlated with C4 than the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. 
From this argument it is clear that the entropy and the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman measures must themselves be closely related. Vanlommel 
et al found a correlation coefficient of 0.82; our own results for 
the 14 sectors/sub-sectors shown in Table 111-7 give a simple 
correlation coefficient of 0.931 and a rank correlation 
coefficient of 0.952. V 
There are certain advantages of the entropy measure over the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index such as its greater sensitivity to 
the number of firms and its cardinal consistency in reflecting 
changes in that number. 
Further appraisal of the properties of the entropy index is being 
undertaken by econometricians in Brussels and more detailed study 
is planned at Cranfield. The shortage of time imposed by the 
deadlines for the Commission studies and the sponsor's emphasis 
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on the oligopoly measures discussed below has precluded fuller 
examination of the entropy measure, which does not appear to have 
been analysed extensively elsewhere. 
3. The Rosenbluth Index 
This index is not prescribed by the Commission and is mentioned 
here because it is the only widely used index which is not so 
prescribed. Designed by Rosenbluth in the 1950's (Ref. 76), 
it combines the Gini coefficient (G) and the number of firms (n) 
R= 1 where P1 = Xi/ EXi and firms 
arranged in descending order, 
i=1 for the largest unit. 
are 
n 
2(iE, iPi - 0.5) 
so that 
Buyse (Ref. 77) points out the relationship between R and G. 
R= 1 
n(1-G) 
The minimum value of the index, when G=0, is 
I/n 
and the 
maximum value when G= (n-l)/n and n=1 is 1. 
The Rosenbluth index is less sensitive to small changes affecting 
the largest units than either the Herfindahl-Hirschman index or 
the entropy measure. The term ipi is such that falling values of 
p1 are compensated by increasing i, whereas the Herfindahi measure 
uses pit. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Since concentration depends partly upon the number of units in a 
distribution and partly upon the degree of inequality among those units, 
any single measure which is determined by both elements is likely to 
be ambiguous. 
In this chapter I have attempted to summarise the argument that 
inequality is likely to be measured more consistently by use of indices 
relating to the logarithms of size. Such measures include the Gini 
coefficient and the variance of logarithms; they would be preferred 
to the coefficient of variation of absolute size, which is likely to be 
unduly sensitive to changes in the sizes of the largest firms. All 
three measures are unaffected by the number of firms and could not 
be used alone to describe concentration. 
Because it is related to the coefficient of variation, the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index will also. be considerably affected by small changes in 
the sizes of the largest firms. The Entropy measure appears to have 
certain advantages which justify more attention than it has so far 
received. More detailed study of this and of the Rosenbluth index 
will form part of further research at Cranfield into this subject. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Commission's interest in concentration is due mainly to its 
implications for dominance and the market. In Chapter One, section C, 
was described the Commission's emphasis on the study of oligopoly and 
the philosophy which underlies its approach to the analysis of oligopoly 
an approach which measures interdependence, inequality and dynamism. 
In Chapter Three it was pointed out that several authors have argued 
that statistical measurement of concentration needs to focus upon the 
largest firms. A further quotation, this time from Adelman (Ref. 48, 
p. 4-5) serves to emphasise their view: - 
.. our interest in the phenomena. of big business and industrial concentration is not confined to the primary 
focus of great inequality of distribution; it is con- 
cerned also with small absolute numbers. What we are really 
trying to describe are the very small number of very large 
firms and their place in the economy". 
Because of the large positive skew usually found in distributions of 
company sizes the Herfindahl-Hirschman and the Entropy index, which are 
influenced by absolute numbers are both very sensitive to changes in 
the size of the largest firms. Some critics view this as a weakness; 
others regard the high correlation with C4 as a strength. However, 
these two indices are not specifically designed for the study of 
oligopoly. Following Adelman's argument there appears to be a case for 
examination of the comparative strength'of the largest firms - for 
examining the degree of inequality among those enterprises who form 
an oligopoly group. 
B. EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE INEQUALITY WITHIN OLIGOPOLY 
1. Exponential Functions (Simple and Modified) 
Adelman (Ref. 48 pp. 7-8) suggested a measure of relative size 
based on concentration ratios. If Cr represents the combined 
proportion of sales accounted for by the r largest firms 
rn 
(Cr =EXE X) then a measure of average inequality would 
i=l i=l i 
be the coefficient b in the equation: - 
Cr =1- e-br 
Adelman went on to describe trials of this equation at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology which indicated that it 
was insufficiently flexible. 
A test on the sales turnover of the 20 largest firms in publishing 
in 1975 revealed the problem: - 
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if Cr =1- e-br 
Then Loge(1 - Cr) = -br 
On values of r=1 to 20 the equation for the publishing data 
gave the value of b as 0.09768 but, although the R2 value was 0.87, 
the curve did not describe e relationship correctly. This is 
obvious from the graph (curve I in FigurelV-1). The Durbin-Watson 
coefficient was 0.039, though this information is clearly of 
academic interest only. 
Two corrections were then attempted; the first recognised that 
the values of Cr were based on a sample which included 90.7 
per cent of total publishing sales. The concentration ratios were 
adjusted accordingly and the equation tested was 
Loge(1 - 0.907C r) _ -0.0873r 
This correction did not affect the predicted values of Cr at all 
significantly - if the resulting curve were superimposed on Figure 
V-1, it would correspond with curve II. 
The second correction was the inclusion of another constant in 
the equation, which now became 
Loge(1 - Cr) =a- br 
or 1- Cr = eae-br 
This equation gave a much closer result, depicted on Figure IV-2. 
Loge(1 - Cr) _ -. 30213 - 0.07557r R2 = 0.976 
DW=0.154 
Despite the higher value of R2, the Durbin-Watson coefficient 
confirms the (visually evident) existence of autocorrelation. 
Figure IV-2 indicates that the modified exponential function cannot 
describe the actual relationship between Cr and r because of the 
discontinuity which occurs at r=6. For values of r from 2 to 6, 
the change in the logarithm of r) varies between -0.11 and 
-0.14. Beyond this point the change varies between -0.063 and 
-0.087. The second derivative at this--point has its highest 
absolute value. 
This discontinuity in the concentration ratio curve may be interpreted as a demarcation between two groups -a threshold in size between a group of distinctly larger firms to the left and 
other firms to the right. The firms to the left, if they are 
few in number may constitute an oligopoly group. In this case, 
their combined market share of the six is 57 per cent, that of the 
six next largest firms is only 15 per cent. 
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FIGUREIV-I CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN U. K. PUBLISHING 1975 
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FIGURE IV-2 CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN U. K. PUBLISHING 1975 
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2. Hart's Summary Concentration Measure 
Although Hart has consistently urged the use of the variance of 
the lognormal distribution as a measure of business concentration, 
he has also proposed (Ref. 75) as an indicator of oligopolistic 
concentration the mean of concentration ratios over a standard 
range: - 
r 
Br =1 Cr where r is an arbitrary number assigned 
r consistently in all cases; the r firms are 
ranked in descending order. 
Br becomes a weighted average of market shares - the weight of the 
ith largest firm being (r -i+ 1). 
For example if p represents the proportion of the market held by 
firm i, then with r=3, 
B3 = [P1 + (Pl + P2) + (PI + P2 + P3)] 
_ (3p1 + 2P2 + pl) 
This weighted average is a useful summary measure, reflecting 
not only the combined strength of the r firms but also the degree 
of concentration within the group. It does not make possible 
identification of the oligopoly group and the choice of r remains 
a somewhat arbitrary decision. 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LINDA INDEX UP TO 1977 
One of the main advantages of the Linda index is its apparent power 
to determine the cut-off point referred to in Section B. It-was not 
originally designed for this purpose: work on the index by Linda 
himself and by other economic statisticians has led to changes in the 
application of the concept and interpretation of the results. This 
section is a chronological survey of this evolution. 
The definition of the Linda index remains that first published in 
1967 (Ref. 36). If n firms are ranked in descending order of size (x): - 
n-1 
Ln =1 (n-i) A" 
n(n-1) i (1-Ai) 
i=1 
i 
where Ai =E Xi E xj 
j=1 j=1 
This index reflects both the number of firms and the inequality 
between them. It may be considered as an average of (n-1) ratios 
of inequality, which is then divided by n to adjust for the 
number of firms. 
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-a 
To the reader who is encountering the Linda index for the first 
time, its disadvantage may be apparent. This is its complexity. 
The mathematical properties of the index can be analysed only by 
iterative computation. 
The greater the Linda index for any given value of n, the greater the 
degree of inequality between the n firms. The smaller the value of n, 
the greater the interdependence among those firms. 
1. Application and Interpretation of the Linda Index 1967-71 
In his 1967 paper Linda defined n as the smallest number of firms 
with a combined market share exceeding 80 per cent. In this he 
was following Rosenbiuth (Ref. 76). As well as Ln he also defined 
the following conceptual measures: - 
M= the maximum value of EOi/n within the 
(n-1) cases of EOi 
where EOi = Ai - (1-Ai) _ (n-i Ai 
i (n-i) i(1-Ai) 
EO = equilibre oligopolistique 
i* = the value of i at which P1 occurs 
PL = 
1/n 
which is the value which would be taken by 
the Linda index if all firms are of equal size 
I shall demonstrate these measures with a numerical example. 
Let us consider two distributions of five firms: - 
Firm (i) Series A% share Series B% share 
1 1000 29.75 1000 39.49 
2 800 23.80 800 31.60 
3 640 19.04 300 11.85 
4 512 15.23 240 9.48 
5 409.6 12.18 192 7.58 
3361.6 2532 
Let us now take n=5 and show the computation of L5 and the 
identification of M and i* 
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TableIV-1 Computation of Linda index and associated measures for 



























2.5176 = 0.6294 
1 4 
In Series B, M is 0.7377 and i* is 2. This demarcation point 
corresponds to a discontinuity in the series,. since xi = 0.8 xi_l 
except for x3 = 0.375x2. Linda described the i* firms as a 
"sub-group with abnormal power" (Ref. 36) and in his 1972 article 
defined (M-L) as the intensity of domination. 
Reference to the results for Series A identifies a weakness: 
i* cannot exceed (n-1). The value of M (0.3605) corresponds 
to the fourth firm but one cannot state that there is a discon- 
tinüity between the fourth and fifth firm. 
Morvan (Ref. 44) preferred a simpler interpretation of Linda's 
conceptual framework. Two results were important: - 
n= the number of firms accounting for at least 80 per 
cent of the market 
Ln-PL = the divergence between the degree of inequality among 
the n firms, as indicated by the Linda index, and 
complete equality which would be given by a Linda index 
equal to 1/n. Morvan called 1/n the "Modele 
Concurrentiel" (MC) but it is equivalent to Linda's PL. 
Used in this way, the Linda index was sAmilar to Hart's summary 
measure. It did not define the oligopoly group. 
2. The Application of the Linda Methodology 1972-7 
0 
In his 1972 paper (Ref. 37pp. 375 et seq. ) Linda asserted that 
the index could be used to define an oligopolistic group within 
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a sample of n firms. This is done by the calculation of the Linda 
index for the n* largest of the n firms, for n* = 2, n* =3 etc. 
until a minimum, value is found. He quotes from a paper published 
in 1971 by R. Buyse (Ref. 78) "The oligopolistic arena ends at 
the lowest point of the Linda curve .., this definition is from the standpoint of mathematical logic rigorously objective". 
(see footnote*) 
Support for this view was also provided by Marfels (Ref. 61). 
The first value of n*(n*m) at which a minimum value of ln* occurs 
is the number of firms which form the oligopoly group. A minimum 
was defined as a value of the Linda index which is preceded and 
followed by higher values: - 
Ln*m-1 >Ln*m <L n*m+l 
(see footnote**) 
The Linda index used in this way serves two purposes - identifica- 
tion of the oligopolistic group and measurement of the degree of 
inequality within that group. S ni ce it incorporates lJn* it 
also reflects the number of firms and the degree of interdependence 
between them. 
Over the period 1972-7 Linda introduced a number of elaborations 
of his methodology for analysis of oligopoly. These are described 
in his 1976 publication (Ref. 39) and also appear in the textiles, 
vehicle accessories and publishing reports. They include Ln*m the 
first minimum of the Linda function with respect to n*, which has 
just been described and to which we shall return. They also 
include: - 
(i) Ln*h = the first maximum value of Ln* 
(ii) Ls = index of synthesis, which is the mean of values of 
Ln* from n* =2 to n* = n*m 
(iii) The matrices of oligopoli'stic interdependence based on 
rankings of variables by Ls and Ln*n' 
* This is my own translation of part of Linda's quotation from 
Buyse. 
** This conforms also with Linda's 1976 definition (Ref. 39 
p. 19) but there are also cases where L2 < L3. In these cases 
L2 is deemed a minimum, according to recent verbal instructions 
from Linda, but there are interpretation problems, discussed on 
pages 81 and 82 below. 
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Following discussions with some of the leaders of research teams 
working on this series of concentration studies (including 
Cranfield), Linda is proposing to revise this methodology and 
these three particular elaborations are likely to be withdrawn or 
substantially modified. I do not propose to discuss them here 
since I do not think that they form an important part of the work 
completed at Cranfield. 
Although the "coefficient of dominance" (M) and the "sub-group 
with abnormal power" (i*) were again described in Linda's 1972 
article, they have received progressively less attention in sub- 
sequent presentations by Linda himself and were not mentioned in 
the 1976 methodology document (Ref. 39). 
One application of the Linda index and associated measures, by 
Linda himself, has been to comparison of inequalities within 
different variables. The interpretation of the results is 
discussed in Section G below (p. 89). 
D. VALIDATION OF THE LINDA INDEX 
1. Introduction 
Since 1972 the Linda index has been used to determine the 
"oligopolistic arena", as well as to measure the degree of ine- 
quality between the oligopolists and their interdependence. How 
effectively does it perform these functions? 
I have already pointed out that this index can be analysed only 
by iteration. Support for this conclusion is provided by Marfels 
(Ref. 61p. 255-7). In this section I shall summarise some of the 
relevant results from the four Cranfield studies and shall then 
examine some theoretical issues surrounding the existence of a 
minimum of the Linda index. The comments are confined entirely to 
results based on sales turnover or market share; discussion of the 
application of the methodology to other variables appears in 
Section G below. 
Let us first examine the application of the Linda index to the 20 
largest values of sales turnover in publishing in 1975, to which 
were fitted (in Section 6.1 above) exponential and modified 
exponential curves. 
Table IV-2 shows the concentration ratios and Linda indices. 
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Table IV-2 Publishing industry turnover (EAU) in 1975 - 
Concentration Ratios and Linda indices 
No. of 
firms (n*) -n -n* 
n* ýn* ýn 
(%) 11 70.2 0.309 
1 18.9 - 12 72.2 0.293 
2 29.9 0.861 13 74.0 0.280 
3 39.0 0.586 14 75.5 0.275 
4 45.1 0.522 15 . 76.9 0.270 
5 51.0 0.428 16 78.0 0.268 
6 56.9 0.352 17 79.1 0.265 
7 60.3 0.355 18 80.1 0.260 
8 63.4 0.339 19 81.1 0.256 
9 65.8 0.336 20 82.0 0.252 
10 68.1 0.321 
It can be seen that the Linda index has its first minimum value 
at n* = 6, the point at which a discontinuity occurs in the 
concentration ratio curve in Figure IV-1. 
This relationship between the first minimum of the Linda index 
and the discontinuity in the concentration ratios is shown 
graphically in the paper and textile studies. The graphs for 
board packaging (Ref. 1, p. 78) and for cotton spinning and weaving 
(Ref. 2, p, 168) provide clear illustrations. 
It should be noted that n*m, the size of the oligopoly group as 
defined by the first minimum of the Linda index may often 
correspond with i* - the definition of the "sub-group with abnormal 
power" in Linda's original 1967 presentation. 
Let us take again the two distributions analysed in Table IV-1: - 
Series A: - 1000,800,640,512,409.6 
Series B: - 1000,800,300,240,192 
Linda indices for these distributions are presented in Table 
IV-3 
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Table IV-3 Linda indices for Series A and B 
n* Linda index (A) 
2 0.6250 
3 0.4659 
4 q. 3907 
5 0.3495 





The value of L2 is a minimum in the sense that it is followed by 
a higher value. * It shows an oligopolistic arena of two. This 
was previously indicated by M (See Table V-Ij, now omitted from 
Linda's methodology. 
2. Linda indices in the four Cranfield projects 
(a) Paper manufacture and conversion 
In neither of these broad industry classes was there a minimum 
point for n* less than 40 in the Linda curves for sales turnover, 
in any of the five years analysed. This is because there was no 
marked discontinuity in the concentration ratios. Yet these were 
concentrated industries: the four-firm concentration ratios in 
1968 were 50.6 and 54.9 respectively. No distinct group of large 
firms was identified, within which firms might consider each other 
as competitors while being able to ignore the "fringes" beyond. 
(Linda's terminology). If oligopoly signifies the existence of 
such a group then no oligopoly existed. 
Within product groups, "oligopolistic arenas" were identified in 
most cases, reflecting specialisation by some of the larger firms. 
Results are summarised in Table IV-4, for 1968 and 1972. 
Table IV-4 Paper industry study - Minimum Values of Linda Curves 
1968 1972 
n*m Cn*m Ln*m n*m Cn*m Ln*m 
Manufacture 
Printing & writing 4 70 0.58 3 58 0.82 
Packaging paper 6 88 0.73 5 85 0.72 
Board 3 76 0.80 3 71 0.62 
Conversion 
Stationery 2 84 1.17 2 83 1.55 
Packaging (not board) 2 57 0.86 2 57 0.94 
Board packaging no minimum n* less than 90 
* The interpretation problems arising when n* =2 are discussed in 
sub-section 3. 
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These results show that the definition of the oligopoly group is 
not much influenced by the combined concentration ratio the 
major determinant is the discontinuity. 
(b) Textiles 
At the time of the textiles study there was increasing interest 
among institutions working for the Commission in this phenomenon of 
the oligopoly group. A summary table in the textiles report 
(Ref. 2 p. 70) reveals a number of interesting problems in the 
application of the concept. 
The results show the existence of an oligopoly in the combination 
of the three sub-sections - cotton, wool and hosiery. In 1968-70 five firms (Courtaulds, Coats, Tootal, Carrington and 
Dewhurst and Viyella)formed an oligopoly. In 1971 the merging of 
the last two companies resulted in a reduction of the oligopoly 
to four firms but the expansion of Illingworth Morris brought it 
within the "oligopolistic arena" as defined by the Linda index in 
1972. The statistical analysis here confirms common observation - 
this group of large firms with widespread textile interests stands 
apart from other organisations which specialise in one or more 
sub-sectors of the industry. 
Within these sub-sectors the definition of oligopoly varies 
erratically. In wool the Linda anal""sis showed an oligopoly of 
six firms in 1968 'with a combined share of sales turnover of 
48 per cent; from 1969 to 1971 no similar small group was 
identified - but concentration had not diminished. Minor changes in shares had led to the disappearance of the Linda minimum; 
in 1972 and 1973 it returned, to indicate a duopoly. In cotton, 
the oligopoly similarly disappeared in 1973 though changes in 
concentration ratios were negligible. In hosiery an oligopoly 
was identified in 1968 (seven firms), 1969 (eight firms) and 
1973 (eight); in the intervening years no group was identified. 
The apparent inconsistency of the definition reflects the existence 
of a critical degree of discontinuity in concentration ratios. If 
that critical degree is exceeded, however slightly, a minimum value 
of L occurs; if it is not reached, by however small a margin, no 
minimum occurs. This is explained further in the next sub- 
section. 
(c) Vehicle accessories (tyres, spark plugs and accumulators) 
This report concerned oligopolies since only large firms are 
involved in the high volume supply of the products. The Linda 
index showed minimum values within the sample for the last two 
years of the data for tyres and this lent statistical support 
to the view that the three largest firms were emerging as 
distinctly powerful competitors within the group of six. With 
batteries and spark plugs also, for which the indices were based 
on market shares the Linda analysis confirmed expectations based 
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on qualitative information. 
(d) Publishing 
For publishing as a whole the Linda index for sales turnover 
snowed a group of seven companies as an oligopoly from 1968 to 
1973. In 1974 this distinction disappeared but reappeared in 
1975 although the "oligopolistic arena" now contained only six 
contenders (Ref. 4 pp. 20-1). 
The Press is more concentrated than general publishing but, the 
Linda index for sales turnover reached minimum values in 1968, 
1973 and 1975 at seven, ten and seven firms. The concentration 
ratios for these groups were very high - 77,78 and 70 per cent. 
One might have expected smaller groups to be defined - although the 
importance of classified advertising for firms outside the large- 
circulation "giants" brings their sales revenue sufficiently 
close to that of these large firms to prevent the occurrence of 
a substantial discontinuity. When the statistical analysis is 
applied to circulation (ibid. p. 85) oligopolies of four firms in 
1968 and five in 1975 are identified - News International 
joining at the latter date the four earlier contenders: 
Reed, Beaverbrook, Daily Mail and Thomson. 
The absence of an oligopoly in the supply of school text-books 
. is apparent from the results of our survey and, once again, 
the 
Linda index confirmed expectations. 
3. Some experimental tests of the Linda minimum and consequent 
conclusions 
The summary of the results from the four Cranfield reports of the 
application of the Linda index to sales turnover demonstrated that, 
in general, the minimum point identified a recognisable oligopoly. 
The index itself or rather (Ln*m - 1/n*m) can then be used to 
describe inequality within that group. 
(a) One difficulty, particularly evident in the textiles report, 
is that the existence of a minimum depends on the degree of 
discontinuity in size. That degree is a continuous variable 
but once a threshold level is exceeded a discrete change in n*m 
occurs. As already emphasised, the critical point can be identified 
only by iteration and defined only by example. 
Let us consider two distributions of ten values: - 
Series C: 1000,800,640,512, and six values of 323. 
and 
Series D: 1000,800,640,512 and six values of 324. 
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" The total of Series C is 4890 and that of Series D is 4896. 
For the two distributions, the Linda coefficients and concentration 
ratios are as follows: - 





















































For Series C the Linda index has a minimum at n* =4 suggesting 
an oligopoly of four firms; for Series D no minimum is indicated. 
The distinction appears to be arbitrary: the difference between 
the two distributions can have no economic significance. It is 
clearly within-the range of errors in data collection. 
Although this is a hypothetical example, one must emphasise that 
a dividing line of the kind shown in Table IV-5 was crossed 
between successive years in the textiles study. Tables 24 of 
the textiles report (Ref. 2 p. 70) shows that a boundary of this 
kind was crossed on six occasions - revealed by big changes in 
the number of "oligopolists". One refinement of the application 
of the Linda index would be some assessment of the degree of 
discontinuity - how distinct is the oligopoly? A refinement 
proposed by another researcher, working on similar contracts 
in Germany, is described in the next section. This refinement does 
not overcome the criticism that no oligopoly at all is identified 
for Series 0- it is the discrete, "yes/no" conclusion of the 
analysis which gives ground for concern. 
(b) In his presentation of the index in both the 1972 article 
(Ref. 37) and the 1976 Methodology document (Ref. 39), Linda 
illustrates the minimum by using a series where xi = xi_1/k 
where k>1. 
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For example a series where k=2 might be as follows: - 
100,50,25,12.5 etc. 
Contrary to my own expectations (even in this case the use of 
calculus appears abortive), the Linda index for this series has 
a minimum at n* = 3. In an attempt to arrive at some means of 
mathematical determination of such minima, the calculation of 
Linda indices was applied to series of this form with values of 
k ranging from 1.2 to 4.0. The results are presented in Table IV-6; 
each series consisted of 30 observations. 
Table 1V-6 First minima of Linda functions with constant ratios 
Ratio constant (k) n*m Ln*m CR 
1.2 11 0.2487 88.9 
1.4 6 0.4587 86.8 
1.6 4 0.6411 84.7 
1.8 3 0.8057 82.9 
2.0 3 0.9444 87.5 
3.0 2 1.5000 88.9 
4.0 2 2.0000 93.8 
Table IV-6 shows very little - there is no apparent functional 
relationship between k and n*m. One conclusion which does emerge 
is that for high values of k, n*m = 2. By chance, an ambiguity 
has been identified. Since with k=4 the first firm is four 
times the size of the second and has 75 per cent of the total 
market (0.8 times 93.8), one might conclude that here was a 
monopoly rather than a duopoly. When n*m =2 the Linda minimum is 
ambiguous; the absolute value of L must be used to determine 
whether the situation is one of balanced duopoly or monopoly. 
(c) A third test was the application of the Linda analysis to 
99 values of ex, where x is normally distributed with a mean of 
2.0. Table IV-7 shows the results of this test. The conclusion 
is that unless the distribution of logarithms has a standard 
deviation more than double its mean there is no Linda minimum 
at values of n* less than 10 per cent of the total sample. At 
the point where s=4.0, the concentration ratio for the 10 per 
cent of firms would be 99.5 and the Gini coefficient much closer 
to unity than has been observed in any of our own studies. 
The existence of a minimum value of the Linda index at small 
values of n* appears to contradict the lognormal hypothesis. 
The fact that the test is applied in practice only to the upper 
tail of the distribution does not invalidate it. This pre- 
liminary conclusion requires further research, for example into 
the standard error of the Linda coefficient but it is of some 
relevance to the arguments concerning the existence of the log- 
normal distribution. 
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Table IV-7 The Lognormal distribution and the Linda Analysis 
S Gini n*m Ln*m CR 
1.0 0.527 80 0.0570 96.9 
2.0 0.862 52 0.3532 98.3 
3.0 0.966 26 2.3272 99.2 
4.0 0.985 10 12.1103 99.5 
5.0 0.989 6 46.1878 99.8 
Note: S= standard deviation of x, which has a mean of 2.0 
coefficients are derived from distribution of ex. 
E. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LINDA INDEX 
Following discussions with representatives of some of the research 
organisations working on this series of studies, including 
Professor Fleischmann of the University of Frankfurt, the Market 
Structure Division of the Directorate General for Competition now 
proposes to amend the existing methodology. These proposals have 
been presented verbally only within the few days before the writing 
of this report; because they relate to basic principles and sub- 
stantially change the application of the Linda index, they are 
summarised here. 
1. Redefinition of the Linda minimum 
Because two firms may form an oligopolistic arena the formal 
definition of a minimum has been changed to the first value of 
n* for which the Linda index is lower than that for n* + 1. This 
means that n* =2 can define the oligopoly. In the Cranfield 
reports, we have anticipated this change because the previous 
formal definition by the Commission: - 
Ln*m-1 > Ln*m < Ln*m+l (Ref. 39, p. 19) 
rules out the possibility of oligopoly with two contenders 
(duopoly). 
Instances of duopoly are quoted for manufactured stationery 
and non-board packaging in the paper study, for woollen textiles 
in 1972 and 1973 and for motor vehicle batteries in 1975. The 
change in the formal definition is necessary but there remains 
the need to refer to the absolute size of L2 in order to identify 
whether one of the two firms in the "oligopolistic arena" may be 
dominant (see previous section, p. 81). 
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2. The degree of oligopoly 
An oligopoly is identified whenever a discontinuity in the 
sequence of concentration ratios is sufficient to cause a 
minimum point of the Linda curve. The degree of isolation of the 
oligopolistic group from competition by other firms depends upon 
the degree of discontinuity. 
A numerical measurement of this degree of discontinuity (so far 
described only by a French title - "degre de rupture") has been 
suggested by Fleischmann. It is as follows: - 
100 Ln*m+k - Ln*m) where Ln*m+k is the first maximum value of L 
Ln*m 
beyond the first minimum yalue, k denoting the difference between 
the value of n* at which this maximum occurs and n*m. By "maximum" 
is meant any value of Ln* such that 
Ln*-1 < Ln* > Ln*+1 
The calculation and apparent validity of this concept may be 
illustrated by data from the publishing study. In Table IV-2 
above I showed that the Linda index identified an "oligopolistic 
arena" in the distribution of sales revenue (from all sources) 
in publishing in 1975, this arena consisted of six firms. 
The analysis of newspaper circulation in London and South-East 
England (copies sold per week) showed an oligopoly of four firms 
which was much more distinct. Table IV-9 and Figure IV-3 show 
these two applications. 
Table IV-9 Definition of Oligopoly in U. K. Publishing Turnover 
and in Newspaper Circulation in South-East England 1975 
U. K. PUBLISHING TURNOVER NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION 
Share of Linda Share of Linda 
i/n* firm i(%) coefficient 1/n* firm i(%) coefficient 
1 18.9 - 1 23.3 - 
2 10.0 0.861 2 19.7 0.593 
3 9.1 0.586 3 18.6 0.397 
4 6.1 0.522 4 15.9 0.319 
5 5.9 0.428 5 6.0 0.414 
6 5.9 0.352 6 5.6 0.408 
7 3.4 0.355 7 2.9 0.474 
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0.339 8 2.1 
0.336 9 1.9 




It is clear from the graph and from the table that a minimum 
occurs in the Linda coefficient when there is a pronounced 
decrease in the ratio of the size of firm i to that of firm 
i-1. * For U. K. publishing turnover as a whole, such a decrease 
occurs at i=7, and this step decrease generates a Linda 
minimum at n* = 6. The step is not a very large one - the 
series of ratios is 0.53,0.91,0.67,0.97,0.98,0.57. For 
newspaper circulation the corresponding series is 0.85,0.94, 
0.85,0.38 -a much more pronounced step. 
For U. K. publishing turnover the "degre de rupture" as defined 
above is 
100(0.355 - 0.352) = 0.85 per cent 
0.352 
For newspaper circulation in S. E. England it is 
100(0.414 - 0.319) = 29.8 per cent 
0.319 
Since the existence of an "oligopolistic arena" is determined by 
a somewhat arbitrary dividing line, a measure of the degree to 
which that dividing line is exceeded appears to be a valuable 
addition to the Linda methodology. 
The "degre de rupture", since it measures the degree of isolation 
of the oligopolist from the other firms in the industry may also 
be positively associated with the incentive for these companies 
to collude or to agree to a detente on competition. This measure 
appears more flexible than the "coalition potential" suggested 
by Miller (Ref. 47) and given that title by Vanlommel et al 
(Ref. 57). This latter measure is (Cß - C4) or, as transformed 
by the Belgian authors (C8 - C4)/C4. The main weakness of this 
measure is the arbitrary choice of four and eight-firm concentration 
ratios. This reflects convenience for use of U. S. statistics 
and has no theoretical basis. 
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3. The degree of inequality within the oligopolistic arena 
In the proposals now under consideration this would be measured 
by 
Ln*m - 1/n*m 
This measure follows the suggestion of Morvan (Ref. 44) except 
that the oligopolistic arena is now defined by the first minimum 
of the Linda index. This adjustment enables one to compare 
relative strengths within oligopoly groups. For example in 
1968 in the productio of packaging paper an oligopoly group of 
six firms was identified with a Linda coefficient of 0.73; 
in the production of packaging using such paper a duopoly was 
indicated with a Linda coefficient of 0.86. 
The degree of inequality in these two cases would be measured 
in the new methodology as 0.56 (that is 0.73-0.17) and 0.36 
(that is 0.86-0.50). 
4. Consequent changes in the Linda methodology 
The implementation of these proposals will mean major changes in 
the presentation of results. In particular Ln*h (the first 
maximum of the Linda index) will cease to be important as such, 
though L2 which describes the relation between the sizes of the 
largest firms) will continue to be noted. The first "matrix of 
oligopolistic interdependence" will be redesigned with probably 
reduced emphasis also on Ls. Because these changes will be so 
extensive and because they result in part from my own criticism, 
I have not described the first matrix of oligopolistic inter- 
dependence in this summary. In the form in which it appears in 
the vehicle accessories and publishing reports I believe it adds 
little to the analysis but is very complex and would require 
lengthy explanation. 
F. THE DEGREE OF DYNAMISM 
It has already been stressed in Chapter One that Linda does not regard 
the existence of oligopoly or inequality within oligopoly as diminished 
competition nor does he consider that these features as such should be 
grounds for public concern. Such public concern should be arounsed 
when an oligopoly is also accompanied by rigidity: evidence of 
competition is to be found in changes in market share. 
An index of dynamism is defined by Linda (Ref. 39, p. 73) as 
d n* -y . t-1 where pi =x/ Ex. and the two vertical 
i-1 lines indicate the use of absolute value. 
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The maximum of this index is 1.00 or 100 per cent and the minimum 0. 
The index of dynamism was introduced to the methodology only in 1976 
and appears only in the vehicle accessories and publishing reports 
(Ref. 3, pp. 68-9) and Ref. 4 p. 21). 
This summary measure can be similar for many different kinds of changes. 
In particular it does not distinguish between increases and decreases 
in concentration. Let us compare the structures of publishing and 
tyres in the United Kingdom in 1970 and 1974, confining the analysis 
to the six largest publishing firms (which formed an oligopoly in 
1975). 
Table V-10 Dynamism among Six Largest Firms in Tyres (U. K. ) 
and Publishing 1970-5 
Tyres - market share Publishing-share of total of 6 
Firm 1970 1975 Change 1970 1975 Change 
1 46.46 43.51 -2.95 41.34 33.22 -8.12 
2 16.37 14.58 -1.79 16.50 19.33 +2.83 
3 15.69 24.18 +8.49 11.93 10.37 -1.56 
4 8.11 6.95 -1.16 11.60 10.72 -0.88 
5 7.18 6.06 -1.12 10.95 15.99 +5.04 
6 6.19 4.72 -1.47 8.00 10.37 +2.37 
Absolute change 16.98 Absolute change 20.80 
Dynamism index 8.49% Dynamism 10.40% 
or 0.085 or 0.104 
In the tyres industry the dynamism was due to increased market share 
obtained by one firm (Michelin) obtained through aggressive marketing 
policies; in publishing the changes were more complex. 
Linda himself admitted the limitations of this measure, (or, more 
precisely a derivative of it which is now no longer part of the 
methodology) in his 1972 article (Ref. 37, p. 401). However he 
emphasised that a low value of the dynamism index, implying rigidity 
of market shares, should attract the attention of those authorities 
concerned with maintenance of competition. Such a value implied either 
(a) An absence of competition due to collusion or 
inert coexistence or 
(b) Competitive strategies were mutually compensating. 
The second case might be one of wasteful competition, which itself 
might merit investigation. 
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In his 1972 article (Ref. 37) Linda suggested that the index of dynamism 
might also be calculated for firms within the oligopoly. One problem 
here is the changing definition of that group but, in principle, 
the suggestion appears to have merit, though it is not applied in the 
current methodology. 
G. AN EVALUATION OF THE LINDA METHODOLOGY 
1. General Comments 
In Section B of this chapter were considered some of the earlier 
attempts to measure inequality within an oligopoly. The main 
defect of these measures was their inability to reflect any 
discontinuity in the size-distribution of the largest firms - that 
is their failure to define and therefore to analyse specifically 
the oligopoly group. 
The Linda index is not based (since 1972) on a. preconceived 
definition of oligopoly, e. g. the first r firms or the number of 
firms accounting for x per cent of the market. It enables the 
researcher to identify the "oligopolistic arena" and to study 
inequality within it. The proposed changes described in Section E 
should be the final stage in the perfection of the system of 
indices, which has evolved through empirical work over the past 
ten years. 
The main weakness of the index remains its complexity. Because 
mathematical analysis can be undertaken only by iterative 
computation, the behaviour of the index under different conditions 
can be determined only by this same means - trial and error. 
Unfortunately the range of conditions is almost infinite. 
A particular problem arises with the occurrence of minimum values 
of the index, which are the criteria for definition of the oligopo- 
listic arenas. This fine dividing line illustrated by hypo- 
thetical example and by reference to the results of the textiles 
and publishing studies creates difficulties of interpretation. 
Measurement of the degree of discontinuity will enable future 
research teams to quantify the degree of separation of the 
oligopoly group when such a group is identified. Cases where a 
Linda minimum only just fails to occur will remain ignored - not 
enough empirical work may yet have been completed for this yes/no 
criterion to be firmly accepted. 
The index of dynamism is more comprehensible than the Linda index. 
The reasoning which underlies it appears logical and has intuitive 
appeal. It would be interesting to use this index as an independent 
variable in statistical studies like some of those described in 
Chapter One which seek to explain variations in company profits. 
2. Refinements appearing in the later reports (The three matrices) 
The first "matrix of oligopolistic interdependence" based on 
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combinations of parameters derived from the Linda curves is likely 
to be discontinued. This matrix presents the rankings of different 
variables according to these parameters (Ls and Ln*h). The 
parameters themselves have been questioned by those working for the 
Commission and comparison of Linda indices for different variables 
is, in my view, of doubtful validity. This is discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
The second matrix of oligopolistic interdependence is based on 
rankings of firms according to two performance ratios; 
net profit before tax and net profit 
before tax 
sales equity 
These rankings are compared with ranking by turnover and profit. 
My own view is that these and many relationships are better 
examined by more conventional statistical methods, particularly 
regression analysis and rank correlation. This latter approach was 
adopted in all four studies, with no significant results and was 
discussed on page 13 above. 
The third matrix is a comparison of the degree of dynamism in 
sales turnover and profits. Again, I believe such comparisons 
to be of dubious validity for reasons explained in the next 
sub-section. 
3. Application of Linda analysis to different variables 
One application of the system of Linda indices and the index of 
dynamism has been to comparison of inequality and change in 
different variables. Linda himself has presented such analyses 
relating to Italian industry (Ref. 80, summarised in Ref. 39 
pp. 44-5 and 74-5). The main conclusion of these studies has 
been that profits have been both less evenly distributed among 
firms and more volatile. 
There are some statistical problems in some of these comparisons 
which result from the differences in ranking of firms according 
to the two variables. These are identified in Appendix B of the 
paper study (Ref. 1). An equally important point is that unless 
revenue (RI-and costs (C) are perfectly and linearly correlated 
then the degree of relative inequality in (R-C) must be greater 
than that in R. The statistical proof of this on pp. 39-41 
seems to invalidate conclusions based on comparison of Linda 
indices for different variables. 
A similar comment may be applied to the index of dynamism. If 
both R and C are subject to random fluctuations then the relative 
degree of fluctuation in (R-C) will be greater than that in R. 
The statistical proof of this can be derived from that on p. 39, 
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4. A final comment on these observations 
It should be emphasised that all of these observations have been 
discussed with Dr. Linda and his colleagues in the Directorate- 
General for Competition. The Commission's representatives have 
welcomed such observations from research teams and appear to 
regard them as a necessary element in the continuing refinement of 
the methods adopted for analysis of concentration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE 
VALUE AND DIRECTION OF THE RESEARCH 
For this chapter I have not attempted a comprehensive survey of all 
the studies in sectoral concentration completed in this series for 
the Commission of the European Communities. Such a survey would 
undoubtedly be useful but would also be a lengthy task, since the 
total number of reports published exceeds 100, most of which are in 
languages other than English. This examination in the four previous 
chapters of the objectives and methodology of the studies makes it 
possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the potential value 
of the entire series. 
A. TOTAL COSTS OF THE RESEARCH 
From the beginning of the studies in 1970 and the end of 1977, total 
expenditure by the Commission on this programme of research was 56.9 
million Belgian francs. In order to interpret this figure it is 
necessary to adjust each year's expenditure for inflation and to apply 
average exchange rates. Since exchange rates do not reflect purchasing 
power parities and since all nine E. E. C. member countries are involved, 
the calculation can only be approximate. The cost in pounds at 
December 1977 U. K. purchasing power of expenditure in year t was 
calculated as follows: - 
Expenditure in t (B. frs. ) x U. K. retail price index Dec. 1977 
Average exchange rate in t (B. frs. per f) " 11 If it year t 
Table V-1 shows the result of this calculation. 
Table V-1 Costs of the Studies in Industrial Concentration 
Actual expenditure* 




















* Source: Data supplied by Directorate General for Competition 
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These figures of costs refer only to the values of contracts placed 
with universities and other research organisations. They do not 
include any proportion of the salaries of those staff of the Commission 
whose time is partly devoted to coordination of the studies, nor certain 
direct expenses such as computing in Luxembourg and costs of travel 
by the Commission's staff. The total of these excluded expenses 
probably has not exceeded £200,000 at December 1977 prices. This would 
bring the total cost of about £1.2 millions. 
It may be argued that some of the studies have made a financial 
contribution to the research organisations which have undertaken 
them and the figure of just over £1 million shown in Table V-1 is an 
overestimate of social opportunity cost. The last figure is difficult 
to quantify. The four Cranfield studies resulted in a surplus over 
direct expenses (excluding the value of the time of permanent staff) 
which amounted to over 35 per cent of the contract prices. However, the 
required involvement of the School's academic staff was such as to 
retard other research and to require colleagues to undertake additional' 
teaching. The contract prices were at the minimum level for the 
School's acceptance of the work and in Cranfield's case do represent 
opportunity costs. It seems reasonable to assume that similar 
arguments apply to other research groups. 
B. THE METHODOLOGY IN RELATION TO THE PURPOSES OF THE STUDIES 
In his paper to the Bruges Conference in 1977 (Ref. 79, pp. 51-2) 
Linda emphasised the importance of the concentration studies as a 
means of providing a "reasoned and systematic stock of specific and 
concrete information". This information will be used within a 
"philosophy of active prediction". I interpret these and further 
remarks by Linda to mean that the results indicate to the Directorate 
General for Competition those industries or product markets in which 
competition is not functioning satisfactorily and the conditions 
covered by Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome may occur. 
This principle - that the major purposes of the studies is the 
collection and analysis of facts about concentration, to provide an 
empirical basis for policy, was emphasised in Chapter One of this 
summary report. It was also pointed out that dominance over a market 
is difficult to define or measure but that concentration is only one 
aspect of it. Traditional analysis, which is based on departures 
from perfect competition, is regarded by some economists as ina- 
ppropriate for measurement of dominance in an oligopolistic environment. 
The methodology prescribed by the Commission consists of two elements: - 
(1) A series of indices based on the entire sample of firms included 
in each study. In Chapter Three the difficulties in interpretation 
of such indices were described; no single summary index appears 
to be satisfactory, though the entropy measure appears to merit 
further consideration. 
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(2) A new framework for the statistical analysis of oligopoly. 
This is based on the Linda index, which measures oligopolistic 
interdependence and inequality and on measurements of stability 
of market shares. This new framework, which is still evolving, 
might well fill a gap in the methods available for analysis 
of oligopoly but problems remain - in particular the discrete 
line of demarcation used to define the existence of an oligopoly. 
At several points in this report I have emphasised that one should 
not compare indices of concentration for size and performance 
variables. Such are comparisons, in my view, a weakness of the 
existing methodology of the Commission. This same comment has been 
made in each of the four reports. 
This last comment relates to the principles of analysis. The more 
substantial weaknesses in the reports which we have produced arise 
not from defective methods of analysis but from the more practical 
problems described in Chapter Two. These include the definitions of 
industries or product-markets; 'the fact that most of the tabulations 
and statistical analysis ignore the competition of imports; the 
definitions of firms and the arbitrary rules for inclusion of companies 
within the sample to be analysed; the treatment of inter-company links. 
The enterprise analysis for textiles which excludes Courtaulds or that 
for publishing which excludes Reed - how can either be of use in the formulation of economic policy? How can one be sure that the 
extensive holdings of the equity of "competitors" in the publishing 
industry will be borne in mind when summary statistics from studies 
in member countries are compared? How can an "oligopoly" be said to 
exist in either paper manufacture or textiles when import penetration 
of the U. K. market is around 50 per cent? These points are so prosaic, 
so elementary that they may seem out of place here - but such criticisms 
undermine the credibility of the statistical results of much of our 
work and, by implication, those of other studies in this series. 
C. SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS 
1. Despite its complexity and certain difficulties of interpretation, 
the framework recommended by the Commission for analysis of oligopoly 
appears to be very relevant to the identification of absence of 
competition and, "dominance", either by one firm or by a non- 
competing group. Further research into its validity and applica- 
bility to the objectives of anti-trust policy should continue. 
2. The studies should be directed more towards the product market 
rather than the industry and the major variables for analysis 
should be sales turnover (in money terms) and, if possible, 
sales volume. Analysis of other variables including performance- 
related measurements should be contained in the projects but the 
identification of dominance should be based essentially on the 
market and the calculation of concentration indices should be 
confined to market data. This concentration on the market is 
closely related to Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 
With market-share as the principal variable, the inclusion of 
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individual firms in the analysis need be determined only by the 
importance of their market share. It is obvious that the total 
size of a firm affects its ability to compete in any single 
market and the studies should continue to include analysis of 
financial variables relating to the total activities of firms 
with significant market shares. However, this analysis might 
usefully be less quantitative, since the need to adhere to a 
statistical framework imposes unnecessary rigidity upon it. 
The use of market-share as a starting point for the analysis 
would also enable the research organisations to incorporate imports 
into the concentration indices. The influence of imports on the 
existence of a "dominant position" cannot be ignored and, although 
the Commission's methodology requires reference to the level of 
imports, the tables of concentration indices would be more useful 
if imports were included quantitatively. 
This suggestion implies much more work in data collection. 
Estimates of market share might be available from market research 
agencies, such as those by the Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., 
Mintel McClaren and the Joint Industry Committee for National 
Readership Surveys, from which we have drawn in our reports. 
Otherwise data on market shares might need to be obtained by 
direct inquiry, carried out by the research institution or wholly 
or partly sub-contracted. A major problem might be the compilation 
of comparative data for earlier years. This might not be 
insuperable: with the latest year as a guide, it might be possible 
to derive acceptable estimates from a variety of sources for 
earlier years - company accounts, Business Statistics office and 
trade association data, foreign trade statistics and any earlier 
market research inquiries. 
3. More analysis of actual competition is required. Linda himself 
has acknowledged that rigidity of market shares could reflect 
compensatory competitive strategies by the companies concerned. 
His view that such competition may be wasteful and may require 
investigation is reasonable but one can argue that such investiga- 
tion should form an integral part of these studies. In the vehicle 
accessories study, advertising expenditure was analysed, for this, 
fairly reliable data are available. It would be useful to add 
to the studies examination of price policies and methods of 
distribution. The influence of vertical integration or of 
monopsonistic buying power on competition might also be a useful, 
topic for study. 
4. Anälysis of profits and performance in relation to concentration 
is subject to numerous difficulties described in Chapter One. 
The Commission is interested in the abuse of dominant positions 
but this cannot in my view be identified by comparison of 
concentration ratios for size and profit variables. 
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The conceptual difficulties surrounding statistical inquiries 
into the effects of concentration on company behaviour, reflected 
in profits, wages or discretionary expenditure are very great. Much 
of the work undertaken by economists in recent years in this field 
has been devoted to unacceptably simple hypotheses. Although the 
Commission's work may provide a useful source of data for 
European studies of this kind, much preparatory work is needed 
before extensive statistical investigations can begin. 
0. A GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Market dominance is something that many people understand without 
being able to design a formula for its measurement. The Commission's 
emphasis on inequality within oligopoly groups and on rigidity of 
market structure as indications of the possible existence of dominance 
is consistent with the views of most economists who have stressed 
the importance of competition among the few. The principal weaknesses 
of the studies as at present designed originate ultimately from the 
imposition of a rigid statistical framework - from excessive reliance 
upon quantification. 
This overemphasis on consistent statistical analysis requires the use 
of consistent criteria for inclusion of firms in samples, for definition 
of industries and of variables but this consistency equates to 
inflexibility and results occasionally in nonsensical anomalies. It 
also implies a degree of quality and reliability in figures which those 
who compile them would not wish to see implied. This reliance on 
standard quantification means that effort is devoted to the computation 
of indices, to ratio analysis or to regression analysis which could 
more usefully be devoted to research into the competitive process. 
These other aspects, described in the tentative suggestions above, 
still require quantitative investigation, but the methods of inquiry 
would be adapted to the particular topic. 
The Commission wishes to compare results from different industries 
and different countries. Some standard output is necessary but at 
present this is given so much emphasis that the value of the reports 
in the formulation of public policy must be open to serious question. 
On page-92 above the total expenditure at December 1977 prices on 
projects then completed or in course of completion was estimated at 
about f1.2 millions. Whether the total value of the information 
reported will exceed this figure is open to question. 
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This Report describes an investigation of the industrial concentration 
within the UK Paper Industry, 1968-1972. The study was sponsored by 
the European Economic Commission and was of approximately nine months' 
duration. 
The research constitutes one part of a series of studies of the 
development of concentration in selected sectors and markets of EEC 
member countries. 
The terms of reference for the study covered the following industrial 
sectors: 
Manufacture of Paper & Board (NICE 271) (S. I. C. 481) 
Conversion of Paper & Board (NICE 272) (S. I. C. 482-484 incl. ) 
The analysis of these industrial sectors covered both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. 
For the quantitative analysis, the Directorate of Competition of the EEC 
specified a number of indices which have been used in similar studies 
throughout the Community. These indices and the research methodology 
are described in Section 1 of the Report. 
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SUMMARY 
The study has confirmed theoretical objections to the use of concentration 
indices to describe structure and performance in a market. The sectors 
investigated were defined by the nature of the raw materials rather 
than the purposes of the finished products. When applied to whole 
industrial sectors so delineated, measures of concentration do not 
reflect competition from substitute products made in other industries 
(for example, between paper and polythene bags, or paper towels and 
textile towelling); neither do they reflect competition from imports; 
finally, their use as a measure of competition implies that all products 
within the sector are competitive with each other (in an extreme case, 
cardboard boxes are competitive with paper handkerchiefs! ). 
Within the paper industry all three of these objections were found to 
be valid. Many products have close non-paper substitutes; imports 
account for about half of total UK paper consumption, and for significant 
proportions of that of certain converted products; within each of the 
major sectors of paper and board manufacture and conversion, there 
exist separate and identifiable product groupings. 
It was considered that a more meaningful description of competitive 
forces would be achieved by individual analysis of each product group. 
Greater emphasis was therefore given to analysis of product groups than 
to statistical information relating to the complete sectors. Sections 
3 and 4 of the report describe for each of the eight product groups the 
relative sizes of the major companies, the pattern of overseas trade, 
and the forms of competition (pricing, distribution and other marketing 
aspects). The diversity of the industry and of the markets which it 
supplies are major conclusions of this analysis. 
The product groups analysed were as follows: 
Paper & Board Manufacturing: Printing & Writing Paper 
Packaging Paper including Tissues 
Board including Corrugated Case Materials 
- 4- 
Paper &, Board Conversion: Non-Board Packaging (bags and multi-wall sacks); 
Board Packaging (cartons and fibreboard 
containers) 
Manufactured Stationery 
Miscellaneous products (cups, plates, fancy 
goods, etc. ) 
Wallpaper 
-5- 
SECTION 1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Basis of Classification 




The terms of reference for the study require that the analysis of 
concentration within the UK Paper Industry be described in terms 
of the following financial variables: 
turnover; 
profit (before tax); 
cash flow" (profits + depreciation); 
equity or own capital (paid up shares plus reserves); 
gross investment (annual additions to fixed assets 
gross of disposals); 
exports; 
number of employees; 
wage bill. 
British published statistics provide aggregate figures for individual 
industrial sectors relating to turnover, exports and, in some cases, 
employees and total wage bill. 
In order to calculate concentration indices relating to each of the 
above variables, the necessary data were obtained from the published 
financial accounts of individual firms. The total figures so obtained 
were cross-checked with the published aggregate statistics to ensure 
that most of the firms in each sector had been identified. Although 
formally required to do so, except where total employment is less than 
one hundred, not all enterprises presented information relating to the 
number of employees and total wage bill, and complete analyses of 
these variables were not possible. 
1. The authors preferred the more conventional definition of cash flow 
(profit + depreciation - tax) referred to here as net cash flow. 
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A. Basis of Classification 
1. Classification of Firms within the Industry 
Before the relevant financial information could be collected, the 
individual establishments classified to Nomenclature Industrielle de 
la Communaute Europeenne (NICE) 271 and 272 (paper manufacture and paper 
conversion) had to be identified. 
British firms are classified according to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (revised 1968), (SIC) system and not NICE. However, for 
both systems the classification of paper manufacturing and paper conversion 
were sufficiently similar in detail for this not to be a problem. 
The UK Government Statistical Service publishes a directory of establish- 
ments classified to the Paper Industry (including establishments classified 
to other industries but producing paper and paper products): 
Report on the Census of Production 1968 
170. Directory of Businesses: Paper, Printing & Publishing 
However, data in companies' financial accounts relate to the total enter- 
prise, not to individual establishments. 
2 
The identification of enterprises within the industry was achieved using: 
British Paper & Board Industry Federation: List of Members; 
Paper & Paper Products Industry Training Board: List of Members; 
Kompass 1968 and 1972; 
Phillips Paper Trade Directory; 
Who Owns Whom in British Industry 1968 and 1972. 
2. The Census of Production defines "establishment" and"enterprise" as 
follows: 
"establishment": the premises under the same ownership or management 
at a particular address (e. g. factory or mine); 
"enterprise": one or more establishments under common ownership or control; 
normally consisting of a single establishment, more than one establishment 
owned by the same firm, or a number of establishments owned by a parent 
company and its subsidiary companies. 
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Copies of the financial accounts of individual enterprises are held 
centrally and were examined at Companies Registration Offices, London 
and Edinburgh. 
2. Classification on the Basis of Output 
In order to ensure the comparability of the results of this co-ordinated 
Common Market investigation, the terms of reference required the adoption 
of several general assumptions. 
The assumption made relating to the classification of individual firms to 
specific industrial sectors was as follows: where 50% or more of the 
turnover of a firm is accounted for by products classified to NICE 271 or 
272, then that firm is considered to be entirely producing within that 
sector. 
The published financial statistics of individual firms relate to the total 
activity of the firm, and data relating to specific product lines are not 
available. Consequently in some cases the financial data for a given firm 
may not relate solely to its paper interests. For instance, if a firm 
makes cartons using 60% paper and 40% plastic, it is not possible to obtain 
the financial statistics relating to paper interests only. On the other 
hand, the assumption implies that where a similar firm uses 40% paper and 
60% plastic, this firm will be excluded from the study on the basis that 
less than 50% of turnover is accounted for by NICE 271 or 272. 
This classification by principal activity of the company led to some 
problems in the definition of the industry. Where a company with multiple 
activities published separate accounts for subsidiaries engaged in different 
activities, data from these subsidiary accounts were used in the analysis. 
Some large companies do not structure their financial reports in this way. 
In a few cases statistics relating to other activities could not be 
excluded from the financial data of firms whose principal products fell 
within our terms of reference. More significant problems occurred with 
manufacturers whose output of paper products is significant in relation to 
this industry but accounts for less than 50% of their own turnover. The 
most significant exclusion was the Metal Box Co. Ltd., an important producer 
of paper packaging. 
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3. Classification on the Basis of Ownership 
A further assumption included in the terms. of reference was that an 
individual firm was classified. as a subsidiary of another when the owning 
or parent company held 90%-or more of the issued capital. 
This assumption did not significantly distort the ownership relationships 
existing within the British paper industry. (For further discussion see 
Section 2). However, the assumption produced an anomalous result in the 
cases of the Bowater Corporation which has a. 50% holding in the Bowater- 
Scott Corporation. It became apparent that the data for this subsidiary 
ought to be included with that of the parent company because of their 
common top management, and this was in fact done throughout the research. 
4. Classification problems in respect of Vertical Integration 
Many firms within the paper industry are vertically integrated, manufacturing 
paper and board and also producing converted products. Within some companies 
the two activities were carried out by separate subsidiaries and financial 
accounts were available relating to each sector. In special cases where 
an individual enterprise was highly vertically integrated, advice was 
sought from the management of these firms, enabling the necessary corrections 
to be made (see Sections 2,3 and 4). 
In further cases, certain arbitrary assumptions had to be made as to 
whether or not a process could be classified as manufacturing or conversion. 
The production of paper tissues and toilet tissues was considered to be a 
manufacturing process only; whereas the production of surgical products, 
babies nappies, etc. was considered an entirely converting process. 
5. Classification according to Product Groups 
As a result of both the theoretical analysis of industrial concentration 
and discussions with individual firms and trade associations, it became 
apparent that in both the manufacturing and converting sectors of the 
industry, not all products were competitive with each other: specialty papers 
do not compete directly with the bulk grades of paper: fibreboard packing 
cases have certain characteristics which do not make them substitutes for 
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board cartons or paper bags: cardboard cartons, stationery and disposable 
babies' napkins cannot be described as competitive products. Within each 
of the major sectors of paper and board manufacture and conversion, there 
exist separate and identifiable product groupings. It was considered 
that in order to present a more meaningful description of concentration 
in terms of market shares, each product group should be individually 
analysed. 
Ample justification for this approach can be found in the relevant 
literature. Ideally, product group analysis should be expanded to include 
all competing products. For instance, in the case of paper bags, competing 
products include plastic and cellulose wrapping bags. In the case of 
fibreboard containers, competing substitutes include wooden cases and 
heavy duty polythene containers. The product group analysis within the 
paper manufacturing sector is somewhat simpler as direct substitutes 
from outside the industry are fewer. 
The product groups analysed were as follows: 
Paper & Board Manufacturing: Printing & Writing Paper; 
Packaging Paper including Tissues; 
Board including Corrugated Case Materials. 
Paper & Board Conversion: Non-Board Packaging (bags and multi- 
wall sacks); 
Board Packaging (cartons and fibreboard 
containers); 
Manufactured Stationery 
Miscellaneous products (cups, plates, 
fancy goods etc. ); 
Wallpaper 
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B. Industrial Concentration and its Measurement 
Concentration is but a single facet of the structure and organisation of 
an industry: among other important factors are the degree of vertical 
integration, the extent of diversification, and the barriers to new 
entrants. 
The structure of an industry is of great interest to the economist; 
different patterns of industrial organisation imply varying behaviour 
among the respective buyers and sellers. From the buyer's point of view- 
different conditions exist if he is buying from a monopolist rather than 
from one of a large number of equally sized firms. 
However, any conclusions as to market forces existing within an industry 
cannot be deduced until the "market" has been clearly defined. Competition 
can only exist between sellers of "competing" products: a manufacturer 
of paper bags does not necessarily compete with only other paper bag 
manufacturers, but is also aware that plastic, polythene and cellulose 
packaging exists, and can be used for equally acceptable forms of packaging. 
In other words, an industry cannot necessarily be delineated by the 
nature of raw materials or a method of production. 
The facet of industrial structure which has attracted most attention is 
concentration, being perhaps the only aspect of structure which can be 
easily and meaningfullyquantified. Concentration describes the number and 
size distribution of the firms in a given industry. Several different 
measures of concentration have been suggested in the literature and are 
used in all of the series of the Commission's concentration studies. 
The value of using a series of indices to measure concentration lies in 
an understanding of what exactly each index is measuring. Concentration 
has been defined as "the number and size distribution of the firms" - 
thus both fewness and dispersion are being measured. 
The remainder of this section defines the various measures of concentration 
and analyses the extent to which the indices which have been suggested 
measure the fewness of firms, or the variability of the sizes of firms. 
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1. Definitions and Basic Properties of Concentration Indices 
it is assumed that some variables, such as turnover, are being used to 
measure the sizes of firms in the market. (The same mathematical forms 
apply whatever the variable selected). The following notation will be 
used in this section: 
N total number of firms in the industry; 
Xi the value of a variable for Firm i, when firms are ranked 
in descending order with respect to that variable; 




P. the proportion of the aggregate accounted for by Firm i, that is, 
x. Z 
x 
the arithmetic mean value of the variable, that is, x 
N 
a) Concentration Ratios 
The Concentration Ratio for an industry is defined as: 
1 
Xi X i=1 Z 
that is, it is the fraction of the total variable accounted for by the R 
largest firms ranked in descending order of that variable. The value of 
R is a parameter chosen by the user. 
For any one value of R this measure gives only a limited picture of the 
whole industry. For this reason the concentration ratios for several 
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different values of R are usually quoted. It should be noted that when 
comparing two industries A and B it is possible for industry A to have 
a larger concentration ratio than industry B for small values of R, but a 
smaller one for large values of R. (i. e. it is possible on this measure 
for industry A to appear to be more concentrated than industry B for small 
values of R, but less concentrated for large values of R). This is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The Concentration Ratio has the advantage in a large industry that only 
the size of the whole industry and that of the top few firms are necessary 





Fig. I No of firms cumulated from largest sized firm 
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b) Measures based on Variance 
These include variance, standard deviation and coefficient of variation. 
N 
E (xi -p) 
Variance, V= i=1 
N 
Standard Deviation, a= iV 
Coefficient of Variation, c=c 
These are prima facie examples of measures which are concerned with the 
dispersion of the sizes of firms in the industry and not with the total 
number of firms in the industry. From the calculation point of view they 
have the advantage that they can be estimated from data on a random 
sample of firms in the industry. It is not even necessary to know the 
aggregate value of the variable. 
c) Gini Coefficient 
This measure is based on the Lorenz curve. 
3 The Lorenz curve plots the 
percentage of total industry turnover on the vertical axis against 
percentage of firms cumulated from the smallest on the horizontal axis. 
Thus the curve is concave (degenerating into a straight line when all 
firms are of equal size). Where a variable other than turnover is used, 
the percentage of firms is cumulated from the firm with the smallest value 
of the variable under consideration. 
The Gini Coefficient is defined (see Fig. 2) as: 
Shaded Area 
Area OXY 
3. For a complete list of references see Bibliography on Page 4.38 
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It ranges from 0 (all firms equal in size) to 1 (all output in the hands 
of a single firm). The following formula provides a method of calculation 
when the values of the variable are ranked in ascending order (xi; j+1 to N) 




Generally, complete data on the aggregate of the variable for the industry 
is necessary for the calculation of the Gini Coefficient. 





Fig. 2% of firms cumulated 
from smallcst 
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d) Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
This was suggested by Herfindahl and is defined as the sum of the squares 
of the market shares, i. e. 
N 
Herfindah1-Hirschmann Index =Ep. 2 
i=1 
It has the interesting interpretation that it is equal to the probability 
of two items of output of the industry chosen at random both originating 
from the same firm. Thus, if the index were calculated for the paper 
industry, it would equal the probability that two pieces of paper chosen 
at random were manufactured by the same firm (for: P1 is the probability 
of both pieces coming from the first firm, p22 is the probability of both 
pieces coming from the second firm, etc. ). 
An alternative formula for the index can easily be shown to be: 
C2 + 
N 
where e is the coefficient of variation. Thus the index can be estimated 
from data on a random sample of firms in the industry providing N is known. 
The index lies between 2 and 1. Some authors prefer to define it as: 
N 
N 
H-H - 1000 E Pi: i: 1 
i. e. to inflate its value by a multiple of 1000. This convention has been 
adopted by the Commission and is followed in this report. 
eý Entropy 
The entropy concept has its roots in information theory and its use to 
measure concentration is suggested by Theil et al. 
Information theory states that the information content of a message that 
an event E has occurred is a decreasing function of the probability of 
occurrence of E. As the probability of E occuring approaches i the event 
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becomes a near certainty and a message stating that it has actually occurred 
provides little information; similarly the more unlikely the event before 
its realisation, the larger will be the information content of a message 
of its occurrence. 
The decreasing function generally assumed is the logarithm of the reciprocal 
of the probability q, i. e. 
h (E) = Zog 1=- Zog q 
q 
where h(E) is the information content of event E. (The reason for this 
choice is the requirement that hWE1 and E2) = h(E1). h(E2) where E1 
and EZ are independent events. ) 
Prior to the receipt of a message, the expected information content of 
that message can be computed. The expected information content of a 
message on which event has occurred from a range of events E1....... En, 
whose probabilities, g1.... qn sum to 1, is: 
nn 
E q. H(E. ) _-Eq. Zog q. 
2=1 22 Z_1 22 
and this is referred to as the entropy of this distribution. 
The entropy is a measure of 'disorder'. The closer the n probabilities qj 
are to 
n, 
and the larger n is, the less order there is in the system; 
disorder being maximum when all the probabilities are equal. Hence the 
application of the entropy concept to industrial concentration is apparent. 
Entropy provides a negative measure of the inequality of the shares in the 
total output etc. of the firms in a given industry. 
In the notation introduced at the beginning of this section, 
N 
Entropy Index, E pi Zog i 
i=1 
If one share is 1 and all others are 0, then E =0 and the degree of 
concentration is maximum. If all shares are equal (_N) then E=- Zog N 
and the degree of concentration is minimum for that value of N. 
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Returning to the paper industry example, if the manufacture of paper is 
nearly all concentrated in the hands of one firm, then the information 
content of a message on where an individual piece of paper was manufactured 
would be low. On the other hand, if concentration is low, information as 
to the place of manufacture of a given piece of paper has a greater information 
content. 
f) Linda Index 
Another measure of'industrial concentration is given by Linda. 
Qi =K-i. Ai 
i1 -AZ 
i 
where A. -= 1. E x. and values of x are in descending order. 2Xj1J 
K may be any number of firms from 2 to N. (Thus Qi is the average share 
of the market held by the top i firms divided by the average share of the 
market held by the other (x-i) firms included in the sample). 
The Linda Index is defined as: 
1 K-1 
... _ý E QZ 
K(K-1) 1 
the Linda Index is 1x the average of the Q S). 
K 
The Linda index is designed to measure the degree of inequality between 
the values of the variable included in a sub-sample of K units. 
r 
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It is also intended to define the boundary between the oligopolists 
within an industry and the other firms. This boundary occurs at the 
first major discontinuity between values of the variable ranked in 
descending order. This concept implies that oligopolists can be 
defined in terms of the variable concerned. 
Linda indices are calculated for the first two firms (K=2), then the first 
three (K=3) and so on, until a minimum value is produced (that is the index for 
K+1 is greater than that for K firms). At this point the "oligopolistic 
arena" is defined. 
2. The Measurement of Fewness 
The variance, standard deviation and coefficient of variation measure 
the degree of inequality within a distribution and, provided relative sizes 
are unchänged, will not be affected by the number of firms. 
Also, the Lorenz curve can easily be seen to be the same whatever the 
number of firms, N and it follows from this that the Gini Coefficient 
remains constant as N increases. 
It can be demonstrated that the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index varies inversely 
with the number of firms, N. In the case of the Linda Index, it can be 
shown that if K is large, the Linda Index will show approximately - but not 
exactly - the same pattern as the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. 
The Entropy Index depends linearly on the logarithm of N, the number of 
firms decreasing as the latter increases. 
No similar generalisations can be made in the case of the Concentration 
Ratio as this is in essence a partial measure. However, if instead of being 
defined as the proportion of the industry which is in the hands of the top R 
firms, the Concentration Ratio were defined as the proportion of the industry 
in the hands of the top P% of all firms, then it would remain constant as R 
increased. 
These results are summarised in rig. 3 (where a linear transformation has 
been applied to each index to make scales correspond). 




. of firms 
-11-1 -r' 
Fig. 3 
When a number of industries are being compared, the entropy measure is 
more likely to accentuate the fewness of the firms within the industry 
than either the Linda or the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. The variance, 
standard deviation, coefficient of variation and Gini Coeefficient cannot 
be considered to be measures of fewness at all. 
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3. The Measurement of Dispersion 
The relationship between each index and the dispersion of the variable 
for which it is calculated is most obvious when the values of the variable 
are lognormally distributed (that is the logarithms of these values are 
normally distributed with a mean m and a standard deviation 8). 
4 
Some authors have suggested that distributions of sizes of firms within 
an industry may be lognormal, though this was not found to be the case 
in the paper industry (see Section 2.6 below). 
The extent to which the different concentration indices measure dispersion 
can be mathematically deduced from the theory of lognormal distribution. 
Analysis shows that when the firms in the industry are lognormally 
distributed, each of the concentration indices is mathematically related 
to s. The nature of the individual relationships is presented in Fig. 4. 
The variance and standard deviation are not shown as these depend on m as 
well as a. This dependence on m is in fact a highly undesirable property 
for a concentration index to have. It means that if the sizes of all firms 
in an industry are increased by the same factor, the value of the index will 
change. Thus the index will depend on the unit in which sizes are measured. 
Also, when two industries are being compared, an index which depends on m 
will, in part, be merely reflecting the' differences in the total sizes of 
the two industries. 
Consequently, where the sizes of the firms within a given industry are known 
to be lognormally distributed, it is not necessary to calculate each of 
the measures of dispersion. Once a is determined each of the indices can 
be calculated from the formulae which have been illustrated graphically in 
Fig. 4 and given below for completeness: 
Mean size = em + 0.5x2 
Variance = elm + s2 (ea2 - 1) 
Coefficient of 
Variation, c= (e s2 
(where e=2.718) 
- 1) 
4. not to be confused with u and a defined on page (1.7,1.9) above. 
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Gini Coefficient 
Herfindahl 
Hirschmann Index = 
2ý S-1 
(where (D(z) is the probability 
that t.. z when t is N(0,1) 
s2 e 
N 
Entropy Index = s2 - loge N 
2 
(this assumes that natural logarithms are used to calculate the index). 
It should be noted that these formulae can hold only when N is large enough 
to provide an adequate description of the lognormal distribution. The 
requi red size for Ni ncreases ass i ncreases . 'When s and N are 
1 arge, 




(The Linda is not, however, normally calculated for the entire group of N firms. ) 
Thus, each of the concentration indices examined measure fewness and 
dispersion in different ways and to different extents. When using a 
series of indices to describe the concentration in a given industry, the 
following particular properties of the indices should be borne in mind: 
( i) the variance, standard deviation, coefficient of variation 
and Gini Coefficient do not take any account of fewness of firms 
in the industry; 
( ii) when two industries are being compared, the Entropy 
measure will reflect fewness to a greater extent than either 
the Herfindahl or the Linda indices; 
(iii) when the distribution of sizes is lognormal (m, s) 
then the Gini Coefficient and the coefficient of variation 
are approximately linearly related to s for O<s<1 . The 
Herfindahl index is a very poor measure of a in this range 
and the Entropy index is related to s2; 
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( iv) "absolute" measures of variability such as variance and 
standard deviation are undesirable as they depend on the size 
of the total industry as well as on the proportion of it held by 
the individual firms; 
( v) the Linda index is only appropriate for reflecting 
relative sizes of large and small firms in an industry and 
has particular application to those markets which characteristically 
have at their head a few large manufacturers. 
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SECTION 2 
MANUFACTURE AND CONVERSION OF PAPER AND BOARD 
The manufacture and conversion of paper and board are distinct and separate 
industrial activities. The manufacture of paper and board involves the 
conversion of raw materials (mainly wood pulp) into base grades of paper 
and board. The distinction between paper and board is a technicality 
based on the relative weights of the two products. The process of 
conversion is the transformation in any way of the basic paper and board 
into the final product. 
Following convention within the industry, the coating of paper was 
considered to be part of the manufacturing process. 
The UK paper industry depends heavily on imported pulp and is thus at 'a 
cost disadvantage to Scandinavia and North America which have local supplies. 
This cost disadvantage arises from the fact that users of imported pulp 
require an additional process to reverse the dehydration of the wood pulp 
needed prior to transportation. 
The industry was greatly assisted in the past by the fact that, whereas 
wood pulp entered the UK duty free, paper and board imports were subject 
to tariffs of up to 20%. These tariffs were removed by 1967 following the 
formation of the EFTA in 1960. 
More recently5' the government has taken a more positive role in encouraging 
the process of recovery and recycling of waste paper, which can also be 
used for the manufacture of certain grades of paper and board. 
Since 1960 the demand for paper and board has been increasing by approximately 
4% per annum by weight. Factors contributing to this increasing demand 
include the growth in demand for packaging items (of which paper is by far 
the more important, see Table 39, page 4.16; the general growth in 
communications and the fast growth in demand for tissue paper (particularly 
soft tissue); and papers and boards for specialised industrial uses. 
5.1974 UK Government Green Paper on Recycling Waste. 
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The British paper industry exports comparatively little of its total 
output: since 1968 exports of manufactured and converted paper and 
board have consistently represented approximately 5% of total production, 
by weight. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the production and trade of each 
sector of the industry. Exports to the EEC have been increasing over 
the last ten years, while traditional Commonwealth markets have remained 
relatively stable. 
As the tables suggest, imports of paper and board continue to account 
for an increasing proportion of total consumption. In 1960, imports of 
manufactured paper and board represented 27% of total consumption by weight, 
34% in 1968, and 43% in 1972; thus by 1972, almost as much paper and board 
was imported as was produced domestically. The principal factor behind 
the rapid growth in imports was the reduction in tariff barriers, mentioned 
above, on paper imports from Scandinavia. 
The Scandinavian countries compete very strongly in the lower grades of 
paper and board and in semi-finished paper products, and since 1954 the 
proportion of UK paper consumption supplied by them has risen from a quarter 
to over a third. The cost advantages that the Scandinavians have over UK 
producers in pulp costs and in respect of fuel costs (through natural 
advantages such as hydroelectric power or by the use of tax-free fuel oil) 
are most important for the low-grade, mass-tonnage grades of paper (news- 
print and kraft paper). 
The response of British firms to this situation has been to switch production 
away from lower grades towards higher quality grades, where it is 
advantageous for the producer to be near the point of sale, and cost 
disadvantages are less noticeable. 
Proximity to the point of sale is probably an important factor in determining 
the quantity of converted products imported into the UK. As indicated in 
Table 2, imports of converted products represent less than 10% of total 
production in value terms. It is interesting to note that almost all 
imports are of packaging products. 
Recent trends in production and trade of individual products are discussed 
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TABLE 1(b): VALUE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION - MANUFACTURE 
V 000 
Year 1963 1968 1972 1973 
Newsprint 39,141 47,336 36,435 38,49 
Other printing and 
writing papers 
121,138 149,375 186,864 238,389 
Packaging papers 53,108 61,444 82,144 102,697 
Tissues 9,274 12,947 16,111 21,370 
Industrial and special 
purpose papers 
39,167 41,237 65,080 93,398 
Packaging board 40,833 66,724 71,058 86,648 
Other board 16,145 26,054 28,728 31,918 
TOTAL { 318,806 
1963,1968 Census of Production 
1972,1973 Business Monitor 
405,117 1 486,420 1 612,910 
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Further details of external trade in manufactures and converted products in terms 
of major origins and destinations is given in Appendix C. 
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1. Vertical integration within the Industry 
Although distinct, the two industrial sectors of manufacturing and 
conversion are closely related; the converting sector is largely 
dependent on the products of the manufacturers. For this reason, the 
extent of vertical integration through the two sectors is of importance. 
Individual firms within the industry have two ways of increasing vertical 
integration: 
(a) expanding their own manufacturing capacity backwards 
or forwards (as appropriate) to cover more stages of the 
production of the final product; 
(b) acquiring a subsidiary company which undertakes a 
further stage in the production process. 
TABLE 3: VERTICAL INTEGRATION WITHIN PAPER & BOARD MANUFACTURING AND 
CONVERSION SECTORS IN 1968 
Total no. Total no. 
of companies of enterprises 
No. of "single-company" organisations identified engaged in: 
manufacture only 40 40 
conversion only 152 152 
both 0 0 
No. Of "multi-company" organisations (groups) identified engaged in: 
manufacture only 10 56 
conversion only 9 33 
both 18 99 
The term "company" refers here to an undertaking producing its own financial 
accounting reports. The term "organisation" refers here to the ultimate 
controlling board of a grouping of subsidiaries with the same ownership. 
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As Table 3 indicates, the "single-company" organisations (i. e. independent 
organisations with no subsidiary companies) identified in the industry are 
either producing entirely within the converting sector or entirely within 
the manufacturing sector. None of these organisations integrates vertically. 
An examination of the "multi-company" organisations (i. e. ultimate 
controlling organisations with one or more subsidiary trading companies) 
shows the opposite picture. Half of the "groups" have subsidiaries 
engaged in both industrial sectors, and are thus described as vertically 
integrated. It is interesting to note that among the subsidiary companies 
of such vertically integrated groups, in the majority of cases each 
subsidiary tends to be either exclusively manufacturing or converting - as 
was the pattern among the "single-company"organisations. One major 
exception to this rule is the largest stationery manufacturer, which both 
manufactures the paper and converts it to its final products. 
2. Diversification by enterprises 
As previously stated, individual companies were classified to paper and board 
manufacture and conversion if these products accounted for more than 50% 
of their activity. 
Consequently, where diversification has been undertaken by the "single- 
company" organisations, this by definition cannot account for a greater 
proportion of activity than paper and board products. In fact, product 
diversification is not a significant characteristic of such companies. 
Those subsidiary companies which are part of "multi-company" groupings will 
again by definition comprise the paper and board interests of such groups. 
However, in several instances, these groupings of companies will be 
significantly diversified. 
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TABLE 4: DIVERSIFICATION WITHIN "MULTI-COMPANY" GROUPS 
Number of multi-company groups identified in 1968 (Table 3) 
of which, 
37 
exclusive to paper and board industry 
21 
having interests in other industries 16 
Industrial areas of diversification: 
engineering/building products 8 
food/tobacco/consumer goods 5 
printing/publishing/office equipment 3 
The following points of interest arose from this analysis: of the ten 
organisations engaged in paper manufacture but not in conversion, only 
one was part of a diversified "group". Diversified conglomerates have 
interests either in both manufacturing and conversion together, or in 
conversion only. 
3. Summary of industry structure 
i 
To summarise, the UK paper and board industry is dominated by several large 
"groups" whose subsidiaries undertake both manufacturing and converting 
processes. In addition, several of these groupings are themselves part of 
highly diversified conglomerates. 
These factors give the vertically integrated groups significant economic 
advantages over rivals as is characteristic of any oligopolistic market 
structure. In this case, the oligopolists' strength lies in the fact that 
being both manufacturers and converters, they have not only an assured 
market for their manufactured products, but, conversely, they have 
guaranteed raw materials for their converting subsidiaries. 
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HAP TO SHOW REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE LARGEST 100 COMPANIES IN THE PAPER & BOARD INDUSTRY 
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4. Employment within the Industry 
Statistics of persons employed in the industry are published in aggregate 
form only, and these are shown in the table below. 
TABLE 5: TOTAL EMPLOYEES CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO MAIN ACTIVITY OF 
ESTABLISHMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
1968 
Paper, board and pulp 














1969 1970 1971 1972 
80,353 73,965 69,015 66,763 
6,419 6,570 6,097 5,424 5,768 
17,237 15,211 14,851 14,257 14,765 
9,942 11,090 9,717 9,438 9,800 
24,870 21,960 22,366 22,030 22,498 
23,128 23,094 21,741 21,227 22,050 
13,573 22,583 20,014 20,851 21,656 
19,074 19,168 19,028 18,806 18,790 
9,727 8,652 7,637 6,952 8,212 
7,504 9,894 6,817 7,068 6,058 
215,161 218,575 202,233 195,068 196,360 
aper and Paper Products Industry Training Boa 
The aggregate level of employment within the UK paper and board industry 
reflects the prevailing economic conditions within the industry, which 
have been discussed in the preceding sections of Part 2. 
Despite an increasing import percentage, due to the competitive disadvantage 
of UK producers already described, the paper industry maintained employment 
in 1967/68, through an unexpected boom in consumer spending. 
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In 1969 the supply of pulp began to fall, resulting in higher prices. 
However, Scandinavian paper prices were also allowed to rise, and thus any 
dramatic increase in the import share of consumption was avoided, and 
employment was generally maintained throughout the industry. 
In contrast to 1969,1970 saw an almost 10% fall in employment, which was 
particularly marked among paper and board manufacturers. Pulp prices were 
increased by around 10% on average from 1.1.70, when the industry had to 
combat other rising costs, particularly those of wages and transport. The 
magnitude of price increases was checked by the need to match the prices 
of competing imported papers. 
Although pulp prices rose again in 1971, a world slackening of demand for 
pulp limited the amount of the increase. However, the UK paper industry 
was also faced with other substantial cost increases, particularly in fuel 
oil and wages. This situation precipitated a contraction in the industry 
and the decision by many of the large groups to reduce their involvement 
in low grade papers. Employment within the industry fell by a further 
7,000. 
The figures for 1972 suggest that the industry was beginning to emerge 
from the downturn in trade. However, the over-capacity situation in the 
light of falling world demand suggests further rationalisation to come. 
The performance of the industry since 1968 is further analysed in terms 
of profitability in the sections dealing with individual product groups. 
5. The Analysis of Concentration 
Sections 1-4 have outlined the salient economic features of the UK paper 
and board industry over the past decade. Against this background, the 
evolving pattern of concentration within the industry can be now examined. 
The pattern of concentration between 1963 - 1972 inclusive within the two 
industrial sectors of paper and board manufacture and conversion was 
measured by a series of indices applied to the following variables: 




cash flow (profits + depreciation); 
net cash flow (profits + depreciation - tax); 
own capital or equity; 
gross annual investment. 
Three methodological problems arose from this analysis. First, as previously 
stated, concentration indices cannot theoretically be calculated for zero 
or negative values of a variable. Thus, in any given year, zero and 
negative values of variables were omitted. This convention, adopted by 
the Commission, leads to some problems of interpretation, in respect of 
those variables which had negative or zero values even though the company 
was trading. These variables include profits, cash flow, exports and 
(in a few cases) gross investment. The following implications should be 
noted: 
(a) the size of the sample of companies is different for 
different variables in the same year; 
(b) the mean values of these variables represent the means 
of positive values only. For this reason, these arithmetic 
means cannot be used to calculate ratios such as average 
return on equity, average margin on sales and similar 
standard ratios; 
(c) those indices which measure the dispersion of the variable 
(e. g. the coefficient of variation) tend to understate that 
dispersion when zero and negative values are excluded. 
Secondly, the development of concentration is studied over a five year period 
only. Discussions with representatives of the industry pointed out the 
cyclical nature of the trade based on an approximate ten year cycle period. 
Consequently, the period chosen is not felt to be adequate to permit firm 
conclusions as to the trends in concentration. 
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Thirdly, concentration indices as described and used within this study 
measure the size and dispersion of UK producers relative to the total UK 
production. However, as has been previously stated, the UK paper and 
board industry represents approximately 60% of total UK consumption of 
all paper and board and converted products. This fact is particularly 
important when conclusions as to market dominance of individual firms 
are being considered. 
The following tables contain an analysis of sales turnover of the firms 
which were identified within the manufacturing (Table 6) and converting 
(Table 7) sectors. 
It will be noted that the estimates of total turnover for each sector 
differ from the corresponding published figure in Tables 1(a) and 2, page 2.4,5. 
This discrepancy occurs mainly because the Census of Production, the source 
of the published aggregate data, is based on individual establishments. 
Paper manufacture and conversion activities of the same firm can be more 
easily distinguished by this method, both from each other and, in the case 
of diversified enterprises, from activities outside the paper industry. 
Table 8 compares the published aggregate turnover figures for 1968 and 
1972 with the sums of individual company data analysed by the authors. This 
comparison shows that most of the discrepancies are due to incomplete 
distinction between manufacturing and converting interests of vertically 
integrated enterprises within the paper industry. 
When these two sectors are combined, the sums of the individual company 
data used in this analysis are fairly close to the published statistics. 
Since data for individual firms for turnover and for other variables, are 
available only from their published account $, complete reconciliation with 
published statistics was not possible. 
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TABLE 6: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF MANUFACTURING ORGANISATIONS 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 Year 
Number of Organisations 
7. 64 65 67 66 66 
Total Turnover (1'000) 469,656 521,486 569,687 567,403 22,911 
Mean (1'000) 7,338 8,023 8,503 8,597 9,438 
Coefficient of Variation 2.03 2.08 2.10 2.04 2.05 
Gini 0.728 0.736 0.731 0.720 0.715 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 80.2 82.0 80.8 78.3 78.9 
Entropy -133.4 -132.8 134.5 -135.9 -136.3 
Linda Index for N* 
=2J,, 
0.56 0.543 0.64 0.721 1731 
29.2 31.6 31.8 30.8 
_40. 
411 0.460 0.501 0.483 0.500 
50,6 50.6 49.1 48.9 49.0 
=80.361 0.359 0.370 
0.369 0.388 
67.5 67.3 65.8 64.5 64.0 
= 10 
0.321 0.311 0.318 0.312 0.320, / 
72.6 73.0 71.5 70.3 69.8 
= 12 
0.313 0.300 0.299 0.294 0.296 
76.4 77.1 75.8 74.5 14.0 
= 20 
0.245 0.264 0.255 0.241 0.240 
87.1 87.2 86.3 85.5 85.0 
= 30 
0.237 0.240 0.233 0.220 21,54 
93.1 93.3 92.4 92.1 92.0 
40 . 221 0.225 0.212 0.200 0.199"-, 
96.7 96.8 96.2 96.2 / 95. 
7. Each "multi-enterprise" organisation group was counted as one organisation - total no. of enterprises is not recorded. 
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TABLE 7: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF CONVERTING ORGANISATIONS, EXCLUDING tIALLCOVERINGS 8" 
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Number of Organisations 7. 179 174 171 161 145 
Total Turnover (f'000) 510,557 577,050 645,618 669,197 738,686 
Mean (f'000) 2,852 3,316 3,776 4,157 5,094 
Coefficient of Variation 4.09 3.97 3.84 3.70 3.50 
Gini 0.829 0.829 0.831 0.823 0.824 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 98.96 96.46 91.97 91.12 91.16 
Entropy -140.4 -140.7 -141.8 -142.1 -140.1 
Linda Index for N* 
Concentration Ratios % 
0.553 0.559 0.589 0.603 0.613 
40.2 39.4 38.3 38.0 37.8 
0.598 0.549 0.547 . 552 0.539 
=4 
54.9 54.6 53.1 52.8 53.1 
0.543 0.541 0.535 0.529 0.526 
8 
67.3 66.7 65.3 64.9 65.1 
0.4 0.480 0.480 0.464 0.468 
= 10' 
Z 
1 71 70.3 8.8 68.6 68.7 
0.415 0.415 0.409 0.395 0.399., -" 
- 12 74.5 73.7 72.3 72.2 2.2 
0.337 0.308 0.271 0.267 0.259/ 
- 20 " 
82.8 83.0 82.6 82.7 x" 83.3 
0.316 0.305 0.268 ý 0 0.254 
= 30 % 
Y 
87.2 87.6 88.0 87 .7 .9 
0'29 0.291 0.268 0.261 0.251 
= 40 
89.8 90.1 90.6 90.5 91.7 
e. bee section 4.5, Page 't", Ju 
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TABLE 8: RECONCILIATIONS OF PUBLISHED STATISTICS WITH ACCOUNTING 
DATA 




Converting 582,220 1,065,102 
less Wallcoverings 36,509 63,535 
545,711 1,001,567 
Manufacturing 405,117 486,420 
950,828 1,487,987 
Aggregation of individual 
firms identified 
Converting 510,526 738,703 
Manufacturing 469,651 622,908 
980,177 1,361,611 
Tables 6 and 7 allow an immediate comparison of the two sectors of the 
UK paper industry. The converting sector is characterised by a large 
number of small organisations, as has been demonstrated in the bar charts, 
pages 2.9 and 2.10. This fact is reflected in both the relative numbers 
of organisations and in the mean turnover values. 
The extent of the variation of the actual turnover of individual companies 
from the mean turnover of the sector is reflected in the coefficient of 
variation. The value of this index for converting organisations is almost 
twice the value for manufacturing organisations. This reflects the 
relative nature of production within each sector; the more capital- 
intensive manufacturing sector means greater standardisation of the possible 
ranges of output. Converting organisations, on the other hand, can feasibly 
produce a far wider range of output. Between 1968-1972 the value of the 
-41- 
coefficient of variation for the conversion sector has fallen 14%, 
compared with the almost static value for the manufacturing sector. 
The relative values of the Gini coefficient indicate that the converting 
sector is more concentrated than the manufacturing sector. The 
explanation of this is found by examining Graph 1 overleaf, which shows 
the percentage share of total turnover held by individual companies in 1972. 
In manufacturing, the concentration ratio corresponding to the first 
quartile (approximately the 17 largest firms) was 82%; in converting, 
the corresponding ratio (for the 36 largest firms) was 96%. 
It will be noted that whereas the other indices all show a greater degree 
of concentration in conversion than in manufacture, the Entropy index shows 
the opposite result. This is a reflection of the greater sensitivity 
of the Entropy index to the number of firms included in the calculation. 
The values of the Linda index calculated for the variable turnover are 
plotted on Graph 2. Both the manufacturing and converting sectors of the 
industry exhibit the same pattern of a falling Linda curve, in all years 
1968-1972, with no minimum point of inflection before the fortieth company 
is reached. This would suggest that no oligopoly existed in either sector 
of the industry - or, in other words, when the firms were ranked in 
descending order of turnover, no distinct "threshold" or discontinuity of 
size was observed, implying no "oligopolistic arena". 
The examination of the separate product groups within each sector of the 
industry contained in Sections 3 and 4 of this Report refutes this 
conclusion. The explanation lies in the fact that each sector of the 
industry has specialised into several distinct non-competing product groups. 
Each product group exhibits the characteristics of an oligopoly having 
at its head a small number of large firms. The sizes of these individual 
oligopolists will vary from one product group to another according to 
nature of production. Thus, the summing together of a series of 
"individual oligopolies" does not produce a single "all industry" oligopoly, 
but rather the varying size of the oligopolists produces no point of 
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This is the situation in both the manufacturing and converting sectors of 
the paper industry. Further analyses of each product group are contained 
in Sections 3 and 4. 
For both the manufacturing and converting sectors, analyses were undertaken 
of the other data variables (exports, profits, cash flow, equity and 
investment) relating to the individual organisations within the industry. 
The full series of concentration indices calculated for each of the 
financial variables examined are contained in Appendix A. 
As stated at the beginning of the Section, concentration indices cannot 
be applied to variables with negative or zero values. This problem did not 
arise in the analysis of turnover, as any firm with zero turnover in any 
year is considered to be non-trading in that year and is omitted. Data 
most affected by this criterion are those relating to exports and profits: 
only a proportion of the firms identified in each sector are exporters; 
and within each sector a few firms will make losses in any given year. 
Consequently the number of data items for these variables will be less 
than the total number of companies in any year. 
Tables 9 and 10 show the numbers of organisations in each sector having 
data relating to each variable in each year 1968-1972. In the case of 
profits, both the amount of profits and losses made in each year are 
shown. 
Having examined the extent of concentration in sales turnover within each 
sector of the industry, further analysis was undertaken to assess the 
concentration of the other financial variables in Tables 9 and 10. As 
stated, the concentration indices calculated for all variables are 
contained in Appendix A. These indices describe the concentration of each 
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TABLE 9: NUMBERS OF FINANCIAL STATISTICS RELATING TO MANUFACTURING 
ORGANISATIONS 
No. of organisations with positive values of variable 
Turnover Net Losses Net Invest- Equity Exports 
profit cash ment 
flow 
No. £''000 No. 000 
total of total of 
variable variable 
1968 64 59 62 64 64 54 33 0 / 50 




64 65 65 57 
1970 67 59 $ 90 63 67 67 61 5 30 
1971 66 57 9 60 66 65 59 
8.90C 2 00 
1972 66 22(8 6,60 
8 
30 63 66 66 60 
TABLE 10: NUMBERS OF FINANCIAL STATISTICS RELATING TO CONVERTING 
ORGANISATIONS 
No. of organisations with positive values of variable 
Turnover Net Losses Net Invest- Equity Exports 
profit cash ment 
flow 
r 
No. £'000 No. £'000 
total of total of 
variable variable 
177 
1968 179 8400 700 177 
178 179 154 
172 
1969 174 42000 
50 172 172 174 150 
1970 171 
168 3 





158 161 161 137 43000 800 % 
140 5 
1972 145 3200 1700 142 145 144 124 
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variable in isolation. For example the table relating 
to manufacture on 
page128 shows that in 1970 the ten largest manufacturing companies 
in 
terms of turnover accounted for 71.5% of total turnover and that the 
ten 
manufacturing companies with the greatest profits accounted for 
70.3% of 
profits. However, only six firms were common to both these groups and 
the order of firms differed according to which variable was used for 
ranking. 
Appendix B sets out more comprehensive statistical evidence on differences in 
ranking in both manufacturing and conversion. Because of the wide 
variations, it was decided to omit from this report certain tabulated 
comparisons of the financial variables, which have appeared in reports 
produced in other member countries, of the EEC and which are valid only 
when differences in ranking are small. This decision is explained more 
fully in the Appendix. 
Of all the variables included in the analysis, turnover presented the 
fewest problems of definition and interpretation. For this reason, it 
was decided to rank firms according to turnover and study the distribution 
of other financial variables in relation to this ranking. 
In other words, having determined that the top 4 manufacturers (in terms 
of turnover) account for 50% of total turnover of the sector, it was of interest 
to see whether these same 4 firms also accounted for 50% of profits, exports, 
cash flow, equity and investment. 
For each sector of the industry, the percentage share of the total of 
each financial variable held by the largest 2,4 and 10 companies in 
turnover terms was calculated. The results are shown for the manufacturing 
sector in Table 11 and for the converting sector in Table 12. 
From Appendix A, it may be noted that, in the converting sector, exports 
were more concentrated than any other financial variable, according to 
most of the alternative indices. This greater degree of concentration 
occurred in each of the five years; in 1972 ten of the 145 companies 
accounted for 87% of exports. From data in Table 2 above, it can be calculated 
that exports were equal to only 3.7% of the converting sector's output. 
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The results revealed by this analysis were particularly interesting 
in respect of profits. (In the event of one of the top ten companies 
in either section making a loss, this was included as a negative figure). 
Considering Table 11 first, in 1968 the percentage of pre-tax profits held 
by the ten manufacturers with the largest turnover was similar to the 
percentage shares of turnover (i. e. the largest two companies held 29% of 
turnover and 32% of profits; the largest four, 50% of turnover and 54% 
of profits, and so on). But in the following years, 1969-1972, the 
percentage share of total profits fell quite dramatically, the fall being 
particularly marked for the top two firms. This pattern is reflected in 
the net cash flow percentages, this being defined as (profit - tax + depreciation). 
The results in Table 12 relating to converters do not show such a dramatic 
slump in the percentage share of profits as was the case for the 
manufacturers. The pattern of profit shares is more variable, but even 
so the figures suggest that at least among the top four firms there was 
some loss in the percentage share of profits relative to turnover. 
In both sectors of the industry, the percentage shares of exports and gross 
annual investments consistently fell below the equivalent shares of total 
turnover. Again, this patternwasless marked among the converting 
organisations than among the manufacturers. The only variable for which 
the percentage share was greater than for the corresponding turnover share 
was equity, and this was the case in both sectors of the industry. 
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TABLE 11: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FINANCIAL VARIABLES HELD BY TOP 2, -4 & 10 
ORGANISATIONS RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF TURNOVER 
n Turnover Exports Pre-Tax Net Equity Annual 
Profits Cash Invest- 
Flow ment 
MANUFACTURERS 1968 
2 29.2 34.3 32.2 33.8 35.2 30.1 
4 50.6 44.2 45.1 49.6 52.1 43.5 
10 72.6 60.5 72.0 73.8 72.1 58.9 
MANUFACTURERS 1969 
2 31.6 25.5 26.1 28.3 35.9 33.2 
4 50.6 33.6 39.8 43.0 51.9 45.0 
10 73.0 56.0 67.6 65.7 73.0 62.3 
MANUFACTURERS 1970 
2 31.8 34.7 19.5 25.2 35.5 31'. 7 
4 49.7 43.1 45.6 45.5 51.5 41.8 
10 71.5 61.0 63.7 66.4 71.7 67.3 
MANUFACTURERS 1971 
2 30.8 30.3 12.9 22.4 35.0 28.9 
4 48.9 38.2 45.2 44.4 49.6 40.9 




2 31.5 34.4 8,3 25.0 36,7 37.6 
4 49.0 40.6 39.7 43.8 50.7 48.7 
10 69.8 58.3 59.5 64.1 75.0 67.9 
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TABLE 12: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FINANCIAL VARIABLES HELD BY TOP 2,4 & 10 
ORGANISATIONS RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF TURNOVER 
n= Turnover Exports Pre-Tax Net Equity Annual 
Profits Cash Invest- 
Flow ment 
CONVERTERS 1968 
2 40.2 36.4 36.7 33.4 46.6 28.0 
4 54.9 39.2 50.8 50.4 58.8 43.4 
10 70.1 78.9 72.8 70.9 69.9 56.9 
CONVERTERS 1969 
2 39.4 35.9 34.4 33.5 45.0 24.6 
4 54.6 40.5 48.1 49.1 57.1 42.0 
10 70.3 76.9 71.6 69.4 67.1 55.5 
CONVERTERS 1970 
2 38.3 39.2 37.7 32.7 44.4 23.1 
4 53.1 45.1 50.5 48.2 56.3 44.5 
10 68.8 72.5 68.5 66.6 63.2 56.2 
CONVERTERS 1971 
2 38.0 32.2 35.8 31.5 42.7 30.8 
4 52.8 36.7 48.8 46.7 55.1 48.4- 
10 68.6 65.0 68.2 64.8 61.0 65.8 
CONVERTERS 1972 
2 37.8 31.6 35.9 32.1 44.6 
4 53.1 35.6 49.4 47.8 57.1 n/a 
10 68.7 61.4 68.3 67.7 67.5 
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6. Test for Lognormality 
An investigation was undertaken to determine how closely the distribution 
of the turnover of the converting companies approximated to the lognormal 
distribution. The number of manufacturing firms identified in the industry 
was too small to permit conventional tests of significance. 
The mean (m) and standard deviation (s) of the logarithms of turnover 
were calculated and a frequency distribution with seven classes was 
generated on the basis of the ordinates of the normal distribution. A 
theoretical distribution of this kind was generated for 1968,1970 and 1972. 
By this technique the actual distributions were found to differ appreciably 
in lognormality. Fig. 5 below compares the frequency observed from the 
data with the expected frequency for each size range. 
The difference between the actual and theoretical 
by the X2 test to be significant at the 2% level 
level in 1970 and 1972. 
distributions was found 
in 1968 and at the 1% 
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7. The Pattern of Ownership 
An analysis was undertaken to determine the relative numbers of public 
companies and private companies in the industry in the most recent year, 
1972. Those organisations which form part of larger diversified conglomerates 
were classified as public companies if the parent company was publicly owned; 
and vice versa when the parent company was privately owned. 
To avoid problems of vertical integration, the manufacturing and converting 
sectors were considered together. 
41 of the 211 organisations in the industry are public companies. Of the 37 
"multi-enterprise" companies referred to earlier, only 5 are privately owned. 
Although they represented only about 20% of the total number of organisations, 
public companies accounted for 85% of the total "own capital" of the 
industry in 1972. 
For data relating to the same year, 1972, a further analysis of the incidence 
of interlocking directorates within the companies classified to the paper 
industry was undertaken. In the first instance the analysis was confined to 
the larger companies. No common directorates were revealed. This was assumed 
to be indicative of the pattern throughout the industry and the analysis was 
discontinued, 
Changes of ownership of firms in the industry during the period 1968-1972 are 
recorded in the table below. 
TAKEOVERS 1968-1972: MANUFACTURERS 
Company Equity First Owner 
11000 
Allan B. Carlisle 
& Sons Ltd. 8 
Leonard Stace Ltd. 169 
Sterling Stubbins 328 
Bathford Paper Mills 





Chartered co., USA 
Bathford & Ryburndale 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
Bathford & Ryburndale 
(Holdings) Ltd. 
Year Second Owner 
07- 
C hange 
1969 Brittains Ltd. 
1969 Associated Paper Mills 
1970 S. I. L. Co., London 
1971 Portals Holdings Ltd. 
1971 Portals Holdings Ltd. 
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TAKEOVERS 1968-1972: CONVERTERS 
Company Equity First Owner Year Second Owner 
Change 
C. P. Corrugated 
Cases Ltd. 580 Independent 1968 Tremlett Ltd. 
Standard Box &. 1969 Delyn Ltd. 
Carton Co. 9 Independent 
Grove Mill Paper 
Co. Ltd. 1293 Lloyds Packing & 
Warehouses (Holdings) 1969 Capseals Ltd. 
Browne & Day Ltd. 106 Independent 1970 Cundell Packaging (Holdings) 
Ltd. 
Decoflex Ltd. 60 Independent 1970 Lamson Industries Ltd. 
Brand Packaging - Melbray Print 
& Packaging 1971 Tremlett Ltd. 
C. A. Coutts Ltd. 131 Bryant & May 1971 Cundell Packaging (Holdings) Ltd. 
F. Morrell & Co. 45 G. U. S. 1972 McCleod Russell 
ENTRANTS INTO THE INDUSTRY 
Equity Date Sector 
Cow I TOO, 
Integrated Packaging Ltd. 1 1968 Packaging 
Sterling Stubbins Ltd. 75 1968 Tissue manufacturing 
Brittains Arborfield Ltd. 405 1969 Paper manufacturing 
Cundell Corrugated (Barnstable) Ltd. - 1969 Packaging 
Capseals Liners Ltd. 397 1969/70 Packaging 
Fay International Ltd. - 1970 Merchanting of paper goods 
Dolan Corrugated Containers Ltd. 374 1970/71 Corrugated fibreboard containers 
Brittains Paper Ltd. 1048 1971 Paper manufacturing 
N&S Export Packers Ltd. - 1971 Packaging materials manufacturing Alf Cooke Bag Co. Ltd. 32 1972 Non-board packaging 
Ruberoid Paper Co. Ltd. 625 1972 Paper manufacturing 
Joseph Batchelor Ltd. - 1972 Paper manufacturing 
EXITS FROM THE INDUSTRY 
W. R. Annan Ltd. 52 1969 Packaging 
Chiltern Hunt 350 1969/70 Packaging 
Chas. Sprenger & Sons Ltd. 36 1971 Packaging 
Clyde Paper Co. Ltd. - 1971 Paper manufacturing 
Note: the tables record those companies for which evidence was found of incorporation or ceasation of trading during the period 1968-1972. Where accounts were not filed for 1972 and for other years, this was assumed to be due to the time lag involved in making the accounts available to the public. 
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SECTION 3. ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCT GROUPS 
1. Manufacture of printing + writing paper product group 
2. Manufacture of packaging papers product group 
3. Manufacture of board product group 
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SECTION 3 
THE ANALYSIS OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCT GROUPS 
Firms comprising the manufacturing sector of the paper and board 
industry 
(NICE 271) were considered to fall into three distinct non-competing groups: 
printing and writing papers, incl. newsprint; 
packaging papers, incl. tissues; 
board making, incl. corrugated case materials. 
The allocation of the individual firms into the relevant product groups was 
made with the help of information from trade associations; and with 
information from the firms themselves on the nature of the competition 
they experienced. Where the different subsidiaries of the same parent 
company manufacture for different product groups, then each subsidiary has 
been classified according to its own individual activity. 
TABLE 14: NUMBERS OF COMPANIES CLASSIFIED TO EACH PRODUCT GROUP 
Year I Printing & Writing Papers I Packaging Papers I Board Making 
1968 27 19 20 
1969 28 19 20 
1970 29 20 20 
1971 29 19 19 
1972 29 19 20 
An analysis of seller concentration in each of the separate product groups 
was undertaken. It was felt that an investigation of concentration amongst 
competing manufacturers provides a better description of the market conditions 
within that product group. The various concentratidn ratios used were 
calculated on the variable of turnover only. The use of this variable avoided 
the methodological difficulties outlined in Section 2.5 above. 
The concentration indices calculated for each of the three product groups 
are summarised in the following tables, 15 and 16. 
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The following sub-sections, 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 consider in greater detail 
the economic features and performance of each product group. This 
introductory section is intended to present some preliminary comparative 
conclusions relating to all of the manufacturing product groups. 
Board manufacture requires different machinery from that used in paper 
manufacture. Manufacturers producing paper can feasibly switch production 
between print and writing papers and packaging papers, or produce a 
combination of the two. The manufacture of newsprint and soft tissue 
paper are further specialisations. Domestic newsprint production is 
effectively a duopoly, but does in fact represent less than half of 
total UK consumption. Tissue manufacture is a relatively new and compact 
industry, with at present only seven members registered with The British 
Paper and Board Industry Federation. 
Tables 15 and 16 indicate that the level of concentration within each of 
the product groups as measured by the Gini Coefficient is similar. Between 
1968-1972 the value of the Gini coefficient for packaging paper has 
remained constant, compared with the declining values over the same period 
within the printing and writing and board manufacturing product groups. 
This apparent fall in the level of concentration is most marked among 
the board manufacturers. 
According to the Gini, Herfindahl-Hirschmann and Entropy indices, in each 
year, the degree of concentration was greatest in the packaging paper 
and least in the printing and writing product groups. For the printing 
and writing group, these indices changed little over the five year period, 
but for the other two groups it tended to decline. This decrease 
reflected reduced dispersion of turnover. The lower concentration indicated 
in the printing and writing group reflects the presence of about 50% more 
firms than in either of the other two groups. 
Graphs showing the full series of concentration ratios and Linda indices 
can be found in the relevant sub-sections. Within the board manufacturing 
and packaging paper product groups, the concentration ratios at the 
beginning of the period at both 5 and 10 are similar. Again, the pattern 
of declining concentration among the board manufacturers over the period 
1968-1972 is reflected in the value of the concentration ratio at 5 for this. 
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TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF THE DIFFERENT MANUFACTURING PRODUCT 
GROUPS 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Printing & Writing 1.79 1.86 1.90 1.87 1.89 
Board Manufacture 2.00 1.88 1.80 1.70 1.72 
Packaging Paper 2.09 2.05 2.00 1.96 1.93 
GINI COEFFICIENT 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Printing & Writing 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.66 
Board Manufacture 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.67 
Packaging Paper 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMANN INDEX 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Printing & Writing 155.10 158.90 159.58 155.53 157.06 
Board Manufacture 249.30 226.87 211.75 203.83 198.33 
Packaging Paper 282.79 273.24 249.75 253.75 248.38 
ENTROPY INDEX 
Product Group 
Printing & Writing 
Board Manufacture 
Packaging Paper 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
-102.92 -102.17 -103.74 -106.21 -106.76 
- 82.13 - 85.43 - 87.28 - 88.64 - 90.20 
- 79.93 - 79.81 - 83.49 - 81.83 - 82.63 
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TABLE 16: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF THE MANUFACTURING PRODUCT GROUPS 
CONCENTRATION RATIO AT N* =5 
LINDA INDEX AT N* =5 
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
73.1 73 1 6 71 68 7 68 2 Printing & Writing 0.73 . 0.76 . 0.81 . 0.82 . f-'Ö. 82 
Board Manufacture 83'6 81.4 80.1 79.0, 
% 78.3 
1.03 1.00 0,98 0.96 1.02 
Packaging Paper 83.0 85.8 84.6 85.9 85.3 
0.85 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.73 
CONCENTRATION RATIO AT N* = 10 
LINDA INDEX AT N* = 10 
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Printing & Writing 85.9 86.0 85.0 82.6 81.7 
Q. 52 0.54 0.51 0,50 0,51 
Board Manufacture 94.0 9 9 91.0 
0.77 0.58 0.58 0.59 
Packaging Paper 94. 94.7 93. 94. 94.1 
0.80 0.85 0.81 0.82 0 . 79 
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group. The comparatively lower level of concentration within 
the printing 
and writing product group is reflected in lower values of the concentration 
ratio at both the level of the first 5 and first 10 companies. 
The Analysis of Performance 
In Section 2, ' the performance of the UK paper and board industry was 
analysed in terms of the level of employment in each sector between 
1968-1972. It was stated then that the more conventional performance 
measures of profit margin and return on equity could not be calculated 
for large sectors of an industry containing many companies not competing 
in similar product markets. At this stage of examining those individual 
product markets, performance can be more meaningfully analysed in terms 
of profitability and return on equity. 
Tables *17 and 18 below show the mean and standard deviation of respectively 
profit margin and return on equity for each of the product groups identified. 
The ratios used were defined as follows: 
profit margin = profit before tax 
turnover 
return on equity ý profit before tax 
shares + reserves 
(Throughout the analysis, companies making losses in any year are included 
and the value of the loss computed as a negative profit. This allows a 
more satisfactory analysis of the variability in performance). 
Tables 17 and 18 show a wide variation in the value of both the profit 
margin and return on equity, both from product group to product group, 
and for any product group, from year to year. This pattern of variability 
is especially marked in the analysis of profit margin. The measurement 
of standard deviation further reflects the enormous variability in the 
performance of each of the product groups. 
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TABLE 17: ANALYSIS OF PROFIT MARGIN 
Mean profit margin 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Standard deviation 
of profit margin 
0.065 0.067 " 0.032 0 047 ' 
Printing & Writing Paper 
7 / 
U. 111 0.085 0.07E 0.073 0 . 064 
0.043 0.071 0.063 0.047 0.066 
Board Manufacture 
0.066 0.073 0.07 0.071 O, OAO 
Packaging Paper 
0.074 0.079 0.046 0.040 056 0/ 
0.054 0.046 0.011 0.044 0.049 
TABLE 18: ANALYSIS OF RETURN ON EQUITY 
Mean return on 
equity 
Standard 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 deviation on return 
on equity 
0.42 0.47 0.34 0.34 0.42 
Printing & Writing Paper 
1.3 1.69 1.34 1.53 1.58 
0.31 0.29 0.20 0.15 
Board Manufacture 
/ 
0.5 0 51 0.36 0.30 . 52 
0.30 0,36 0.26 0.28 
Packaging Paper 
/ 
0.46 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.97 
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It was decided to examine further the wide dispersion 
in-profit margins 
and returns on equity. To what degree did differences 
between companies 
occur consistently over the five year period? 
in order to answer this question, five-year averages of profit margins 




of the five-year averages may be compared with those derived from the 
distribution containing individual figures for all of the five years: 
9. 
Coefficients of Variation 
(a) 5-year averages (b) Individual figures for all 5 yrs. 
PROFIT MARGINS 
Printing and writing 1.38 1.62 
Board manufacturing 0.84 1.26 
Packaging paper 0.55 0.91 
RETURNS ON EQUITY 
Printing and writing 3.17 3.78 
Board manufacturing 1.41 1.88 
Packaging paper 1.24 1.75 
These results show that consistent differences between firms in these two 
performance indicators account for most of the dispersion observed over the 
five-year period. Because of possible anomalies in the original figures 
(e. g. the valuation of capital) and certain assumptions made for the purposes 
of this report (e. g. in allocation of group figures between subsidiares), 
firm conclusions cannot be drawn from these findings. Further research 
would be necessary to verify this apparent divergence in profitability 
between firms before any attempt at explanation. 
9. see next page. 
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One hypothesis which was investigated at some length was the relationship 
between profitability (measured by gross margins or by return on equity) 
and size. No significant regression results were derived from these 
investigations. No relationship was established either between gross 
margin on turnover and level of turnover or between return on equity and 
value of equity. This result is consistent with the nature of competition 
and specialisation within the industry, discussed at greater length in the 
following subsections. The results are presented in the table below. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - VALUE OF R2 COEFFICIENT' 
Product Group Profit Margin 
Turnover 
Return on Equity 
Equity 
Printing & Writing 0.00062 0.01134 
Board Manufacture 0.00647 0.03924 
Packaging Papers 0.02796 0.04576 
9. 
(a) If the profit margin or return on equity in the year j is shown as 
then the five-year average R is (r88+ r69 + r7p+ r? 1+ r? 2J 
_2 
The coefficient of variation is 1E 
ýR-Rý 
where n is the 
Rn-1 number of firms 
(b) The coefficient of variation based on individual figures is given by 




= n688682 + 2698692 f n70a702 f ri713712 + n728722 
n68 + n69 " n70 + n71 + n72 
M= n68'ý68, + n69m69 + n7e70 + n71m71 + n72m72 
c 
n68 # n69 + n70 + n71 + n72 





SECTION 3: SUB-SECTION 1 
MANUFACTURE OF PRINTING & WRITING PAPER PRODUCT GROUP 
Included within this product grouping are those firms manufacturing 
printing and writing paper (incl. coated) and newsprint. 
In terms of domestic consumption, newsprint represents the greater usage 
by weight. However, domestic production of printing and writing paper has 
in recent years almost doubled that of newsprint. The shortfall is 
covered by imports. Production of both types of paper has been falling 
since about 1969/70 and in both cases imports represent an increasing 
proportion of consumption. However, as Table 19 below indicates, imports 
of newsprint account for over 50% of consumption, but less than30% of 
printing and writing paper consumption. 
Financial statistics relating to those firms identified in the product 
group are shown in Table 20. The values shown are at_prices prevailing 
at the time of recording, but even without correcting for inflation it is 
possible to identify the fall in total net cash flow of the firms in the 
product group during the period. 
The large firms in this section of the paper industry during the period 
1968-1972 were Bowaters, Reed International, Wiggins Teape and Inveresk 
Paper Company. 
Of these companies, Bowater and Reeds have an effective duopoly of newsprint 
manufacture. However, UK manufacturers supply less than 50% of newsprint 
usage, the remainder being imported from Canada and Scandinavia. 
Printing papers are used by printers for book publishing and production 
of periodicals, brochures, etc. Writing papers are used for personal 
stationery and office stationery. Paper mills traditionally sell to their 
customers through merchants or directly to printers and wholesalers: few 
manufacturing mills have their own merchanting companies. 
Characteristically, paper mills rely on regular customers, producing 
often on contract and to specification for large orders. The major part 
of orders is supplied from stock. However, as previously stated, the 
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largest firms within the product group are part of larger vertically 
integrated companies and fluctuations on the demand side have a lesser 
influence. These large firms appear to be price leaders in the ordinary, 
bulk grades where other smaller mills are making the same grades. However, 
smaller mills can be equally profitable if they produce specialty papers 
in smaller runs tailor-made to the customers' exact requirements. In fact, 
the long-run future of the industry is seen to be in those products with 
a high "value added", since it is anticipated that it will become increas- 
ingly difficult for UK mills to compete on ordinary bulk grades with lower 
cost producers such as Sweden and Finland, as was discussed earlier in 
Section 2. 
Structure 
Table 21 shows the asset structure of the product group. Paper manufacturing 
is a capital intensive industry. In recent years the low rate of return 
(see Tables 17 and 18) has provided little incentive for new entrants into 
the industry, or for significant takeovers and mergers in the period under 
consideration: one major exception was the takeover in 1970/71 of Wiggins 
T eape Ltd. by the large diversified conglomerate, British American 
Tobacco. 
TABLE 21: ASSET STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN PRINTING AND WRITING 
PRODUCT GROUP 
Own Capital (£'000) No. of firms 
1968 
0- 50 1 
51 - 500 6 
501 - 1,000 5 
1,001 - 10,000 11 
10,001 - 20,000 2 
20,001 - 50,000 1 
50,001 - 100,000 1 
27 











Between 1968-1972 the product group has been fairly static, with most 
firms surviving, but with reduced profits in later years. Declining 
liquidity and failure to produce new investment in real terms may be an 
indication of future rationalisation. 
The analysis of concentration in terms of turnover shown in Table 22 
reflects the situation within the product group. Each of the indices 
has remained fairly static between 1968-1972. The importance of the 
largest producers is reflected in the concentration ratios and Gini 
coefficient. A high variability of size of turnover would not be expected 
in such a capital intensive sector of the industry. 
The graphical representation of the concentration and Linda indices shows 
the four largest firms forming a distinct oligopolistic group. In 1972 
their respective shares of all sales by UK producers were 30%, 20%, 11% 
and 9%; the sales of the fifth largest company represented only 3% of 
total sales. Once again, this oligopoly situation must be considered 
against the background of competition from imported papers; the four 
firms' combined share of the UK market is of the order of 40-50%. 
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TABLE 22: PRINTING & WRITING PAPER, ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 , 1972 
No. of Companies 27 28 29 29 29 
Total Turnover ('000) 254,549 286,440 318,037 311,377 348,096 
Mean 9427.741 10230.00 10966.793 10737.138 12003.310 
Coefficient of Variation 1.785 1.857 1.904 1.873 1.885 
Gini 0.679 0.695 0.690 0.668 0.658 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 155.099 158.898 159.580 155.526 157.059 
Entropy -102.918 -102.166 -103.736 -106.211 -106.763 
Linda Index 
for N* 
. oncentration Rati os % 
0.724 0.699 0.869 1.09 1.14 
-2 50.00 51.36 50.4 8.1 8.3 
O. 7! 2! 7 0.757 0.810 0.81 0.82 
5 
k 
73.1 73.1 1.6 8.7 8,1 
23 0.536 0.507 0.49 0.50 
10 85.8 86.0 4. 2.6 
0.429 0.433 0.424 0.38 0.37 
= 15 93.2 93.3 92.1 0.8 0 
0.394 0.400 0.364 0.3 0030 
= 20 97.5 91.9 7.3 6.9 
0.568 0.623 0.478 0.48 0.41 
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SECTION 3: SUB-SECTION 2 
MANUFACTURE OF PACKAGING PAPERS PRODUCT GROUP 
Included within this product grouping are those firms manufacturing 
packaging papers and tissue paper. Packaging papers are used extensively 
in the wrapping of food and other products. Tissue manufacture includes 
both hard and soft tissue varieties. 
Until 1963 the UK market for tissues was shared by Kimberly-Clark and 
Scott Paper of the USA., the latter being linked with the British company, 
Bobvater. In 1963 their position was challenged by Peter Dixon, Inveresk, 
Wiggins Teape and Satinex. At the beginning of 1966, a Swedish pulp 
producer acquired a controlling interest in Satinex and its name was 
subsequently changed to Modo Consumer Products. In 1967 the tissue 
interests of Peter Dixon, Inveresk and Associated Tissues were merged to 
form British Tissues. 
During the period under consideration tissue manufacture remained a compact 
industry. In 1973 the British Paper and Board Industry Federation had 
seven members registered as tissue manufacturers. Four of these members 
can be considered to be completely vertically integrated, both manufacturing 
and converting the tissue to its final form. 
Tissue firms, being in a relatively newer sector of the paper industry, 
possess comparatively newer machinery and hence the need for replacement 
investment is less critical. 
In many ways, mills producing packaging papers exhibit similar economic 
characteristics to those discussed in relation to manufacturers of printing 
and writing papers. Table 23 shows the financial statistics relating to 
companies identified in the group. The asset structures of the two 
sectors shown in Table 24 are similar, reflecting the common technology 
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TABLE 24: COMPARATIVE ASSET STRUCTURES OF PACKAGING PAPER AND PRINTING 
AND WRITING PRODUCT GROUPS 
Own Capital (f'000) Packaging Paper Printing & Writing 
No. of firms No. of firms 
1968 1972 1968 1972 
0-50 2 1 1 1 
51 - 500 7 9 6 5 
501 - 1,000 2 2 5 
4 
1,001 - 10,000 7 6 11 
14 
10,001 - 20,000 0 0 2 
2 
20,001 - 50,000 1 1 1 
1 
over 50,000 1 1 
19 19 27 28 
Production and trade statistics relating to packaging paper manufacture are 
shown in Table 25. Domestic production of packaging papers represents 
approximately 30% of consumption; imports accounted for the bulk of consumption. 
During the five-year period imports of kraft wrapping paper increased by 
almost 20%. Imports of other wrapping papers have remained more static. 
This large volume of imports reduces the significance of concentration 
indices as indicators of market structure. Table 26 shows the concentration 
indices calculated for the product group on the basis of turnover. The 
size distribution of the sales by UK firms of packaging papers is fairly 
similar to that of sales of printing and writing papers. Apart from the 
entropy index, each of the measures suggests a slightly higher degree of 
concentration (the entropy index is affected more than the other measures 
by the greater number of companies). The graphical representation of the 
concentration ratios and Linda indices shows an "oligopoly" group of six 
firms with 88% of all UK sales, in 1968. In 1972 the minimum value of 
the Linda occurs at the fifth firm indicating a loss in its share of the 
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TABLE 26: PACKAGING PAPER, ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
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SECTION 3: SUB-SECTION 3 
MANUFACTURE OF BOARD PRODUCT GROUP 
Board manufacture may be considered in two sectors: 
( i) packaging board; 
(ii) specialty and other board (excl. building board). 
Domestic production of board has been fairly static, but since 1967/68 
has begun to decline. Imports represent approximately 25% of consumption 
of packaging boards and approximately 15% of consumption of other boards. 
Production and trade statistics are shown in Table 27. 
The manufacture of packaging boards is characterised by a small number of 
large units, usually all having converting interests. Specialty board 
makers tend to be fewer in number and often produce for specialised 
converted products, e. g. plaster board, boards for the motor industry, shoe 
industry, etc. Table 28 presents the financial statistics relating to the 
firms in the industry. Table 29 below shows the asset distribution of the 
firms in the industry. 
TABLE 29: ASSET STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN BOARD MANUFACTURING 
PRODUCT GROUP 
OwnCapital (f'000) No. of Firms No. of Firms 
1968`_` 1972 
0-50 3 0 
5-500 7 9 
50-1,000 3 3 
100-10,000 6 6 
1,000-20,000 1 1 
over 20,000 0 1 
Table 29 illustrates the capital intensive nature of the product group 
compared with other sectors of the paper industry: in 1972 there were no 
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Within the board manufacturing sector there has been a trend towards vertical 
integration over the past decade'or so. In almost all cases this has been 
through mills buying up converting interests. Where mills have been bought 
up this has tended to be by larger conglomerates typically with strength 
in other industries. The three largest firms in the product group, Thames 
Board Mills, Wiggins Teape and Mardon Packaging are owned by diversified 
conglomerates, Unilever, British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco 
respectively. 
Most producers of board confine their manufacturing activities to this 
product (different machines are required for paper and board manufacture) 
but one mill may produce a wide range of qualities of board. Board is 
sold almost entirely to industrial buyers. Many manufacturers sell a 
substantial proportion of their output to regular customers. Board is 
made entirely to order and not for stock, each batch being made to the 
customer's specifications. This results in a fairly competitive industry 
with a tendency for the larger firms to be price leaders. Whereas paper 
manufacturers distribute much of their output via merchants, competition 
among board manufacturers expresses itself through the use of salesmen for 
direct selling-to customers. 
Not all board manufacturers are in competition with one another. Within 
this sector there are distinct product sub-groups: coated and uncoated 
boards, base board for fibreboard packing cases, folding box grades, roofing 
felt base. In other words, manufacturers have specialised to fit in with 
segmentation within the converting industries. The lower penetration of 
imports indicates that board manufacturers experience less competition from 
overseas than other paper- making/converting companies. This reflects 
the bulky nature of the product and also the methods of selling and 
distribution (direct contact with customers and "tailor-made" production); 
competition has recently been increasing, especially from Scandinavia. 
The Scandinavians are achieving this by concentration on standard ranges of 
board; certain British customers are finding it more economical to purchase 
from these standard ranges than to order board which more precisely fits 
their particular requirements. 
The principal raw material used for board production is wastepaper, and the industry is less vulnerable to changes in the supply and prices of pulp. 
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One major need is the establishment of an effective and reliable supply of 
wastepaper. Fluctuations in mill requirements have hindered the growth of 
regular collection. Because it is based on an indigenous raw material and 
because only a proportion of the potential amount of wastepaper is 
presently collected, the manufacture of board is regarded by the trade 
association as the sector of the paper industry most likely to withstand 
foreign competition. 
Structure 
Within the product group there has been a long-term tendency towards the 
takeover of smaller by larger firms. The present decline in liquidity 
and low profitability suggests that this will continue to be the pattern. 
The effect of this long-run trend in the period analysed, 1968-1972 inclusive, 
Table 30, has been to decrease the variability in the sizes of the firms 
in the sector. This is reflected in the Gini coefficient and Herfindahl 
index which indicate a fall in concentration as the firms become more 
equal in size. The analysis of concentration ratios suggests that it is 
the largest 10-12 firms which are tending to become less dispersed in size. 
This is also clearly shown by the pronounced fall in the Linda indices for 
the 15 largest companies. 
Diagrammatic representation of the concentration ratios and Linda indices 
shows a distinct "oligopolistic arena" consisting of the three largest 
firms. Their shares of total UK sales in 1972 were 35%, 23% and 13% 
respectively; the fourth largest firm accounted for only 4%. 
-84- 
TABLE 30: BOARD MANUFACTURE, ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
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SECTION 4. ANALYSIS OF CONVERTING PRODUCT GROUPS 
1. Manufactured Stationery product group 
2. Non-board packaging product group 
3. Board packaging product group 
4. Miscellaneous converted products group 
5. Walicoverings product group 
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SECTION 4 
ANALYSIS OF CONVERTING PRODUCT GROUPS 
Firms comprising the converting sector of the paper and board industry 
(NICE 272) were considered to fall into five distinct non-competing 
product groups: 
stationery; 
packaging - not board (paper bags, sacks); 
board packaging (boxes, cartons, fibreboard cases); 
miscellaneous (fancy goods, cups, plates)'; 
wallcoverings. 
The allocation of the individual firms into relevant product groups was 
undertaken as described in the case of manufacturing product groups (Section 3). 
The analysis of the wallcovering product group is considered separately 
from general analysis of the converting product groups. The reasons for 
this are explained in Section 4.5. 
TABLE 31: NUMBERS OF COMPANIES CLASSIFIED TO EACH PRODUCT GROUP 
Year Stationery Packaging - not Board Board Packaging Misc. 
1968 14 27 108 21 
1969 14 27 107 21 
1970 14 27 105 21 
1971 14 27 102 21 
1972 14 27 102 21 
The analysis of seller concentration in each of the separate product groups 
was undertaken as described in the previous section relating to the 
manufacturing product groups analysis. 
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The concentration indices calculated for the four product groups, stationery, 
board packaging, non-board packaging and miscellaneous, are summarised in 
Tables 32 and 33. 
The following sub-sections 74.1,4.2,4.3, and 4.4. consider in greater 
detail the economic features and performance of each product group. This 
introductory section is intended to present some preliminary conclusions 
relating to all of the converting product groups. 
The various product groups identified within the converting sector of the 
UK paper industry represent very distinct and non-competing product markets. 
Although largely dependent on the manufacturing sector of the industry for 
its raw materials, the converting sector is concerned with the transformation 
of the paper and board into its final useable form. 
A clear distinction can be made between board and non-board packaging. 
Although both may be considered as alternative forms of packaging, the 
products of the two groups exhibit physical properties which tend to make 
them non-competitive: board packaging usually represents the outer form 
of packaging, boxes, cartons and the stronger fibreboard packing cases. 
Non-board packaging includes paper bags, carrier bags and other paper 
wrappings. Such products experience more competition from plastic, 
polythene and cellulose packing than from board packaging. 
Miscellaneous converted products include other packaging items such as 
tapes, gummed tape, labels, etc., as well as a plethora of items such as 
novelties, crackers, dress patterns and cigarette filters. 
Stationery forms a further distinct product group involving the conversion 
of fine papers into their final product form: envelopes, school and 
office stationery, and so on. 
With such a diverse range of product markets within the converting sector 
of the industry, the economic-structure and performance of any product 
group will not necessarily bear any resemblance to any other product group. 
- The very wide difference in the number of companies in each product group 
is an indication of this fact. 
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TABLE 32: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF DIFFERENT CONVERTING 
PRODUCT GROUPS 
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 
1972 
Stationery 2.22 2.28 2.25 2.26 
2.20 
Packaging - Not Board 2.01 2.12 2.08 
2.04 2.02 
Miscellaneous 1.71 1.71 1.73 1.79 1.79 
Board Packaging 3.27 3.20 2.97 2.98 2.95 
GINI COEFFICIENT 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Stationery 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 
Packaging -Not Board 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.67 
Miscellaneous 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 
Board Packaging 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82 
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMANN INDEX 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Stationery 423.5 444.3 432.0 437.9 416.8 
Packaging - Not Board 187.0 203.1 196.8 190.6 187,8 
Miscellaneous 187.1 186.4 190.9 200.3 200.1 
Board Packaging 108.4 104.1 93.6 96.9 95.0 
ENTROPY INDEX 
Product Group 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Stationery -51.05 -51.89 -53.88 -53.59 -52.46 
Packaging - Not Boar d -100.89 -98.64 -99.57 -101.25 -100.54 
Miscellaneous -93.31 -93.19 -92.44 -91.42 -91.86 
Board Packaging -128.42 -129.19 -131.95 -131.12 -131.11 
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TABLE 33: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER OF THE CONVERTING PRODUCT GROUPS 
CONCENTRATION RATIO AT N* =5 
LINDA INDEX AT N* =5 










77 . . . . . 
69.5 70.1 69.5 67.8 68.7 Packaging - Not Boar d 1.10 1.19 1.18 1.12 1.07 
Miscellaneous 76.7 76.8 78.4 77.9 77.4 
0.73 0.71 0.72 0.82 0.87 
Board Packaging 63.0 61.6 
59.6 60.8 60.0 
0.60 0.59 1 , 
0.49 0.49 0.50 
CONCENTRATION RATIO AT N* = 10 
LINDA INDEX AT N* = 10 












































Board Packaging is the largest product group in the converting sector having 
over three times as many firms as in the next largest product group - 
Non-Board Packaging. On the other hand, stationery manufacture has relatively 
few firms. 
The relative numbers of firms in each product group is reflected in both 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann and Entropy indices: both show similar values 
respectively for non-board packaging and miscellaneous manufacturers, these 
product groups having roughly similar numbers of firms, and exhibit extreme 
values for the two product groups with very. large and very small numbers of 
firms. 
Having the largest number of companies, the board packaging product group 
shows the greatest degree of variability between sizes of firms as 
measured by the coefficient of variation. The stationery product group 
has the second highest coefficient of variation. The reason for this is 
that this group is dominated by a single particularly large manufacturer. 
This fact is further reflected in the relative values of the concentration 
ratio for the top 5 firms, where the stationery product group appears 
most concentrated. Graphs showing the full series of concentration ratios 
and Linda indices can be found in the relevant sub-sections. 
The Analysis of Performance 
In Section 2, the performance of the UK paper and board industry was 
analysed in terms of the level of employment in each sector between 
1968-1972. It was stated then that the more conventional performance 
measures of profit margin and return on equity could not be calculated for 
large sectors of an industry containing many companies not competing in 
similar product markets. At this stage of examining those individual 
product markets, performance can be more meaningfully analysed in terms 
of profitability and return on equity, 
Tables 34 and 35 below show the mean and standard deviation of respectively 
profit margin and return on equity for each of the product groups identified. 
The ratios used were as follows: 
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profit margin = profit before tax 
turnover 
return on equity = profit before tax 
shares + reserves 
(Throughout the analysis, companies making losses in any year are 
included and the value of the loss computed as a negative profit. This 
allows a more satisfactory analysis of the variability in performance. ) 
Tables 34 and 35 show a wide variation in the value of both the profit 
margin and return on equity, both from product group to product group; 
and from year to year for any given product group. As already pointed out, 
the diverse range of product markets within the converting sector partly 
explains the differences in the performance of each grouping. 
As with the manufacturing product groups, it was decided to investigate 
how much of the dispersion of profitability was explained by differences 
between individual forms which occurred consistently in each of the five 
years. The methods used are explained on page 3.7 above and the results 
shown in the following tables. 
Coefficients of variation (Standard deviation/Arithmetic mean) 
(a) of five-year averages for individual firms; 
(b) of all the individual figures for each of the five years. 
PROFIT MARGIN ON TURNOVER (a) (b) 
Stationery 0.56 0.70 
Packaging - not board 0.78 0.92 Miscellaneous 1.28 1.59 
Board packaging 1.26 
RETURN ON EQUITY 
Stationery 1.03 2.63 
Packaging - not board 1.91 2.16 Miscellaneous 3', 10 3.55 
Board packaging 1.68 3.25 
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TABLE 34: ANALYSIS OF PROFIT MARGIN 
Mean profit margin 
Standard deviation 
of profit margin 
1968 1 1969 1 1970 1 1971 1 1972 
0.045 0.064 0.005 0.006 0.032- 
0 
Stationery 
0.061 . 068 0.168 
0.113 . 081 
Packaging - Not Board 
0.064 0.054" 0.047 0.048 0.063 
040 0.047 0.055 0.059 0.050 0 
Miscellaneous 
0.064 0.064 0.056 0.059 / 0.065"/ 
0.101 0.093 0.096 0.090 /0.108 
0.060 0.063 070.0.0ýOO 0 0.062 
Board Packaging 
0.063 0.093 085/. 063 
TABLE 35: ANALYSIS OF RETURN ON EQUITY 
0.132 0.376 0.365 0.029 0.295 
Stationery 
0.151 0.986 0.662 0.642 . 388 
0.393 0.354 0.260 0.283 0.402/ 
Packaging - Not Board 
0.951 1.035 0.348 0.462 . 59 
0,788 0.697 1.035 0,638 0.325 
Miscellaneous 
2,719 2.086 3.802 1.995 0,591 
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This analysis shows that, as in the manufacturing sectors, most of the 
variation in rates of profits is due to differences between firms which 
were consistent over the five-year period. As was pointed out on page 3.7 
inconsistencies in the original data and assumptions adopted for the purposes 
of this report may account for part of these differences. Before definitive 
conclusions could be drawn from this analysis, more exhaustive research 
would be required. 
No relationship was found to exist between profitability and size. To 
some extent, this may reflect deficiencies in the basic data, but the 
absence of any such relationship is consistent with conclusions drawn from 
the analysis of product groups in the following sections. The results are 
shown in the following table. 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - VALUE OF R2 COEFFICIENT 
Product Group Profit Margin 
Turnover 
Return on Equity 
Equity 
Stationery 0.03386 0.00011 
Non-board packaging 0.00025 0.00039 
Miscellaneous 0.04112 0.01492 
Board Packaging 0.00222 0.00268 
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SECTION 4 SUB-SECTION 1 
STATIONERY PRODUCT GROUP 
Classified to this product group are those firms engaged in the manufacture 
of stationery including writing pads, envelopes, manuscript books, account 
books, office and school stationery, cardboard files, index cards and 
tabulating machine cards. 
The market for stationery is seen to fall into three segments: 
( i) the domestic market, catering for the individual who 
requires writing paper and envelopes, notepaper ana exercise books; 
( ii) industry generally which requires supplies of plain 
envelopes, pay packets, account books, index cards and so on; 
(iii) "big industry" which requires printed and personalised 
stationery of all types in large quantities. 
Stationery orders will be met from stock or will be made to order according 
to which of the above three markets the manufacturer is supplying: the 
larger buyers, requiring personalised stationery, will place bulk orders 
directly with the manufacturers: more standardised products will, on 
the other hand, be met from stock. Stock distribution is primarily through 
wholesalers or direct to retail stationers. 
The product group is dominated by one manufacturer, John Dickinson, which 
is a subsidiary of one of the major groups in the industry, having other 
subsidiaries in both the manufacturing and converting sectors. This 
dominance of the product group is illustrated in the attached graphs of 
concentration ratios and Linda indices. It will be noticed that the 
minimum value of the Linda occurs at n* = 2, and rises thereafter, suggesting 
the existence of a single oligopolist. The other large stationery 
manufacturers are Wiggins Teape and Spicers - which is part of Reed 
International. 
The asset structure of the firms identified in the product group is shown 
in Table 36 below and statistics of other financial variables relating to 
the firms in the product group are shown in Table 37. 
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TABLE 36: ASSET STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN STATIONERY PRODUCT GROUP 
Own Capital (£'000) No. of firms No. of firms 
1968 1972 
0-50 22 
51 - 500 67 
501 - 1,000 01 
1,001 - 10,000 42 10,001 - 20,000 11 
20,001 - 50,000 11 
14 14 
The analysis of concentration within the product group is shown in Table 38 
It has already been mentioned that the group is dominated by a single 
manufacturer and has the fewest members of all converting product groups. These 
facts are reflected in the various concentration indices. During the 
period under examination, 1968-1972, the values of the various concentration 
indices have remained fairly static. 
41 
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TABLE 38: STATIONERY, ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
No. of Companies 14 14 14 14 14 
Total Turnover ('000) 153,074 166,990 178,239 189,179 207,905 
Mean 10933.857 11927.857 12731.357 13512.786 14850.357 
Coefficient of Variation 2.198 2.220 2.284 2.246 2.264 
Gini 0.813 0.821 0.812 0.805 0.805 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 416.776 423.483 444.264 431.984 437.856 
Entropy - 52.463 - 51.048 - 51.894 - 53.881 - 52.463 
Linda Index 
for N* 
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SECTION 4: SUB-SECTION 2 
NON-BOARD PACKAGING PRODUCT GROUP 
Classified as producers of non-board packaging are manufacturers of 
paper bags, including print bags, multi-wall paper sacks and other 
packaging items such as moulded pulp units, jam pot covers and bottle 
caps. 
In terms of turnover, non-board packaging represents only approximately 
one quarter of all paper and board packaging. Non-board packaging items, 
such as paper bags and sacks, probably represent the product group with 
the highest cross-elasticity in respect of competing goods made from 
materials other than paper. Plastic and cellulose bags and sacks have, 
to an extent, replaced paper equivalents, these former having the 
advantage of greater strength and waterproofness. For this reason, the 
entire market for all types of bags and sacks should ideally be considered 
before conclusions as to finns' conduct and behaviour can be made. Paper 
bag manufacturers have met this competition by themselves producing bags 
of materials other than paper. 
Paper bags require a great variety of papers for their manufacture, 
depending on the end use. Raw materials are bought from British or 
Scandinavian paper mills, and bags are made from the reel. Buying is 
primarily on the basis of price and quality: integrated companies do not 
necessarily buy from the parent company's manufacturing mill, but will go 
for the best price. It is however advantageous at times of shortage to 
have assured supplies of raw materials. 
Apart from the larger bag manufacturers identified, the product group is 
characterised by an estimated 100 very small operators for whom data was 
not available. Most smaller manufacturers tend to be single-product orientated 
whereas the larger firms have diversified into other forms of packaging. There 
are an estimated six integrated manufacturers, the remainder being entirely 
bag manufacturers. 
Given that a firm is a bag manufacturer, there is little sub-specialisation. 
A manufacturer can produce a wide range and variety of paper bags; only 
Barrier bags require special plant. This results in a highly competitive 
atmosphere within the industry. 
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Specialisation within the industry is confined to whether or not the 
manufacturer undertakes the printing of bags. Non-printed bags are produced 
in large quantities and are generally distributed through merchants. 
Paper and other wrapping bags are such "regular use" items that total 
usage is not expected to increase significantly; if anything, the use 
of paper bags may decline as retailers try to tust costs and housewives 
attempt to conserve resources! 
"Own name" bags and carriers are produced to the buyer's specification. 
Customers requiring such wrappings vary from the large retail chains down 
to the local grocer. In such a situation, larger buyers have a 
monopsonistic position. 
For comparison, the following table illustrates the relative importance of 
the different packaging types: 
TABLE 39: MANUFACTURERS' SALES OF PACKAGING PRODUCTS (fm) 
1971 1972 1973 
Paper and Board n/a 640 767 
Plastic 111 128 231 
Laminates (foil on plastic, paper 
cellulose, polythene, etc. ) n/a 27 48 
Metal n/a n/a 327 
Wood, etc. 44 43 56 
Glass 100 110 123 
Business Monitor PQ 480 
Structure 
The financial statistics relating to the firms identified in the product 
group are presented in Table 40. 
The largest firms in the product group in the period investigated, 1968-1972, 
were subsidiaries of Dickinson Robinson and Reed International. 
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The importance of the two largest firms is reflected in concentration ratios 
which indicate that nearly 60% of the turnover of the product group is 
accounted for by the top two firms. The concentration ratios and Linda 
indices for the product group are shown graphically below. 
Examination of the Linda and concentration indices shows that the two 
largest firms are considerably greater than their other competitors and in 
1972 their sales accounted for 37% and 19% of sales by all British companies; 
the next largest firm accounted for only 5%. Although according to these 
indices these two firms, Dickinson Robinson-and Reeds, forma duopoly, this 
position is modified by competition from products outside the definition 
of the industry. 
An analysis of the asset structure of the firms classified to the product 
group is shown in Table 41. Relative to other product groups examined, the 
range of size of firms is not great, no firm having equity of greater than 
£10 million, with a distinct modal value of £51-500,000. 
TABLE 41: ASSET STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN THE NON4BOARD PACKAGING 
PRODUCT GROUP 
Own Capital (f'000) No. of firms No. of firms 
1968 1972 
0-50 42 
51 - 500 19 20 
501 - 1,000 34 
1,001 - 10,000 11 
More than 10,000 00 
27 27 
From 1968-1972 net cash flow fell in money terms implying a much greater fall 
in real terms of expenditure on investment. 
Relative to other product groups examined in the conversion of paper and 
board industry, the manufacture of non-board packaging appears the least 
concentrated- a Gini coefficient of less than 0.7 reflects this fact. 
Table 42 shows the concentration indices for the product group. 
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TABLE 42: PACKAGING (NOT INCL. BOARD), ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
1968 1 1969 1 1970 1 1971 1 1972 
No. of Companies 27 27 27 27 27 
Total Turnover ('000) 38,154 42,602 46,895 46,674 52,289 
Clean 1413.111 1577.852 1736.852 1728.667 1936.630 
Coefficient of Variation 2.012 2.117 2.077 2.036 2.017 
Gini 0.661 0.670 0.667 0.656 0.669 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 187.017 203.106 196.816 190.594 187.755 
Entropy -100.889 - 98.640 - 99.568 -101.251 -100.535 
Linda Index 
for N* 
oncentration Rauios % 
_ 
0.86 1.00 01>56.0.94 
2 
57.2 58.9 4 56.6 
1.09 
. 18 1.12 1.06 5 69.4 
. 1970.0 
69.5 67.8 68.6 
= 10 
0.5 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.51 
82.1 83.2 83.2 82.7 84.2 
= 15 
0'3 0.4 0.4 0.39 0.39 
91.9 91.8 91.9 91.7 92.6 
= 20 
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Since 1968, the product group appears static in terms of concentration. As 
already explained, this is not a growth sector and the firms in the industry 
are long-established, this being one of the oldest converting sectors. 
The highly competitive nature of the grouping has in the past caused exits 
from the industry, but more recently firms have continued to exist through 
increased specialisation. It is through such specialisation that large 
and small manufacturers can survive together. 
Again the competitiveness of the product group and the existence of older 
firms with established market shares act against new entry into the industry. 
Similarly, takeovers have been limited, as paper bags manufacturing is not 
a profitable area of diversification. 
This somewhat static picture is not expected to change within the near 
future. 
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SECTION 4: SUB-SECTION 3 
BOARD PACKAGING PRODUCT GROUP 
Folding Cartons 
The Board Packaging product group can be considered in two distinct sections 
- the conversion of board into folding boxes and the manufacture of fibre- 
board packing cases. Very crudely, fibreboard packing cases represent the 
heavier, outer form of packaging, while folding boxes are used for the 
initial packing of goods. 
Folding cartons are used widely to package food and non-consumable items. 
Plastic, cellophane, and paper/plastics mixtures are increasing in importance 
as packaging materials. Recognising this, many of the converters in this 
product group produce both paper (predominantly) and some plastic packaging 
items, in order to ensure the packaging buyer of the best type of packing 
for his particular product. 
In order to produce folding boxes, converting organisations require board 
in many varieties. Board is obtained from both home and foreign mills. 
Those converters who are subsidiaries of vertically integrated groups 
having a board manufacturing subsidiary have guaranteed supplies of board 
for conversion. 
Independent converting firms are in a less favourable position regarding 
the purchasing of manufactured board. To a certain extent they are forced 
to accept. the selling terms of the larger board manufacturers. especially 
when board is in short supply. 
Folding carton makers produce almost entirely to order. The nature of the 
product is such that it is "tailor-made" to the requirements of individual 
customers. 
Considerable economies of scale can be obtained from long production runs. 
For this reason, several of the producers are reliant on a small number of 
regular customers. Again, the market strength of the large buyer is felt 
by the smaller folding carton makers: such large buyers will perhaps split 
an order between several small producers. This small producer cannot 
withhold supplies to the buyer (for instance to speed up payment) as the 
buyer will not miss the quantity and the producer is left with useless 
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"tailor-made" cartons. 
Even so, the smaller firms do exist alongside the larger ones. This fact 
is attributable to the willingness and ability of the smaller firms to 
produce specialised products and to undertake small runs for individual 
customers. 
Fibreboard Containers 
Production of fibreboard cases can be further subdivided into the production 
of solid cases and the production of corrugated cases. Originally fibre- 
board containers were of the solid type, but their use has of more recent 
years been superseded by the use of corrugated cases, as the tables below 
indicate. 
Year 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 
Solid 246 241 277 222 233 222 196 173 155 161 
Corrugated 842 865 929 949 1075 1146 1192 1201 1277 1399 
TOTAL 
I- 
1088 1106 1206 1171 1308 1368 1388 1374 1432 1560 
I 
The relative growth in the two sub-sectors is further reflected by the 
relative levels of capital formation over the last 10 years. 
Year 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 
SOLID: 
Plants with laminators 10 10 10 10 9 8 9 9 9 
Number of laminators 15 15 15 15 14 13 13 13 13 
CORRUGATED: 
Plants with corrugators 52 52 55 57 59 64 66 70 70 
Number of corrugators 75 75 76 76 80 87 89 94 98 
The Fibreboard Packing Case Association 
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Fibreboard cases are used for the outer packaging of goods. -The properties 
users seek in packing their goods in fibreboard containers are strength to 
protect valuable goods in transit as well as moisture resistance. Prior to 
the widespread use of fibreboard cases, approximately 10 years ago, wooden 
boxes were used for outer packaging. Now fibreboard case manufacturers 
see their main competition from plastic containers. Fibreboard cases are 
used throughout all industrial sectors as the following end use classification 
indicates. 
TABLE 43: END USE CLASSIFICATION - FIBREBOARD CONTAINERS - 1972 
Foodstuffs 28.8 
Metal working, machines and parts, electrical machines 
(excl. household appliances) 13.5 
Radio, TV., communication equipment, household appliances 11.7 
Beverages 9.9 
Agricultural produce and fresh foods 9.6 
Soaps, perfumes, cosmetics, etc. 5.2 
Ceramics, glassware, other non-metallic products 3.7 
Chemical and allied products 3.5 
Paper goods and printed matter 3.3 
Other 10.8 
100.0% 
British Fibreboard Packing Case Association 
The manufacture of fibreboard cases is in two stages: the manufacture of 
the solid or corrugated case material, and the conversion of this material 
into actual cases. Obviously some firms within the industry are engaged 
in both processes. Other producers buy in the completed board and are 
concerned with the conversion process only. New entrants into the industry 
tend to be via the conversion process because of the initially, high capital 
costs involved in putting down a corrugating or laminating plant. 
Inputs into the manufacturing process are kraft liner in sheet form, and 
fluting material, usually the cheapest quality available including waste. 
Kraft liner has to be imported (see Manufacturing section). Obviously in 
times of excess demand, those manufacturers with overseas links will have 
priority in receiving kraft liner. As material costs are over 50% of the 
cost of production, individual manufacturers are vulnerable to increased 
costs of imports; but prices from suppliers tend to be similar. 
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Individual firms within the fibreboard case-making sector are generally 
single product firms. The particularly large firms who are part of 
diversified conglomerates are now beginning to move into the new plastics 
product market. 
Manufacturers do not produce fibreboard cases for stock - every order 
placed with a producer is a tailor-made job. The practice of producing 
for stock is discouraged unless the manufacturer is totally confident of 
a repeat order. This reflects the normally very competitive nature of the 
industry - this pattern having been somewhat distorted in the present 
situation of short supply of paper goods generally. Manufacturers are 
tied to particular buyers only to the extent of inter-group trading. 
Competition reflects itself in the marketing strategies which are to a 
limited extent through industrial advertising, but largely through direct- 
selling salesmen. 
Why does the industry appear so competitive despite a fairly high degree 
of concentration? Small "converting only" firms specialise in small runs 
and specialty products. The larger firms are more concerned with bulk 
orders involving long production runs to reduce costs. 
Structure 
The large firms in this section of the converting industry during the 
period 1968-1972 were Reeds, Bowaters, Mardon Packaging, Unilever, 
McMillan Bloedal, Tremletts and Tillotsons Corrugated Cases. 
The product group is characterised by a large dispersion in the sizes of 
firms in the industry. Although over 100 firms have been identified in 
the sector, the top two account for 35% of turnover, and 75% of total 
turnover is controlled by the top 10. Similarly, at the lower end of the 
distribution, the bottom 50 or so firms appear very small in terms of 
turnover. This pattern is not incompatible with the nature of the product 
allowing the small specialists to exist alongside the "giants". The asset 
structure of the product group is shown in Table 44 below. 
During the period examined, 1968-1972, there have been no significant 
changes in the concentration indices measured; the results are shown in 
Table 45. 
z 
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TABLE 44: ASSET STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IDENTIFIED IN BOARD PACKAGING PRODUCT 
GROUP 
Own Capital (£'000) No. of firms No. of firms 
1968 1972 
0- 50 30 13 
51 - 500 62 
66 
501 - 1,000 7 8 
1,001 - 10,000 7 12 
10,001 - 20,000 1 2 
20,001 - 50,000 1 1 
50,001 - 100,000 0 0 
108 102 
The concentration ratios and Linda indices for the product group are shown in 
the following graphs. It will be noticed that the Linda indices show no 
distinct minima, suggesting that no oligopolistic grouping exists within the 
product group. This is the same phenomenon as was observed in the analysis 
of the entire converting sector discussed in Section 2.5. Because the 
data for box and fibreboard case manufacturers could not be distinguished, 
the Linda index is effectively summing two "oligopolies" and producing the 
results observed. This observation might have proved invalid if separation 
into two product groups had been possible. 
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TABLE 45: BOARD PACKAGING, ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
No. of Companies 108 108 105 102 102 
Total Turnover ('000) 236,870 277,035 327,355 334,634 377,922 
Mean 2193.241 2565.139 3117.676 3280.725 3705.118 
Coefficient of Variation 3.271 3.200 2.971 2.980 2.947 
Gini 0.829 0.829 0.822 0.817 0.821 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 108.378 104.126 93.642 96.871 94.977 
Entropy -128.415 -129.191 -131.952 -131.109 -131.107 
Linda Index 
for N* 
oncentration Räti os % 
=2 
0.59 J. 63 0.65 0.68 0.63 
39.7 37.1 34.2 5.0 4.7 
= 10 
0.40 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.36 











8 1 . . . . . 
= 40 
0.31 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
93.8 94.1 94.6 4.3 .7 
= 50 
0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.29 
95.8 96.0 96.2 6.1 6.4 
= 60 
0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 
97.2 97.3 97.5 97.4 7 66 
80 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.27 
98.9 99.0 99.1 99.1 9.1 
= 100 
0.2 0.2 0.29 0 
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SECTION 4: SUB-SECTION 4 
MISCELLANEOUS CONVERTED PRODUCTS GROUP 
The miscellaneous manufactures of paper and board sector does not 
represent an homogeneous product group as has been the case with the 
other sectors examined. Products classified to this group are diverse 
including dress patterns, crackers, cigarette filters, paper novelties, 
doilies and catering paperware. Such a range of products suggest that 
few conclusions can be drawn from the behaviour of individual firms 
within the grouping. 
The three largest firms classified to this product group are Bunzl Pulp 
and Paper; Smith & Newphew; and Robinsons & Son. The last two manufac- 
turers produce surgical dressings, babies nappies and other cellulose 
wadding materials. The subsidiaries of Bunzl Pulp & Paper classified to 
this sector produce cigarette filter materials, tape, rolls, tubes, etc. 
For completeness the tables of analysis are presented below. Table 47 
shows the financial statistics relating to the firms in the product group, 
and Table 48 summarises the concentration indices. 
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TABLE 48: 
MISCELLANEOUS: ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
No. of Companies 21 21 21 21 21 
Total Turnover ('000) 63,475 70,272 75,090 79,539 85,751 
Mean 3022.619 3346.286 3575.714 3787.571 4083.381 
Coefficient of Variation 1.711 1.707 1.734 1.790 1.789 
Gini 0.678 0.682 0.687 0.689 0.682 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann 187.069 186.448 190.926 200.327 200.064 
Entropy - 93.313 - 93.191 - 92.442 - 91.422 - 91.860 
Linda Index 
for N* 
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SECTION 4: SUB-SECTION 5 
WALLCOVERINGS PRODUCT GROUP 
During the main course of the study the analysis of those firms producing 
wallpaper and other paper-based wallcoverings has been excluded. It will 
be noted that in Section 2 the general analysis of the converting sector 
of the industry excluded wallpaper manufacturers. Instead, the product 
group is separately analysed in this section. 
The reason for this approach is as follows: wallpaper manufacture is 
essentially a printing process whereby a pattern is applied to a base 
paper: the production of base paper for wallpaper is included in the 
manufacture of other printing and writing papers. For this reason, the 
analysis of the wallcoverings product group has been undertaken separately. 
the methodology was the same as described for the entire study. 
The supply of wallpaper was the subject of a Monopoly Commission10. 
enquiry in the early 1960's. The largest firm in the product group, 
Wallpaper Manufacturers (WPM) was formed in 1899 by the voluntary 
amalgamation of thiry-one wallpaper firms. It was a merger-intensive firm 
throughout its existence until it was itself taken over by Reed Paper 
(now Reed International) in 1965. In 1899 it claimed to produce 98% of 
the total output of wallpaper, but since then there has been a downwards 
trend in this proportion, temporarily reversed by acquisitions. The 
Monopolies Commission concluded that such acquisitions may be expected to 
operate against the public interest, and recommended that further 
acquisitions should not be allowed without the permission of the (then) 
Board of Trade. 
Developments since 1963 have also tended to limit WPM's market share. By 
1966, ICI held approximately 10% and had entered the "vinyl" market; WPM 
were slow to follow. In addition, smaller companies were taken over by 
larger companies, in several instances with significant paints interests 
(ICI; Berger, Jenson & Nicholson; and Leyland Paints). 
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Throughout the period under examination, the product group has continued 
to be dominated by ICI and WPM, the former having significantly increased 
their share of the market. ICI is one of the UK's largest companies, 
being predominantly in the chemical industry. Because of the divisional 
organisation of the company, it was not possible to isolate from the 
consolidated accounts the financial statistics relating to their wallpaper 
interests only. 
The financial statistics relating to the remaining companies identified 
in the product group are summarised in Table 49. 
TABLE 49: FINANCIAL STATISTICS RELATING TO COMPANIES IDENTIFIED IN THE 
WALLCOVERINGS PRODUCT GROUP (Excluding ICI) 











1968 8 35,365 3.105 3,870 26,083 1,981 
1969 8 46,548 4,297 2,850 26,270 832 
1970 8 52,966 5,195 1,534 30,362 1,026 
1971 7 47,834 4,965 1,830 29,822 711 
1972 8 38,379 4,487 2,480 31,967 1,552 
As the statistics collected relating to this product group proved to be 
incomplete it was decided that any further analysis of concentration would 
be inconclusive. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Comparison of Concentration Indices for all 
financial variables relating to companies in 
manufacturing and converting sectors of the 
U. K. paper industry; 
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MANUFACTURE 
COMPARISON OF INDICES APPLIED TO DIFFERENT VARIABLES 
VARIANCE 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 2.03 2.08 2.10 2.04 2,05 
exports 2.16 1.65 2.33 2.05 2.28 
profit before tax 1.95 1.75 1.73 1.81 1.72 
net cash flow 2.08 1.91 1.77 1.66 1.82 
own capital 2.22 2.26 2.28 2.27 2.40 
gross investment 2.07 2.14 2.10 2.35 2.70 
GINI COEFFICIENT 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 0.728 0.736 0.731 0.719 0.715 
exports 0.742 0.706 0.746 0.737 0.753 
profit before tax 0.750. 0.708 0.703 0.721 0.678 
net cash flow 0.753 0.720 0.700 0.693 0.706 
own capital 0.766 0.769 0.766 0.766 0.772 
gross investment 0.758 0.780 0.761 0.788 0.742 
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMANN INDEX 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 80.2 82.0 80.8 78.2 78.9 
exports 104.93 65.4 105.. 5 88.5 103.6 
profit before tax 81.4 64.5 68.1 75.4 68.4 
net cash flow 86.1 72.6 65.7 63.0 68.7 
own capital 92.8 94.2 92.2 95.2 102.6 
gross investment 82.5 86.1 80.9 98.7 125.8 
ENTROPY 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover -133.4 -132.8 -134.5 -135.9 -136.3 exports -123.8 -134.7 -127.1 -129.3 -126.0 profit before tax -128.5 -138.2 -135.9 -131.6 -138.0 net cash flow -129.0 -136.2 -138.6 -138,4 -137.9 own capital -127.3 -127.3 -128.9 -127.3 -126.2 gross investment -130.0 -126.7 -131.4 -124.2 -127.5 
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MANUFACTURE: C011PARISON OF INDICES APPLIED TO DIFFERENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 1968 1969 1970 1971 
1972 ' 
Linda index 
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CONVERSION 
COMPARISON OF INDICES APPLIED TO DIFFERENT VARIABLES 
VARIANCE 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 4.09 3.97 3.83 3.69 3.49 
exports 5.15 4.74 4.22 4.15 3.94 
profit before tax 4.02 3.68 4.01 3.53 3.26 
net cash flow 3.81 3.66 3.67 3.31 3.07 
own capital 4.65 4.42 3.76 4.05 3.94 
gross investment 2.89 2.99 3.25 3.47 3.00 
GINI COEFFICIENT 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 0.829 0.829 0.831 0.823 0.824 
exports 0.905 0.896 0.898 0.905 0.910 
profit before tax 0.859 0.847 0.852 0.854 0.840 
net cash flow 0.845 0.834 0.837 0.831 0.822 
own capital 0.834 0.828 0.777 0.818 0.824 
gross investment 0.708 0.809 0.820 0.831 0.826 
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMANN INDEX 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover 98.9 96.4 91.9 91.1 91.1 
exports 179.2 156.7 128.4 133.0 133.3 
profit before tax 97.3 84.6 101.7 87.4 83.4 
net cash flow 87.7 83.7 85.1 75.8 73.6 
own capital 126.6 117.9 88.9 108.1 115.2 
gross investment 52.7 58.1 67.6 81.2 69.1 
ENTROPY 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
turnover -140.3 -140.6 -141.8 -142.0 -140.1 
exports -105.6 -111.5 -116.5 -112.0 -109.8 
profit before tax -136.6 -140.4 -136.7 -136.5 -138.4 
net cash flow -141.2 -143.2 -143.3 -144.1 -143.5 
own capital -134.5 -136.6 -152.1 -139.0 -134.7 
gross investment -166.9 -154.4 -149.9 -142.9 -144.3 
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CONVERSION 
COMPARISON OF INDICES APPLIED TO DIFFERENT VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Linda index 
i where n* Conc. 
-4 ratios 
0.597 0.549 - 0.540 0.552 
0.538 
Turnover 
54.9 - 54.6 / 53.1 52.7 
/53.0 
71- - 
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Own Capital 0.812 0.185 0.704 
0.754 0.780 
58,8 57.1 ß7ß 55.1 56.8 
Gross investments 0,457 0.380 
0.528 0,431ýý 
/ 39,2 42.0 144.5 10.529 48.3 45.1 




Turnover ' 0.475 0.480 0.479 0.463 0.467 
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APPENDIX B- TECHNICAL NOTE 
COMPARISON OF CONCENTRATION OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES - THE EFFECTS OF 
DIFFERENT RANKING 
Certain methods of comparison have been suggested by economists of the EEC 
Commission with responsibility for co-ordination of this series of studies. 
l' 
These depend upon the assumption that ranking of companies is similar, 
with respect to each of the financial variables. This assumption was 
found to be invalid in the two sectors of paper manufacturing and conversion. 
The authors decided to examine differences in 
of the variables: turnover, exports, profits, 
gross investment. The method used was that of 
were arranged in descending order with respect 
correlation coefficients were computed between 
each firm. Two technical questions arose: 
rankings according to each 
net cash flow, equity and 
rank correlation: firms 
to each variable and simple 
the different rankings of 
(a) because of "bunching" of values of certain variables, 
might rank correlation coefficients tend to be misleadingly 
low? This danger was aggravated by the uncertain accuracy 
of some of the data; 
(b) how close to unity should a coefficient be in order to 
justify the use of the comparative analysis. 
In order that any distortion of the kind described in (a) might be avoided, 
the validity of rank correlation coefficients was checked by examination 
of correlation between the logarithms of the corresponding series. Because 
of negative values of some variables (and the evident distorting effects 
of linear transformations to exclude these) a complete correlation-matrix of 
logarithms could not be-produced. Where they could be calculated, these 
coefficients were very close to the coefficients of rank correlation. 
Question (b) cannot be answered definitively, since the analysis combines 
both ordinal and cardinal principles. As an intuitive benchmark, it was 
decided to reject any coefficient which was below 0.900. Because the 
computation of the,. two sets of coefficients proved time-consuming, it was 
decided to confine the analysis to only one year. Because it was the 
middle year of the period, 1970 was chosen. 
1. R. Linda: Problems of Economic Concentration and Competition (Documenti 
di lavoro del prop e tto "Ii Sistema Impreditoriale Italiano" No. 2, November 1964. Available in English from the Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli). 
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The rank correlation coefficients for the 66 manufacturing 
firms were 
as follows: 
Turnover Exports Net Cash Profits Equity 
Flow 
Exports 0.774 
Net cash flow 0.863 0.711 
Profits 0.701 0.541 0.908 
Equity 0.855 0.643 0.792 0.674 
Gross 
investment 0.870 0.650 0.772 0.590 0.805 
Of the 15 coefficients only one (that between profits and net cash flow) 
exceeded 0.900. Moreover, if the 66 firms were regarded as a random sample 
of a larger group, none of the other coefficients would be consistent 
(at the 95% confidence level) with a population coefficient of 0.9002. 
For the converting sector (161 firms), also in 1970, the corresponding 
matrix is: 
Turnover Exports Net Cash Profits Equity 
Flow 
Exports 0.774 
Net cash flow 0.839 0.301 
Profits 0.700 0.287 0.922 
Equity 0.828 0.339 0.783 0.667 
Gross investment 0.758 0.289 0.725 0.613 0.664 
Once again, the only close rank correlation is between net cash flow and 
profits. The other values appear too low to justify any further analysis, 
which depends upon similarity of ranking. 
lote that the low values associated with exports are consistent with the 
observation in Chapter 2, that those converters engaged in exports were 
generally those with special products or particular links with overseas 
countries. It was not expected that the ranking by exports would 
2. Using Fisher's transformation, that is the (normally distributed) variable 
Z= Zog e1 with a standard deviation of I 1-r n-3 
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correspond with that by any other variable, especially since exports 
are, for most firms in this sector, negligible. 
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APPENDIX C (a) 
EXTERNAL TRADE IN MANUFACTURED AND CONVERTED PRODUCTS 
EXPORTS BY ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS 
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES COI, 1iON14EALTH EEC 
MANUFACTURE in. tonnes £'000 in. tonnes £' 000 in. tonnes £'000 
newsprint 221 20 18 4 50 5 
uncoated p+w 37,132 10,529 14,356 3,680 3,073 875 
coated p+w 24,347 8,575 3,239 1,031 5,444 2,006 
kraft paper + board 4,766 1,358 1,224 375 804 174 
cigarette paper in bulk 440 157 101 37 23 10 
other machine-made paper 93,789 17,771 14,735 3,672 50,873 6,649 
hand-made papers 19 25 4 3 7 8 
greaseproof or 
parchment paper 2,225 695 474 191 352 110 
composite paper or board 2,970 711 1,317 285 247 100 
corrugated etc. paper 
and board 13,399 2,511 5,803 976 840 260 
ruled paper + board 2,141 864 593 212 220 121 
impregnated paper + board 40,140 12,910 8,653 2,461 8,290 3,509 
wallpaper 24,718 11,980 2,002 1,149 16,364 7,269 
CONVERSION 
paper bags, paper board, boxes + other containers 21,738 5,898 
packing containers of 
paper and paper board 20,936 5,500 3,703 1,209 6,376 1,323 
stationery 4,915 2,951 2,135 1,212 470 365 
exercise books, registers 
etc. 4,348 3,284 2,073 1,499 262 259 
other articles of paper 
+ board 44,011 20,735 
cigarette paper cut to 
size 1,014 485 294 130 10 6 
carbon + other copying 
papers cut to size 5,224 5,644 1,677 1,482 1,049 1,363 
other paper and board 
cut to size 18,712 6,638 4,690 1,608 3,714 1,150 
bobbins, spools, etc. 654 304 122 56 188 55 
other articles of 
paper + board 18,407 7,664 2,863 1,338 4,973 1,706 
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EXTERNAL TRADE IN MANUFACTURED AND CONVERTED PRODUCTS 
IMPORTS BY ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS 
TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES COMMONWEALTH EEC 
MANUFACTURE m. tonnes £'000 in. tonnes £'000 in. tonnes £'OOO 
newsprint 1,129,456 83,759 526,758 38,903 3,333 248 
uncoated p+w 244,999 26,095 11,455 1,234 3,543 831 
coated p+w 109,556 15,043 3,389 463 23,710 3,078 
kraft paper + board 954,798 80,290 205,473 16,622 8,974 1,338 
cigarette paper in bulk 978 356 84 23 570 244 
other machine-made paper 369,680 32,488 24,461 1,309 21,472 2,530 
hand-made papers 1 6 0 0 0 1 
greaseproof or 
parchment paper 36,369 5,972 123 26 3,018 640 
composite paper or board 21,574 1,377 9 2 17,982 1,014 
corrugated etc. paper 
and board 35,919 4,964 4 1 1,784 367 
ruled paper + board 178 221 0 1 52 104 
impregnated paper + board 147,463 26,286 7,114 1,660 11,030 4,052 
wallpaper 2,625 1,045 1 1 1,342 709 
CONVERSION 
paper bags, paper board, 
boxes + other containers 14,600 3,889 
packing containers of 
paper and paper board 14,555 3,850 160 77 2,333 1,159 
stationery 857 411 27 30 174 92 
exercise books, registers 
etc. 2,408 1,577 204 138 822 581 
other articles of paper 
+ board 35,675 11,828 
cigarette paper cut to 
size 1,522 802 115 30 279 143 
carbon + other copying 
papers cut to size 323 457 19 23 101 139 
other paper and board 
cut to size 23,701 7,112 889 442 2,120 1,017 
bobbins, spools, etc. 854 328 3 2 348 197 
other articles of 
paper + board 9,275 3,129 117 84 547 505 
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APPENDIX D: COMPANY PROFILES 
Reed International Ltd. 
The Dickinson Robinson Group Ltd. 
Wiggins-Teape Ltd. 
The Bowater Corporation Ltd. 
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COMPANY PROFILE 
REED INTERNATIONAL LIMITED 
Reed International Limited is a British based organisation and is the 
ninth largest U. K. company. It has an annual turnover in excess of 
£597 million and employs some 80,000 people - 17,000 of them overseas 
in 44 countries where Reed has interests. 
The principal activities of Reed International and its subsidiary 
companies are the manufacture and merchanting of building products 
(plastic pipes and guttering, sanitary ware, pitch fibre pipes); wall- 
coverings including paint, textiles and furnishing fabrics; "do-it-yourself" 
products; pulp, paper and board products; paper and plastic packaging and 
stationery; and the printing and publishing of newspapers, consumer and 
business magazines, books, and other general printing. 
The companies carrying out these activities are grouped into five main 
divisions, and their shares of total turnover in 1973 were as follows: 
ANALYSIS OF 1973 TOTAL SALES AND PROFITS 
Division 
Sales 11 Profits 
Em % fm % 
Paper & Paper Products 294.4 41 21.3 44 
Decorative Products 150.9 21 10.4 21 
Publishing & Printing 201.7 28 9.5 20 
Building Products 20.3 3 3.5 7 
Other Activities 40.8 7 3.7 8 
Total 708.1 100 48.4 100 
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Reed Group Limited 
One of the five main divisions - Reed Group Limited - embraces the 
majority of the paper and board manufacturing and the paper-converting 
and packaging interests in the U. K. 
Reed Group Limited employs some 20,000 people in a total of five 
separate operating divisions and one service division: 
Reed Paper & Board (UK) Ltd. (incl. Spicer-Cowan Ltd. ) 
Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd. 
Reed Medway Division 
Field, Sons & Co. Ltd. 
Spicers Ltd. 
Reed Transport & Shipping Division 
Reed Paper & Board (UK) Ltd. 
Onp of the largest manufacturers of paper and board in the world, Reed 
Paper and Board employs some 8,000 people and produces about one fifth of 
the total U. K. output of paper and board on some forty machines at 
eleven mills. 
Products include - newsprint, printing and writing papers, wrapping papers, 
tissue papers, special purpose papers, printing, packaging and specialty 
boards. 
Through Spicer-Cowan, Reed Paper and Board has the largest paper merchanting 
organisation in Europe. 
Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd. 
One of the largest producers of corrugated fibre-board cases in Europe, 
Reed Corrugated Cases employs over 5,000 at its thirteen factories making 
over 30 million cases weekly. 
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The main activity of the company is the production of protective 
packaging for a wide cross-section of British Industry. In addition, 
the company offers a packaging advisory service to customers. 
A specialist group of factories produces paper tubes, corrugated paper 
products, corrugated greaseproof and glassines for the food and 
confectionery industry. 
Reed Medway Division 
Reed Medway Sacks, pioneered the development and utilisation of multi- 
wall paper sacks in the U. K. for packaging and refuse disposal. 
Sacks are currently produced for packaging a wide range of commodities 
from animal feeds to fuel, and for local authority and industrial refuse 
disposal. 
Field, Sons & Co. Ltd. 
This company produces high quality cartons and display boxes, converting over 
50,000 tonnes of packaging board each year at its three factories. 
Spicers Ltd. 
Through Spicers Ltd., Reed is a major manufacturer of envelopes, business 
and personal stationery, and many other converted paper products, as well 
as being a coater and laminator of a wide range of basic materials. 
Spicers employs more than 3,000 people at 24 factories in the U. K. 
The Wallpaper Manufacturers Limited 
Wallpaper Manufacturers (WPM) became part of Reed in 1965 and is the 
largest decorating products organisation in the world. 18,000 people are 
employed in W. P. M. s eight divisions: wallcoverings, paint, household 
textiles, Polycell (do-it-yourself products), Sanderson, merchanting and 
two retailing divisions. 
The wallcoverings division produces from eight mills in the U. K. over 
3,000 designs of wallpapers and vinyls. It has the largest share of the 
U. K. wallcoverings market and is a strong exporter. 
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COMPANY PROFILE 
THE DICKINSON ROBINSON GROUP 
The Dickinson Robinson Group is a British-based organisation employing 
over 20,000 people in the U. K. Recent statistics* indicate that the 
Group is one of the most profitable companies in the U. K. paper industry. 
The principal activities of the Group are the manufacture and marketing 
of envelopes, branded stationery and papers, and of packaging materials 
from paper, board, plastics and metal foils. There are also important 
activities in specialised engineering. In 1973 the turnover and contribution 
to trading profit of the Group's activities were as follows: 
ANALYSIS OF 1973 TOTAL SALES AND PROFITS 
Sales Profits 
Div4sion 
fm % fm % 
Envelopes, stationery 
and packaging: 
UK: 162.0 69 14.4 68 
Overseas: 63,7 27 6.1 29 
Engineering 9.5 4 0.8 3 
Total 235.2 100 21.3 100 
The U. K. companies carrying on these activities are grouped into five 
principal divisions: the paper and board division; the envelope-making 
and manufactured stationery division; the packaging division; the 
consumer products division; and the engineering division. 
* Management Today, October 1974 
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The Paper and Board Division 
This division comprises the five mills of John Dickinson & Co. 
Ltd. 
engaged in paper and board manufacture, which are as follows: 
Croxley Mills, Watford 
Nash Mills, Hemel Hempstead : 
Keynsham Mill, Bristol 
Fife Paper Mills, Scotland 
Balerno Mills, Balerno 
printing, writing and specialty papers 
pulp board 
coated and uncoated MG packaging papers 
fine papers, MG, carbonless copy papers 
carbonless copy papers 
Envelope Making and Manufactured Stationery Division 
The remaining mills of John Dickinson & Co. Ltd. are engaged in converting 
the products of the manufacturing division into final product forms, 
which are as follows: 
Aspley, Hemel Hempstead : commercial envelopes, paper and film 
bags, personal stationery, commercial 
notebooks and drawing books, 
document wallets and files, paste- 
boards, printers' cards and continuous 
stationery; 
Production machinery for own use. 
Malago Works, Bristol : paper and film bags for general 
packaging purposes. 
Northern Works, Liverpool : commercial envelopes, carrier bags 
and personal stationery. 
Basildon Works, Tottenham : commercial envelopes, labels and 
table stationery; 
Production machinery for own use. 
Leighton Buzzard Factory : rigid transparent boxes. 
Certain departments within the division specialise in the production of 
sterilization packaging for use in hospitals. 
Packaging Division 
Eleven subsidiaries within this division are concerned primarily with paper 
and board packaging, the remaining seven are engaged in allied activities 
and distribution. The types of paper and board packaging manufactured are 
as shown overleaf: 
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Robinson Sacks : multiwall paper sacks, baler bags 
and refuse sack equipment. 
Kent Kraft Mills : kraft paper for sacks. 
RWP Flexible Packaging : flexible packaging, coated papers, 
laminates of paper, foil and plastic 
films, packaging systems. 
Robinson Cartons and Printing : cartons, envelopes, and colour- 
printed packaging systems. 
New Merton Board Mills : lined and unlined chipboard and 
fibreboard combined. 
John Laird and Son ; cartons, boxes, flexible packaging, 
labels, colour printing, corrugated 
cases and corrugated greaseproof. 




DRG Hospital Supplies 
Robinson Multiple Packaging 
cartons, rigid boxes and packaging 
systems. 
solid and transparent rigid boxes. 
: disposable hospital products. 
multi-unit packaging. 
Consumer Products Division 
This division comprises the three mills of Adhesive Tapes Ltd. and Industrial 
Sealants Ltd.; the products manufactured include self-adhesive tapes, 
special adhesives, gummed paper and tapes. 
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COMPANY PROFILE 
WIGGINS TEAPE LTD. 
Wiggins Teape Ltd. is the largest manufacturer of fine and specialty 
papers in the United Kingdom. In addition to being papermakers, Wiggins 
Teape are also converters and merchants of a wide range of papers and 
allied products, with twelve paper mills and six factories in Britain 
and others in Belgium, Eire, Latin America, Africa and Asia. It also 
has sales offices and warehouses in many parts of the world and is the 
largest exporter of paper from the U. K. 
Wiggins Teape's most important product is carbonless copying paper, 
produced at the Company's mills in South Wales and Belgium. Other 
papers which are leaders in their respective fields are natural tracing, 
photographic, gummed, heat-seal and self-adhesive papers, all produced 
in the U. K. Cigarette tissue paper is the principal produce in Indian 
and Brazilian mills. 
Total Group turnover exceeded £180 million in 1973; the following table 
shows a breakdown of total production: 
ANALYSIS OF TURNOVER IN 1973 
% of total 
Commercial and packaging papers 25 
Fine and industrial papers 23 
Drawing, office and photographic paper 10 
Stationery 6 




In 1970 Wiggins Teape Ltd. was taken over by British American Tobacco 
Co. Ltd. The main activity of British American Tobacco and its subsidiaries is in the tobacco industry, but it also has sizeable interests in 
retailing and the paper and cosmetics industry. 
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British American Tobacco is the world's largest manufacturer of tobacco 
products including cigarettes, cigars and pipe tobacco, although tobacco 
products are not sold on the domestic U. K. market. 
The Group's interests in the cosmetics industry comprise the Yardley, 
Lentheric, Morny, Germain Monteil, Scandia and Tuvache companies. 
In addition to the 25.6% interest acquired in 1971 in Horten A. G., a 
leading department store organisation in West Germany, British American 
Tobacco has acquired other substantial U. K. interests in retailing more 
recently. 
In addition to Wiggins Teape, British American Tobacco is the joint owner 
with the Imperial Group Ltd. of Mardon Packaging International Ltd., which 
produces a wide range of packaging and promotional materials in the U. K. 
and Europe. 
The following table shows an analysis of the turnover and profits of the 
British American Tobacco Co. in 1973: 
ANALYSIS OF B. A. T. 1973 TOTAL SALES AND PROFITS 
Sales Profits 
Divi i on s 
fm % fm % 
Tobacco 2162.1 77 193.7 78 
Retail 334.1 12 12.9 5 
Paper 230.3 8 18.7 7 
Cosmetics 46.2 2 2.5 1 
Other activities 35.0 1 21.9 9 
Total 2807.7 100 249.7 100 
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COMPANY PROFILE 
THE BOWATER CORPORATION 
The Bowater Corporation is a British-based company with significant over- 
seas interests, employing over 20,00 people in the U. K. alone. 
She company, through its subsidiaries, is the largest producer of newsprint 
in the world, as well as being a substantial manufacturer of woodpulp and 
a wide range of printing and coated stationery, packaging paper, hardboard 
and other products. Subsidiaries operated in association with Scott Paper 
Company of the U. S. A. produce, in the U. K. and Australia, household tissues 
and hygienic paper products. 
The company is also an important producer in the packaging industry of 
both the U. K. and Europe. The following table shows a geographical analysis 
of company performance: 
GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF SALES AND PROFITS IN 1973 
fm U. K. North Australasia Europe Far Other America East Overseas 
Sales 425.6 249.5 91.3 148.0 66.5 17,9 
% of total sales 42.6 25.0 9.0 15.0 7.0 1.4 
Profit 17.6 17.4 5.6 4.1 3.4 1.1 
As part of the company's policy to broaden its base, a Building Products 
Division was formed in 1970. This division manufactures building components, 
factory-made housing units, bedroom and dining-room furniture and carpets. 
An analysis of performance in each of the divisions is shown in the 
following table: 
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ANALYSIS OF 1973 TOTAL SALES AND PROFITS 
Sales Profits 
Di i i v s on 
fm % fm % 
Paper and pulp 199.5 20 18.7 38 
Packaging 70.7 7 5.7 12 
Building products 97.7 10 7.4 15 
Tissue products 54.9 6 6.0 12 
Trading and transport 576.1 57 11.2 23 
Total 998.9 100 49.0 100 
The subsidiaries of the Corporation within the U. K. paper industry are 
described below together with the product markets in which they operate. 
Paper Group 
Bowaters U. K. Paper Co. : Management company; manufacture 
of newsprint, roll and blade 
coated papers, printing, stationery 
and packaging papers. 
Bowaters Paper Sales : Distributors of products of U. K. 
Paper Co. 
The Donside Paper Co. 
(50% Bowater/50% Reed Intl. ) : Blade coated and uncoated papers. 
Packagi nnGroup 
Bowater Packaging : Management and holding company; 
manufacture of corrugated and solid 
fibreboard containers, sacks, drums, 
cartons and other packaging products. 
Bowater Containers : Distributors of corrugated and solid 
fibreboard containers of Bowater 
Packaging. 
Bowater Flexible Packaging : Distributors of flexible packaging 
products of Bowater Packaging. 
Bowater Industrial Packaging : Distributors of sacks, drums, paper 
and foil products of Bowater Packaging. 
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APPENDIX E 
OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT INDICES OF WHOLESALE PRICES - COMMODITIES PRODUCED IN THE U. K. 
w 
Paper + board (excl. 
building board 
Paper - uncoated 
Paper - coated 
Board - uncoated 
Board - coated 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
100.0 101.9 104.4 104.9 104.6 113.0 117.3 128.5 136.6 142.5 
100.0 101.6 103.6 103.9 103.5 112.3 116.1 126.3 134.4 140.4 
100.0 101.7 103.1 103.8 103.1 111.3 112.9 123.0 128.2 132.9 
100.0 103.0 108.8 109.7 109.8 116.4 125.4 140.9 151.6 157.8 
100.0 103.0 105.3 106.7 107.1 115.7 120.9 131.9 140.9 145.3 
Printings + writings 
(incl. newsprint) 100.0 101.6 103.6 103.7 104.5 114.7 118.2 129.0 136.9 143.1 
Food wrapping papers 100.0 102.9 106.5 107.0 105.7 112.9 115.2 122.2 136.1 140.6 
Kraft wrapping papers 100.0 102.7 103.5 104.5 101.0 112.3 118.4 130.4 135.3 145.7 
Other wrapping + 
packing papers 100.0 100.6 103.3 103.2 100.9 98.8 n/a* n/a* n/a* n/a* 
Household, toilet 
papers + tissues 100.0 102.2 104.5 105.7 103.4 113.8 116.1 125.4 131.0 138.1 
Industrial + special 
purpose papers 100.0 100.9 102.2 102.8 102.4 111.6 115.4 125.1 135.6 139.7 
Packaging boards 100.0 103.2 110.3 111.0 111.2 118.5 128.7 145.8 156.8 162.5 
Industrial + special 
purpose boards 100.0 103.3 104.8 105.5 105.5 109.8 115.1 125.3 135.2 143.1 
Cardboard boxes, 
cartons + fibreboard 
packing cases 100.0 102.8 108.6 110.2 110.5 114.3 122.7 137.6 148.4 157.2 
Paper sacks 100.0 106.1 110.1 112.1 112.7 120.1 117.3 127.6 132.8 143.1 
Paper bags 100.0 101.9 104.8 106.0 103.4 108.2 113.0 125.1 134.4 149.0 
Manufactured 
stationery 100.0 100.4 103.1 107.0 107.3 113.1 119.9 132.9 146.4 155. E 
Wallpaper 100.0 99.8 100.8 112.7 116.2 129.7 124.2 143.6 157.7 171.4 
Department of Trade & Industry 
British Paper & Board Industry Fed. 
*no longer published by Department of Trade and Industry 
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AN OUTLINE OF THE STUDY AND A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
A. THE ACTIVITIES INCLUDED 
This report is about concentration and its implications for competition 
in three sub-sectors of the textile industry: traditionally referred 
to as cotton, woollen and worsted and hosiery and other knitted goods. 
The introduction of man-made fibres, which accounted for 71 per cent 
of all fibres used in the United Kingdom in 1974, and the formation 
of large groups with interests-in all three sub-sectors have blurred, 
the distinctions between them but traditional boundaries remain. 
These boundaries are partly geographical: the "cotton industry" 
is concentrated mainly in East Lancashire and Greater Manchester, 
the "woollen inaustry" in West Yorkshire and the "hosiery and knit- 
wear industry" (except for some warp- and weft-knitted fabrics) in 
the East Midlanos. Associations of traders and employers, trade 
unions and technical institutions-are still defined on the older 
boundaries. 
The "cotton industry" is now a small remnant of what existed before 
self-sufficiency and competition from other countries caused the 
disappearance of its export markets. The scale of its decline is 
without parallel in Britain: 
1912 1974 
Total employment (000's) 
Fabric production (million m2) 




sources: Textile Council (1912) 
Government departments (1974) 
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The sub-sector encompasses: 
(a) the spinning into yarn of cotton and of staple man-made fibres 
on the cotton system (the addition of flax-spinning to official 
statistics is of negligible importance because of the declining 
use of this fibre); 
(b) 'doubling of such yarns and of continuous filament yarns; and 
(c) weaving of cloth from yarn spun on the cotton system and/or from 
man-made filament. 
The woollen and worsted industry did not experience a decline during 
the earlier decades of this century on the same scale as that in 
Lancashire. There are two reasons for this: less reliance on plain 
easily manufactured fabrics and no reliance on exports to warm climates. 
The industry is defined in this report (and in official statistics) 
to cover: 
(a) the preparation and spinning of wool into woollen or"worsted 
yarns (the latter consist of longer-staple fibres, combed before 
spinning and with less twist in the yarn), the preparation 
and spinning of man-made fibres on the sane systems; and 
(b) the weaving of woollen and worsted yarns (including man-made 
fibre yarns spun on the same systems) into fabric. 
The hosiery and other knitted goods sub-sector has expanded since the 
last war because of the inclusion within it of warp- and weft-knitted 
fabrics used for a wide variety of purposes, including shirts, trousers, 
soft furnishings and bedding as well as more'fämiliar knitted gar- 
ments. Between 1948 and 1968°total employment in this sub-sector 
increased from 103,000 to 135,000. The official definition of 
the sub-sector (1971 Census) shows the breadth of, its coverage: 
knitting of fabrics on warp looms ; knitting of stockings, ' socks ; 
knitted garments and other goods including weft-knitted fabrics. 
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Making up of household textiles and of clothes cut from knitted fabrics is 
included when it is carried out in the same establishment as the knitting 
of the fabric. 
Because for many purposes cotton-type, woollen- and worsted-type 
and knitted products are close substitutes, the report also examines 
concentration in the three sub-sectors combined under the title "textile 
processing". The report is not directly concerned with the production 
of artificial and synthetic fibres but, because of the importance of 
such fibres in all three sub-sectors, the dominant position of the 
two major tritish producers and the interests which they have acquired 
in the processing industries, frequent reference is made in the 
report to this other sub-sector. 
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH METHODS 
The investigation forms part of a series sponsored by the Commission 
of the European Communities throughout the European Economic Community. 
One objective is to provide a detailed statistical analysis of concen- 
tration according to a standard methodological framework specified by 
the Commission; this statistical analysis appears as Appendix B of 
this report (Tables of Concentration). Another objective is to identify 
the main factors influencing competition within the sub-sectors and the 
relationship between this competition and industrial concentration. 
The research programme began with a search of statutory accounts of 
companies identified as operating within one'or more of the sub-sectors. 
Over 500 companies were included in this search, although not all these 
were included in the statistical analysis (for definitions of samples 
see the first part of section IV). After the statistical analysis had 
been completed and certain conclusions drawn, there was a series of 
discussions with major companies in each`of the three sub-sectors, 
with a sample of some of the smaller undertakings and with each of 
the major retail concerns, who are the main customers for certain 
major products. 
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SUMMARY OF FOLLOWING SECTIONS OF THE REPORT 
Section II examines trends in the industry, mainly, since. 1963. The 
total market for textiles and clothing has expanded only slowly in 
recent years and overseas suppliers have obtained an increasing proportion 
of this market, especially in woven cotton and man-made, fibre fabrics, 
and knitted and made-up clothing. Exports have expanded more slowly. 
Total production in the woollen textile industry has been falling, 
mainly because of increased imports of made-up clothing and a static 
market for woollen carpets. Output, in the "cotton" sub-sector has been 
relatively static while output of hosiery and ether knitted goods 
sector expanded until about 1970 and has then tended also to be static. 
Intense competition between home-produced goods and imports, between 
fibres, between knitted and woven fabrics and between companies within 
each segment of theindustry has been expressed in pricing. The response 
of companies to these competitive conditions has been increased product- 
ivity achieved t-. º'ough capital investment and at the cost of a large 
cut in employment. Much of this investment and assoUated reorganisation, 
especially in the cotton and hosiery and other knitting sub-sectors, 
was financed by the two major U. K. producers of man-made fibres. 
Section III examines influences on the structure of the textile industries. 
In 1963, in spite of reorganisation under the Cotton Industry Act of 
1959 the cotton industry remained much less concentrated than manufacturing 
industries as a whole - firms with fewer than 1,000 emnloyees accounted 
for over 40 per cent of employment. The wool and knitting sub-sectors 
were even more fragmented. This struqture contrasted sharply with 
the virtual duopoly already existing in man-made fibre production. 
Another feature of the three sub-sectors was a horizontal rather than 
vertical structure (the only exception was woollen, as opposed to 
worsted, spinning and weaving). The need for long runs in spinning 
contrasted with that for variety in weaving and knitting of all but ,.. the plainest fabrics (and most of the market for plain fabrics had 
long before been lost to overseas products). This horizontal structure 
increased the industries' vulnerability to inventory cycles and to 
imports and severely impeded marketing activities. Vertical integration 
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was economic only if undertakings were sufficiently large to permit 
variety in weaving and knitting together with long production runs 
in spinning. 
A third feature of these industries, which influenced changes in structure, 
is the importance of a few major customers - the multiple retailers of 
clothing and, to a lesser extent, household textiles. The role of these 
customers in importing, in forcing down prices and in generating 
sharp changes in demand were emphasised by some manufacturers in 
discussions with the author. Section III also summarises the views 
of major tetailers on these aspects of their trading. There is, little 
doubt that the predominant position of major customers has created 
pressure for (a) greater size, to give countervailing selling power, 
and (b) more vertical integration, to facilitate greater-control 
over supplies and outlets and development of branded textile products. 
A major reason for the emergence between 1963 and 1968 of large multi- 
process vertically integrated groups in the textile industries was 
the intervention of Courtaulds and I. C. I. Section III traces the 
history of this intervention: the abortive takeover of Courtaulds 
by I. C. I., the series of acquisitions in textile processing by Courtaulds 
(f150 m. in five years) and the investments by them and I. C. I. in other 
major textile groups. The purpose, of this, intcrvention was the 
preservation of the United Kingdom market for fibres. In view of their 
fragmented and horizontal structure and the importance of major retail 
customers, themselvesforýed by intense competition to seek low-cost,, 
supplies, the cotton and hosiery sub-sectors might have contracted 
very sharply without this assisted reorganisation. 
Government policy on mergers in the textile. Industry has varied. 
Until 1968 there was a favourable policy towards "rationalisation", 
which had extended over many years (pre-war legislation affecting 
cotton spinning had common features with the 1959 Cotton Industry 
Act). In 1969 the Government announced its opposition. towards 
further acquisitions by fibre manufacturers in textile processing, 
and this has restricted further growth of the largest combines in 
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the cotton and knitting sub-sectors. The goverment has continued 
to 
encourage amalgamations of smaller firms in the textile industry 
and rationalisation is one of the objectives of a scheme for the 
reorganisation of the woollen and worsted sub-sector. 
Section IV examines changes in concentration between 1963 and 1968 
and between 1968 and 1973. To this latter period the statistical 
framework of the Cor. amission has been applied in complete detail 
(the first part of Section IV explains the methodology, the coverage 
of the data and the meaning of the various ir. dices of concentration). 
Between 1963 and 1968 concentration increased appreciably in both 
cotton and hosiery, mainly because of the intervention of the two 
fibre producers. In the wool sub-sector less development occurred 
although Courtaulds acquired some capacity and I. C. I. obtained a 
minority interest in one of the moderately large independent concerns. 
In the period 1565-73 concentration increased more in the wool sub-sector 
than in cotton or knitting. The increase in concentration was confined 
to the largest firms in the industry: as a r3sult or acquisition of 
other large groups, Coats-Paton and Illingworth Morris increased their 
share of total turnover in the sub-sector from about 19 to 30 per 
cent. The combined share of the ten largest firms in the woollen 
and worsted industry remained, however, at 60 per cent in 1973 (the 
same as in 1968). 
In the cotton industry a distinct oligopoly group of four firms was 
reduced to three at the end of 1970 by the merger which formed Carrington- 
Viyella Ltd. This merger, brought about by financial pressures and 
effected by I. C. I., was the only major development. A proposal by 
Courtaulds in 1969 to take over its then largest competitor, English 
Calico, was aborted by Government opposition which also prevented 
any further intervention by fibre producers (other than the Carrington- 
Viyella case) until 1973. There is evidence that the pölicv has 
not changed. Although it changed little over the five years, concen- 
tration in cotton remained much greater than in wool: ten firms 
controlled 73 per cent of turnover in 1968 and 75 per cent in 1973. 
I 
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In hosiery and knitting also, concentration changed negligibly between 
1968 and 1973. As in cotton, there had been a big increase in 
concentration over the previous five years. In 1968 four firms controlled 
53 per cent of turnover and 10 firms just over 72 per cent; in 1973 
the two proportions were unchanged. As in cotton, government opposition 
to further intervention by fibre producers was probably of paramount 
importance. 
One of the more unusual features to emerge from the statistical analysis 
is the existence of an oligopoly in textile processing as a whole. The 
degree of concentration in the combination of the three sub-sectors 
(and vertically integrated dyeing, finishing and distribution) is 
remarkably high: five firms controlled 57 per cent of all turnover 
in 1968 and 59 per cent in 1973. One. of these five firms is itself 
a major fibre producer (Courtaulds), in another (Carrington-Viyella) 
I. C. I. have a majority shareholding and in a third (Tootal) both I. C. I. 
and Courtaulds hold 8 per cent of equity. 
The concentration of profits in the cotton and wool scab-sectors appears 
to have varied inversely with the state of trade. In the recession 
of 1969-70 the share of profits obtained by the five largest concerns 
fell significantly. In hosiery and other knitting the reverse (and 
more usual) tendency was observed. 
Concentration of most other financial variables (cash flow, capital 
expenditure, equity, net assets and net cash flow) appears to be 
greater in most years than that of turnover and the firms with the 
largest turnover tended to account for even greater proportions of 
these other variables. One exception to this observation was that 
exports were more evenly distributed among firms in the textile 
industry. The five largest textile enterprises (apart from Courtaulds) 
accounted for a much lower proportion of exports than of sales 
turnover. 
Section V examines in some detail the markets for certain product 
groups, both intermediate products and end-uses. Intermediate 
products examined are wool tops (for worsted spinning). woollen and 
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worsted yarns, spun yarns of cotton and man-made fibres and warp- 
knitted fabrics. End-use products selected for detailed analysis 
are hand-knitting yarns, coloured tweeds, sewing thread, shirts, bed 
linen and ladies' hose. In each of these end-uses the importance 
of supplies from overseas and of major customers in this country is 
evident. 
Section VI relates the findings of the statistical analysis to the 
wider competitive situation described in Sections II, III and V. 
The combined effect of verti. cal integration, of increasing concen- 
tration among customers and continuing imports is likely to be a 
tendency towards greater concentration in the textile industries 
over the next few years. This tendency is evident from develop- 
ments occurring at the time of writing. These developments - 
mergers and acquisitions - generally result, like those of the 
1960's, from defensive motives. Unless this is prevented by 
Government action, this defensive reorganisation is likely to 
continue for some years. 
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SECTION II 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE THREE SECTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies in all three sub-sectors have been operating in a continuously 
competitive environment in recent years: The total market for textiles 
and clothing in the United Kingdom has expanded only slowly; competition 
from imports has affected a growing part of this static market and low- 
cost producers have also competed in export markets. Within the textile 
industry there has been intensive competition between fibres and between 
knitted and woven fabrics. The response from companies to this competition 
has been increased productivity achieved through capital investment and 
at the cost of a large cut in employment. This investment has reflected 
the intervention in the inaustry of large fibre producers eager to 
preserve the U. K. textile industry as an outlet for their-fibres and to 
ensure the security of their own sales. 
A. THE U. K. DEMAND FOR TEXTILE PRODUCTS 
An analysis of textile demand by end-uses was produced by the National 
Economic Development Office (1) for 1970. This analyses consumption of 
fibres by weight: - 
Table 1: End-uses of textile products (by weight), including imports 
and excluding exports 
Made-up clothing (woven or knitted fabrics) 28.2 
Knitted garments and hosiery 8.9 Hand-knitting yarn and sewing thread 3.0 Household textiles, furnishings and blankets 14.6 Carpets, linoleum and leathercloth 18.5 Tyre cord 3.4 
Other industrial uses and narrow fabrics 18.8 
100.0 
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Clothing is the largest single end-use for textile fibres in the 
U. K. 
and, when knitted garments are included, accounted for 37.1 per cent of 
1970 consumption by weight. Consumers' expenditure on clothing 
has 
remained in recent years at about 8 per cent of total consumers' 
expenditure. Between 1963 and 1974 total expenditure rose by 32 per 
cent and expenditure on clothing by 33 per cent; analysis of data for 
intervening years confirms that the elasticity of demand for clothing 
in relation to consumers' expenditure is close to 1 (See footnote 1). 
Knitted garments (that is hosiery and garments knitted complete) 
accounted for between 22 and 25 per cent of annual consumers' expenditure 
on clothing in each of the years 1963-71 (1); later data are not 
available. There are few data on the relative importance of knitted and 
woven fabrics in made-up clothing. 
As with that for clothing, demand for household textile: and soft 
furnishings has grown approximately in proportion to consumers' total 
expenditure with a 30 per cent growth over the period 1963-74. Analysis 
of annual data over this period confirms that expenditure-elasticity was 
close to unity2. The shares of knitted and woven fabrics are not known. 
The weaving and tufting of carpets do not come within the terms of 
reference of this report but represent a major market for spun yarns of 
wool and man-made fibres. In 1974 carpet manufacturers took 6 per cent 
of the output of the cotton and man-made fibre spinning sector (most of 
it spun rayon) and 33 per cent of the yarn produced in the woollen 
industry. In recent years, sales of woven woollen carpets have remained 
static, in contrast to those of tufted carpets, in which man-made 
filament fibres predominate: - 
lA 
regression equation produced an estimate of 1.036 with a standard 
error of 0.032. 
2 Regression analysis produced an estimate of 0.980 with a standard 
error of 0.138. The greater instability possibly reflected 
fluctuations in indirect taxation and new housebuilding. 
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Manufacturers' sales of woven and tufted carpets in the United Kingdom 
(million square metres) 
1966 1968 1973, 1974 
Woven woollen 31.2 31.9 32.9 27.1 
Woven man-made 18.1 18.5 20.1 19.7 
Tufted 27.5 49.2 102.2 100.1 
Most of the smaller categories of end-use have also shown slow growth of 
demand in recent years. For example, U. K. use of tyre cord (U. K. 
production - exports + imports) rose by 40 per cent between 1958 and 
1963 but the figure for 1973 was less than 1 per cent above that for 
1963. 
Measured in volume terms, total demand for textile products has grown 
more slowly than real income in the United Kingdom over the ten years 
up to 1974. Evidence has been presented elsewhere (2) that this low 
income-elasticity of demand for textiles is a characteristic of most 
western European countries. 
B. EXTERNAL TRADE 
Table 2 shows imports and exports of textile products in 1968 and 1973. 
Production of man-made fibres (as opposed to processing) has been 
excluded, but made-up textiles have been included because much of their 
value content falls within our terms of reference. 
.t 
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Table 2: The value of external trade 1968 and 1973 (£m) 
1968 1973 




Cotton yarn & thread 10.8 8.8 +2.0 22.0 
15.6 +6.4 
Spun man-made fibre 
4 4 6 3 +0 8 28.1 17.1 +11.0 yarn . . . 
Woollen & Worsted yarn 20.4 1.9 +18. x. 41.6 10.4 +31.2 
Woven fabrics - cotton 28.2 67.7 -39.5 39.5 
103.5 -64.0 
- man- 
made f. 20.6 33.0 -12.4 49.9 115.4 -65.5 
- wool 66.5 8.8 +57.7 91.5 11.8 +79.7 
Knitted fabrics 11.4 7.0 +4.4 43.2 12.6 +30.6 
Carpets 29.6 18.8 +10.8 78.2 41.5 +36.7 
Other textile products 70.7 58.5 +10.3 104.9 121.7 -27.2 





262.6 1 208.1 
27.1 1 44.9 
57.4 65.2 
84.5 110.1 









-25.6 179.6 333.5 -153.9 
Source; Textile Industry Statistics Bureau 
Since 1974 was a year of international recession, the comparison of 1966 with 
1973 probably indicates trends over the survey period more satisfactorily 
than a comparison with 1974. One recent development which has produced 
extensive comment within the industry has been a sharp increase in the imports 
of cotton and man-made fibre spun yarns, from 31,100 tonnes in 1973 to 53,400 
tonnes in 1974. The overall trading surplus on spun yarns and fabrics 
increased in 1974 to £47.9m but the deficit in trade of clothing widened to 
£172.9m. 
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One of the reasons why the overall balance of trade in textile products 
has not worsened more sharply has been a favourable movement in the 
terms of trade - U. K. export prices have risen more quickly than those 
of imports. The deterioration in volume terms is shown in the increases 
in import penetrations and decreasing ratios of exports to imports shown 
in Table 3. 
There are two elements in the growth of imports which affect the U. K. 
textile industry: (a) the increase in imports of clothing and made-up 
textiles,, of which the fabric contents are also produced overseas (with 
negligible exceptions) and (b) the increase in imports of intermediate 
products - fabrics and yarn. Because of the importance of vertical 
integration in the industry on the part of major producers of man- 
made fibres, the increased import penetration of the U. K. market for 
unprocessed staple fibres and filament yarns is also significant to this 
study of competition. Table 3 shows estimates of import penetration in 
volume terms for each of the main categori:; of textile products together 
with the ratio of imports (in weight or area) to exports (measured in 
the same way). 
Import penetration = 100 x 
Imports 
Manufacturers' deliveries - exports + imports 
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Table 3: Import penetration and export/ import ratios 
Import penetration Exportsýto imports 
1963 1972 1974 1963 1972 1974 
Man-made staple 
10 26 26 2.63 2.77 2.53 
Continuous 




man-made fibres 5 13 23 0.75 0.64 0.26 
Woollen & worsted 1347.00 3.50 3.00 
Woven fabrics 
Cotton 41 47 55 0: 35 0.25 0.24 
Man-made fibres 9 37 42 1.33 0.56 0.49 
Wool & worsted 11 893.17 4.88 4.72 
Knitted fabrics 6751.67 3.88 - 4.00 
Carpets 87 13 0.85 2.57 2.24 
Made-up clothing 6 13 20 " 0.59 n. 56 0.47 
Hosiery & Knitwear 12 23 27 0.49 0.65 0.62 
Sources; NERO and Department of Trade. 
Tables 2 and 3 need to be interpreted with care. Those firms making 
intermediate products such as man-made fibres, yarns and loom-state 
fabrics, are adversely affected by increased imports of textiles 
incorporating such products. For example in 1974 imports represented 
42 per cent of the volume of man-made fibre fabrics supplied to U. K. 
customers (mainly makers-up of apparel, household textiles or other 
end-use products). Of the man-made fibre content of all end-use 
products, 52 per cent was imported. These "indirect imports" become 
progressively more significant with mo'ement away from the final 
market. Indirect imports substantially diminish the duopoly position 
of the two major producers of man-made fibres and contributed to their 
, policies 
described in Section III of vertical integration in the textile 
processing and consumer-product industries. 
15. 
The Geographical Pattern"of'Trade 
Most of the United Kingdom's textile imports originate from the Far 
East or from the Mediterranean. In contrast, the main markets for 
exports are western Europe and (to a lesser extent) North America. 
The following table shows total trade in textiles and made-up clothing 
in 1973. (See note at end of table). 
TABLE 4: THE GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERN OF TRADE 1973 (im) 
U. K. imports from U. K. exports to (a) Overall 
(a) Trade 
Country (a) Textiles Clothing Textiles Clothing Balance 
Republic of Ireland 50.9 30.0 46.3 21.1 -13.5 
Italy 28.4 10.3 13.5 3.7 -21.5 
Other E. E. C. 124.0 33.4 116.0 41.7 +0.3 
E. E. C. Total 203.3 73.7 175.8 66.5 -34.7 
Portugal 38.7 29.1 11.7 2.7 -53.4 
Other Western Europe 98.7 46.0 126.9 49.4 +31.6 
U. S. S. R. & E. Europe 11.1 9.7 24.9 3.5 +7.6 
North America 45.7 4.7 70.5 29.6 +49.7 
Pakistan 9.4 1.1 0.9 - +49.7 
India 28.0 4.7 0.6 -32.1 
Taiwan 5.6 18.7 0.3 - -24.0 
Hong Kong 33.8 123.4 12.7 2.9 -141.6 
S. Korea 4.5 8.4 - - -12.9 
Japan 9.6 3.4 29.7 3.7 +20.4 
Total of above six 90.9 159.7 44.2 6.6 -199.8 
All countries n. e. s. 26.5 10.6 135.6 , 
21.3 +119.8 
WORLD TOTAL 514.9 333.5 589.6 179.6 -79.2 
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Note: Owing to the degree of detail published. in official statistics, 
it was not possible to produce Table 4 for exactly the same data as those 
in Table 2. Table 4 includes man-made filament yarn and does. not include 
carpets. Total imports of filament yarn in 1973 were £70.7 millions and 
exports £110.0 millions; for carpets the corresponding figures were 
£41.5 millions and £78.2 millions. 
Restrictions on Imports of'Textile Products 
Until 1959 imports of textile fabrics were allowed into the United Kingdom 
free of duty if they originated in Commonwealth countries. This explains 
the emergence of Hong Kong as a major supplier. Subsequently, rising 
"ceilings" (quotas) were imposed on cotton textiles from such sources 
to prevent disruption of the domestic industry (under the provisions of 
article 19 of GATT). 
From February 1962 until the end of 1973, restrictions on trade in cotton 
textiles were regulated by a Long Term Arrangement negotiated by. _50 
member 
countries of GATT, which provided for expansion of gales by developing 
countries but also for protective quotas to prevent disruptive effects. 
Because the U. K. 's policies at that time wet-e among the most liberal and 
any increase in restrictions was subject to external scrutiny, they 
remained more liberal than those of most other western European countries. 
Quotas are rege. rded as preferred to tariffs by most enterprises in the 
industry which express the fear that imports may be subsidised in order 
that foreign exchange may be gained. Although quotas were to have been 
replaced by tariffs in January 1972, they were retained (because of 
industry pressure) at a higher level and accompanied by tariffs. Quotas 
were confined to cotton goods and during 1972 there was a switch by Asian 
producers to fabrics containing more than five per cent man-made fibres. 
During 1973 the quotas were extended to certain man-made fibre fabrics. 
Table 4 showed that most imports from Hong Kong and nearby Asian countries 
now consist of made-up and knitted clothing and since early 1973 restrictions 
have been widened to a range of clothing. Under E. E. C. arrangements, 
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restrictions are specific to individual countries. 
These arrangements are now subject to a four-year multiple-fibre agreement 
reached in December 1973 by 50 countries of GATT. This agreement, which 
set-up a Textile Surveillance body, concerns most textile products - tops, 
yarns, piece-goods, made-up articles, garments and other products of cotton, 
wool, man-made fibres or blends thereof. No new unilateral or bilateral 
restraints are to be placed on trade in textiles unless specifically 
authorised under the provisions of the arrangement; all existing restraints 
were to be "notified immediately and thereafter to be either phased out or 
justified under the provisions of the arrangement". Phasing-out is to be 
within three years of April 1974. New restrictions can be introduced 
under strict conditions and multilateral surveillance; they can apply 
only to precise products and specific countries. They are essentially 
temporary and quotas on imports from developing countries are to be 
enlarged automatically by six per cent per year. 
The 1973 multi-fibre agreement appears to prevent the imposition of more 
severe restrictions on imports. of textiles into the U. K. The expansion 
of textile imports may, however, be restrained by membership of the 
European Economic Community which negotiates as a single unit under the 
GATT arrangement. Recent proposals put forward by the Commission of the 
European Communities provide for a wider sharing of textile imports 
from developing countries among members of the Community. Textile imports 
may remain fairly static over the next two or three years but in the 
longer term, restrictions are unlikely to provide continuing protection. 
C. PRICES, OUTPUT, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT 
There are several different elements of competition within the textile 
industry: - 
1. Between fibres: cotton, wool, flax and a widening variety of man- 
made fibres available in staple or filament form. Competition 
between rival producers of synthetic and cellulosic fibres is 
affected by their investments in textile processing. 
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2. Between alternative methods of fabric production: many end-uses 
are now supplied by woven, warp-knitted or weft-knitted 
fabrics. 
These processes are usually carried out in different establishments 
and individual companies have differing degrees of investment 
in 
each. 
3. Between home-produced and imported fibres, yarns and fabrics: this 
element of competition is complicated by the importation of inter- 
mediate products by some firms engaged more heavily in the later } 
stages of ; iroduction. 
This intensely competitive environment is to some extent reflected in 
trends in wholesale prices of textile products. These prices also 
reflect the changing costs of raw materials, especially the increasing 
prices of natural fibres in relation to those of man-made. Table 5 
shows that until 1970 the prices of man-made fibre textile products 
rose more slowly than the general price level. In the case of natural 
fibre yarns and fabrics, prices rose much less than those of the raw 
material content in 1973. 
TABLE 5ý___SE_! ECTED TRICE INDICES 1963-74 (1963=100) 
1968 1970 1973 1974 
Raw cotton (1) 130 116 246 265 
Raw Wool (2) 99 81 291 215 
Man-made fibres (3) 86 90 95 124 
Man-made spun yarns 100 108 136 171 
Cotton and mixture y,:,, "ns 130 144 207 274 
Cotton cloth (loomstate) 124 144 200 279 
Man-made fibre cloth (loomstate) 106 114 150 196 
Worsted yarns 97 100 189 190 
Hosiery and knitwear 98 99 115 138 
Made-up clothing 109 115 138 160 
Prices of all manufactured products 117 128 158 194 
(1) refers to c. i, f. price of cotton landed at Liverpool from New Orleans. 
(2) refers to the average price at selected auctions of Merino 64s (sourCý 
of these data U. N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics). 
(3) this and all following indices refer to wholesale prices and are 
calculated by the Department of Industry (or its predecessors). 
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Their falling cost in relation to that of cotton has encouraged an 
acceleration of the shift to man-made fibres in the "cotton" industry 
before 1970 and the rapid rises in the prices of both cotton and wool 
during 1972 and 1973 led to more widespread replacement of these fibres: - 
Table 6: U. K. rill consumption by category of fibre (000 metric tonnes) 
1966 1968 1970 1973 1974 
Man-made 340 432 469 627 560 
Cotton 206 172 166 126 112 
Wool 187 189 163 149 121 
Total 733 793 795 902 793 
Man-made as % of total 46.4 54.5 59.0 69.5 70.6 
ouý : Textile Industry Statistics Bureau (Quarterly Review) 
Although the switch from natural to man-made fibres occurred partly 
within the traditional weaving industries, it also reflected the 
increased adoption of knitted in place of woven fabrics. In 1973 warp 
knitting absci°bed 15 per cent of the total U. K. output of filament yarn. 
1.8 times as much as weaving. Weft knitters absorbed 15 per cent of the 
output of yarns spun on the cotton system. 
The competition between woven and knitted fabrics is considerably 
affected by fashion ao.. d by technological developments in man-made fibres. 
For example in both shirts and bedding the advance of warp-knitted nylon 
fabrics has been reversed in 1973 and 1974 by the popularity of woven 
polyester and cotton mixtures. Table 7 shows indices of production for 
major sectors of the industry: - 
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Table 7: Indices of Production (1963=100) 
1968 1970 1972 1973 1974 
Man-made fibre production 201 238 255 303 265 
Cotton & m. m. f. spinning 
and weaving 99 101 100 106 97 
Wool and worsted spinning 
and weaving 93 85 83 83 74 
Knitting 132 149 149 153 146 
Source: Textile Industry Statistics Bureau (Quarterly Review) 
Some indications of the relative importance of the three sectors covered 
by this study is given by a comparison of net output (value added). In 
Table B value-added in each sub-sector is shown as a percentage of the 
total of the three sub-sectors combined. (This method of comparison 
avoids the distorting effect of inflation on the absolute figures. ) 
TABLE 8: VALUE ADDED WITHIN EACH SECTOR 
Sector 1963 (%) 1968 (%ý 1971 (%) ` 
Spinning & weaving of cotton 
and man-made fibres 33 33 34 
Wool & worsted 41 34 31 
Hosiery & other knitted goods 26 34 35 
Source: Censuses of Production 
Further evidence of the competitive pressures on the textile industries 
is provided by the rapid rise in labour productivity since the late 
1950's. With falling sales, this increased productivity has been 
accompanied by decreased employment: - 
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TABLE 9: EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 1963-74 
Spinning & weaving of cotton 













198.9 164.2 111.4 104.0 
Index of Employment 100 83 56 52 
Index of Output 100 99 106 97 
Index of Productivity 100 120 189 186 




Index of Employment 
Index of Output 









188.3 152.9 103.9 95.0 
100 81 55 50 
100 93 83 74 
100 115 151 148 
Hosiery & Knitwear 
Employees: Male 38.2 44.0 42.4 41.7 
(000's) Female 89.4 90.9 82.4 80.9 
Total 127.6 134.9 124.8 122.7 
Index of Employment 100 106 98 96 
Index of Output 100 132 153 146 
Index of Productivity 1^0 125 156 152 
Source: Department of Employment and Department of Industry 
Note that part-time employees are included on a "full-time equivalent" basis. 
22 
The greatest increases in productivity have occurred in the spinning and 
weaving of cotton and man-made fibres, though even in this sub-sector 
there was a deterioration in the 1974 recession. The increased product- 
ivity has been achieved through capital expenditure, much of it financed 
by the largest enterprises. In 1968 the 19 largest employers in weaving 
accounted for 44 per cent of employment and 66 per cent of capital 
expenditure. In spinning, the corresponding proportions for the 15 
largest employers were 59 and 71 per cent. In order to maximise 
utilisation of the new equipment most firms have introduced shift- 
working and total capacity has been correspondingly reduced. , 
Table 10: Capacity in Spinning and Weaving (000's_) 
Spindles in place 
Spindles running (average) 
% operating on three shifts or on 7-day working 
Looms in place 
Looms running 
% operating on three shifts or 7-day working 
3 
4 







The widespread use of shiftwork in the "cotton industry" is one reason 
for the growing proportion of males in the labour force. A large part 
of the labour force on night shifts consists of Commonwealth immigrants. 
The wool and worsted sub-sector had much less capital expenditure than 
cotton spinning and weaving and hosiery and knitwear during the survey 
period. 
This is shown in Table 11: - 
I 
23 
Table 11: Expenditure on Plant and Machinery (Gross) Per Employee 
1968 1970 1971 
Cotton and m. m. f. spinning & weaving 179.8 163.7 147.6 
Wool & Worsted 96.4 105.6 112.8 
Hosiery & Knitwear 162.5 182.1 182.3 
Source: Censuses of Production 1970 and 1971 
Note that figures are at current prices and not adjusted for inflation. 
This lower rate of capital expenditure may be associated with the more 
fragmented structure of the woollen industry (see Section III) and with 
the decline in total sales by this sub-sector. 
In the hosiery and knitwear sub-sectur a major objective of capital 
investment has been to increase capacity. Of the three sub-sectors this 
had the highest productivity in the survey period, but Census figures 
confirm that productivity increases were greater in the other sub-sectors. 
Table 12: Value added per Employee Sf - current prices) 
1968 1970 1971 % increase 1968-71 
Cotton etc. '1300 1496 1615 24 
Wool & Worsted 1415 1487 1668 18 
Hosiery & Knitwear 1475 1538 1676 14 
Data on wage earnings show that (in spite of the high proportions 
receiving shift premia in the "cotton industry") average earnings 
in all three sub-sectcrs were less than those in manufacturing as 
a whole: - 
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Table 13: Earnings and shiftwork in April 1973 (Full-time manual workers} 
Average hourly earnings % receiving shift 
(pence) premium 
I Men I Women I Men I Women 
Cotton etc. spinning 70.6 48.8 24.3 8.1 
Cotton etc. weaving 74.6 48.6 20.6 10.9 
Wool & Worsted 69.3 44.1 19.1 2.4 
Hosiery & Knitwear 81.0 50.2 11.5 0.0 
All Manufacturing 1 83.6 49.5 1 22.6 1 5.2 
Source: Department of Employment, New Earnings Survey. 
Table 9 showed a loss of 193,100 jobs in the cotton and woollen industries 
between 1963 and 1974. The progressive decline in employment in the 
cotton and woollen industries has led to an ageing labour force and a 
consequently high rate of natural wastage but the social consequences of 
reduced employment are aggravated by geographical concentration. 
In the "cotton industry" over 80 per cent of employment is concentrated 
in East Lancashire, Greater Manchester and immediataly adjacent parts of 
other counties. Over 70 per cent of the woollen industry is located in 
West Yorkshire, The economic consequences for many Pennine towns of 
the decline of textile employment are a major pressure for greater trade 
protection. 
The Knitting industry is less concentrated: about 55 per cent of 
employment in hosiery and weft knitting is in the East Midlands and 
15 per cent in southern Scotland; about 40 per cent of employees in 
warp knitting are in the East Midlands and 25 per cent in the North- 










D. FINANCIAL TRENDS 
No official data are published on company profits within individual sub- 
sectors and estimates of profits must be based on examination of company 
accounts. The data collected for this report refer to firms with a 
turnover of over fl million, subject to a maximum of 601. Because of 
increasing concentration, especially in the wool sub-sector, the pro- 
portion of industry turnover represented by the samples increased 
progressively during the survey period, (this is discussed in Sections 
III and IV. ) The following table shows total turnover and net results 
(including both profits and'lbsses) in each sub-sector sample annually 
from 1968 to 1973. Absolute figures are not corrected for inflation. 
TABLE 14 : TURNOVER AND NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX - SAMPLE DATA 
































Cotton 1968 386.1 73 21.7 5.6 
1969 415.0 74 20.0 4.8 
1970 425.8 75 18.9 4.4 
1971 457.8 77 19.2 4.2 
1972 501.2 80 26.3 5.3 
1973 590.2 82 37.5 6.4 
Hosiery 1968 364.7 79 25.5 7.0 
1969 392.2 - 23.0 5.9 1970 431.2 77 22.8 5.3 
1971 461.6 85 29.0 6.3 
1972 483.0 86 32.9 6.8 
1973 583.8 89 41.8 7.2 
1 In one instance (Wool 1970) the maximum was extended to 61, as there was 
a, discrete gap in the distribution of sales turnover after the 61st firm. 
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These data show that in all three sub-sectors there was a decline in 
profitability in 1969 and 1970 and that in all three sub-sectors profits a 
as a percentage of sales did not recover to their 1968 level until 1973. 
This period of reduced profitability can be attributed to falling (or 
levelling off) of demand (see Table 7) accompanied by increases in costs 
of natural fibres and of labour. The 1973 boom in demand led not only to 
fuller utilisation of capacity but also to increases in margins. 
Since 1973 the three sub-sectors have been severely hit by trade depression 
(in common with textile industries throughout the world) which has once 







INFLUENCES ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUB-SECTORS 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY IN THE EARLY 1960's 
Table 15 shows the distributions of enterprises by size of employment in 
cotton spinning, cotton weaving, woollen and worsted and hosiery and 
knitting in 1963: - 
TABLE 15 : CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES BY SIZE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Cotton etc. Cotton etc. Woollen & Hosiery & 
No. of employees Spinning Weaving Worsted Knitting 
1 - 99 191 277 790 681 
100 - 199 44 109 154 95 
200 - 499 55 81 133 64 
500 - 1999 36 28 63 52 
2000 and over 8 5 7 5 
Total of above 
categories 334 500 1147 897 
Firms reporting 
unsatisfactorily 11 29 44 40 
TOTAL NO. OF FIRMS 345 529 1191 937 
Total employment 
(0001's) 104.3 89.1 177.1 124.5 
Source: 1963 Census of Production 
The official separation of spinning and weaving overstates the number of 
enterprises in the cotton industry because of the double-counting of 
vertically integrated enterprises. There were about 80 such firms controlling 
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about 70 per cent of spinning capacity and around 40 per cent of looms in 
weaving. 
' 0 
The structure of the cotton industry had been changed considerably during its 
long period of contraction partly as a result of government action. Before 
the 1939-45 war legislation had been introduced to give legal enforcement to 
the Yarn Spinners Price Agreement which set common prices and to empower 
spinners' organisations to purchase compulsorily excess spindle capacity. 
(This common price list was declared illegal by the Restrictive Practices 
Court in the late 1950's). Although one or two large spinning combines 
resulted from the pre-war groupings, the weaving sector remained highly 
fragmented and many small spinning concerns continued to compete within 
the industry. The existence of excess capacity and the associated danger 
of "cut-throat" (= marginal cost) pricing . sere widely regarded as deterrents 
to re-equipment within the industry. The view that such re-equipment was 
essential to the stabilisation of the cotton industry found expression 
in the Cotton Industry Act 1959. 
Under this legislation, the Government compensated firms for scrappage of 
machinery with additional grants to companies ceasing to trade in the 
textile industry. It also subsidised the purchase of neap equipment. In 
total £17.1 millions were paid out for scrappage and £13.4 millions for 
re-equipment. The number of firms in the cottin spinning and weaving 
industries fell sharply: - 
R 
_ý 
I Estimates based on references (3) and ( ). 
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TABLE 16 : THE STRUCTURE. OF THE COTTON INDUSTRY 1958-63 
Analysis of companies with at least 100 employees and engaged in the 
spinning and/or weaving of cotton and/or man-made fibres: 
1958 1963 
Size of firm No. of Total Net No. of Total Net 
(No. of firms Empt. Output firms Empt. Output 
employees) (000s) (£mill) (000s) (£mill) 
100-499 379 81.3 48.6 223 51.1 40.9 
500-999 58 41.7 20.9 34 24.3 17.3 
1000-4999 38 73.7 41.3 26 54.0 45.5 
5000 & over 7 63.9 38.6 6 56.6 49.8 
TOTAL 48? 260.6 149.4 289 185.9 153.5 
Source: Census of Production, 1963 
Neither the wool textile nor the hosiery and knitwear industries underwent 
the degree of reorganisation weich took place in cotton in-the early 1960s. 
In both sub-sectors (as was shown in Table 15 ) there was a preponderance 
of very small firms. 
All three sub-sectors were much more fragmented than manufacturing industry 
as a whole and this fragmented structure contrasted with the virtual duo- 
poly already existing in the supply of ratan-made fibres. Five-firrn 
concentration ratios fron the five-yearly production censuses show that 
for only isolated products of the textile processing sector (as well as 
the supply of man-made fibres) was the market dominated by five (or fewer) 
firms. 
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TABLE 17: FIVE FIRM CONCENTRATION RATIOS 1958,1963 and 1968 
t 
Combined sales of five largest 
firms as % of total sales of 
selected products. 
i 
1958 1963 I R68 
Man-made fibres n. a. 99.9 100.0 
Finished thread for sewing etc. n. a. 81.8 87.9 
Single cotton or m. m. f. spun yarn 31.9 37.2 50.3 
Doubled cotton or m. m. f. spun yarn 34.9 41.7 47.1 
Woven cotton cloth 11.6 19.3 31.2 
Woven m. m. f. cloth 21.1 35.8 51.9 
Wool tops 30.1 34.0 54.7 
Yarn of animal hair or m. m. f. - spun on 26.7 26.0 
33.9 
woollen systera 
- spun on 25.8 32.9 40.2 
worsted system 
Woven woollen fabric 12.0 15.1 24.0 
Woven worsted fabric 17.3 26.7 31.0 
Knitted fabrics 30.2 34.7 43.2 
Socks, stockings etc 21.4 20.1 43.3 
Underwear and shirts 25.6 39.5 53.1 
Source: Census of Production 
From this table it can be seen that for a number of products the combined 
market share of the five largest firms increased by more than ten per cent 
of the tutal market. These were single yarns spun on the cotton system, 
woven cotton and man-made fibre cloths, wool tops (for worsteds), socks and 
stockings and underwear and shirts. Except in the case of wool tops, a 
major cause of increased concentration was the intervention of the large 
producers of man-made fibres, seeking to strengthen the structure of those 
parts of the textile industry which were their main customers. 
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B. HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Although some activities have remained vertically integrated since the early 
nineteenth century (for example woollen blanket manufacture), the textile 
industries were mainly organised on a horizontal basis for the first 60 
years of this century. In the cotton and worsted industries separate 
firms carried out most of the top-making (worsted), spinning, weaving and 
firnishing. Intermediate processes such as winding or beaming, sizing or 
yarn-dyeing were, in many cases, also carried out on a commission basis 
by specialists in each process. 
The predominantly horizontal structure of the cotton industry developed 
in the later part of the nineteenth century, and was due to economies 
of long production runs in spinning and the need for variety of yarns 
in weaving of all but the plainest of fabrics. Except for some companies 
with a large output of a limited range of standard cloths (e. g. surgical 
gauze), integrated mills remain exceptional. Even in such mills it is 
usual practice to sell some yarn to other weavers and to purchase yarn 
from other spinners. Vertical integration under these conditions is 
economic only when the firm concerned is sufficiently large to control 
several spinning mills and thereby combine product variety with long 
runs. 
Another deterrent, of increasing importance, to vertical integration 
between small firms in the cotton industry during the 1960's was the 
growing proportion of yarn sold to knitters and other nQn-weavers, 
most of them located outside the Lancashire area. In 1957 weavers 
absorbed 74 per cent of spun yarn produced within the United Kingdom; 
by 1967 the proportion had fallen to 58 per cent. 
' 
I The Textile Council: Cotton and Allied Textiles, 1969, p. 149 
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In the woollen industry the difference between woollen and 
worsted 
production is quite pronounced. In the manufacture of woollen 
fabrics 
the majority of weaving concerns spin their own yarn; 
this has been 
attributed2 to the importance of raw material blending to 
the quality 
and profitability of woollen cloth. In 1967,68 per cent of woollen 
yarns produced by companies engaged predominantly within the 
industry 
went into weaving. The other main demand was from carpet manufacturers. 
(Some carpet manufacturers spun part of their own yarn requirements). 
Those wool spinning firms which were not engaged also in weaving 
were mainly concerned with carpet yarns. 
In worsted spinning vertical integration is less economic because 
only about 40 per cent of worsted yarn goes into weaving, the rest 
going into knitwear, hand knitting and (to a lesser extent than 
woollen yarns) carnets. The worsted weaver also requires a variety 
of yarns and, as in the cotton industry, there is a contrast between 
economies of long suns in worsted top making and yarn spinning on 
the one hand and smaller machine units and variety of yarn inputs 
in weaving on the other. 
In both the cotton and wool textile industries the traditional 
practice was for cloth to be sold to merchants or "converters". 
Forward integration by textile firms into made-up clothing, household 
textiles or industrial products remained exceptional and the majority 
of producers were, therefore, at least one stage removed from the 
manufacture of the final consumer product. 
This separation from the final market subjected manufacturers to a 
number of disadvantages: - 
1) fluctuations in demand resulting from inventory adjustments of 
merchants and retailers 
2) a tendency for some customers to switch to imported fabrics 
and to market products made from these under the same brand 
names as similar products made from U. K. cloths 
2 W. S. Atkins and Partners: The Strategic Future of the Wool Textile 
Industry, NEDO 1969. 
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3) weak bargaining power in dealings with multiple retailers 
dominating certain parts of the consumer textile market - 
shirts, men's underwear and nightwear, children's wear, made- 
to-measure suits are some examples. Large groups could take 
advantage of the fragmented structure of the U. K. industries 
and the facility for importation 
4) inability to use advertising and sales promotion to influence 
the final purchaser 
5) inability to influence the choice between knitted and woven fabrics 
in the making-up of household textiles and clothing. 
Conclusions on vertical integration $n the 1960's 
(1) In the "cotton" industry the need for long production runs in 
spinning and yarn variety in many kinds of weaving meant that integration 
would be economic only for very large enterprises, able to combine 
economies of scale with variety. 
(2) The future size of the "cotton" industry depended partly upon 
links with the final market through forward integration. Control 
over both weaving and knitting capacity would be a further safeguard 
against fashion changes between these two types of fabric production. 
(3) In the wool industry vertical integration in woollen spinning and 
weaving was traditional but worsted spinning and weaving remained 
separate partly because of the importance of yarn sales to activities 
other than weaving and partly because of the need for variety of yarn 
in worsted weaving. The industry's needs for links with final customers 
was similar to that of the cotton industry though the industry was 
less vulnerable to imported cloths. 
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C. CONCENTRATION AMONG CUSTOMERS 
The fragmented textile processing industries of the early 1960's were 
facing 
increasing concentration among customers. An oligopsony situation 
existed 
not only for industrial products such as tyre cord, which went 
to a small 
number of tyre producers, but also for products sold by multiple retailers. 
Such products include many kinds of knitwear, shirts, underwear, 
hosiery, 
men's suits and certain household textiles. 
The percentages of total retail turnover in 1966 accounted for by multiples 
with 10 or more establishments were as follows: - 
t 
Household textiles and soft furnishings 25 
Men's and boys' wear 46 
Women's, girls' and infants' wear and other 
drapery goods 40 
Source: Census of Distribution 1966 
(The use of these broad categories conceals the concentration of retail sales 
of individual items. ) k 
Reliance on a small number of major customers often selling under their 
own brand names gives certain advantages to suppliers in economies of long 
production runs, elimination of marketing and administrative overheads. 
Some alleged disadvantages have been discussed hoth with textile producers 
and with large multiple retailers: - 
(1) Some producers alleged that certain retailers are relying increasingly 
upon imports for the "base load" of their requirements of garments or 
fabrics. The majority of garments sold by the largest retailers 
consulted during this study appear to be made up in this country but 
policies on importation of cloth differ widely. There seems to be 
some consensus thaw savings in costs through use of imports are to 
some degree offset by difficulties of communication regarding 
qualities and composition (e. g. by colours) of fabrics supplied. 
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Some retailers have decided to buy in the United Kingdom as a matter of 
long term policy, others buy overseas if cost savings are significant 
and if the volume is sufficient to cover costs of communication with 
overseas suppliers. Such communication is least important in the case 
of less expensive products in regular demand and not subject to fashion 
changes (e. g. working clothes and children's playclothes). Some retailers 
who currently import much of their fabric expressed the view that imports 
are likely to represent a progressively lower proportion of cloth and 
garment consumption because of the devaluation of sterling, high rates 
of inflation in certain Far Eastern countries and the reductions in costs 
now (1975) being achieved in the U. K. textiles industry. The impact of 
quotas and implications of existing and potential import restrictions 
for reliability of supply are additional influences. Opposite factors 
include availability of cheaper fibres enjoyed by some Far Eastern producers 
(including polyester fibres exported at marginal cost prices by U. S. and 
European producers) and increasing willingness on the part of U. K. garment 
producers, including some within textile groups, to find overseas supplies 
of fabrics. *`%is is examined "again in Section V. 
(2) There was almost universal concern among manufacturers about the 
downward pressure on prices of knitted garments, fabrics and yarns 
imposed by the large customers. A number of producers agreed with 
the retailers' own argument that this pressure reflected competition 
between retailers. Those retailers with a "buy British" policy were 
competing with other large retailers and with independent shops 
where imported garments have their main outlet. One textile manu- 
facturer bemoaned the fact that his cost reductions were passed 
on to the ultimate consumer, on the grounds that this threatened 
the long-term stability of the industry. 
(3) The policy on the part of retailers of holding minimum stock levels 
(warehousing is not common practice), together with the horizontal 
structure of much of the textile industry and consequent extension 
of the production period, leads to sharp variations in orders 
received by producers in the earlier stages of textile processing. 
This situation is aggravated by what the manufacturers soe as 
deferred acceptance of agreed orders and resulting deferment of 
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payment. Among the large retailers consulted 
during the study 
there seemed to be some recognition of the problems which their 
low- 
inventory policy created for suppliers. (This recognition was 
confirmed by the suppliers themselves. ) Assistance with cash 
flow 
difficulties, placing of alternative orders for immediate delivery 
and payment for garments and cloth ordered but not yet accepted 
were among policies adopted by different firms. One major retailer 
explained that there is a conflict of interests: - the manufacturer 
would like a definite order well in advance of a firm delivery date 
after which payment would be prompt; the retailer, especially in 
this fashion-influenced trade, wishes icy maintain maximum flexibility. 
The need to establish good communications with suppliers provides some 
pressure towards loyalty on the part of the large retailers and 
towards a compromise between these conflicting objectives. 
Investment in the share capital of suppliers remains exceptional and appears 
to be confined to only one of the large retail groups. Although the comments 
of both manufac1; i'ers and retailers showed that trade between them was 
affected by longer-term considerations, there is little doubt that the 
dominance of large retailers has motivated some of the changes in the 
structure of the textile industry since the early 196u's. When well over 
half of the output of a textile firm goes to one customer with whom there 
is no financial or other tie and when those goods represent as little as 
5 per cent of the customer's supplies, bargaining must be uneven. (One large 
retailer insists that its purchases must not account for more than one- 
third of any suppliers output of the product concerned, to avoid "moral 
constraints" on freedom to place subsequent orders., Another firm aims to 
make suppliers significantly but not excessively dependent. Some dependence 
is regarded as necessary to ensure supplies during periods of boom, when 
other orders may become more profitable than contracts with retailers. ) 
One of the policies adopted by some large textile firms to counter the power 
of multiple chain-stores has been the sale of branded apparel and household 
textiles. The practical difficulties of developing brands while at the 
same time supplying similar items for sale under the retailers' labels 
are discussed at greater length in the comments on product groups in 
Section V. Important preconditions for branding are size (to achieve 
economies of marketing) and vertical integration (to ensure quality). 
Increased size and vertical integration are also important in the creation 
of countervailing selling power to offset reliance on large customers. 
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D. THE ROLE OF THE LARGE FIBRE PRODUCERS 
By 1960, the production of man-made fibres in the United Kingdom was dominated 
by Courtaulds and I. C. I. Courtaulds was (and remains) the dominant producer of 
cellulosic fibres (rayon and acetate), while I. C. I. was developing polyesters as 
well as producing nylon in a joint venture with Courtaulds. Courtaulds was 
also developing'acrylic fibres. 
An abortive attempt by I. C. I. to take over Courtaulds in 1961-2 (described 
in Appendix F), led to the exchange of I. C. T. 's holding of. Courtaulds' 
equity plus £10m. for Courtaulds' 50 per cent interest in the joint nylon 
subsidiary (British Nylon Spinners Ltd. ) in 1964. Since that date 
Courtaulds has developed its own nylon production and are currently increasing 
output of polyesters. Approximate shares of U. K. production of major fibres 
in 1972 were as follows: - 
Courtaulds I. C. I. Others 
Cellulosic Rayon 100 -- 
Acetate 80 - 20 
Synthetics Nylon 20 60 20 
Polyester 5 80 15 
Acrylics 60 - 40 
The strong position of Courtaulds and I. C. I. in the U. K. market for man- 
made fibres could prove irrelevant if the textile industries which used 
those fibres were to go on contracting as a result of declining exports 
and increased penetration of the U. K. market by imposts. The cotton 
industry in particular appeared very vulnerable. Fragmented, horizontally 
organised, paving failed to take full advantage of assistance with re- 
equipment, the Lancashire industry faced large customers who could buy 
their textile fabrics at lower cost overseas. 
This fear for the future of their market in Lancas-iive motivated both 
Courtaulds and I. C. I. to invest large sums of money into the spinning, 
weaving and knitting industries. Courtaulds' chairman explained his own 
company's policy in his statement to shareholders in 1965: "We wanted 
to ensure that there would indeed be a Lancashire industry to take our 
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The two companies acted differently in the way in which they intervened 
in the textile industry. Courtaulds, with long experience in silk and 
filament weaving, embarked upon a policy of acquisitions in the "cotton" 
spinning and weaving and hosiery industries: I. C. I. pursued a policy of 
long-term lending and purchases of limited amounts of share capital 
their major acquisition (Carrington-Viyella Ltd. ) was the result of 
short-term necessity not long-term design. 
Over the period 1963-9 Courtaulds spent nearly £150m. on acquisitions 
leaving it with 30 per cent of all Lancashire spinning production, 
22 per cent of filament weaving, 35 per cent ofwarp-knitting and 35 per 
cent of ladies' hosiery. (For further details see Appendix F). In addition, 
the firm invested £5m. in English Sewing Cotton Ltd. and as a result 
held 8 per cent of the equity of English Calico Ltd., which in 1968 was 
its largest competitor in Lancashire. (An investment in Carrington and 
Dewhurst Ltd. was sold to I. C. I. in 1968). 
I. C. I. also ii-. ested money in English Sewing Cotton Ltd. (leaving it 
with 8 per cerº+: of the equity of English Calico) and over the period 
1963-70 invested over £20 millions in Viyella International Ltd. and 
Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd. When these fi: -ms exptrienced financial 
difficulties in 1970, I. C. I. arranged a merger and with further 
investment into the new company (Carrington-Viyella Ltd. ) possessed 
64 per cent of the equity. In the woollen industry during the 1960's 
I. C. I. acquired a 20% holding in Lister and Co. Ltd. a worsted combine 
with net assets of £14 millions and a 1968 turnover of £27 millions. 
Following the report of the Monopolies Conmission into the supply of 
cellulosic fibres (1968), the Government adopted a policy of active 
discouragement of further acquisitions by fibre producers of textile 
firms. I. C. I. agreed to reduce its holding of shares in Carrington- 
Viyella Ltd. to 35 per cent of the equity "as soon as possible" (no 
significant disposal had occurred by mid-1975) and meanwhile to exercise 
voting power egpivalent to only 35 per cent. The Government's policy also 
prevented the execution of a bid for English Calico Ltd. which Courtaulds 
announced in 1969. 
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As a result of Government policy, fibre manufacturers did not extend 
their participation in textile procesin3 between 1969 and 1973. Since 
most of the previous increase in concentration had been due to intervention 
by fibre manufacturers, this slowed down markedly the process of concen- 
tration in the cotton and hosiery sectors. In the woollen sector, fibre 
manufacturers have acquired less financial interest, possibly because 
they felt that this sector was less vulnerable to imports and was more 
certain to remain as a major outlet for the next few years. 
Since 1973 Courtaulds Ltd. has acquired a 29 per cent holding in Highams Ltd. 
a vertically integrated manufacturer of cotton-typs textiles especially sheets 
and bedding, with a 1973 turnover of £14m. This will provide Courtaulds with 
an outlet for polyester/cotton yarns which were developed at an earlier stage 
by Carrington-Viyella in collaboration with I. C. I. Government policy on such 
acquisitions has not changed: in June 1975 Courtaulds agreed with the Office of 
Fair Trading to reduce the holding to 25% and not to use it to influence policy. 
Discussions with textile companies suggest that most of Courtaulds' 
output of synthetic fibres is used by its own subsidiaries in spinning, 
weaving, hosiery and knitting. Cellulosic fibres are sold by Courtaulds 
to its oven subsidiaries and their competitors and this leads to occasional 
friction on transfer-pricing in times of recession and on maintenance of 
supply in times of boom. Friction has also occurred when major retailers 
have placed orders with Courtaulds' subsidiaries for commission weaving 
or making up from yarns or fabrics bought outside the Courtaulds' group 
and including competitive fibres. In spite of these allegations, the 
general view which appeared to emerge from discussions within the industry 
was that Courtaulds' more widespread participation in textile processing 
provides it with greater facility for production planning and control 
over deliveries than I. C. I. 
E. GOVERNMENT POLICY 
Although a negative attitude towards participation by fibre manufacturers 
in textile processing has been adopted since 1969, governments (of both 
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parties) have otherwise tended to favour amalgamations within the industry. 
This policy was, to some extent, implicit in the Cotton Industry Act 1959. 
Discussions with smaller firms within the industry revealed that the 
Department of Industry (or its earlier equivalents) has in recent years 
arranged a number of mergers with a view to elimination of excess capacity 
in small firms, re-equipment and reorganisation. 
For the woollen and worsted industry, less affected by intervention on 
the part of fibre manufacturers than either the cotton or knitwear sub- 
sectors, the Government introduced in July 1973 the first assistance 
scheme under the 1972 Industry Act. The aims of this are "rationalisation 
of production facilities, improvement of structure and elimination of 
uneconomic and un-needed capacity". There are three forms of 
assistance: - 
(1) Capital grants for re-equipment: 15 per cent of total costs for 
plant and machinery within existing buildings and 20 percent of 
total costs for combinations of plant and new buildings. (In both 
cases the proportions refer to costs after deduction of any regional 
development grants). 
(2) "Realisation grants" for companies ceasing to trade or closing 
down complete factories. These grants may be calculated either as 
4 per cent of annual turi4over or on the basis of standard payments 
per spindle or loom eliminated. 
(3) "Ad hoc finance" ('loans or interest relief) for schemes of rational- 
isation or amalgamation. 
By the end of 1974 applications had been received for £6.5 m. in capital 
grants (relating to gross expenditure of £27m. on equipment and £9m. on 
buildings) and for £0.3m. for "realisation payments" (equivalent to the 
closure of capacity with an annual turnover of £7.5m. ). No application3 
had been received for financial assistance with schemes of rationalisation 
or amalgamation and this was attributed by the regional director of the 
Department of industry to the fact that financial assistance was "not 
sufficiently generous" to encourage such changes. 
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SECTION IV 
A STATISTICAL STUDY OF CONCENTRATION 1963-73 
A. METHODOLOGY 
1. Concentration and Market Forces 
In this study, as throughout the series published by the Commission, 
concentration measurement is applied to industries delineated by raw 
materials and methods of production. In the earlier Cranfield report 
about concentration in the paper industry doubt was expressed about the 
relationship between such measures and market competition. Power over 
a market depends primarily upon the inabflity, of customers to turn to 
substitute products. The manufacturer of paper bags Is competing more 
directly with producers of plastic bags than with manufacturers of 
paper napkins. Because of these reservations, much of the analysis Was 
directed towards product groups within paper manufacture and conversion. 
The traditional structure of the textile industries was less specialised. 
Qistinct product groups existed but these were divided by technical 
rather than end-use boundaries: - fine and coarse yarns, woollen and 
worsted yarns, plain and fancy fabrics, fibre-, yar-ii- and piece-dyeing etc. 
The development of vertically integrated groups and branded goods has, 
to some degree, limited the flexibility of a producer to enter any market 
for which he is technically equipped but commission processing remains 
important. 
In textiles as a whole there are fewer elements of competition from out- 
side the industry than in the case of paper. For certain textile products 
there are close non-textile substitutes but these are exceptional. 
Competition between sub-sectors is close for certain end-uses: - warp-knitted 
and woven fabrics for many purposes, (for example bed-linen and shirts); 
between weft-knitted and woven fabrics, (for example dress fabrics, soft 
furnishings); and between fabrics produced on the woollen or worsted 
systems and those produced by "cotton" weavers or knitters, (for example 
woven worsted, woven cotton/synthetic mixtures and knitted fabrics for 
trousers). Some specialist activities can be clearly separated from the 
rest of the industry (for example ladies' hosiery and finished sewing 
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thread) though the trends towards amalgamation and vertical integration in 
recent years have resulted in the predominance in these specialist areas 
of firms strongly represented in the rest of the industry. 
For these reasons, concentration indices give a closer indication of 
market structure in the textile industries than in paper but the analysis 
is probably more meaningful when the three sub-sectors are combined than 
when they are treated separately. 
2. Coverage aWd'Ddta 
I 
The terms of reference called for an examination of concentration in three 
sub-sectors: woo' (NICE 231), cotton (NICE 233), hosiery and other knitted 
goods (NICE 237). The definitions in NICE (Nomenclature Industrielle-de la 
Communaute Europtenne) are very similar to those of the U. K. Standard 
Industrial Classification (flax is now of minor importance): 
NICE 233 j MLH 412 Spinning and doubling on the cotton or flax systems MLH 413 Weaving of cotton, linen and man-made fibres 
NICE 231 MLH 414 Woollen and worsted e 
NICE 237 MLK 417 Hosiery and other knitted goods I 
The Standard Industrial Classification was therefore used since establish- 
ments were classified on this basis by the Business Statistics Office. 
Firms in each sector were identified by the 1968 Census Directory of 
Businesses, by trade directories and by reference to trade associations. 
Ownership of subsidiaries was checked by reference to "Who Owns Whom" and 
by direct examination of "annual returns of members". 
(a) Enterprise Data 
Because the larger textile companies were engaged in at least two 
of the three sub-sectors, in some cases with other activities also, it 
was not possible to produce data for all variables for each firm in ,. 
i 
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each sub-sector. It was decided by the Commission that enterprise 
data should be confined to published consolidated accounts (from which 
inter-subsidiary transactions are excluded). A firm would be included 
in the enterprise analysis if its world-wide sales in the three sub- 
sectors accounted for more than 50 per cent of total sales. This created 
one very large anomaly - the exclusion of Courtaulds Ltd. whose fibre- 
producing and non-textile activities exceed activities in spinning, 
weaving and knitting. In certain cases (for example William Baird 
Textiles Ltd. and Smith and Nephew Textiles Ltd. ) where separate 
consolidated accounts are published which summarise textile activities, 
these were included in the enterprise analysis. The enterprise tables 
can therefore be used only for comparison of the concentration of the 
variables; the total figures do not represent the total of the industries 
concerned but only of the sample. 
The criteria for inclusion in the enterprise sample were a turnover of 
at least E3 millions in the three sectors combined. The expansion of 
the sample, from 49 firms in 1968 to 55 in 1973 was due to inflation 
and amalgamations of-smaller firms on the one hand, only p: +rtly offset 
by liquidations on the other. 
Variables included in the enterprise analysis were: - 










Net Profit before Tax 
Cash Flow: 04 + depreciation 
Gross Investment (additions to fixed assets) 
Equity (shareholders' funds) 
Exports from the U. K. 
Net Assets total assets - current liabilities 
Net Cash Flow = Cash Flow Taxes 
Concentration indices can meaningfully be applied only to positive values. 
In accordance with analytical principles specified by the Commission, firms 
making losses or experiencing negative cash flows (variables 04,05 and 
12) are omitted from the analysis of the variable concerned. This explains 
the discrepancies in the Tables of Concentration at the end of this 
report between the numbers of firms occurring in tabulations of different 
variables in the same year. For some purposes, the author has thought 
it desirable to analyse net profits before tax and losses; when 
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described in this report, the variable concerned is referred to as "net 
results" and a brief definition is repeated, in order to avoid confusion. 
The level of price inflation experienced in the United Kingdom in recent 
years significantly distorts inter-company comparison of long-term capital. 
Negligible differences in the ages of fixed assets lead to substantial 
differences in the book value of assets (e. g. a new factory built in 1970 
might have cost 40 per cent less than an identical one built in 1973). 
Periodic revaluations of assets may also affect capital values. The 
variables affected by this factor are 07 (equity), 10 (net assets) and, 
because of the effect on depreciation, 04 (net profit before tax). 
Figures relate to those accounting periods which most closely correspond 
to the calendar year. For example "1968" data are taken from accounts for 
financial years ending any time from July 1968 to June 1969. In practice, 
all of the larger companies were found to report within the period October 
to March, most of them at the end of the calendar year. 
I 
Employment and wages bill were omitted from the analysis because most 
firms publishEd data only for their U. K. operations and these could not 
be compared with ; iorld-w; de values for other variables. 
(b) Economic Activity Units 
The figures used in the analysis of "economic activity units" are estimates 
of turnover of U. K. operations in each of the three sub-sectors and of 
their contributions to group profits (where a firm is engaged entirely in 
the U. K. and in sub-sector concerned the enterprise and economic 
activity unit figures will coincide). When the available breakdown 
of profits for diversified enterprises related to profits before 
interest or before central expenses, the author adjusted the figures 
by allocating these deductions in proportion to sales turnover. (This 
adjustment is necessary for comparison with other single-activity 
firms and for consistency with the Commission's definitions). Losses 
were again excluded from the analysis. 
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In most cases, it was possible to obtain data for diversified firms on 
turnover and profits in each. sub-sector, Some firms published the 
requisite-breakdown in their consolidated accounts; in other-cases 
it was possible to obtain the data by analysis of subsidiaries (with 
guidance from some of the firms concerned). In a few cases where pub- 
lished data were not available estimates were made from a wide variety 
of sources, including publications of other researchers (see the 
Bibliography). 
Economic activity unit data were assembled for each of the three sub- 
sectors and also for the combination of the three. In the combined 
figures, vertically integrated finishing and making-up activities were 
included. The advantage of their inclusion was ability to use published 
rather than estimated data for all but one firn; it also avoided 
arbitrary assumptions about transfer pricing. 
The samples of firms for inclusion in the economic activity unit tables 
for sub-sectors ware based on two criteria: 
(a) Turnover of at least £1 million in the sue-sector concerned 
(b) Where the number of such firms exceeded 60, the first 60 in 
terms of turnover wore included. (In 1970 for wool the 
sample was extended to 61 because of a discrete gap in the 
distribution of sales turnover after the 61st firm. ) 
The economic activity unit tables for combined activities ("textiles") 
relate to firms with turnover of at least £3 million in one or more 
of the three sub-sectors and vertically integrated finishing and making- 
up activities. 
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Appendix A shows a list of firms included in enterprise and'economic 
activity unit tables for combined activities in 1968 and 1973. This 
listing shows turnover in all activities, and in textiles, world-wide 
and in the United Kingdom. 
3. Definitions and Basic'PropertieS of ConcentiA tion-Indices 
In this explanation of the main indices specified by the Commission and 
used in this analysis the following notation is used: 
N total number of firms in the ? ndustry; 
xZ the value of a variable for Firm i, ; Then firms are ranked 
in descending order with respect to that variable; 





Pi the proportion of the aggregate accounted for by Firm i, that is, 
xi 
x 
the arithmetic mean value of the variable, that is, x 
N 
(a) Concentration Ratio 
The concentration ratio for R firms within an industry is the fraction of 
the total value of the variable accounted for by the R largest firms 
ranked in descending order of that variable: - 
d 
47 
CR = 100. 
R 
XE xý (%) Z=j Z 
Concentration ratios give only limited information about the structure 
of an industry. With different distributions of the variable, comparison 
of degrees of concentration between different sectors may depend on 
the number of firms chosen. In industry A the top five firms may account 
for 40 per cent of sales and the next five 30 per cent (giving'a ten- 
firm CR of 70 per cent). In industry B the five largest firms may 
account for 50 per cent of sales and the next five 18 per cent (giving 
a ten-firm CR of 68 per cent). 
0 
(b) Coefficient of Variation 
This is the standard deviation of the distribution of values of the 




(c) The Gini Coefficient 
This measure is based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve plots the 
percentage of total industry turnover on the vertical axis against 
percentage of firms cumulated from the smallest on the horizontal axis. 
Thus the curve is concave (degenerating into a straight line when all 
firms are of equal size). Where a variable other than turnover is used, 
the percentage of firms is cumulated from the firm with the smallest value 
of the variable under consideration. 





It ranges from 0 (all firms equal in size) to I (all output in the hands 
of a single firm). The following formula provides a method of calculation 
when the values of the variable are ranked in ascending order (xe; j+1 to N) 






0/0 Of Totd 
Industry 
Turnover 
Fig. 1 %"of firms cumulated 
! ro. n smoü¢st 
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(d) Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
This was suggested by Herfindahl and is defined as the sum of 
the squares 
of the market shares, i. e. 
N 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index =E pie 
: =1 
The index lies between 1 and 1. Some authors prefer to define it as: 
N 
N 
H-H - 1000 E pi i=1 
i. e. to inflate its value by a multiple of 1000. This convention 
has been 
adopted by the Commission and is followed in this report. 
The index is related to the coefficient of variation and in other publications 
by the Commission in this series has been defined'accordingly: - 
H-H = ZOOo(v2 + 1) 
N 
(e) Entry 
This is defined as: - 
N 
Entropy Index, E=-E Pi Zog Pi 
i=l 
If one share is 1 and all others are 0, then E r-0 and the degree of 
concentration is maximum. If all shares are equal (=N) tnen E Zog N 
and the degree of concentration is minimum for that value of N. 
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The entropy index, explained at some length in the Cranfield report on 
the paper industry, has the advantage over other measures of concentration 
that absolute changes in its value may be compared. For example if the 
Gini coefficient moves from 0.3 to 0.5 in one industry and from 0.7 to 
0.9 in another, it cannot be concluded that concentration has increased 
to the same degree. With the entropy index, such a conclusion could be 
drawn. (10 ) 
(f) Linda Index 
Another measure of industrial concentration is given by Linda. 
QZ K-i Ai 
ir Ai 
1. 
where A. .=1"Ex" and values of x a; E" in descending order. X1 
I 
4 
K may be any number of firms from 2 to N. (Thus Qz is the average share 
of the market held by the top i firms divided by the average share of the 
market held by the other (K-i) firms included in the sample). 
The Linda Index ;s defined as: 
1 K-1 
K(K-1) 2 
(i. e. the Linda Index Is Ix the average of the Q. S). 
The Linda index is designed to measure the degree of inequality between 
the values of the variable included in a sub-sample of K units. 
The Linda Index may also be used to define the boundary between oligopolists 
within an industry and the other firms. This boundary occurs when the value 
of xk is so large in relation to previous ratios that, in spite of 
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averaging, the Linda index rises. If the value of the Linda index (L) 
is greater for (k+1) than for (k) then an "oligopolistic arena" of k 
firms may be identified. 
Mathematically this critical point (km) may be defined as where 
dL =0 aid d2L) 
A A2 
A measure of "synthesis" (LS) is included in the Tables of Concentration. 
This represents the mean value of the Linda indices from k=2 tok=k . LS m is used in further statistical development of the analysis of concentration 
now being undertaken by the Commission. 
The definition of km (N*n in the Tables of Cuncentration) on this basis 
differs from that used in earlier reports published by the Commission. 
This re-definition follows further analysis of the concepts underlying 
the Linda approach. 
B. CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION 1963-8 
Section III of this report outlined the influences towards greater 
concentration during this period and emphasised the importance of the 
two main fibre producers in the formation of vertically integrated 
combines in the "cotton" and knitwear sectors. Because of government 
discouragement of further intervention of this kind, the structure of 
these sub-sectors has changed much less sind 1968 and an examination 
of the earlier evolution is necessary for an understanding of this 
more recent period of consolidation. Appendix Tables B (1 to 5) show 
a breakdown of economic activity units by size of employment according 
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to the 1968 Census. The most convenient method of suit. -nary 
comparison is 
use of Gini coefficients, based not on 
individual enterprises but on 
the groupings shown in the appendices. 
Reference will also be made to 
five-firm concentration ratios, which have already 
been described in 
Section II. 
Table 08) shows the Gini coefficients for the three sub sectors 
(cotton 
spinning and weaving are shown separately) and compares 
these with 
corresponding figures for textiles as a whole 
(including sub-sectors 
outside the present study) and for all manufacturing. 
These coefficients show that for all three variables the degree of 
concentration in textiles was less than in manufacturing as a whole. 
There was, however, a much greater increase in concentration' in 
textiles between 1963 and 1968 than that which occurred in total manufacturing. 
Although, because classification was based on employment, the degree of 
concentration of ine other two variables might be understated, 
' the Gini 
coefficients for both manufacturing and textiles are least for employ- 
ment and greatest for capital expenditure. Net output was more 
concentrated than employment because larger firms produced greater net 
output per employee; this is almost certainly due to a higher capital : 
labour ratio. Because concentration was the greatest in capital 
expenditure, it appears that the relationship betweer, size and labour 
productivity may have become stronger since 1968, 
In textiles in 1968 the six firms with 10,000 or more employees 
accounted for over 42% of'investment by all of the 1,871 firms employing 
25 or more. The 96 largest employers were responsible for 46 per cent 
of employment and nearly 60 per cent of investment. Between 1963 and 
1968 the concentration of capital expenditure increased substantially 
in textiles, whereas in all manufacturing no such tendency was apparent. 
l This would occur if the ranking by employment were substantially different 
from that of the other variables. Because of the large numbers and the 
broad size categories; such distortion is probably slight. 
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Concentration in each of the four sub-sectors currently being studied 
vias less than in textiles as a whole. There are a number of reasons 
for this: - 
1. Certain other sub-sectors of the textile industry are much more 
highly concentrated. These include the production of man-made 
fibres (h1LH 411), which accounted for 15 per cent of net output 
and in which there were only five firms in 1968 and texti 1e 
finishing (MLH 419), which is also dominated by large combines. 
2. Analysis by sub-sectors ignores the existence of vertically 
integrated "textile conga or rates" with substantial interests 
in most sub-sectors but without dominance in any single one. 
I 
3. Vertical integration is linked with size of firm in the cotton 
(and allied fibres) industry. By splitting this industry into 
spinning and weaving, the Census results understate the importance 
of large vertically integrated groups. 
Points (2) and (3) need to be remembered in any interpretation of the 
Gini coefficients for the individual sectors. 
Cotton (and allied fibres) spinning was in 1963 the most concentrated of 
the four sub-sectors, though by 1968 hosiery and knitwear had approached 
a similar degree of concentration. One unusual feature of this sub-sector 
in 1963 was the absence of a positive relationship between net output per 
employee and size of employment. This is probably explained by the 
importance of small specialist firms working on high-value yarns; concen- 
tration is greatest in the high volume, lower value coarser yarns. By 
1968 the more usual relationship of labour productivity with size had 
become apparent in this sub-sector, almost certainly because of the 
application of more advanced spinning techniques by the larger firms. 
The five-firm concentration ratios for single cotton or man-made fibre 
yarn increased from 37.2 per cent in 1963 to 50.3 per cent in 1968. In 
both years there was much greater concentration in the production of 
finished thread, which is dominated by four companies. 
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Cotton (and allied Fibres) weaving remained, even in 1968, much less 
concentrated than other textile sectors. Because of a previous absence 
of comparable economies of scale, the weaving industry had until recent 
years a much more atomistic structure than that of spinning. However, 
continued separation of spinning and weaving in Government statistics 
leads to serious understatement of the predominance in these more 
recent years of vertically integrated concerns. 
One indication of the growing importance of the largest firms in weaving 
is the high concentration of capital expenditure. In 1968,55 per cent 
of all capital expenditure was undertaken by only four companies: the 
author knows that these were vertically integrated concerns with interests 
in other sectors of the textile industry. 
Increased concentration in weaving is also reflected in the 5-firm concen- 
tration ratios which rose from 19.3 to 31.2 per cent for cotton cloth and 
from 35.8 to 51.9 per cent for man-made fibre cloth. Some of the largest 
weavers of synthetic fabrics were wholly or partly owned by Courtaulds and 
Imperial Chemicals Industries Ltd. Courtaulds and Carrington & Dewhurst 
produced over half of fabrics woven from filament yarns. (3) 
The woollen and worsted industry showed comparatively little increase 
in concentration between 1963 and 1968. Very large firms were less 
dominant, in terms of net output and capital expenditure, than in any 
of the other three sub-sectors: 
^o of variable represented by enterprises with 2,000 or more workers in 1968 
Employment Net Output Iflvettment 
Woollen and worsted 29 
Cotton etc. spinning 41 
Cotton etc. weaving 28 









This confirms the conclusion of Section III that fibre manufacturers 
became much less involved in the . ioollen and worsted industries than in 
"cotton" and hosiery and knitting. 
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In hosiery and knitting the main increases In concentration occurred in 
the production of warp-knitted fabrics (for which separate data were not 
at the time published) and in hosiery proper (men's and women's), for 
which the five-firm concentration ratio increased from 20 to 43 per cent. 
Both of these sections of the industry were affected by major acquisitions 
by the fibre manufacturers themselves or firms with their financial 
support. 
C. CONCENTRATION OF SALES TURNOVER 1968=73 
The results of the statistical analysis of samples of company accounts 
are shown in Appendix B (Tables of Concentration). For technical reasons 
these were produced at Cranfield but the contents are identical to those 
of the Tableaux de Concentration produced by the Commission to accompany 
other reports in this series. 
1. Concentration in the Sub-sectors as a Able 
Because of the continued existence of a very large number of small firms, 
it was not possible to produce complete data on the residue of the 
industry not included in the samples. (In any sub-sector these comprise 
firms with turnover of at least fl million, subject to a maximum of 60; 
in the combination of sub-sectors and in the enterprise analysis the 
turnover criterion is f3 millions). 
Some evidence is available on sales turnover of establishments engaged 
principally in each sub-sector from data published by the'Business 
Statfstics Office (6). For the "cotton"sub-sector the separation 
of spinning and weaving in official statistics results in double-counting 
of yarn produced by vertically integrated enterprises when sales figures 
are added together. 
The sample turnover figures include yarn sales to weavers other than 
inter-group transactions; the use of input-output tables to produce 
"gross output free from duplication" for spinning and weaving combined 
4 
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therefore led to a cotton industry total which was' less than that of the 
sample. Estimates of total sales to "outside customers by establishments 
in the cotton sub-sector have been derived by the author but are less 
reliable than the totals for the wool aid knitting sub-sectors, for which 
the'B. S. O. publishes figures*on this basis. These estimates are 
explained in'Appendix C. 
A delay in the publication of`the'. enterprise tables for the 1970 and 1971 
Censuses of Production restricts analysis to a comparison of sample 
totals for economic activity units with these data for establishments. 
The comparison is somewhat unsatisfactoryg ba-: ause of the existence 
of multi-activity establishments. 
The following table shows approximate estimates of 30-firm concentration 
ratios in each of the sub-sectors, as well=as the proportion of overall 
turnover represented by all firms in the samples: 
TABLE 19: 5HAý: LS(%)'Or OVERALL SUB-SECTOR TURNOVER 
Wool Cotton Ht"sieiy and knitting 
(a) Obtained by all firms'in the Samples 
1968 56 73 83 
1969 58 74 82 
1970 59 75 80 
1971 65 77 87 
1972 64 80 83 
1973 60 82 90 
(b)Obtained'by 30 largest firms 
1968 48 68 75 
1969 50 70' 74 
1970 50 71 72 
1971 55 73 
1972 55 76 75 
1973 52 78 81 
The table indicates that there 
. was 
in each =sub-sector a fal I., Jn the 
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estimated shares of total turnover being obtained 
by firms other than 
the top 30 in each sub-sector (in cotton from 32 to 22 per cent; 
in 
hosiery from 25 to 19 per cent and in wool from 52 to 48 per cent). 
Although these falls were moderate in view of the often-quoted economies 
of amalgamation and rationalisation, this comparison conceals reductions 
through mergers, takeovers, and cessation of trading, of the numbers 
of firms concerned. In the woollen and worsted sub-sector, the number 
of enterprises with at least 25 employees in 1968 was 538, by 1973 this 
number had fallen to 393. In hosiery and knitting the corresponding 
fall was from 548 to 3701. Comparable figures are not available for 
the cotton sub-sector. 
2.011 go; Ioly 
E 
From the Concentration tables and from the graphical representations 
of the Linda curves at the end of them it will be seen that in each 
sub-sector there is in most years a minimum (i. e. a point preceded 
and followed by a higher value) in the Linda index for ;. small number 
of firms. This implies that a small group exists whose shares of the 
market are considerably greater than that of the next largest firm. 
The Linda index itself measures the average degree of inequality 
among this group ("within the oligopolistic arena"). 
The table overleaf, relating to turnover in 1968, demonstrates the 
meaning of this concept. 
Although an"oligopoly" may be said to exist in a statistical sense, this 
does not mean that the U. K. market is dominated by the firms concerned. 
For example in the cotton sub-sector although the four largest firms 
accounted for 58 per cent of sales by U. K. manufacturers, im orts sup- 
plied more than half (by weight) of all articles made from cotton and/or 
man-made fibres. This intensely competitive situation needs to be borne 
in mind throughout the reading of this section. , 
1 Business Statistics Office data, with an adjustment by the author of 
the 1973 figure for knitting to overcome the official separation of 
warp knitting from the rest of the sub-sector. 
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Wool Cotton Knitting 
Number of firms in group 6 4 7 
Combined share of total turnover 
in sample (%) 48.2 56.2 67.3 
Share of the smallest in the group(%) 5.0 9.3 3.8 
Share of the largest firm excluded() 3.6 3.6 2.4 
Linda index for the group 0.245 0.464 0.912 
The predominance of a few firms was greatest in the cotton sub-sector 
where four concerns (Courtaulds, Tootal, Viyella, International and 
Carrington and Dewhurst) together accounted for 56 per cent of the 
turnover of the 52 firms in the sample. In the wool sector the "oli- 
gopolists" were six in number with 48 per cent of turnover but the 
lower value of the Linda coefficient shows that they were more equal in 
size than the four cotton companies. In hosiery and knitting the 
oligopoly was slightly larger but within the larger group there was 
greater inequality. 
In most studies of concentration, oligopolistic groups are associated 
with specialisation. In their study of the paper industries the Cranfield 
research team found that no oligopoly situation was indicated by the 
Linda curves for paper manufacture and conversion but that specialist 
activities tended to be dominated by small groups. This led to some 
doubts about the validity of application of concentration measures to 
paper-making and -using activities as integral industries. 
In textiles there is a different situation. When distinctions between 
"cotton", "wool" and knitting are ignored (man-made fibres predominate 
throughout! ) a distinct textile oligopoly remains, consisting of multi- 
process firms. 
In 1968 there were five companies which together controlled 57.3 per 
cent of the total of the 50 largest figures of U. K. turnover derived 
from spinning, weaving or knitting of wool, cotton or man-made fibres. 
These five were Courtaulds, English Calico (now Tootal), Coats-Paton, 
Viyella International and Carrington and Dewhurst. Courtaulds' turnover 
in textile processing in 1968, the end of its period of most extensive 
acquisitions in cotton-type spinning and weaving and in hosiery Was about 
f228 millions whereas those of the other groups ranged from £69 millions 
(Carrington & Dewhurst)to £78 millions (Tootal and Coats Paton). The 
largest firm excluded from the "oligopolistic arena" defined by Linda 
index was Illingworth Morris (U. K. textile turnover of £29 millions). 
The amalgamation of Carrington & Dewhurst and Viyella International at the 
end of 1970 reduced the oligopoly to four members with 55rper cent of 
sample turnover and made Carrington-Viyella the second largest firm with a 
textile turnover in 1971 of £142 millions, just under half that of 
Courtaulds. By 1973, Illingworth Morris had increased its U. K. textile 
sales to E82 millions and had become part of the` oligopoly group. The 
five firms concerned together controlledr55 per cent of turnöver in the 
sample of 58 textile companies with over f3 million annual sales; the 
degree of concentration had, therefore, changed negligibly since 1968. 
The representation of the large combines in each of the sub-sectors is 
shown in Table 20, which also names other competitors in the "oligopolistic 
arena" within each sub-sector: 
TABLE 20: OLIGOPOLY GROUPS 1973 
Gl5 igopolistic Arena 
om i ned share of No. of samole total Names of firms Sub-sector Firms (rounded) (share of sample) 
Wool 2 30 
52 
68 
Illingwo rth Morris 
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had rationalised production less than the big three appear to have beet better ahla to exploit this, 
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In the wool sector, although two firms were distinctly larger than their 
competitors it cannot be argued that there was ä duopoly in 1973 because 
they together had only 30 per cent of total sample turnover. The position 
of the two firms results largely from acquisitions', during'the period 
covered by the survey. These acquisitions included firms which , h'ad been, 
among the largest in the woollen textile industry. 
In cotton the situation is probably closest to oligopoly, in spite of the 
tendency since-1971 for the predominant position of the big three to 
decline somewhat. It may be recalled that I. C. I. -owns 64 per cent of the 
equity of Carrington-Viyella and eight per cent of Tootal (it has a nominee 
on the board of Tootal) and that Courtaulds (eight per cent) and Illingworth 
Morris (two per cent) have investments in;. Tootal, Part-acquisition by 
Courtaulds of Highams Ltd. will strengthen its share of the market, though 
its competitive advantage may be decreased by government surveillance. 
In hosiery and other knitting, the statistical approach is somewhat mis- 
leading because of market segmentation. Thus, whereas Courtaulds 
produces, warp-knitted. and weft-knitted fabrics, -knitted garments and 
hosiery, none of the other groups is represented, in all of these activities. 
Pretty Polly, for example, is almost entirely engaged in ladies' hosiery. 
3. Summary of Changes in Concentration of Turnover 1968-73 
Wool 
The growth of the two largest firms in the wool sub-sector has already 
been described. This development resulted from acquisitions within the 
larger enterprises in the 
, 
industry, so that the percentages . of . total 
turnover in the sample represented by the top 10,20 and 30 firms., 
changed little (see Table 21 below). The index., of entropy rose from, 
-151.7 to -146.8, a rise of 4.9 points, 
l indicating a greater increase 
in concentration in this sub-sector than in either of the other two. 
I This index is the only one of the series in the Tables of Concentration 
which permits comparison of absolute changes. 
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(b) Cotton 
The main change in concentration in the cotton sector was 
the merging 
of Viyella International and Carrington & Dewhurst at the end of 
1970. 
In 1970 (treating the two firms as separate), it is estimated that 
four firms accounted for 53 per cent of sample turnover; in 
1971 the 
three firms accounted for a slightly greater percentage. Apart from 
this single merger, the structure of the cotton sub-sector changed 
little between 1968 and 1973, mainly because of Government hostility 
towards further extension by I. C. I. and Courtaulds. (Had the Govern- 
ment not intervened Courtaulds might well have acquired English Calico 
and this might in turn have led I. C. I. to acquire more processing 
capacity. ) The index of entropy rose b3 only 4.4 points. 
(c) Hosiery & Knitting 
In the hosiery and knitting sub-sector overall changes in structure 
within the sample of the 60 largest firms were negligible with only 
one major merger: that between Carrington and Dewhurst and Viyella 
International. Concentration ratios changed very little and the entropy 
index fell by 2.8 points. 
-(d 
j Combination of sbb-sectors (Economic Activity Units) 
Among the firms with over f3 millions turnover in the three sub-sectors 
combined a slight fall in concentration is observed. This results merely 
from the entry into the sample of additional firms attaining £3 m. turnover. 
While this change is primarily of technical interest, it emphasises the 
absence during the survey period of any further growth of large textile 
groups established in the five years before 1968. 
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TABLE 21: CHANGES IN CONCENTRATION WITHIN SNWLES 1968-73 
Cöricentration Ratios 11,16ol Cotton Knittinq Combined- 
Four firms 1968, 35.9 56.2 52.9 49.8 
1973 41.6 56.0 53.3 51.9 
Ten Firms 1968 60.0 72.8 72.6 70.4 
1973 60.5 75.5 72.4 67.3 
Twenty Firms 1968 75.4 86.5 84.0 a3.4 
1973 76.8 88.9 82.9 80.6 
Entropy Index 
Change 1968-73 +4.9 +4.4 -2.8 -4,3 
D. CONCENTRATION OF OTHER FINANCIAL VARIABLES 1968-73 
1. Net Profits and Net Results (Economic Activity Us its) 
This part of the study was restricted by. the existence in the industry of 
overseas and/or non-textile interests which are consolidated in the accounts 
of major textile companies. Comparison of net profit after interest and 
before tax with turnover for activity units is of doubtful validity, for the 
following reason. s: 
(i) Turnover includes the value of purchased materials. A very 
efficient single-process firm may make a lower margin on sales 
than a less efficient vertically integrated firm. 
(ii) Profits before interest may be more relevant, since the comparison 
with sales would then be less distorted by variations in the capital, 
structure of the firms concerned. 
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(iii) For economic activity units, transfer pricifl^ 
based on'"group net, 
benefit" may be reflected in misleading profit 
figures for any 
part of the vertical process. . 
For example attention has been 
drawn by other'researchers to low profit margins obtained 
by 
Courtaulds in its spinning and weaving activities' 
(8) during 
the recession of 1970 but this policy 
has to be considered in 
relation to capacity utilisation in the company's 
fibre producing 
divisions. 
(iv) The published data often reflect exceptional 
items or changes 
in accounting policy for which detailed Adjustments 
are 
impossible in a large study of this kind. (Nearly 
2,000 annual 
company reports have been examined). L 
(v) The depreciation estimates used in the calculation of net profit 
figures published by companies are based on historic cost of 
assets. In an inflationary period, comparison of net profit 
figures car, be severely distorted by slight differences in the 
ages of fixed assets of different companies. 
(vi) In some cases the research team has had to make its own estimates. -- 
of profits derived by companies from particular activities or to 
üse estimates of previous analyst's'-. Such estimates' must be 
regarded, at best, as approximate. 
Concentration of net results has"been examined in two wiys: 
(a) application of the statistical framework of the Commission to 
positive values (net profits), these being ranked independently 
of turnover, so that a four-firm concentration ratio (for example) 
would be the proportion of the total of all net profits in the 
sub-se: tor accounted for by the four firms with the largest 
profits; 
ty, 
(b) calculation of the shares of total net results (profits and losses 
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included) in the sub-sector achieved by specified numbers of 
"largest firms" ranked in order of sales turnover. 
Approach (a) gives greater opportunity for more advanced statistical 
analysis but resulting coefficients cannot be validly compared with 
those for turnover if the ranking of the two variables is substantially 
different. Differences in ranking were found to be too great to justify 
general comparison of the two sets of results though partial comparison 
was possible (see below) 
1. 
1 
Ranking was checked by computation of product-moment correlation 
coefficients (rZog`T zcf9 7r 
) and by rank correlation coefficients. 
The former were preferred because of the effects on ranking of 
minor differences between approximate estimates, which did not 
distort the correlation ietween logarithms of turnover (T) and 
profits (7r). The resulting coefficients are shown at the end 
of Appendix D. Firms experiencing a loss were excluded from 
the calculation. 
66 
(a) Concentration indices for Net Profits (EAU) 
The details contained in the Tables of Concentration are summarised 
in Table 22. The entropy index is again quoted so that absolute 
changes may be compared. 
TABLE 22 : CONCENTRATION OF NET PROFITS (EAU) 1968-73 
Wool 





Average profits as % of sales 
Cotton 





Average profits as % of sales 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
41 46 36 35 42 45 
60 60 61 61 66 66 
81 85 84 82 81 82 
0.56 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 
-152 -147 -149 "149 -146 -147 
5.2 3.9 2.7 3.4 6.4 7.0 
67 57 55 59 58 58 
82 77 78 84 83 81 
92 91 92 96 94 93 
0.76 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.72 
-115 -124 -122 -115 -118 -120 
5.6 4.8 4.4 4.2 5.3 6.4 
Hosiery and Knitting 
C. R. for 4 firms (%) 53 58 63 60 56 57 
10 75 76 77 75 71 73 
20 87 88 88 87 85 86 
Gini Coefficieit 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.71 
Entropy index -130 -124 -117 -123 -128 -127 
Average profits as % of sales 7.0 5.9 5.3 6.3 6.8 7.6 
Combined sub-sectors 





Average profits as % of sales 
48 45 53 50 44 45 
74 68 69 68 67 69 
86 83 84 84 82 83 
0.65 G. 63 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.66 
-131 -137 -131 -134 -139 -139 
6.2 5.1 3.9 4.9 6.6 (7'6 
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One of the more remarkable aspects of the concentration of profits in 
the cotton and wool sub-sectors is that during the recession years of 
1969 and 1970, when average margins on sales fell sharply, profits 
became less concentrated. Because of the greater strength of large 
firms in relation to the market, an opposite tendency might be expected 
and can be seen to have occurred in the hosiery sub-sector. The reasons 
for this are discussed at greater length in Section V. They mainly 
reflect the pricing policies of certain of the larger vertically 
integrated companies which, because of the predominance of their 
fixed costs, were induced by the market into "weak selling". 
It is evident from the table that profits were more concentrated in the 
cotton and knitting sub-sectors than in wool and this is consistent 
with the greater concentration of turnover in these two sectors. 
(b) Relationship between Net Results and Turnover 
Table 23 shows the results (net profits + net losses) of firms 
ranked in order of turnover as percentages of the total sum of net 
vrofits and losses in each sub-sector. 
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TABLE 23 : PERCENTAGES OF SAfPLE TURNOVER AND NET RESULTS HELD 
BY 































1969 Top 5 47 47 59 57 58 62 56 47 65 10 62 63 73 72 73 75 68 
1970 Top 5 44 35 57 57 58 71 54 42 62 10 61 62 69 69 72 73 66 
1971 Top 5 46 32 61 60 60 62 58 48 
10 61 50 77 82 73 73 69 64 
1972 Top 5 47 47 61 60 58 56 57 47 
10 61 60 76 81 72 68 68 65 
1973 Top 5 46 49 60 61 58 57 56 54 
10 61 60 76 79 71 68 67 66 
This table shows that the comparative profitability' of larger firms varied 
considerably between sub-sectors and over time. In wool the larger 
companies obtained shares of industry profits fairly close to their 
shares of turnover with the excepticn of the largest groups in 1970 and 
1971, which (as was remarked earlier) reduced profit margins during 
a period of trade recession. 
In cotton before the 1969-71 recession the very largest firms achieved 
a disproportionate share of profits and the effect of the recession was 
to reduce this share to approximate equality with their share of turn- 
over. In the recovery some evidence of greater profitability is again 
indicated and this is believed (on the basis of discussions within the 
industry) to reflect increased margins. 
In knitting, the effect of recession was to give a greater share of 
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the reduced profits to the five largest firms in terms of turnover: 
this was particularly pronounced in 1970. At other times, shares of 
trading results and turnover were approximately equal. 
When combined textile processing interests are considered, the overall 
share of profits achieved by the largest firms was consistently below 
their share of turnover. Reasons for this lower profitability are 
examined in Section VI. 
The great variations between profit margins between firms can lead 
to misleading conclusions when groups of five are considered. To 
avoid all problems of grouping a regression analysis was carried 
out on individual company data to test whether profit margins varied 
with sales turnover. In no sub sector and in no year did any signi- 
ficant correlation exist: this means that the features observed in 
Table 22 were the result of performance by individual companies. 
Over the wh,. 'be sample profit margins were not influenced by size of 
turnover. This is not surprising in view of the comments on page 63 
and is consistent with the findings of most other research studies. 
(c) Turnover and Profits in Oligopoly Groups 
The Linda index can be used to identify groups of firms whose shares 
of profits are so high in relation to the rest of the samples that 
they may be defined as a major profit group analogous to an oligopoly. 
If profits were closely related to tunnover as a constant or increasing 
function, then this select group of profit-makers would also be the 
oligopolists. 
The oligopoly and major profit groups were found to coincide only in 
the case of the cotton sub-sector in 1968 and 1969. In 1968, the 
same four firms accounted for 56 per cent of sample turnover and 67 
per cent of profits; in 1969 the corresponding proportions were 55 
and 57 per cent. For the four, the Linda index was greater for 
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turnover than for profits indicating less inequality of profits than 
of turnover. The rankings of the four firms differed for the 
two 
variables. (ABCD for turnover in 1968; BCDA for profits. ) 
In all other instances, the oligopoly groups defined by the 
application of Linda coefficients to turnover did not coincide with 
distinct profit groups. Table 24 shows the shares of total net 
results (profits - losses) in each sub-sector and in textile processing 
as a whole annually from 1968 to 1973: 
TABLE 24: SHARES OF TURNOVER AND PROFITS (NET RESULTS) OBTAINED BY 
OLIGOPOLY GROUPS 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Wool 
Number of f! ^ns 6 12 14 58 22 
% share of sample tu"nover 48 *** 31 30 
% share of sample net results 49 *** 26 25 
Cotton 
Number of firms 
% share of sample turnover 
% share of sample net results 
Hosiery & Knitting 
Number of firms 
% share of sample turnover 
% share of sample net results 
Combination of sub-sectors 
Number of firms 
% share of sample turnover 
% share of sample net results 
4 4 4 2 3 16 
56 55 53 43 51 
68 5i 53 27 48 
78 59 58 60 8 
67 70 *** 63 
67 70 *** 69 
5 5 5 4 5 5 
57 56 54 55 57 56 
55 47 42 45 47 54 
i 
No "oligopoly" can be said to exist when Nm > 10 
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Table 24-confirms that oligopoly groups in textile processing as a 
whole tended to account forlower proportions of profits than of sales 
and that this difference was more pronounced during the recession 
period than during the comparative boom years of 1968 and 1973. In 
hosiery, the profits of oligopoly groups represented a similar share 
of the sample turnover to that of total turnover. In the wool sub- 
sector the two largest firms in 1972 and 1973 appear to have operated 
with lower profit margins than the rest of the sample. 
2. Enterprise Analysis 
The firms included in the enterprise tables had at least £3 millions 
turnover in the three sub-sectors concerned in the U. K. and world- 
wide interests in these sub-sectors accounted for at least 50 per 
cent of total turnover from all activities. Figures used in the analysis 
were based on total (not just textile) interests and this permitted 
the use of consolidated accounts and consequent avoidance of distortions 
resulting from transfer pricing etc. Distortions resulting from inflation 
remain; these were discussed on page 63. 
One of the least satisfactory aspects of the enterprise analysis is 
the exclusion of Courtaulds, the U. K. 's largest textile concern on 
the grounds that fibre-production and non-textile interests account 
for over 50 per cent of turnover. It should be re-emphasised that 
"shares of the sample totals" do not represent shares of textile 
markets but, in the case of the enterprise tables, indicate relative 
strengths of major companies engaged predominantly in the three sub- 
sectors. 
(a) Turnover 
The four largest firms in 1968 were Coats-Paton, English Calico, 
Carrington and Dewhurst and Viyella International. They represented 
an oligopoly group (defined by the Linda index) and together obtained 
56 per cent of total turnover of the 49 firms. Following the merger 
into Carrington-Viyella in 1971, the oligopoly consisted of three 
firms and in 1973 their share of sample turnover had fallen to 50 
per cent. 
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Over the six-year period, the overall degree of concentration of 
turnover among the sample of enterprises changed little. 
(b) Other variables 
The overall degree of concentration of other variables also remained 
fairly steady over the six years. Net profits, cash flow and net cash 
flow showed a slight increase in concentration in 1970, during the 
recession period but *this was fairly marginal. Over the whole period, 
these variables remained more concentrated than turnover. 
Gross investment became somewhat more concentrated than turnover 
throughout the period and net assets were more concentrated than 
equity. This may reflect the greater unportance of loan capital in the 
larger companies with greater borrowing potential. 
The least concentrated variable is exports, il, contrast to the findings 
of the paper study. The lor, g-established tracition of exporting in 
the textile industry continues to be reflected in overseas sales by 
smaller as well as large companies. 
(c) Other variables in relation to size of turnover 
The following table shows the shares of turnover and other variables 
accounted for by the "oligopoly group" and by the ten largest firms 
(in terms of sales turnover) in 1968,1970 and 1973: 
TABLE 25 : SHARES OF TURNOVER AND OTHER VARIABLES OF "OLIGOPOLY" GROUPS 
AND TEN LARGEST FIRMS (IN TERMS OF TURNOVER) 
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This table shows that in 1968 the enterprises with the largest turn- 
over accounted for an even greater percentage of all other variables, 
apart from exports. This demonstrates again the importance of exports 
to medium-size firms, without the branded nome-market products and 
overseas subsidiaries of the largest groups. This was especially in the 
woollen industry. In 1970, a recession year, the concentration of 
profits, cash flow and net cash flow in the hands of the largest 
enterprises decreased (a result consistent with the earlier analysis 
of activity units) but they were responsible for a greater proportion 
of capital investment. By 1973 this dominance of capital expenditure 
by the largest groups had again receded. 
(d) Size and Profitability 
As in the paper study, no significant correlations were found to exist 
between size of enterprise and rate of profit. The following regression 
equations were cdnputed; in no case did the significance level of the 
regression coefficient approach even 10 per cent: - 
Turnover 
v Net assets 
(to check whether larger firms'achieved 
Net assets better utilisation of capital). 





Capital expenditure v Cash Flow 
Cash Flow 
The absence of significant correlation is consistent with a number 
of other studies in this field. The subject is further discussed in 
the final section (section VI) but fuller understanding of reasons 
why significant relationships of this kind are seldom found must 
await the conclusions of more detailed empirical research. 
_(e) 
Ranking according to different variables 
One of the conditions necessary for more detailed analysis of the 
Linda indices is that the ranking of companies should be the same (or 
almost the same) for each of the variables. This was checked by rank 
correlation coefficients; the matrices for 1968 and 1973 are shown 
in Appendix D. Except an expected close correlation between rankings 
of net profits and cash flow the coefficients are too far from unity 





PRODUCT MARKET ANALYSIS 
A. SPECIALISATION 
Specialisation in the textile industries can be based either on end use 
(e. g. tyre cord, ladies' hosiery, hand-knitting yarns) or on technical 
distinctions (e. g. spinning of coarse yarns, weaving of coloured fabrics, 
warp-knitting). Product markets cannot be defined exclusively on either 
one of these criteria. 
1. Degree of specialisation within each sub-sector 
Traditionally the three sub-sectors were separated by geographical as 
well as product boundaries. The cotton industry was concentrated in 
Lancashire and trading was normally via the Manchester Exchange, where 
cloths produced by a large number of small companies was purchased by 
an equally large number of merchant converters, for home or export 
sale. The woollen and worsted industry was similarly focussed upon 
Bradford and the knitting industries on Leicester and Nottingham. 
Although the system of selling has now changed and the boundaries 
between products have been eroded by the widespread adoption of man- 
made fibres, the orientation of most of the medium-size and smaller 
firms remains within the old geographical limits. Trade associations, 
employers' federations, trade unions and technical ; nstitutions remain 
delineated by the cotton, woollen and worsted and hosiery and knitwear 
"industries". 
The detailed statistical analysis in Section IV covered 150 companies in 
1973 - these included the 60 largest in wool and in knitting and the 47 
largest in cotton. Only two of the 150 companies were represented in 
the sample of largest activity units in every sub-sector (Courtaulds and 
Coats Paton); 13 were among the largest firms in two of the sub-sectors. 
Of the remaining'135 companies, represented among largest activity units 
in only one sub-sector; 30 had activities with less than fl million 
turnover in either or both of the other two. 
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2. Specialisation among largest groups 
Three enterprises - Courtaulds, Carrington-Viyella and Tootal supply many 
end-uses, having integrated forward to the final product. The structure 
of Courtaulds is such that its share of production diminishes at successive 
stages closer to the final market (greatest in spinning, less in weaving 
and knitting and least in finishing and making-up). There are some end 
products in which it is the market-leaner (ladies' hosiery) and others 
in which its representation is negligible (sewing thread and tyre 
fabric). Tootal's structure is the inverse of that of Courtaulds: 
capacity in finishing and mirchanting exceeds that in weaving and knitting 
which in turn use more yarn than is produced by the group's spinning mills. 
As a result of its merchanting activities, Tootal is able to advertise 
its ability to supply almost all categories of textile products (the few 
exceptions include tyre fabric and hose). Much of the cloth concerned is 
purchased outside the group. Carrington-Viyella is orientated towards a 
less wide range of final products but produces most of what it sells. 
The other enterprises in the textile industyic"s tend to be more specialised 
and some firms with annual turnover of over 115 million concentrate on 
only one or two products (Pretty Polly on ladies' hosiery, Sir James Hill 
on wool-combing, 'Dunlop Textiles and John Bright Group on tyre fabrics). 
3. The role of small firms 
One of the unexpected findings of a series of discussions with smaller 
firms was diversity of end-uses for which output was destined. The basis 
of specialisation in euch undertakings is technical and the market 'advant- 
age is ability to supply small quantities. Variety remains important and 
can be reconciled with the economic advantages of long runs on high-draft 
spinning frames and automatic looms through inter-company trading which 
is important in this, highly entrepreneurial, part of the textile industry. 
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B. ANALYSIS BY PRODUCTION PROCESS - INTERMEDIATE PRODUCTS 
1. Preparation of Material for Worsted Spinning. 
One of the most capital-intensive processes in the wool sub-sector 
is the production of "tops" of wool which has been sorted, scoured 
and combed for worsted spinning. Man-made fibres have been intro- 
duced to this process: they are usually supplied in filament or 
tow (continuous band) and are then shredded or stretch broken for 
subsequent combing. Net output per employee in this activity in 
1968 was more than double that for the woollen sub-sector as a whole. 
In 1973,24 enterprises were known by the Business Statistics Office 
to be engaged in the production of combed tops of wool and only six 
to be engaged in the similar processing of man-made fibres. Total 
sales of tops of wool, other animal hair and man-made fibres amounted 
to £112 uni 11' c, ns in 1973; exports were worth £49 millions and imports 
only £5 millions. 
Top-making is undertaken partly by large specialist firms and partly 
by worsted spinners. In recent years one of the largest woolcombing 
concerns (Woolcombers Ltd. ) was gradually ; cquired by the large 
woollen and worsted combine Illingworth Morris Ltd. , 
About 35 per cent of the total weight of tops produced in 1973 
consisted of mean-made fibres and Courtaulds has built up its own 
worsted spinning division which accounted for over one-third of all 
man-made fibre tops produced in 1973.. I. C. I. does not appear to have 
any major direct investment in this activity. 
2. Woollen yarn spinning 
The spinning of yarn from carded wool remains a highly fragmented 
sector, though there are elements of concentration within it. Table 
17 showed that the share of total production achieved by the five 
largest firms increased from 26 per cent in 1963 to 34 per cent in 
1968. This ratio conceals the existence of concentration occurring 
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through vertical integration by large carpet producers. The proportion 
of woollen yarn going to carpet manufacturers rose from 40 per cent 
in 1968 
to nearly 50 per cent in 1974. Most of the remainder went into weaving 
or was exported. Exports of woollen yarn, mainly to other E. E. C. or 
western European countries, amounted to 116 millions in 1973, about 11 
per cent of total sales. Imports were negligible. 
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3. Worsted yarn spinning 
Over 80 firms were engaged in worsted spinning in 1973 but, because of 
the economies gained by long production runs, there is considerable 
specialisation. Yarns for machine-knitting took 38 per cent of output 
in 1969 and by 1973 and 1974 this had risen to 48 per cent; the pro- 
portion of output sold as hand-knitting wool remained constant at about 
16 per cent. (The structure of the market for hand-knitting wools is 
discussed in the next sub-section of this report, B. 1). Total exports of 
worsted yarn in 1973 amounted to about £20 millions; 65 per cent of 
which was hand-knitting yarn. Imports were less than half this amount. 
Total sales by U. K. producers were about 1170 millions. (6) 
4. Spinning of cotton and man-made fibres 
This is another activity in which long production runs are required. 
Vertically integrated groups now control a dominant proportion of 
spinning capacity and the Business Statistics Office data indicate 
that only 38 firms with over 25 employees spun single cotton yarn 
in the U. K. in 1973 compared with 51 in 1963. Imposts of yarn have 
recently risen as certain weaving and knitting concerns have been 
able to buy yarn more cheaply overseas. Allegations have been made 
about the "dumping" of yarns, subsidisation by foreign governments 
eager to obtain foreign exchange and the effects of "dumping" by 
fibre producers of the U. S. A. and western Europe (including the 
U. K. ) which has led to polyester/cotton mixed yards entering the 
U. K. "at less than their fibre content would cost here". Some 
weaving conc^rns attributed yarn imports to a desire for independence 
from reliance on U. K. spinning subsidiaries of their major competitors. 
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The spinning of coarser yarns from cotton and man-made fibres has been 
more adversely affected by fabric imports than that of finer yarns. This 
is because cheaper more "basic" fabrics tend to use coarser yarns. On 
the other hand, spinners of fine yarns have been affected by the adoption 
of synthetic filament and this effect has been more severe (many mills in 
the former mule-spinning area around Bolton have been closed in the last 
few years). Output and consumption of spun yarns in 1968,1973 and 1974 
were as follows: - 
1968 1973 1974 
Production (000 tonnes) 240 208 189 
Exports 9 16 14 
Imports 17 31 53 
U. K. domestic use 248 223 228 
(Note: Figures include yarns of cotton, cotton waste or man-made fibres 
spun on the cotton system. ) 
Concentration in cotton etc. spinning increased greatly during the period 
1963-8, when the five-firm concentration ratio increased from 37 to over 
50 per cent. Textile Council estimates for 1968 (3) show Courtaulds with 
30 per cent of output, Carrington-Viyella (then two separate firms) with 
nine per cent and English Calico (Tootal) with eight per cent. More 
recent estimates are not available but these proportions are believed 
to have increased slightly. 
The continued existence of the small firm in spinning appears, from 
discussions with such firms, to be due to the ability to exploit the 
advantages of smallness. Technical economies require long production 
runs and such firms normally specialise on urgent commission work or 
specialist orders. The ability of the proprietor or single manager to 
consider both production and marketing factors is reflected in price 
discrimination (recovery of the costs of urgent orders from the urgent 
customer and disposal of the balance of production on a marginal-cost, 
basis) and in finely judged inventory policies. 
80 
5. ., Warp-knittin 
In 1973 423 million m2 of fabrics warp-knitted from synthetic 
filament 
yarn were sold by U. K. producers, 383 million m to 
the home market. 
Imports were negligible. Of this volume, about 42 per cent was 
used 
in women's dresses and lingerie, about 20 per cent in other apparel 
and 31 in household textiles. Parts of this market, for example 
men's shirts and sheets have dwindled since 1973 because of competition 
from woven polyester/cotton mixtures. To this fashion trend has 
been added an increase in imports of warp-knitted synthetic-fibre 
garments. The slower growth and then the decline of U. K. demand 
for warp-knitted fabrics followed a boom in the late 1960's and has 
left this section of the industry with considerable excess capacity. 
Prices are low and the main pressure for lower prices has come from 
vertically integrated fibre producers eager to contribute to heavy 
fixed expenses not only in the capital-intepsive warp-knitting section 
but also in their fibre-manufacturing facilities. 
Of the 36 firms engaged in warp-knitting in I N3, by far the largest 
were subsidiaries of Courtaulds and Carrington-Viyella. In 1968 
Courtaulds' share of warp-knitting output was estimated (3) at 35 per 
cent and this has probably increased; the combined share of Viyella 
International and Carrington and Dewhurst was 25 per cent but in more 
recent years Carrington-Viyella has rationalised its warp-knitting 
capacity and its current share of the market may be slightly lower. 
Discussions within the industry lead the author to believe that dominance 
by Courtaulds and I. C. I. (via Carrington-Viyella) is likely to increase 
and that prices will be such as to discourage new entrants and further 
growth of imports. 
C. ANALYSIS OF SELECTED END USES 
The variety of end uses of textile products make it necessary to confine 
this analysis to a number of examples which demonstrate the different 
competitive conditions. These are hand-knitting wool, coloured woven 
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woollen dress fabrics, sewing thread, shirts, bedding and ladies' hosiery. 
Among aspects examined are the degree of vertical integration to the con- 
sumer product, the importance of branded and unbranded items and the 
impact of foreign trade. 
An attempt has been made in a number of cases to assess the shares of 
the market obtained by individual companies. This measurement is 
complicated (i) by the significant proportion of sales of many textile 
products achieved by major retail groups selling under their own brand 
labels and (ii) by the practice on the part of some textile firms of 
buying intermediate or even finished products from other U. K. companies 
or from overseas. 
1. Hand-knitting yarn 
This product has declined in the last few years with increasing efficiency 
and lower costs in the knitwear industry. In 1969 U. K. sales of hand- 
knitting yarn amounted to 16.3 million kg. and by 1974 had fallen to 
13.1 million kg. This remains a large market with consumer sales value 
of about E55 millions. 
Exports of hand-knitting yarns are about ten per cent of industry sales; 
imports are negligible. About 50 per cent of the fibre content of this 
yarn is now man-made fibre, especially acrylic and nylon, I. C. I. and 
Courtauids direct advertising of such fibres to the hand-knitting 
consumer but are not themselves engaged in the production of hand-knitting 
yarns. Competitive advertising by the International Wool Secretariat 
emphasises the advantages of the natural fibre and a 1972 market research 
survey (12) reported some "basic preference" for wool. 
Just under half of total sales of hand-knitting yarns are via specialist 
wool shops. Some of these (e. g. Betimans and Scotch Wool Shops) are 
owned by the spinning companies (in that case Coats Paton). Variety of 
yarns on offer is a major competitive strategy by such shops and this 
means low retail stocks of any one product line. Conversely, the 
manufacturer. is expected to hold large stocks as retail outlets advertise 
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their ability to obtain yarn quickly. One solution to the inventory 
problem, convenient to all parties, is the arrangement whereby the 
retailers "lay by" wool for the customers to purchase while they are 
knitting a garment. Provided delivery by the manufacturer is reliable, 
this need not tie up much of the retailer's stock. Since 1969 there 
has been some decline in the number of specialist wool shops and Coats 
Paton have closed some of their retail outlets. The major alternatives 
are department stores and chain stores; the latter sell "wool" under 
their own brand labels and usually concentrate on a narrow range with 
more rapid stock-turnover. 
the 1972 Mintel research survey (14) showed that 15 companies accounted 
for 86 per cent of total sales and in 1973 some of these were mergfd 
through acquisitions. The following table uses Mintel's estimates of 
market shares: - 
per cent 
Coats-Paton (including Bellmans) 33 
Sirdar (including Hayfields, acquired 1973) 16 
Robert Glew Ltd. (including Emu, acquired 1973) 10 
Lister Brothers 5 
Other firms 36 
100 
As with many other textile products, brands of hand-knitting yarns are not 
heavily advertised by manufacturers and brand-awareness appears to be low. 
Advertising was estimated by Mintel to represent only about one per cent 
of sales (this figure does not include advertising by fibre manufacturers 
or the I. W. S. ) 
2. Coloured woven woollen tweeds 
This specialisation is concerned mainly with heavier fabrics woven 
from dyed yarn and used for men's jackets and overcoats and women's 
coats, suits and skirts. This is traditionally a fairly fragmented 
sector and independent producers remain numerous. Vertically 
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integrated woollen mills produce most of this cloth, encompassing 
spinning, yarn dyeing, weaving and finishing but the dyeing and finishing 
processes are sub-contracted by some of the smaller firms to the 
larger enterprises possessing those facilities. 
The market for this kind of fabric has contracted with the fashion 
trend towards lighter clothing, expecially among men. The trade in 
tweeds has also been adversely affected by imports of finished garments 
by retailers and more recently of fabrics, especially from Italy. 
The fabric manufacturers sell their product to the clothing producers: 
vertical integration to making-up does not occur in this specialist 
sector. "Auch of the output of the clothiers is then sold by larger 
retail groups (men's and women's clothing is sold predominantly through 
multiple retail outlets: chains of clothing shops and of department 
stores). Overseas sales are made via agents to clothing manufacturers, 
mainly to Europe and North America. Two stages removed from the final 
consumer, tweed manufacturers have always bec-i subject to wide 
variations in orders resulting from inventory a: ljustments on the 
part of customers. It was alleged in discussions that these variations 
have been aggravated by the practice of certain large retailing 
groups of buying the "base load" of some of their product lines overseas 
and using U. K. s'ippliers as a "tap" to meet the fluctuating element 
of demand. The adverse trading conditions now prevalent in the industry 
(1975) have led to greater competition for business, partly on price 
but also (in this essentially fashion-influenced trade) on cloth 
design and quality. 
This specialisation is an example of several in the textile industry 
where growth beyond a certain size might reduce flexibility and ability 
to respond to different trading conditions and opportunities. Pro- 
duction economies, beyond a certain scale are not great and, because 
of the importance of variety, design and price, close links between 
production and marketing are necessary. In most cases these links 
are through one or twu men at the head of the firm. The resulting 
fragmented structure' of the manufacturing sector weakens its position 
in relation to that of its customers and, in this case, the ultimate 
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large buyers. The response of the manufacturers to current trends 
new designs, improvements in production methods etc. - 
is likely to 
prevent an accelerating flow of imports. Discussions with retailers 
suggested that the difference in prices between imported and 
home- 
produced clothing was becoming too small to justify the sacrifice 
of easy communication with fabric designers and producers, of great 
importance in the fashion trades. 
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s, Sewing thread 
This has for many years been one of the most concentrated sections 
of the cotton industry dominated by two companies, J. P. Coats (now 
part of Coats-Paton) and English Sewing Cotton (now part of Tootal). 
Although official statistics ( 6) show that, 22 firms were engaged 
in the production of finished cotton thread for sewing and 
embroidery and 15 firms in the production of man-made fibre thread, 
in 1968, the five-firm concentration ratio was 88 per cent and the 
largest producers now share approximately equally about 75 per cent of 
total production. 
The demand for sewing thread consists of industrial demand, mainly of 
spun synthetic fibres and of domestic purchases in which adherence to 
cotton has continued despite manufacturers' attempts to develop sales 
of synthetics with the more stable raw material price. J. P. Coats' 
share of each market is estimated, from a variety of sources including 
references (6) and (8) and company accounts, to be about 38 per cent. 
Tootal is stronger in the domestic thread market with about 50 per 
cent of sales but in the industrial market its share is closer to 
25 per cent. 
Earlier in this century, common marketing arrangements for thread on 
a world-wide basis were established and were dominated by Coats. Only 
by virtue of its size was English Sewing Cotton able to break away 
fron, this arrangement. Distributive links and branding are strong and, 
although profit margins are high, entry into this specialisation is 
not easy. 
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Imports of sewing thread for retail sale are negligible (200 tonnes 
in 1973) and exports (1,100 tonnes) represent only about 15 per cent 
of output. In part, this absence of trade is due to the international 
operations of Coats-Paton and to a lesser extent Tootal. These companies 
are described in greater detail in Appendix F. 
The main reasons for dominance of the market by the two firms appear 
to be: 
(a) economies of scale in production, but more important 
(b) cumulative effects of long periods of leadership'in marketing. 
4. Men's and boy's shirts 
Comprehensive data on sales of cotton and man-made fibre shirts are 
available only from 1971. The following table shows U. K. production, 
exports and imports in 1972 and 1973: - 
1972 1973 
Millions £milIIons Millions £millions 
Made-up from woven cloth 
U. K. manufacturers 29.2 45.3 31.7 54.4 
Exports 2.4 3.0 2.5 3.2 
Imports 24.1 15.1 27.9 21.8 
Estimated U. K. market 50.9 57.4 57.1 73.0 
Knitted or made-up from knitted fabric 
U. K. Manufacturers 16.3 18.6 13.4 17.7 
Exports 2.1 2.3 1.4 1.8 
Imports 34.2 11.8 31.5 12.5 
Estimated U. K. market 48.4 28.1 43.5 28.4 
Sources: Business Monitor and Overseas Trade Accounts. 
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The data show that imports accounted for nearly 59 per, cent of all 
shirts sold (by volume) in both 1972 and 1973. The volume 
figures 
are distorted by the inclusion of boys' knitted shirts and other 
low- 
value shirts in which imports predominate. In value terms the 
U. K. 
share of the domestic market was (after the addition of U. K. importers' 
margins) between 65 and 70 per cent. 
The share of the market taken by knitted shirts has decreased considerably 
in recent years. In 1971 shirts knitted in the piece or made-up from 
knitted fabric accounted for 42 per cent of U. K. manufacturers' volume 
and 58 per cent of imports; by 1974 these percentages had fallen to 
25 and 45. 
Many of the major suppliers of shirts were acquired by textile manu- 
facturing groups during the period of vertical integration between 
1963 and 19b8. The largest producer is now probably Carrington- 
Viyella with a wide range of cotton, cotton/wool and polyester/ 
cotton woven shirts as well as warp-knitted nylon shirts. This 
company covers the complete range of the market from the least 
expensive to the "quality" end of the market selling under 
different brand-names associated with subsidiaries acquired by 
Viyella International and Carrington & Deuhurst during the 1960's. 
Tootal is also strongly represented in this market, with a variety 
of woven and knitted shirts but with a greater emphasis on the 
more expensive part of the market. 
Certain of the shirt manufacturers, although operating their own U. K. 
spinning and weaving activities, import some of their shirts. These 
imports occur mainly when prices quoted by foreign producers are below 
marginal costs of production in the United Kingdom. This discrepancy 
occurs for a number of reasons, including the "dumping" of synthetic 
and natural fibres in some oriental markets as well as lower wage 
rates and (in the view of some observers) greater efficiency on the 
part of overseas producers. For this reason, U. K. brand names do not 
always imply production within the United Kingdom. 
Another factor which hinders estimation of market shares by manufacturing 
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units is the significant role in this market of multiple retailers,. handling 
about 30 per cent of shirts sold in 1972 (12). Major producers. of shirts 
supply these customers with shirts usually with less variety of design 
or range of sizes and colours. This trade is very price-competitive: 
both the large retailers and their ultimate customers tending to be 
price-conscious. The relative importance of branded and unbranded 
shirts and the possible effects on the branded market of supply of 
quality shirts at low price to major retailers are constantly studied 
by the firms concerned. 
From a market survey in 1972 (12) the major firms in the shirt market 
emerged as follows: - 
per cent 
Marks and Spencer 15 
Other "own label" retailers 15 
Van-Heusen (Carrington-Viyella) 7 
Rael Brook (Tootal) 5 
Buckingham Al lliam Baird) 4 
Others 54 
This information is slightly misleading because" others" include smaller 
subsidiaries of Carrington-Viyella and Tootal and because the major 
firms all supply the "own label" retailers. The shirt-making industry 
remins highly fragmented but Carrington--'liyella probably achieve 
between 12 and 15 per cent of market sales (12) and Carrington-Viyella, 
Tootal, Courtaulds and Baird probably together account for between 30 
and 35 per cent of the market. 
Despite the importance of branding for some of the major companies, 
advertising is low in relation to sales - only 0.2 per cent in 1971. 
This supports the view put forward by certain retailers during our 
survey that shirts were becoming a "commodity item". 
5. Sheets and bedding 
This is another product group which was affected by the changes in 
the structure of the textile industry in the 1960's. In that period 
bt$ 
warp-knitted synthetic fabrics took an increasing share of this 
market and some of the major groups (especially Carrington & Dewhurst 
and Courtaulds) extended considerably their warp-knitting capacity. 
The development, initially by Carrington-Viyella, of mixed polyester/ 
cotton yarns and their use in woven sheets reversed the trend towards 
warp-knitted filament, because the new fabrics combined the 
comfortable feel of staple fibre with non-iron properties. The 
total output of sheets rose from 16.2 millions in 1972 to 21.2 millions 
in 1973 and 21.5 millions in 1974 but output of warp-knitted sheeting 
in 1974 was over 20 per cent below the 1972 level. 
The market lead obtained by branded sheets developed by Carrington- 
Viyella, Tootal and a number of smaller specialist firms is threatened 
by imports. Imports of made-up woven sheets rose by only 9 per cent 
between 1972 and 1974 but imports of polyester/cotton fabric rose 
by 28 per cent in the same period. One of the factors appears to be 
the lower overseas price of polyester fib'-s. The importance of 
branding in bed linen is probably not great. the demand for "seconds" 
(imperfect fabrics) has always been substantial at sheeting mills. 
This means that continued growth of sales of this product can be 
achieved only by cost reductions reflected in lower prices. 
The partial takeover by Courtaulds of Highams, one of the larger 
of the producers of bedding after Carrington-Viyella and Tootal may 
be regarded as a further example of vertical integration as a means 
of securing an outlet for synthetic fibre. (Courtaulds is developing 
its polyester production. ) This specialisation provides an archetype 
of the struggle for survival of the Lancashire textile industry and 
of the complex role in that struggle of the main fibre producers. 
6. Women's hose (stockings and tights) 
The structure of this activity has been changing rapidly with develop- 
ments in technology. In 1963 there were 157 enterprises engaged in 
the production of women's hose; in 1973,54. Changes which have 
taken place in design and technology include the moves to seamless 
stockings and, with the introduction of stretch nylon. to simple 




the sewing together of the nylon tubes into "tights". A further 
reduction in production costs is likely to result from the gradual 
adoption of a technique of producing tights in one piece, to eliminate 
the current practice of sewing the two tubular stockings together. 
A number of factors have tended to reduce profit margins: - 
(a) Intense competition between major companies, including subsidiaries 
of Cour-taulds which now undertake about 35 per cent of U. K. pro- 
duction. (The second largest firm, Pretty Polly, a member of 
the Thomas Tilling group, accounts ir about 25 per cent). 
(b) A tendency for tights to be sold as a "commodity item". Four 
chain stores (Marks and Spencer, British Home Stores, Littlewoods 
and Woolworth) accounted for 25 per cent of sales in 1974, multiple 
food shops and co-operatives another. 20 per cent and market stalls 
seven per cent (12). Both the chain stores and some of the multiple 
food shops sell tights under their own brand-names and, when sales 
via market stalls, garages and similar outlets are considered, 
it is probable that less than 40 per cent of tights are sold under 
the manufacturers' own brand name. 
(c) A tendency for the total market to become static, in 
spite of lower prices. The total output of women's tights 
and full-length stockings (in'millions of pairs) fell from 
582 in 1972 to 568 in 1973 and rose in 1974 only to 580. 
This failure of the market to expand may be explained by the 
adoption by women of longer skirt lengths and of trousers. 
Although imports of hose appear to be significant, a large proportion 
of these imports represents supplies from branch factories of British 
companies, especially Pretty Polly in the Irish Republic. About 20 
per cent of U. K. output was exported in 1973 mostly to other E. E. C. 
countries. 
Over the next few years, the supply of ladics hose is likely to 
become more concentrated as technological developments are associated 
with economies of scale. A major feature of the market is likely 
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to be an attempt by manufacturers to re-establish brand concepts 
in order to give them greater control over sales in what has become 
a market dominated by their major customers (a typical oligopsony). 
Sandwiched between large suppliers of filament yarn on the one hand 
and large customers on the other, producers of hose see a need to 






CONCENTRATION AND CWIPETITION - SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The statistical analysis of the U. K. textile companies showed the 
existence of a small group of multi-fibre, multi-process companies 
accounting for over half of total sales. Analysis of financial links 
between companies, referred to in Sections III and IV and collated in 
Appendix E, reveals a further departure from the competitive structure 
which existed in these industries fifteen years ago. 
The implications of this concentration for competition and particularly 
for pricing policies need to be considered against the background of 
competition between rival textile processes and, even more significant, 
the high level of imports. When account is taken of the fabric content 
of imported made-up textiles, the U. K. receives 57 per cent of its supply 
of cotton and man-made fibre fabrics from o., ýrseas. Although three firms 
control nearly half of output in this sector, their home sales represent 
under 20 per cent of the U. K. market. "Oligopoly" as defined in Section 
IV of this report is not the equivalent of the economist's concept of 
dominance by the few. Rather is it the result of a defensive reaction 
against imports on the one hand and concentration of customers on the 
other. The development of this concentration through vertical integration 
is due to the declared desire of fibre producers and of other textile 
firms to safeguard outlets for their products. 
B. THE IMPACT ON COMPETITION OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
The effects of vertical integration on company organisation and policy 
differ widely between enterprises. At nne end of a spectrum, one 
group is reported by most observers to apply a fairly rigorous policy 
of "group net benefit" which means that group companies are expected 
to buy from each other rather than elsewhere and that transfer prices 
are based on the objectives of group sales gro,, "; th and profitability. 
At the other extrene, another of the largest companies operates a 
principle of divisional autonomy, in the belief that the resulting 
incentive to profit centres provides greater advantages than attempts 
at central pl. nning. 
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One of the features of the textile industry which emerged clearly 
from discussions was willingness of companies to market products 
purchased from competitors. Ability to offer complete ranges of 
products is regarded as a major marketing advantage but the economies 
of scale in production are increasing. Long production runs result 
in greater utilisation of machinery and if production is standardised, 
continuous shifts can be operated without duplication of senior 
management and technical personnel. Especially in the excess capacity 
situation in 1974 and 1975, this situation sometimes leads to fierce 
price competition: supply of a woven fabric to a competitor for 
finishing and making-up may be followed by a cut in the transfer 
price of that fabric and a competitive bid for the ultimate 
business. 
The growth of vertical integration has caused some friction between 
the textile firms concerned and major customers used to placing 
orders in accordance with the industry's horizontal structure - 
negotiating with spinners, then with weavers and knitters and then 
with makers-up. The relative strength of the textile group and the 
retailer appears to depend upon the availability of substitutes. In 
the case of processing of acetate yarns for example, Courtaulds would 
be in a stronger position than with polyesters or nylon. 
There are several indications that the competitive advantages of 
vertical integration have not yet been fully exploited by the under- 
takings concerned. In the competitive environment which is expected 
to continue over the next few years, the power of vertically inte- 
grated groups may be expected to increase. This is likely to lead to 
further growth of concentration as other firms combine to compete on 
more equal terms with existing groups on the one hand and imports on 
the other. Recent developments (e,. g. the Spirella-Vantona merger) confirm 
this expectation., 
C. THE ROLE OF IMPORTS 
The future level of imports depends upon many factors, including 
trade restrictions, comparative exchange rates and relative inflation. 
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In the cotton sub-sector vertical integration is less important 
protection against imports as vertically integrated concerns are force(j, 
by price competition, to import fabric at prices well below production 
costs in their own mills. The reasons for the relative price differ- 
ential are complex: - U. K. mills no longer suffer from relative under- 
mechanisation; payments to labour are becoming a progressively smaller 
element of total costs. Major factors appear to be lower fibre prices 
in overseas countries, ability to achieve longer production runs by 
more narrow specialisation and heavy reliance on exports and, 
it is alleged, government subsidies to encourage earning of foreign 
exchange. 
The short anälysis of trading restrictions in Section II described ýiow 
the 1973 multifibre agreement of GATT severely limits imposition of 
additional import quotas, especially those affecting developing 
countries. Recent proposals by the European Economic Commission would 
transfer most of the growth of textile imports to other member countries 
over the next ; cw years but, in the longer term, import quotas are likely 
to provide decreasing protection. 
Discussions with retailers indicated that they expected less growth 
of textile imports as price differentials narrowed. Communication 
with U. K. suppliers was sufficiently important to justify some differ- 
ential on price. U. K. producers can respond more quickly to local 
fashion changes and with the reorganisation and increased efficiency 
which has been achieved are now becoming able to offset any price 
disadvantage. With certain more basic items of clothing, in which 
fashion is less important, growth of imports would in the absence of 
restrictions continue unless price differentials were to be narrowed 
appreciably. 
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D. THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION 
In view of world excess capacity in textiles, the existence of access 
to overseas supplies is bound to limit prices in the United Kingdom 
textile industry in the immediate future. This excess capacity 
is 
particularly prevalent in warp-knitting, weaving of 
"grey" fabrics 
from cotton and man-made fibres and in fibre production. 
Competition 
between fibre producers may well lead to further acquisition or 
intervention in the processing sector, if Govarnment policy allows this. 
In this competitive environment, it. i;, likely that the largest concerns, 
especially those financially linked with fibre producers will adopt 
aggressive pricing policies. The reductions of profit margins by 
the largest groups during the 1969/71 recession were greater than 
those of smaller firms (See Section IV). In the case of Courtaulds, 
which appears to have led this price-cutting, this has been attributed 
to an attempt to increase its share of the market. While this inter- 
pretation may explain part of the policy there are other reasons 
why fibre producers and textile groups which they control may decide 
to cut prices sharply during recession periods: - 
(1) They tend to operate the most capital-intensive units in textile 
processing and have a predominance of fixed expenses. 
(2) A long-term concern is the preservation of textile processing 
in this country, which means that imports must be countered during 
periods of world excess capacity. 
1 
(3) The economics of fibre production may justify under-recovery 
even of marginal costs in textile processing if the overall 
contribution to overheads in fibre production and processing 
is positive. 
For these reasons the author expects the current (1974/5) period of 
intense competition (especially on price) to continue. This is likely 
to undermine the stability of the present structure of the textile 
industries and in all three sub-sectors is likely to lead to further 





APPENDIX A: PART 1 
LIST OF ENTERPRISES SHO': IING TEXTILE AND NON-TEXTILE ACTIVITIES 1968 
Published or est. Published or est. 
IM TOTAL TURNOVER TEXTILE TURNOVER NET PROFITS 
World- World- U. K. 
Name of Company vii de U. K. Worldwide U. K. wide 
Textiles 
Courtaulds (N. E. ) 1 577 
Tootal 151 




& Dewhurst 68.6 
Illingworth Morris 29.9 
Lister & Company 27.1 
Woolcombers 23,4 
Nottingham 
Manufacturing Co. 19.9 
Corah 18.5 
Joseph Dawson 16.9 
William Baiº"d Group+ 31.4 
Rexmore. 13.6 
John Bright Group 12.5 
Vantona 11.5 
Sir James Hill 
& Sons 11.3 
Bulmer & Lumb (Hdgs) 10.7 
Readson 10.6 
Parkland Textiles 9.7 
Thomas Tilling/ 
Pretty Po11y+ 190 
Dunlop+ 450 
Allied Textiles 7.6 
David Whitehead 















































n. a. n. a. 



















Published or est. 
£m TOTAL TURNOVER TEXTILE TURNOVER 
World- 
Name of company wide U. K. Worldwide U. K. 
Troydale Industries 






(N. E. ) 
Sirdar 
Nova (Jersey) 
Knit (N. A. ) 
John Foster & Son 





Walker & Atkinson 
John Crowther Group 




India Mills (Darwen) 
Scottish 




































25.7 n. a. 




























Published or est. 
NET PROFITS 






























N. E. = This company was not included in the enterprise analysis 
because turnover in textile processing accounted for less 
than 50% of company turnover. 
N. A. = Not included in activity unit analysis. 
+= These companies published separate : onsolidated accounts 
summarising U. K. textile activities. In the enterprise 
analysis these textile accounts were used because of the 
greater relevance of the data. World-wide data for the whole 
group are included here to make possible comparisons in this 
Appendix. 
Where overseas activities are very small (less than 
1500,000 turnover) they have been ignored in this table. 
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APPENDIX A: PART 2 
LIST OF ENTERPRISES, SHOIWIING'TEXTILE'AND'NON-TEXTILE ACTIVITIES 1973 
fm 
Name of Company 
Published or est. Published or est. 
TOTAL TURNOVER TEXTILE TURNOVER NET PROFITS 
World- World- U. K. 
wide U. K. Worldwide U. K. wide Textiles 
Courtaulds (N. E. ) 956 717 440(e) 385(e) 116.3 20.8(e) 
Carrington-Viyella 184 154 184 154 12.1 10.1 
Coats Pator 415 136 358 136 54.1 10.6 
Tootal 215 118 192 94.7 18.3 7.96 
Illingworth Morris 85.6 82.9 85.6 82.9 4.47 4.40 
Nottingham 
Manufacturing Co. 63.3 63.3 48.2 48.2 10.21 9.47 
Joseph Dawson(Hdgs) 37.3 37.3 5.41 5.41 
William Baird Group+ 53.1 43.1 29.7 29.7 2.94 1.17 
Vantona 38.3 35(e) 38.3 35(e) 3.60 3.0(e) 
Spirella 25.8 25.8 1.71 1.71 
Readson 21.5 21.5 21.0 21.0 1.56 1.48 
Rexmore 
, 
37.3 37.3 28.2 28.2 2.65 1.94 
Lister & Co. 26.6 26.6 1.44 1.44 
Corah 22.3 22.3 1.61 1.61 
Thomas Tilling/ 
Pretty Po11y+ 510.9 n. a. n. a. 21.8 34.4 1.22 
Sir James Hill 
& Sons 17.9 17.9 0.19 0.19 
Bulmer & Lumb (Hdgs) 13.1 13.1 0.52 0.52 
Parkland Textiles 18.1 18.1 1.01 1.01 
John Bright Group 14.0 14.0 0.88 0.88 
Dunlop+ 750 286 n. E. 9.0 11.7 0.28 
Allied Textiles 21.9 21.9 2.17 2.17 
Lonrho 27.4 25(e) 23.4 20.0 Z9-4- 3.43 
Highams 13.9 13.9 0.72 0.72 
Bodycote 
International 19.1 15.4 18.9 15.2 1.42 1.10 
Troydale Industries 7.3 7.34 5.83 5.8 0.31 0.33 
100 
Im 
Name of Company 
Published or est. Published or est. 
TOTAL TURNOVER TEXTILE TURNOVER NET PROFITS 
World- World- U. K. 
wide U. K. Worldwide U. K. wide 
Textiles 
2.0 12.0 0.72 0.72 
34.1 n. a. 15.5 9.4 10.4 0.76 
)8 534 n. a. 9.5 42.6 0.55 
10.5 8.3 10.5 8.3 0.61 0.51 
8.5 7.6 8.5 7.6 0.08 0.44 
9.6 8.7 7.9 6.8 0.96 0.72 
8.1 8.1 0.64 0.64 
10.4 10.4 0.43 0.43 
8.6 8.6 0.51 0.51 
5.8 5.8 0.26 0.26 
3.7 3.7 . 0.53 0.53 
8.6 8.6 0.62 0.62 
5.3 5.3 0.44 0.44 
1.6 1.6 0.10 0.10 
3.4 3.4 0.07 0.07 
5.6 5.6 0.44 0.44 
7.0 7.0 0.50 0.50 
12.4 12.4 1.71 1.71 
12.7 12.7 1.68 1.68 
7.1 7.1 0.56 0.56 
5.3 5.3 0.40 0.40 
6.8 6.8 0.72 0.72 
7.9 7.9 0.48 0.48 
5.9 5.9 0.50 0.50 
W. & J. Whitehead 
Smith & Nephew+ 
Reed International 




John Foster & Son 
John Beales Assocn. 
Charnos 
John Hawkins 
& Son (Hdgs) 
Wormalds, 
Walker & Atkinson 
John Crowther Group 























Published or est. Published or est. 
fm TOTAL TURNOVER TEXTILE TURNOVER NET PROFITS 
World- World- U. K. 
Name of Company wide U. K. Worldwide U. K. wide Textiles 
House of Lerose 
R. & J. Pullman 
RKT Textiles 
T. W. Kempten 
S. Lyles & Co. 
Scottish, English 








































Notes as for Part 1. 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES OF CO1CENTRATION 
ENTERPRISES 
SECTOR TEXTILES (NICE 23) U. K. 
102 
Prepared at the Cranfield Institute of Technology, Bedford 
U. K. TEXTILES 
TABLE 1: SUM TOTAL VALUES*1968-73 (SAMPLE OF ENTERPRISE 
103 
N= number of positive 
VaTues) 
N f 000 1968=100 N £ 000 1968--100 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT 
1968 49 896,819 100 46 70,866 100 
1969 52 1,044,744 116 49 62,808 89 
1970 52 1,084,407 121 45 57,387 81 
1971 52 1,143,921 128 48 73,859 104 
1972 53 1,316,186 147 50 105,854 149 
1973 55 1,612,905 180 55 149,847 211 
VARIABLE U5: CASH FLOW VARIABLE 06: GROSS INVESTMENT 
1968 46 95,213 100 49 42,698 100 
1969 49 88,769 93 `.. 69,781 163 
1970 50 83,973 88 52 £0,720 142 
1971 49 105,006 110 52 43,197 101 
1972 52 140,304 147 53 49,666 116 
1973 55 188,981 198 55 70,771 166 
VARIABLE (';: EQUITY VARIABLE 08: EXPORTS 
1968 49 381,078 100 46 100,612 100 
1969 52 401,680 105 50 125,770 125 
1970 52 422,588 111 50 126,734 126 
1971 52 428,738 112 51 137,642 137 
1972 52 472,925 124 51 157,661 157 
1973 55 539,739 141 53 218,857 218 
VARIABLE 10: NET ASSETS VARIABLE 11: NET CASH FLOW 
1968 49 511,531 100 46 64,389 100 
1969 52 571,028 111 49 61,639 95 
1970 52 611,685 119 50 61,306 95 
1971 52 620,575 121 49 69,763 108 
1972 53 672,312 131 51 91,891 142 
1973 55 782,733 153 55 123,533 191 
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TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION (SAMPLE OF ENTERPRISES) 
N* MEAN V GINI H-H ENTRE` 
1968 
01 Turnover 49 18,302 1.997 0.6321 101.8 ý129s 
"115 04 Net Profit 46 1,541 2.400 0,7141 147.0 
-118. 05 Cash Flow 46 2,070 2.309 0.6959 137.7 1 06 Gross Investment 49 877 2.117 0.7239 111.9 , ^12 114 P 07 Equity 49 7,777 2.375 0.7072 135.5 
0 78 "-130. 08 Exports 46 2,187 1.608 0.6599 . } 113 10 Net Assets 49 10,439 2.536 0.7379 151.6 . - 
-120 11 Net Cash Flow 46 1,400 2.215 0.6810 128.4 
1969 
01 Turnover 52 20,091 2.099 0.6423 104.0 -131' 
04 Net Profit 49 1,282 2.392 0.6994 137.1 -120) 
05 Cash Flow 49 1,812 2.369 0.6895 135.0 -1211 1 06 Gross Investment 52 1,342 3.286 0,8046 226.9 -100 1 
07 Equity 52 7,725 2.370 0.6911 127,2 -123 ' 08 Exports 50 2,515 1.835 0.6636 87.3 , -13 115 10 Net Assets 52 10,891 2.660 0.7324 155.3 . - ' 11 Net Cash Plow 49 1,258 2.374 0.6839 135.4 -121. 
1970 
01 Turnover 52 20,854 2.187 0.6422 111.2 -129 04 Net Profit 45 1,275 , 2.593 0.7267 171.6 -110' 05 Cash Flow 50 1 679 2.665 0.7118 162.1 -115. D6 Gross Investment 52 1,168 3.144 0.7711 209.3 -107 37 Equity 52 8,127 2.403 0.6911 130.3 -123. ` 08 Exports 50 2 535 1.8670 0.6610 89.7 -131, 10 Net Assets 52 11,763 2.7825 0.7307 168.1 -114. 11 Net Cash Flow 50 1,226 2.5103 0.6894 146.0 -1190 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; definitions of the four 
concentration measures are given on page 
2 
TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION (SAMPLE OF ENTERPRISES) (Cont'd) 
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N MEAN V GINI H-H ENTROPY 
1971 
01 Turnover 52 21,998 2.235 0.6553 115.3 -127.2 04 Net Profit 48 1,539 2.637 0.7291 165.7 -113.2 
05 Cash Flow 49 2,143 2,578 0.7135 156.1 -115.8 
06 Gross Investment 52 831 2.038 0.6776 99.1 -128.1 07 Equity 52 8,245 2.443 0.6990 134.0 -121.0 
08 Exports 51 2,699 1.888 0.6982 89.5 -127.8 10 Net Assets 52 11,934 2.771 0.7334 166.9 -113.2 11 Net Cash Flow 49 1,424 2.405 0.6828 146.5 -120.3 
1972 
01 Turnover 53 24,834 2.224 0.6548 112.2 -128.5 04 Net Profit 50 2,117 2.588 0.7108 153.9 -118.0 
05 Cash Flow 52 2,698 2.567 0.7065 146.0 -120.0 06 Gross Investment 53 937 2.104 0.7056 102.4 -125.8 
07 Equity 52 9,095 2.431 0.7063 132.9 -120.8 
08 Exports 51 3,091 1.820 0.6790 84.6 -130.1 10 Net Assets 53 12,685 2.725 0.7280 159.0 -114.7 11 Net Cash Flow 51 1,801 2.433 0.6786 135.6 -123.6 
1973 
01 Turnover 55 29,326 2.197 0.6562 106.0 -130.6 
04 Net Profit 55 2,724 . 2.815 0.7431 162.2 -116.0 05 Cash Flow 55 3,436 2.699 0.7209 150.7 -119.0 06 Gross Investment 55 1,287 1.958 0.6972 87.9 -129.9 
07 Equity 55 9,807 2.488 0.7163 130.7 -121.7 
08 Exports 55 4,129 1.867 0.683 84.7 -131. 10 Net Assets 55 14,232 2.690 0.7289 149.8 6 
11 Net Cash Flow 55 2,246 2.613 0.7105 142.3 -120.9 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; definitions of the four 
concentration measures are given on page 
ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS CR) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
L 0.573 0.669 0.716 0.889 0.683 4 CR 55.7 54.1 55.3 57.4 57.6 
L 0.545 0.544 0,593 0.662 0.663 8 CR 66.9 65.5 65.5 66.8 66.7 
10 L 0.475 0.461 0.514 0.539 0.539 CR 70.8 69.8 69.2 70.7 70.6 
12 L 0.422 0.388 0,446 0.457 0.475 CR 74.2 73.8 72.5 74.2 73.6 
20 L 0.297 0.290 0,285 L. 319 0.317 CR 83.6 83.1 82.9 83.6 82.9 




0.190 0.186 0,194 0.192 
CR 96.2 95.6 95.8 96.0 95.8 
'SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 












































0.7462 0.8808 0.9820 0.9309 0.9565 0.9638 
48.06 40.28 41.57 40.76 40.45 39.03 
3 2 2 2 2 2 
0.5731 0.6694 0.7158 0.5731 0.6314 0.6325 
55.71 54.11 55.27 54.16 52.28 50.41 
4 4 4 3 3 3 
0.673 0.802 0.866 0.752 0 794 798 0 . . 
ENIERPJUSE ANALYSIS (Cont'd) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
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N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.721 0.774 0.814 0.763 0.865 0.834 CR 62.3 58.6 67.1 65.4 60.4 63.3 
8L 0.626 0.604 0.855 0.793 0.634 0.664 CR 76.1 71.7 75,5 74.2 72.7 74.8 
10 L 0.581 0.531 0.724 0.678 0.577 0.622 CR 79.5 75.5 78.6 77.5 76.3 78.1 
12 L 0.532 0.476 0.606 0.580 0.523 0.580 CR 82.2 78.6 81.6 80.4 79.2 80.5 
20 L 0.418 0.335 0.410 0.371 0.354 0.404 CR 89.2 87.5 89.8 89.6 87.8 88.2 
30 L 0.321 0.265 0.308 0.300 0.281 0.325 CR 94.8 94.2 96.1 95.6 94.1 93.7 
40 L 0.259 0.224 0.292 0.27) 0.244 0.275 CR 98.9 98.7 99.7 99.0 98.1 97.3 
'SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 





















Overall L 1.2180 1.4254 1.2822 1.3945 1.5432 1.4765 Maximum CR 46.43 43.87 43.87 49.18 46.79 48.37 N*H 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ist Minimum L 0.6037 0.2228 0.8144 0.7634 0.2405 0.2604 CR 71.84 98.98 467.08 65.45 98.77 98.15 H*M 6 41 4 4 43 44 LS 0.827 0.412 0.012 1.071 0.440 0.469 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 05; CASH'FLOW (BEFORE TAX) 
N* 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
L 0.690 0.761 0.810 0.732 0.821 0.787 4 CR 61.4 58.7 65.1 65.1 60.7 62.6 
8 L 0.621 0.625 0.876 0.811 0.667 , 
0.670 
CR 74.4 72.0 72.8 73.4 72.0 73.5 
10 L 0.572 0.579 0.762 0.689 0.608 
0.635 
CR 77.7 75.1 75.6 76.5 75.3 76.5 
12 L 0.514 0.520 0.646 0.591 0.557 0.582 CR 80.6 77.9 78.2 79.3 77.8 79.0 
20 L 0.388 0.346 0.401 0.378 0.358 0.399 CR 88.2 86.7 86.4 87.9 86.4 86.6 
30 L 0.299 0.267 0.277 0.296 0.271 0.311 CR 94.1 93.4 93.8 94.3 93.3 92 4 
40 L 0.239 0.222 0.232 0.254 0.235 0.258 CR 98.6 98.0 98.6 98.2 97.4 96.3 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
t 
F 























1.0696 1.2285 1.2068 1.3023 1.3904 1.3489 
N*H 
45.68 44.6 50.1 47.7 45.9 46.8 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
1st Minimum L 0.6138 0.6137 0.8103 0.7317 0.2240 0 7869 
* NC 
















TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES 
r(L) 
AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 06: GROSS INVESTMENT 
N* 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.565 1.060 1.295 0.602 0.524 0.337 CR -58.7 70.9 63.4 56.2 57.9 55.2 
8L 0.462- 0.867 0.731 0.516 0.495 0.418 CR 73.5 80.7 76.0 68.0 70.5 70.1 
10 L 0.434 0.717 0.603 0.453 0.432 0.421 CR 77.7 84.3 80.3 72.2 74.8 73.8 
12 L 0.401 0,645 0.530 0.401 0.418 0.390 
CR 81.3 87.1 83.7 75.6 77.8 76.9 
20 L 0.314 0.539 0.438 0.294 0.302 0.290 CR 90.6 93.1 91.2 85,1 87.0 86.2 
30 L 0.294 0.473 0.350 0.217 0.234 0.235 CR 95.9 96.7 96.2 92.9 94.3 93.1 
40 L 0.279 0.434 0.332 0.188 0.227 0.201 CR 98.9 98.9 98.9 98.1 98.1 97.6 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 





















Overall L 0.7773 1.9392 2.1878 0.6019 0.5536 0.5917 Maximum CR 40.39 55.92 53.20 56.19 61.93 31.46 
N*H 2 2 2 4 5 2 
ist Minimum L 0.3044 0.5927 0.3413 0.3956 0.3556 0.3366 CR 92.08 89.25 96.60 51.67 52.57 55.2 N*M 22 14 31 3 3 4 ýS 0.4319 0.9306 0.6340 0.460 0.432 0.446 
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CR) TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION-RATIOS 
VARIABLE 07: EQUITY 
N* 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4 L 0.776 0.753 0.755 0.760 0.719 
1 
0.732 
CR 60.5 58.2 58.6 62.2 62.0 61.2 
8 L 0.610 0.597 0.623 0.709 0.681 0.656 CR 71.5 69.5 70.2 71.3 71.9 72.1 
10 I 0.501 0.502 0.534 0.613 0.592 0.557 CR 76.0 73.8 74.1 74.7 75.4 75.8 
12 L 0.443 0.454 0.501 0.557 0.532 0.504 CR 79.6 77.0 76.8 77.3 78.2 78.8 
20 L 0.349 0.324 0.336 0.360 0.360 0.383 CR 88.4 86.1 85.6 86.0 86.6 86.3 
30 L 0.282 0.258 0.259 0.274 0.280 0.290 CR 94.4 92.7 92.6 92.6 93.0 92.5 
40 L 0.247 0.215 0.217 0.225 0.230 0.237 } CR 98.3 97.3 97.2 97.2 97.5 96.7 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
Ist Maximum L 
CR 0.9603 1.0427 1.1165 1.0623 1.0955 1.0657 
N*H< 54.1 44.5 44.6 43.9 43.5 43.4 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Overall L 0.9603 1.0427 1.1165 1.0623 1.0955 1.0657 Maximum CR 54.1 44.5 44.6 43.9 43.5 43.4 
N*H 3 2 2 2 2 2 
1st. Minimum L 
CR 0.9503 0.7534 
10.6977 
0.6355 0.6470 0.6660 
N 
46.7 58.2 63.0 57.3 56.6 55.9 
LS 24 5 3 3 3 0.931 0.891 0.849 0.871 0.866 
ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE D8: EXPORTS FROM THE U. K. 
N. 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.519 0.585 0.623 0.453 0.372 0.411 CR 45.9 48.6 49.0 52.2 52,6 52.0 
8L 0.318 0.386 0.368 0.392 0.411 0.451 CR 66.4 66.9 66.8 71.0 69.4 67.4 
10 L 0,294 0.365 0.347 0.371 0.376 0.414 CR 71.7 71.3 71.6 75.5 73.7 71.3 
12 L 0.267 0.342 0.334 0.356 0.357 0.364 CR 76.4 74.9 75.2 78.9 77.1 74,9 
20 L 0.207 0.243 0.250 0.295 0.277 0.251 CR 89.7 85.8 85.9 87.8 86.3 85.9 
30 L 0.210 0.197 0.202 0.230 0.220 0.201 CR 96.8 94.4 94.0 94.9 93.8 94.1 
40 L 0.250 0.203 0.204 C 22. i 0.201 0.202 CR 99.4 98.5 98. i 98.6 98.3 98.0 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 





















Overall L 0.6178 0.8497 0.9077 2.215 0.657 0.6438 Maximum CR 31.35 34.74 35.5 100 100 100 
N*H 2 2 2 51 51 53 
1st Minimum L 
CR 0.2954 0.3591 0.1946 0.3317 0.4089 0.3460 
N*M 63.64 64.64 95.7 65.9 67.0 59.8 
LS 7 7 33 6 7 4 0.469 0.574 0.328 0.480 0.406 0.462 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 1.1: NET ASSETS 
r 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973' 
4 L 0.730 0.742 0.901 0.892 0.913 0.657 CR 64.9 64.3 63.9 66.7 66.4 65.9 
8 L 0.689 0.700 0.734 0.834 
0.854 0.758 
CR 77.1 76.0 75.3 75.5 74.8 75.2 
10 L 0.602 0.629 0.664 0.728 0.720 0.671 CR 80.6 79.2 78.4 78,5 77.9 78.3 
12 L 0.565 0.591 0.622 0.656 0.653 0.637 CR 83.1 81.6 80.7 80.9 80.3 80.5 
20 L 0.451 0.448 0.426 0.446 0.450 0.453 CR 89.5 88.3 88.2 88.2 87.3 87.0 
30 L 0.351 0.350 0.339 0.349 0.337 0.347 CR 94.6 93.4 93.4 93.4 92.8 92.1 
40 L 0.284 0.283 0.279 0.284' 0.263 0.266 CR 98.3 97.1 97.1 97.1 96.8 96.3 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 






















Maximum CR 0.9754 1.1931 1.3618 1.2836 1.0587 1.2444 
N*H 48.98 48.42 50.22 49.1 49.2 45.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1st Minimum L 
CR 0.6475 0.6888 0.2462 0.7537 0.6986 0.6568 
N 
70.31 69.13 99.80 62.2 62.2 65.9 
L5 
5 5 50 3 3 4 
0.810 0.905 0.458 1.019 0.873 
ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 12: CASH ROW AFTER TAX 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
L 0.659 0.787 0.726 0.781 0.432 0.713 4 CR 59.7 58.3 62.9 61.0 43.7 62.1 
L 0.588 0.620 0.812 0.744 0.362 0.661 8 CR 72.6 72.0 70.9 70,0 57.8 72.7 
10 L 0.522 0.581 0.701 0.622 0.321 0.624 CR 76.4 75.1 73.9 73.5 62.5 75.7 
12 L 0.477 0.530 0.614 0.532 0.288 0.556 CR 79.4 77.7 76.4 76,6 66.5 78.3 
20 L 0.360 0.355 0.371 0.340 0.193 0.392 CR 87.3 86.2 85.2 85.9 79.3 86.0 
30 L 0.274 0.269 0.257 0.257 0.150 0.302 CR 93.9 92.9 92.9 93.3 89.6 91.9 
L 0.225 0.22.1 0.210 0.220 0.131 0.244 40 CR 98.4 97.6 98.1 97.8 96.0 96.1 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 





















Overall L 1.0667 1.2759 1.1979 1.4038 1.6202 1.3748 
Maximum CR 43.77 44.37 47.0 46.1 42.9 44.6 
N*H 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ist Minimum L 0.6041 0.6056 0.726?. 0.7809 0.1987 '0.7131 
CR 68.84 64.70 62.9 61.0 97.9 62.1 
N*M 5 5 4 4 48f 4 
LS 0.809 0.926 0.962 1.086 1). 386` 0.976 
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TABLE 41 Cfl uPLET'_ LISTING OF LINnA CUUPVES FOR 1968 
TIIRNOVER NET PROFIT CASH FLOW WSS I NVESTº'ENT 
N* 
2 0.6982 1.2180 1.0696 0.7773 
3 0.7462 0,9861 0,9409 0,5986 
4 0.5731 0.77n7 0,6402 0.5687 
5 0.6467 0,6066 0,6138 0,5567 
6 0,6149 06037 , 0,6244 0,5317 7 0,5767 , 6338 0 0,630A 0,5060 8 0.5446 0,6260 0.6207 0.4617 
9 0,5072 0,58.56 0 5933 0.4583 
1ý1 0,4745 0.5305 0,5721 0.4342 
11 07 4 0 0,5567 0,536'1 04091 , 2 , 0.5315 0,5135 0 . 4012 13 0.4035 0.5126 0,5008 0.3840 
14 0.3A68 0.502.0 0,4845 0.3637 











18 0.3205 0.4455 0.4124 0.33o 
19 0.3083 0.4287 0.401? 0,3224 





0.4041 0.3753 0,3066 




0.3849 0.3565 0,3051 
. 0.3756 0.3461 0.3071 25 
26 
012569 2493 0 0.3652 0.337? 0,3079 
27 , 0 2441 
6.355" 0.3284 0,3059 
29 . 0 2383 
0.3465 0,37.04 0,3026 
29 . 2337 0 
0.3372 0.3131 0,200) 
30 . 2282 0 
0.378Q 0,3061 0,2041 








0.3044 . 0.2R38 , 0,2983 




























0.2592 0.239k) , 0.2787 























040000 010000 . 0.3465 












4 0: 7763 
5 0.963-1 
60 . 7813 7 0.6908 
R 0.610, 
9 0.5550 






























































































































































































































TABLE 41 Cni4PLETl LISTING OF LINDA CURVES FOP. 1969 
TURNOVER NE: T PROFIT CASH FLo w ARMS INVESTMENT 
N+ 
2 0,8808 1.4254 1.2285 1,939?. 
3 0,8559 1,0085 1'0427 1,2n74 
4 0.6694 0,7743 0,7608 1: 0604 
5 0,6944 0,6643 0,6137 1,0540 











10 0.460QQ 0.5310 0.5790 0.7170 












































































0; 2121 0: 2084 
, 0 2547 
O; Z492 
0.466? 














0.2346 , 0.2358 
0.4430 
0,4397 
































0.1767 0.2405 2455 0 
. 0 2196 
0.4286 













0,7725 . 0.2281 
p 
0.4476 











05015 0.0000 0.0000 0.. 5665 
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TABLE 4: COMPLETE LISTING OF LINDA. CURVES FOR 1969 (Cont'd) 
Enl1ITY EXPORTS Nr'T ASSETS NET CASH FLOW 
Nt 
2 1.0427 0.8497 1 . 1931 1,2759 3 0.9955 0.7759 0.9941 1.0375 
4 0.7534 0.5854 0.7420 0.7865 
5 0.7504 0.4753 O. 6A8 0.6056 
6 0,7394 0.3984 0,7277 0,6206 
7 0.6664 0.3501 0.7044 0,6488 
A 0.5973 0.3F62 0.7003 0,6201 
9 0.5438 0.3827 0.6621 0.6032 
10 0.5015 0.3647 0.02H'= 0,5810 
11 0.4794 0.3469 0.6167 0,5501 
12 0.4544 0.3415 0.5909 0,5304 
13 0.43499 0.3277 0,5619 0,5059 
14 0.4142 0.3107 0.5327 0.4773 











18 0.3509 0,2641 0,4748 0,3901 
1Q 0,3359 0,2530 0.462E 0.3714 
2o 0,3235 0.2427 0.4484 0,3548 
21 03180 . 0,2327 0,438? 03388 , 22 . 3097 0 0.2244 0.42614 . 3291 0 23 0.3014 02192 0,41S3 0.3185 
24 0.2965 0: 21p, ° 0.403cß 0,3086 
25 0.289: 3 0.2070 0.3917 0.3004 
26 0.2842 0.2040 0.3818 0.2°42 
27 0.2760 0.2032 0.3731 0.2887 
28 0.2711 0.2021 0,3658 0.2820 
29 0.2644 0.2000 0,3579 0,2758 
3o 0,2579 0.1969 0.3501. ) 0,2692 
31 0.2536 0.1938 0.3420 012635 
32 0,2487 0.1903 0,3338- 0,2580 
33 0.2433 0,1699 0,3253 0.2521 34 0.2366 0,1007 0,3171 0,2461 
35 0.2333 0.1917 0,3101) 0,2405 
36 0.2263 0.1941 . 0.3046 0.2364 37 0.2238 0.1960 0,2981 0.2321 
38 0.2198 0.1966 0.4031 0,2280 
39 0.2160 0.2008 0.2883 0.2247 
41 
0,213L 0: 2i 
53 0: 47AS 
0 217 , 3 
42 0.2125 0,2096 0,2734 0,7,146 43 0,2116 0.2127 0.2686 0.211? 





















49 0.2141 0.2482 0.2457 0.2254 So 0.. 2178 0.2677 0.2469 010000 
Si 0.2231 0.0()0() 0.252. 010000 52 0.2361 0.0000 0.7.654 0.0000 
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TABLE 41 COMPLFTF: LISTINt, OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1970 
TURNOVER NET PROFIT CASH FLOW GROSS INVFSTNENT 
N+ 
2 0.9820 1.282? 1.2068 2.1878 











6 0.7401 0,9356 1,0129 0.8740 
7 0.6612 0.9083 0,9604 0,7979 




00 . 8236 0,6034 0,6031 
11 0.4773 0.6608 0.7033 0.5603 12 0.4462 0.6055 0.6455 0.5299 







































0.3441 0.3214 0,3067- 










0.22 0,28 0.2 0 2? , 0, 676 3 
31 
31 4 
0: 2150 0 3080 . 2993 
R 44 ý 0" 
0 ý765 0,26LI3 
pý 3 y8 y 













0 34? r 
35 
3 










0.2698 . 0,239? 
0.3370 
0,3335 
38 . 0.1909 
0.2721 
0,2722 





1 061 o 61 8 
0,2801, . , 0.2311 
0,3? 85 
0.3306 





















46 0.1731 1 
0.6249 
0000 0 . 













0,28? ý' , 013855 


















TABLE 4: COMPLETE LISTING OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1970 (Cont'd) 
Er)UITY t; XPORTS NET ASSETS 'irr CASH FLOW 


















0: 7337 , 
8012 0: 
8115 
0.5653 0.3650 0.710.1 0.7337 
1i) 0.5337 0.3474 0.6639 0,7013 11 0.5171) 0.3451 0,6509 0.6562 
12 0.5016 0.3337 0.6221 0,6137 1.3 0.4i5ä 0.317tß 0.593h 0,57()5 
14 0.6536 0.3079 0,5571 0,5304 15 0.4295 0.2941. 0.5231 0.497-8 
16 0.4067 0.2t30 0,694ei 0,4541 
17 0.3895 0.2733 0.4675 0,4285 19 0.3709 0.2650 0.453-1' 0,4037 
19 0.3520 0.258? 0.637.3 0.3878 20 0.3361 00255or 0.425' 0.37n5 














41 36Q9 0,363011 A 0.2784 







0 330: 1 
0,3; 3d 0,2505 0 2439 













0.199 0. ZRý, 0.2120 0.21 0.2020 83< ü. 2- 0.2120 40 0.2173 0.20,1 0.2780 0.21A1 41 0.215t 0.2045 0,2743 0.2076 42 0.2143 0.2051; 0.270c 0,2.! 156 43 
44 


























0 7 49 7 
0,2 23 
0,2E3ß0 




TAßLF 4: Cf, PLFTr LISTItlr, OF LINDA CURVE; FOR 1071 
TI. IRNOVER NET PROFIT CASH FLOW (ROSS INVESTMEJT 
N " 
2 0.9309 1.3945 1,3023 0.5251 
3 0.5731 1.0566 0,8830 0,3456 











7 0.7494 0 A46K 0,8650 0.5702 8 0.6620 0.7'27 0.6114 0.5167 
Q 0.5982 0.73Y, 9 0.753t) 0.4702 10 0.5385 0.6775 0,6893 0,4525 11 0.4963 0.6237 0332 0,4232 


















0,4181 0,4398 0,3276 



















0,3435 0.3414 , 0.2694 
25 . 0.2755 0.3375 0.32qß; 
0.347 






0 . 146 3f08i3 0 , 





0,3119 , 0.3054 
0.237n 
0.2295 










0.2445 , 0,2903 3 
0,2166 
0.21i n 
. 33 . 0.221 
0.29on 
0 2667 
0.2P, 413 2 
34 0.2162 . 0,2844 0,2807 0.2753 




0.2817 0.2699 1 0.1965 




0 242 ,1 
011935 
9 19 0,1934 0.2794 
0 2780 
. . 0,2586 
0,1 13 
0.1895 
























0,2987 0,2531 , 0,1966 
6 
0,179 0,3955 
0.3113 0,2531 2539 0 0 200 : aT 4R 0.1776 0 1776 0,3299 , 0,2554 
0 2067 
0 2128 









32 0.1729 , 0 0000 
0,0000 0,2091 
. o. ooo 0,2939 
i 
TABLE 4: COMPLETE LISTING OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1971 (Cont'd) 
EQUITY EXPORTS NET ASSETS NF: T CASH FLOW 
N* 
2 1.0623 0.7160 1. x836 1.4038 
3 0.6355 0,5119 0.7537 1.0728 4 0.7591ß 0.4536 0.8923 0.7809 




















12 0.5572 0.3560 0.0555 0,5316 




























































0.2508 . 0.2251 . 0.3189 
0.2446 















0.2285 . 0,2767 . 0.2894 
0.2237 





























. 0 2124 
48 
49 








0,9338 0,2495 0.0004 








TAßI. E 4: Cfl PLETE LiSTIN63 OF LINhA CURVES FOR 1972 
TURNOVER NET PROFIT CASH FLI)W GROSS INU! '. STt! ý!! t 
No 
2 0.9565 1.5632 1.3004 0.5082 
3 0.014 1.1912 0,9743 0.3556 
4 0.682I' 0.8653 0,. 3714 0.5235 
S 0.7751 0.7702 0,7721 0,5536 
6 0.7°4t, 0.7442 0,7511 0.5462 
7 0.7362 0,6ri06 0,702e3 0.5029 










0 , 4r46 12 0,4753 0.5231 0,5572 0,41771 
13 0.4443 0.5062 0,5295 0.402-5 
14 0,41,2 o. 4 f.? p, 5n0, O 03RRn 
15 
16 










0.412? 0.4211 0.3341 
. 0.391x; 0,344 




0.3535 0.358? 013021 





o. 21 ?7 




0.3?. 10 0,31 56 0.2694 












0. R3: ß 1 02525 . . Q. lA14 ü . 2459 0 2391 
0.23x' 0,7855 0. ý>311 o, 2766 0 2! 14 0 , 2336 31 0.2266 012755 , 0.? 665 
0 




0.7703 02,517 . 0.2256 
34 
3 







36 O. zOSb 
0.2577 
r 0 2568 
5o 
, C. 2z 
, 0.2267 








0.2489 0,1413 . 0.2268 
















43 0,192 . 2405 0 
0,2290 0,2252 
44 0.1806 . 0.2409 
0.2265 






1765 0.2406 . . 0.? 242 
0,2257 
0.2306 
g7 . 0.1743 
0.2411 

























53 . 1759 0 
O. OIýOt) 0,2654 0.3215 
. 010000 0.0002' 0.3599 
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TABLE 4: COMPLETE LISTING OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1972 (Cont'd) 
EIWITV LXPÖRTS NET ASSETS NUT CASH FRnW 
N* 
2 1,09 :1 t1,5ý4? 1. U5dr' 1, b? t12 
(i. 64/ i (). 415 0"f'9tý' 1 "t? 062 
4 : 1.7191 0.3711., 0.912, ". o. 7P34 
5 u. 7u1 ; 0,329 1 0.96 i'1 0.71 17 
6 0.7G5 ; 
" 
0.357A 0.987 0.6788 
7 0,12 7 t' 0.41AY 0.9067 0,6498 
A 0 ! ßt)0: 1 0,4111 0. ß. 54. i 0.6177 
Q 0,15 215 0.3t'16 0. /102 0,5,382 
III 0. c? i v, 3lAo 0,720. ' 0,5e 20 
11 1f. 5! 42 0 , 3,, 15e3 0. h727 0.5253 12 0.532 (), 3911 0,6 5'1, ýi U, 49 57 
13 0,5013 0,3491 0,623,1 0,4740 
14 0.4'+1 0. Y {89º 0,588' 0,4515 
15 0.4`i. 7 0.310' 0.60tw 0.4281 
16 0.43?. < , 03w1'ß 0,535, ' 0,401,9 17' 0.40W 0º , 
31() 0,50, 0,3.11 
1R 0.386. '1 0.20;; '1 q, 4R3: 1 0.3633 19 0,1.7%t). 'ý ? iiris 4), 41634 p 0,365)8 
20 Q, 360 , 0,? 771 0,450? 0,3305 
21 0,; 4ý, 02 A. 5 0.4: 177 0,3210 
22 0.3381 0.2541 0, k? 5(1 0.3115 
23 G 321 r , 02.129 0,4121 0,3016 24 0 , 
, 173: 00: 2-03 0,3991 0,2923 
25 0.3101 0.21614 0,3A64 0.2829 
26 0.3O?. 0,2375 0,3735 0.2739 
27 0.297 0.2329 0,3621 0,2651 
28 t1,? Q15 0,?? ++'ý 0,35Z: 0.2544 
2Q 0.2P%54 0,2237 0,3430 0,? `, 57 
30 0,7? U 
' 
0?? n5 0,336 0,2`+05 31 0.7ß 4r) n, ? 1!, 4 0,4? 9?, 0,2450 
37 0.26i' (1.2128 0.321 ? 0,2408 
33 0.21,23; 0,2092 0.313t, 0,2361 
34 0.2`+( '. 0,2')6°) 0.3051: 0,2334 
35 (1.2511 0,2633 0,2A7'r 0 23n0 36 0,246 0,2ü?. h 0,2006 , 0,2779 
37 0.242i 0.20,18 0.2844 0,2747 
38 (1 .? 3t" 0.7006 0. Me") 0. y?. 1S 
39 C.. 233', 0. IQ1i3 0,2724 0,2183 
40 0,229" O, 21i14 0,2674 3.2148 
41 0,726 0.71)29 0.1624 ). 2113 
42 0,7231 0, V"7 0,2575 0 2(78 43 0. ? 22; ý r), 203cß 0,253.5 , 0.2050 
44 C1.22o? 0,2: 34 0,2498 0,7032 













0,? 34. ý 







51 0.24 iß 0,6574 0. ? 42A , 0.2115 5?. 31.46 t+. ýi,! ý, ýtºCý 0,253 0.0000 
53 0,000 0,0000 0,263; ( 0,0 400 
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YA91. E 41 Cnº1PLETC LISTIN(; OF L114 DA Cl1RVF. S Fv)R 1973 
TURNOVER NET PROFIT CASH FLOW GROSS INVESTMENT 
N. 
2 0.9634 1.4765 1.3489 0.5917 
3 0.6325 1,091a 0.9406 0.4097 
4 0.6723 0.8336 0.7869 0.3366 
5 0.6531) 0.83033 10.8147 0.3459 6 0.640A 0.7516 0.7456 0.4237 7 0.6451? 0.7220 0.7268 0.4377 
8 0.5800 0,6637 0,6700 0.4180 
9 0.5504 0.6387 0,6518 0.4251 10 0.5214 0.6222 0,6352 0.4206 
11 0.4870 0.5966 0.8016 0.4009 
12 0.4642 0.5F, 02 0.5815 0.3995 




0.5216 0.5302 0.3607 




0.4756 0.4794 0.3286 



























0.3568 0.3472 0.2564 
27 . 249 0 











30 . 2345 0 
u"3345 0.3185 0.2391 391 










0.3129 0.2951 0.. 2278 




0 2195 35 
36 
0.2121 




8 3 0.1993 
0.2903 
? ý'ý5Z 0 0.2710 
0 ,2 0: 2120 
0.2093 




0 2030 40 
41 
0,191 4 



























4Ä . 0.1713 
0,1691 
0,2609 





4S 1660 0 












0.2608 , 0.2296 
0,2297 
0.2330 







0 2486 0.3065 0.22? 4 . 0: 2522 
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TABLE 4: COMPLETE LISTING OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1973 (Cont'd) 
EQUITY EXPORTS NET ASS1TS NET CASH FLOW 
2 1.0657 0,6070 1.2444 1,3748 
3 0.6660 0.4830 0.7164 0.8408 
4 (. 7317 0.4122 0,6566 0,7131 
5 0.6873 0.3460 0,7481 0,7900 6 0.751b 0.4412 0.8151 0.7297 
7 0.7051 0,4424 0,6165 0,7026 8 0.6559 0.4513 0,758' 0.6610 
9 0.6040 0.4383 0.708'1 0.6414 
10 0,5567 0.4136 0,6707 0.6244 
11 0.5286 0.3890 0.6455 0.5932 
12 0.5041 0.3641 0.63''; 0.5564 
13 0.4911 0.3413 0.6182 0.5221 
14 0.4709 0.3234 0,5934 0.5034 
15 0.4494 0.3047 0,5641 0.4807 
16 0.4314 0.2.920 0.5370 0.4574 
17 0.4180 0.2784 0.5139 0.4427 











21 0.370.1 0.2423 0.4392 0.3754 










0,3420 26 0.3198 0.2180 0,3891 0.3333 27 0.3108 0.2136 0,378? 0,3245 
28 0.3030 0.2088 0,3678 0,3169 29 0.2961 0,2052 0.357; 5 0 3092 30 0.2895 0.2010 0.3471., , 0,3016 31 0.2824 0,1985 0,3369 0.2937 32 0.2769 0.1988 0,3280 0,2861 



















0.2315 45 0.2244 0.2049 0.2452 2291 0 46 
47 


















0 2175 51 
52 









0 21'36 54 
Mr 
0.2420 
'_ + C 
0.0000 
www. w 
0,2351 . 0.2125 
"ý"ý, " v. vvuv 0,2476 0.2138 
APPENDIX B 
TABLES OF CONCENTRATION 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNITS 
I 
TEXTILES (parts) 
Data relate to firms of combined activities 
in the following sub-sectors 
WOOL (NICE 131) 
COTTON (NICE 232) 
HOSIERY AND OTHER KNITTED GOODS (NICE 233) 
126 
together with vertically integrated 
finishing activities. 
TEXTILES (EAU) 127 
TABLE 1. TOTAL VALUES OF THE SAMPLE 1968-73__(N*- number of positive values) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TA) 
N f000 1968=100 N £000 1968=100 
1968 50 911,604 100 48 57,266 100 
1969 54 1,030,811 113 52 52,667 92 
1970 54 1,034,288 113 48 43,602 76 
1971 55 1,151,726 127 51 57,864 101 
1972 56 1,269,044 140 53 84,383 147 
1973 58 1,543,646 163 58 111,393 195 
TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION 
NI MEAN IVI GINI I H-H I ENTROPY 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 50 18,232 1.937 0.6266 95.0 -132.5 1969 54 19,089 1.947 0.6299 88.7 -135.8 1970 54 19,153 
. 
1.843 0.616_ 
. 1.5 -138.0 1971 55 20,941 2.145 0.6533 101.8 -131.9 1972 56 22,662 2.061 0.6357 93.7 -135.3 1973 58 26,607 2,089 0.6365 92.5 -136.8 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
1968 47 1,218 1.729 0.6458 84.9 -130.8 1969 52 1,013 1.727 0.6306 76.6 -137.1 1970 48 908 1.816 0.6358 89.6 -131.4 1971 51 1,135 1.808 0.6397 83.7 -134.4 1972 53 1,592 1.651 0.6?? 6 70.3 -139.3 1973 58 1,921 1.790 0.6578 72.5 -138.6 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; 
definitions of the four concentration measures 
are given on page 
TEXTILES (EAU) 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
L 0.576 0.587 , 550 0 0.590 
0.597 0.643 
4 CR 49,8 48.9 , 47.6 54.9 51.4 49.4 
8 L 0.436 0.456 n.. 428 0,574 
0.527 0.490 
41 
CR 66.2 63.7 62.5 65.3 63.9 63.2 
10 L 0.400 0.401 0.404 0.487 0.452 0.445 CR 70.4 68.0 66.3 6942 67.9 67.0 
ý2 L 0.359 0.344 0.360 0.420 0.403 0.390 CR 74.0 72.0 69.8 72.6 71.1 70.4 
20 L 0.275 0.261 0.238 0.291 0.278 
0.266 
CR 83.4 81.8 80.9 82.7 81.1 80.6 
30 1 0.218 0.201 0.183 0.224 0.209 
0.207 ¬ 
CR 90.9 90.1 89.7 90.1 89.0 8`ý"fi 
40 L 0.183 0.179 0.165 0.188 0.175 
0.174 } 
CR 95.9 94.9 94.9 95.2 94.3 93.8 
'SUMMARY COEFFICIEUTS OF LINDA CURVES 
























Ist Minimum L 0.436 0.460 0.435 0.590 0.525 0 53.7 CR 
N*M 
57.3 55.6 ' 54.2 54.9 56.6 . 55.2 
LS 5 5 5 4 5 5 0.822 0.749 0.585 0.773 0.752 0.800 
TEXTILES (EAU) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT 
129 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
L 4 0.482 0.567 0.483 0.463 0,453 
0.452 
45 0 CR 48.4 44.5 52.9 50.4 44.3 . 
8L 0.338 0.335 0.475 0.448 0.318 0.318 CR 69.2 63.6 65.1 63.5 62.5 64.1 
10 L 0.324 0.320 0.414 0.391 0.314 0.310 CR 74.0 68.3 69.4 67.8 67.3 69.2 
L 0.319 0.300 0.357 0.338 0.314 0.300. 12 CR 77.6 72.1 73.3 71.8 71.1 72.7 
L 0.282 0.229 0.255 0.230 0.217 0.235 20 CR 86.4 83.1 84.2 83.9 82.3 83.2 
L 0.228 0.185 0.195 0.185 0.177 0.201 30 CR 93.2 91.5 92.9 92.7 90.9 90.5 
L 0.189 0.159 0.164 0.172 0.156 0.173 40 CR 98.2 97.1 99.0 97.7 96.5 95.4 
'SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
























Ist Minimum L 0.322 0.154 0.483 0.463 0.304 0.299 
CR 66.4 98.0 52.9 50.4 65.4 67.5 
N*M 7 44 4 4 9 9 
LS 0.532 0.276 0.658 0.711 0.470 0.460 
130 
EAU TEXTI Lº S 
TABLE A; CrIJIPLFT<* LISTIN', fF LINDA CIIPVES FOR 
TU{JrfrºVLA IJET PROFITS 
N. 
2 1.4614 1.0466 
3 0.8141 01.6262 
4 0.576'. 0,4%120 
5 0.4357 0,3'i26 
6 0,46Y 0,3351 
7 0.456; 
Ii (). 43hä U. 33? sll 
9 0.4204 0). 3391 
1il 0.39 5 0.3235 
11 0.314)3 r). 32 (, 15 
1? 0.35;: -: 31 i36 13 0.353/ 0,3173 
14 0.345:; 0.311? 
15 0.3333 o. 309e. 
16 0.3211) 0 3(19z 
1? 0.30i;? 0,301A 1A C. 29oe; 0.2956 
1° 0.2+ 4'% n. 2rtb9 
20 0.274J. 0,2A17 
21 0.2951 0.2745 
22 0.759:. (1.2t 1 
23 0,25? _t 0.2649 24 0.2457 0.259° 






. 0,2434 2R 
29 
0.2252 
2211) 0 0,2379 . 0.23 32 
30 0,21 715 0,22130 
31 0.21 44 02ý 3 




202 , 0 
0,213A 
. 0 2s)Mo 
35 36 
0.199?: 
0 1`54 0,2060 . 4 0,2004 37 0,192x, 0,1971 




1) 1 301+ 
0,1892 
. 0,1F 73 42 0,1774 0.1852 43 
44 
0.1143 
0 1 71 1 
45 , 0.11; 111! 
0,11.5) 
0 19? 0 46 0.1653 , 0.1975 47 
4ß 
0.10,23 0,2183 0.1591, 0.0000 
49 00570 0 0000 50 0.1543 . 0.0000 
1Q6A 
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Ln11 TFXTTL! -S 
TA! ILE 4: CO tP .f 
Tz LISTIN', IF LIN()A C'IRVF"S F WW 1069 
-TUPMOV;; R NET PROF IT., 
N 
z 1.111>; 1,0741 




6 (1,4'1.41 (), 'Srl3ý 
7 0,6, c3. > 0.342.1 
9 0.4561) 0.3153 
0 0.4241 0.332o 
101 1), 4011 0.3 04 
11 p. ilr? o 0.3131 
17 p, 343' 0.2ý, Q 1-1 
14 0, ß2c, 14 0. 
15 0,31:! 0.272,11 
16 0, '(' t) 0,263r> 
17 0.2`4 16, 0.25 30 
is 0.2,112 0,2457 
19 0.27Uý. 11 .2 , 61) 20 0.7.! 'O 0.21; 17 
21 0.2'x; 0.22cs1 
27. 0.? 'sA1 0,2163 
23 0,23c": i 0.21 Cº 
21, 0.? i. 6" 0.2075 
25 0.220t, U, 7º; ýr. º 2(4 
27 0.20.0 
28 0.2037 0,1 r; 99 
20 0.? 02'i u, 11. » 3it O, 2th) 0,1,; 49 
31 0.1 0,1, '; 11) 32 0.195" 0,171 (4 
31 0.1941 0.1752 
34 0.1915 0.1719 
3S 0,14'1)1'. 0.1 citlh 
34 0,1 %tri'º 0,1656 
37 0,1? +t, 1 0 1047. 
3F; 0.1 A36 , 0.162.3 
3U 0 ,1ý 11 0.1604 4tº 0.1 7t's't (c, 1 59A 
41 0.1766 0.1575 
4. 0,17x44 ft, 1'ý5r 
43 0,171'' 0.1'144 
44 0.1c94 0,153e 
45 0.167.1 0,1 , ho 
46 0,164!, 0,1n7. ß+ 
47 11 AU . tº. 1iýh, 4R 1S1R 0 ` 0.1702 
41) 0.157: 1 0.1746 
Scº 0.15S: ä 0.10126 
51 0.153Z 0,191 52 0,151:; 0,2094 
53 0.1443 0,01º(ºf 
5 /A (), 1 4! 7 0.0Ö00 
EAU 1 EXTTLES 
TARLE 4: CnMPLETE LTSITV(; OF LT JDA CURVES 
MR 
TURNOVER NET PR[lFT TS 
N* 
2 1.0nß9 0.8541 
3 0.7456 0.6385 
4 0.5504 0.4825 
5 0.4353 0.5Lß6 
6 0. '834 0.5132 
7 0.4616 n. 5n38 
R 0.4277 n. 4747 
9 0.4237 0.4461 
1nn. 4041 n. 413% 
11 0.3809 0.3853 
12 0.3601 0.3566 
13 0.3392 0.3353 
14 0.3192 0.3203 
15 0.3039 0: 3049 
16 0.2,997 0.2905 
17 0.2757 0.9831 
18 0.2620 0.2727 
19 0.2501 0.2628 
2n 0.2382 11.2545 
21 0.226% 0.2477 
22 0.2222 0.239% 
23 0.2166 0.2314 
24 0.2112 n. 22, -i6 
25 0.2056 n. 2176. 
26 n. 1994 n. 2.124 
27 0.1950 0.2070 
28 0.1914 n. 2n? 4 
29 0.1873 0.1991 
3n 0.1935 0.1951 
31 0.1812 0.1908 
32 0.1790 0.1$463 
"33 0.1765 0018%8 
34 0.1749 0.1773. 
35 0.1734 0.1738 
36 0.1716 0.1705 
37 0.1705 X1.1673 
3R n. 1688 n. 1643 
39 n-1669 0.1622 
4n n. 1645 11.1639 
41 0.1 63 5" n. 1659 
42 0.1619 0.1711 
43 0.1601 0.1785 
44 0.1582 fl-1851 
45 0.15.62 0.1991 
46 0.154? 0.2267 
47 0.1522 n. 299R 
49 0.1502 n. 3ß79 
49 0.1481 0.0000 
50 0.1465 0.0000 
51 0.1448 0.0000 
52 0.1430 n. nnnn 53 0.1419 0.0000 








EAIJ T(XTT Lr: S 
TABLE 4: COHPLCTr LISTI? J& OF LINDA CURVES FOR 1971 
TUnr4(0VER NET PROFIT`; 
tr 
2 1.0323 1.0131 
3 0.6970 0,6569 
4 0,59oo 0,4632 
5 0.674d 0.4175 
6 0.43(14 (1.4715 
7 0.6227 0,4574 
8 0.5740 0). 4476 
9 0.5321 0.4165 
10 046 0.3912 
11 0.456u 0.3624 
12 0.419: 3 0,3: 181 
13 0.3582 0,3196 
14 0,36 56 0.3012 
15 0.3463 0.2(33 
16 0,3283 0,2673 
17 0.318A 0.2545 
19 0.30ö6 0.2423 
19 0.2'1 '= 0.2 : 16 8 
20 0.290 1 0.2, Q9 
21 0.2925 0.2? 21 
22 0.2737 0.2155 
23 0.2671 0.2095 
24 0.2601 0.2043 
25 0.2537 0.2019 
26 0.2479 0,19ßq 
27 0,2415 0,1950 
2R 0.2350 0.1(1107 
2'?. 0.2295 0.1j160 
34) 0,2236 0,1A69 
31 0.2188 0.1X17 
32 0.212(, 0.1794 
33 0.2074 0.1773 
34 0.2054 0.1755 
35 0.202x1 0,1743 
36 0.2001 0.173s1 
37 0.1972 0.1720 
38 0.1941 0,171A 
39 0,1909 0,1722 
40 0.1877 0.1717 
41 0.1855 0.1714 
42 0.1823 0.1709 
43 0,1800 0.1716 
44 0.1776 , 01723 45 0.1751 0 , 1755 46 0,1724 0,1 793 
47 0.170" 0,11322 
49 0.1677 0.1 A82 
49 0.1657 0.1929 
50 0.164e) 0.2056 
51 0.163: 3 0.2176 52 0.162 , 0.0000 
53 0.1620 010000 
54 0.1412 0.0000 
55 0.17d2 0.0000 
EAII Irr-XT ILt, S 
TABLE 4: Co)11f'LFTt: LIST1`P's )f Ll*. np CU VCS FO 1972 
TIIN4OVE: R W: E T PWUhi r-. 
N. 
2 1 .1A7? 0.9x; 1 
3 0.7211 0,6,12 el 
4 0.5965 0.45`!. 7 
5 0.5? 53 0.3.1 ", 
6 0.5471? 0.3S.? S 
7 0.55S1 3;; vß: 
P 0.5273 0,317° 
0.4' 36 0.3u411 
1ýº 0,45fIt n, 31.55 
11 0,42v, ß 0.3,, 51 
17 0.4OO2' 0.? Q19 
13 0. S7i;; 0.?,. 47 
14 0.3) 6Y 0.2 150f, 
15 0.337:; 0.266? 
I. D. 3231A 0.255") 
1? 0,3VAo o. 2441' 
18 0.2" 4 0.2 355 
10 0.2' 7A 0, Z? 5? 
20l 0.27It; 0.2167 
21 0.? f, 13 0.212r, 
22 0. Mi4 0.2. )6c; 
23 0.251(" 0.? "13 
24 0.2441) 0 111 7ý- 
25 0.237; ' 
. 
0 1tl'V 
26 O. 2: 'S 0.1"05 
27 0.2? S" U. 1 ßi14 29 0.219 0.1.145 
2° 0,214,. ' 01111 
3; 1 0,7tº'11 0,177? 
31 0.? 0S'I n, 1731 32 0.2001 0.1703 
33 0.19 0.1677 




0.1 Rai 0.16V n1 Ili) S 
3n 0,1 ., 03 0.15 8r) 39 0,17? 4 0,157v 




1695 0 0.1550 . . 0 153; 43 0.1667 0,152tß 
44 0.1 h4: i 0.1513 




0 15,83 ()1512 . 
4R . 0,1562 
0 1522 
0 1534 49 0.154: , 0.1546 5o 0.152iß 0 15("9 Si 0.1694 . q, 15Q5 52 0.1433 1b7h 0 53 
54 
0.1473 , 0.3264 0,1 4U2 O. Orý(ý, ý SS 
5b 
0.1ýºýýi 










EA i! 7r-:. TIu: S 
T1 !; 0: 4: 1.13T1`J'H (IF LI'"IhA CºJ(2VFS FQºZ 1973 
Tti?: IV n ý. F< týittFIT 
N+ 
0 SO 40 
4 ti, hl, l 0,410 7 
1S iýMu 03l.; l5 
! it ttt1 Q) . 3,1 4 
21, A1 
1A .; ,ý 43 14 3711 º1.1.,.. t_ 1ý; . A4. 'l( 
1'1 t)" 
1'; fº. 241ST 
It, Ü. i'"i' 0.2411 
2o (). 2,347 
21 ýi. 27ct' 0.22 ri3 
2 .? º1.14 4 
23 tt ,153. ' (, , 2; 4? 4 24 U.?? 16 
25 0,2's'? 1 0.21Q4 
2(, 0.229:. 0.21'71D 
27 n, 2, '3'(' '), 2136 
23 (0,21. x: 0.2, x°6 214 ? 1: 0,? t, 47 
3o 0.21'1. ' ! ), 21107 
3.1 C. 2117 0,1x: 74 
3; 0.2GSA' rt, 'I(ýt7 
3A v1y'%,; u I0o2 
34 }, 1; `", (; 1;; 3 
3S 0.1'1 0 . 1,16, ) 3 r, 01 Ii 6l, 0 16 41 
37 01 f" 3 r) :1 ; 11 6 
3i G. 17oi, 1, (, N *1 3Q +"l, 1% ý'% ß 1'l54 
Ott ^. 1??. ' +1,1? '_i1 61 l., 166) i). 1 I'* i, 
4? t1,1/, C , 1673 4: tZ, 1tý'3t o, 11,54 
44 16011, 0 161 
4"+ i! 15T - 01ole., 
4[, O. 15A'" 159 0', 
47 :), I 'ý 4: " 01 oil') 4R 11.151-. 111tß; 1? 
4( t) 1 4, J 110 1 5tt. 0; 141' tl, 1rºýýti 
51 tý. 14ýý a, 1 1 5? fß. 144: " 0.103 5z ý, 1 iý2. 0.1.1,24 
54 0,141"' ('1r, /.: 
S i; ". 7 ý': ý tº .1 
#'; 1 
56 0.161)1 0 1 !; 31 
57 ,, , 11 9. L, 
. ºý ,1 C'4 Ski t, lkhý" U.. ý;? r'Si., 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNITS 
SUB-SECTOR: WOOL (NICE 232) U. K. 
Prepared at the Cranfield Institute of Technology, Bedford. 
WOOL (EAU) 137 
TABLE 1: TOTAL VALUES OF THE SAMPLE 1968-73 (N = number of positive values) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
N f000 1968=100 N* f000 1968=100 
1.968 60 315,306 100 56 16,911 100 
1969 60 340,965 108 56 13,653 81 
1970 60 333,823 106 50 10,181 60 
1971 61 346,195 110 55 12,792 76 
1972 60 398,170 126 59 25,656 151 
1973 60 499,724 158 59 34,927 207 
TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 60 5,255 1.378 0.5600 48.31 -151.7 
1969 60 5,683 1.654 0.5818 62.25 -147.4 
1970 60 5,564 1.609 0.5725 59.84 -148.7 
1971 61 5,675 1.607 0.5829 58.74 -148.7 
1972 60 6,636 1.716 0.5947 65.74 -145.9 
1973 60 8,329 1.654 0.5942 62.26 -146.8 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
1968 
1969 56 243.8 1.703 0.6570 69.64 -138.4 
1970 50 203.6 1.242 0. j867 50.87 -143.9 
1971 55 232.6 1.361 0.6031 51.84 -145.8 
1972 59 434.8 1.653 0.6388 63.23 -142.7 
1973 59 592.0 1.694 0.6413 65.61 -141.9 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; 
definitions of the four concentration measures 
are given on page 
133 
WOOL EAU) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES. (L AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
L 0.302 0.483 0.541 0.454 0.525 0.554 4 CR 35.9 41.0 39.2 40.6 43.5 41.6 " 
8 L 0.250 0.340 0,319 0.334 
0.393 0.375 
CR 54.9 56.7 55,1 55.8 56.6 55.6 
10 L 0.238 0.298 0.272 0.294 0.334 0.318 CR 60.0 62.0 60.9 61,0 61.4 60.5 
12 L 0.225 0.276 0.243 0,263 0.296 0.268 CR 64.2 66.0 65.6 65.2 65.5 65.2 
20 L 0.183 0.218 0.212 0.206 0,213 0.199 CR 75.4 76.1 75.6 75.8 76.8 76.8 
30 L 0.145 0.161 0.155 0.154 0.159 0.151 CR 84.8 85.4 85.1 85.3 86.4 86.9 
40 L 0.122 0.133 0.131 0.113 0.136 0.133 CR 91.4 91.9 91.7 92.0 92.8 93.2 
SU14MARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
Ist Maximum L 0.628 1.119 1.097 0.404 0 664 0.640 CR 
N*H< 
19.4 26.3 26.1 26.0 , 37.4 36.2 




Ist Minimum L 0.245 0.276 0.242 0.113 t1,532 0.0 ' ' ' CR 48.2 66.0 68.7 99.5 31.1 29 . 7 N*'l 6 12 14 58 2 2 LS 0.365 0.455 0.387 0.206 - - 
1ý(1L__ýFAU. ), _, 
(CDnt' d) 
TABLE 3: LINDA If' DICES L AND 
_CONCENTRATION 
RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
139 
r 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.348 0.442 0.293 0.461 0.504 0.399 CR 41.4 46.0 35.9 35.4 41.7 45.1 
1 0.285 0.382 0.237 0.254 0.289 0,332 8 CR 60.0 60.4 54.5 53.1 59.5 60.7 
10 L 0.293 0.328 0.204 0.205 0.261 0.308 CR 64.3 65.4 61.2 60.7 65.8 65.6 
L 0.273 0.281 0.176 0.185 0.255 0.277 12 CR 68.2 70.0 67.5 66.5 70.0 69.7 
L 0.188 0.178 0.146 0.150 0.207 0.207 20 CR 80.9 85.3 83.8 82.3 80.8 81.6 
L 0.148 0.182 0.138 0.144 0.162 0.175 30 CR 91.3 92.6 93.4 91.6 90.2 90.0 
L 0.141 0.167 0.147 0.142 0.146 0.155 40 CR 96.6 97.3 98.2 96.7 95.8 95.3 
'SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
























Ist Minimum L 0.281 0.178 0.252 0.142 0.473 0.355 
CR 49.2 85.3 42.8 89.5 36.7 38.9 
N*M 5 20 5 27 3 3 
LS 0.142 0.327 0.378 0.231 0.608 0.443 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL COMPETITION 
IV/A-3 
A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION 
OF CONCENTRATION 
IN THE- UNITED KINGDOM 
PAPER INDUSTRY 
lqoý- 





140 kALI WO11L 
TA. I3l .E 4i COMPLCTr: LISTIw( OF LINDA C"RVF, S FOR 1968 
TURuOVE: R kEl' PROFIT:; 
N* 
2 0.6277 p. 5635 
3 0.4005 0.4544 
4 0.3021 0.3443 
5 0.24A0 0.2414 
6 0.2448 0.30-83 
7 0.2521 0,3)25 
8 0.250n 0.2; `. 52 
9 0.2634 0.2919 
10 0.23134 0.2932 
11 0.228" 0.2F 3.1 
12 0.2254 0.2127 
ý{ 0.22Gu 0 2581: 
14 0.2211 0.2463 
I5 0.2134 0.2341 
16 0.2055 0.223" 
17 0.200k 0.2128 
19 0.1951 0,202Q 
19 0.1KA9 0.1943 
20 0.1830 0 1;, A 21 0.1712 0.11#20 
22' 0.1714 0.1757 
23 0.1673 0.1700 
24 0.1633 0.1643 
25 0.159' 0.158" 26 0.1554 0,1575 
27 0.1531 0.1556 
2A 0.1507 0.152° 
20 0.1479 0,1497 
30 0.1451 0.1480 
31 0.143(1 0.1661 
32 0.140,1 0.1451 33 0.1384 0.14499 
34 0,1357 0.1447 
35 0.1329 0,1645 
36 0.130a 0.1442 37 
39 
0.1283 
0 1260 0.1450 . 0.1465 39 
40 
0.1239 
1216 0 0.1471 ý 0.1470 41 0.1196 0 1470 42 0.1178 . 0.1464 43 0.1160 0.1455 44 
45 
0.1145 0.1445 
0.1130 0.1438 46 0.1115 0.1442 47 0.109(1 0.1464 48 0.183 0.1481 49 0+1071 0,1510 
51 ' 
104`' 7 0 0,159o 
S2 . 0.1034 
0.1 856 
0.1716 53 0.1033 0.1762 54 0.103' 011853 55 
56 
0.1031 




0 1'U3+ß 0.0000 . 0.0000 Cn A 111336, vv ; ki 6cº 0.1041 0 , onoo 
F. AU tlnf)L 141 
TABLE 6; Cnrl+PLFTI LISTIw; OF LINrA CORVEC Falk 196Q 
TU4. OVCR rF'f PROFIT', 
ºr * 2 1.11' . 0.61224. 
3 0. fib 0.41275 
4 0.4' 3s!, *0.4 417 
5 0.6042 0.4149 
E, 0.389.5 0.4144 
7 0.3640 0.3v61 
8 0.3404 11 . 3. `, 17 9 0,3102 0,3`., 2.9 
1 (' 0.29141 0.32A 0 
11 0.2K02 0.3o31 
12 O. 27ä7 0.2.11 
13 0.277.3 0.2597 
14 0.271)4 07-4(13 
1! 0.2012 Q.?. 269 
1() 0.251'= (), 2172 
17 0.2.40; ` 0.2065 
1t; 0.2349 0,1Q57 
19 0.2260 0.1F6i 
2o 0.21.31 0,17x3 
21 0.21u(1 0.1 ft47 
22 0.202., 0 , im 23 0.1p61 0.1x377 
24 0.1891 0,1R 6 
25 0.1324- 0.1: 74 
26 0.1 704 0,1 v%59 
27 0.1 72n 0,1835 
2A 0.16e' 0ý1 3o 
29 0.161+1 0.1 1'323 30 0.1611 0,1815 
31 0.1573 0.13491 
37 0.1542 0,179 s) 
33 0.15L15 0,1776 
4 0 1 
35 $ , 4 
0,1731 
36 0.1427 0,1710 
37 0.14j)5 0,1703 
39 0.136 0.1695 
39 0.135' 0.1677 
4rº 0.1334 0.1 t,, f, 9 
41 0.. 1304? 0.1666 
42 0,121 h. 0,1656 
43 0.1274 0.1691 
64 0.1261 0.1723 
45 0.124: 3 0.1742 
46 0.1233 0.1758 
47 0.1217 0.1782 
48 0.1 200 0.1705 40 0.11 i3 0.1320 
So 0.116c" 0.1862 
51 0.1154 0.16691 
52 0.1144 0.2032 
3 
6 
0.11 32 0.22 +2 
0.1130 U. 24K5 
55 0.1131 0.2603 
56 0.113"' 0.39 45 
57 011131 0,0000 
58 
59 0` 9: 
1 1 1.1 0 0000 
0: On()n 
6cß 0.1133 0,0000 
EAU I-, nflL 
1t. 1. C /. s C+;, l. l'T. 1.1`ß`C1' º)f hI'It'A CtIRVrºt: z 1ý)+ý 
T ot, P"(1VI, (2 t, F; 'I' Pkt)F IT 
1. t)ü? (s, 57ý. ', 
3 (1,614 , '? 
5 w1,4567 0.? 54 
0.409 0.7. r> ., 
('. 4b 0. 
ý' (1.2r7ii U. 21 
1c, 10 .? 7? 02''t4(1 
11 02 f7 rti, 1"1 
13 co.?. '. 1() +i. 1/. r., I 
14 (}.? t"1+; 0.1ä_I"; 
1S 0,263k 0.1S3'". 
16 0.2 3Y5 0.1477 
17 0.7. .S 0 ,14i 1A 0.2 "; (;, 1 461 
10 0.21 15 0.1 
21' 0,7115 0 14Sel 
21 0,7+i; sý 0,14' 41,1 
2? 0,1" 0.1 620 
23 0.1 . y1 0.142Y 21" 0.1'' i? 11, I 25 0,1? 14 0,144 
21 e' ' 1l fi (j % 0. qiý. 1 r 
2t 
20 I:. 15Q4 111 
3(I U, 1''56 0,137,, 
31 0,151, ', 
32 0.1477 
3S 0.1t. 4') 0.1-, 91 
31, 0.1 t. 1 s' (i 1 '. 0 ". 
35 0.1394 0,1416 
3 !" 0.1 "ý J; 0.142'j 37 r) .1 r'i g' (0.1 411 38 0.1346 0.1437 34 0.132 0,1/157 










0 1 u? 
0 166/ 








0 11 4.211.5 . 2 0. U1)nn 52 0,1110 0,0(u0 
53 0,1(19, 001: `O, `) 54 0,104. 0,01 fC' SS 
56 
0.1r93 Q. gnOý (1.1 1191 A. piýgrt 
57 C"1(); 0 0)0o SF' tl' 1 n°º . 11.0000 50 0.1083 0, Q(10+) 6,1 t) .7 oa f*) 0" '» ,»I 
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EAIJ 0fl4JL 
TA LE4: Cc, r4PLFT.: LISTIPI OF LIWnA CWW vES ct 1071 
Tt'. J')VL r. r PR(IF IT; 
N+ 
2 0.9). c1s l). 71Q/a 
o. 5o2 
4 0.4545 (), 4607 
5 0.39 o9 0.. 3;; 46 
' 0.3901 ('. 3253 
7 0,356, E U. 2A W3 
0.2544 
ü, t0 0.2265 
10 0.293cl 0.2047 
11 0.27'ßf; 0,1 f) 4r3 
12 0.29 6,11 0,1654 
13 0,259.; t1,1 i'Sy 
11- U. 25ý, 4 0,1707 
15 0.251 0.1636 
16 0.241 1570 
17 U2 3"º. º º1,1 5x3 
is 0.2226 6.1490 
10 0.2141 (). 1512 
2o 0.20' 2 0,1501 21 0,1"u. S 0.1483 
22 0.19? e 0.146Q 
23 0.1 r. S 0.1456 
24 0,1h1. i 0,1651 
25 0,177 0,1433 
2cß 0,171v 0.1430 
2? 0.16t40 ('. 1622 
2H 0,1e$j 
. 0.14.25 29 0.1 5,, `' n, 1436 
30 0,1544 0,1437 
31 0.150t 0.1435 
32 0,1 4S'ß 0,1424 
33 1.142,; 0.1410 
34 0.1-397 0; 1394 
35 0 0.1305 
3/., 0.137'1 0.14114 
3? 0,1356 0.1405 38 0,1337 0,1414 
30 0.131 0,1/. 16 
4o 0.130rß 0,1421 
41 O, 1243 U, 1 42,1 
4?. 0,1261 0,14? 1 







46 0.1215 0.1448 
47 0.1201 0,1449 
4R 0.115,3 0,1464 
4 
49 0.11Y4 0.1167 
0.1479 
0,156x0 
Si 0.1159 0,16'40 
52 0,1155 0.172A 
51 0.1152 0.1313 




0.1 1 . 1) 0,0 0o SA 
51) 
(a, 11 ?7 il oor)(I . 0.11 So 0t 0t+ 0 
by tl, 11 ýl Ut)týOn 
61 0,113; 0.0100 
143 
EAU Wn01. 
TABLE' 4: Co fIPLETE: LIST! i OF LI, Jnn CURVES rtw 
TU' IJVE9 '-'CT PKOF1T, 
N+ 
2 0.5321 0.7421 
3 0.6641 0.472") 
4 0.5241) 0,504? 
5 0.5081 0.436; 
6 0.4652 0,3740 
7 0.4187 0.: 220 
a 0,3926 0.2819 5 
9 0.3 71 0.2564 
jo 0.3 536 0.2607 
11 0.5417 ; 0.252c: 
1?, 0.2V5. 0.254fc 
13 0.2A22 0.2545 
14 0.2tt9? 0,2510 
15 0.2543 0,244" 
1I+ 0.2461 0,2367 
17 0.2373 0.2291 
19 0.22d: i 0.2219 
10 0.2207 0.213M 
2o 0.2130 0.2068 
21 0.205.1 0.2014 
22 0.190 0.1956 
23 0.1911 0.1A36 
24 0.1860 0.1,22 7 25 0.13UlJ 0.1777 







3o 0.1'j`i9 0.1624 
31 0.1'$5 0 16( 32 0.1523 0,1595 
33 0.146ß 0,15i75 34 0.1462 0.1554 
35 0.14381 0.1529 
36 0.142 0,1510 




0.137? 0.1479 0.1461 
4o 0.1357 0 1461 41 0.1337 . 0.1453 
42 0'. 1317 0.144a 
43 0.1297 0,1443 44 0.1282 0,1450 






SO . 0,1223 
0,1492; 




0 1220 0.1554 





6 1216 0,1639 
57 . 0 '121 f. 
0.1605 
58 0,1210 0.1 ; n7 0 2124 59 0.1221 , 0.2714 
An 0.1242 0,0000 
ßq7? 144 
EAU wnfl 145 
TAFLE 4; CI)1 PlF Ti: LISTIll'i i3I LIº1! >A C1. ºi; ý11: ; Fnrl 1')73 
Tur, NhV,: R 'FT P1? (1FI 
2 0.5997 0.5424 
3 0. t31"c 0.3'i4A 
4 0.5542 U, 3U8S, 




0.3 .v 0: 34Z7 
A 0.3745 0.3; 123 
9 0.3467 0.3375 
1 ý) O. 31 r3 0.3079 
11 0.2'10 i; 0.2 0 l. 7 
12 0.2694 0.2772 
13 0.203' 0.2681 
14 0.253i; 0.2559 
15 (1.2411) 0.245A 
16 0.2i41 0.2364 17 0.226v 0: 2266 
1R 0.215.; 0,2172 
1r 0.20 3 0.2113 
2i) 0.19 6 0.2.1)A 6 
21 0.1931 0.2016 
22 0.1A63 0.1r)so 
2t 0.1791, 0.1u3Z 
24 0.173? 0 ,1 ! 10') 25 0.1c7', 0.1i 72 
26 0.1c, 43 0.1345 












0,1 74 0.1?? 3 
32 0.1444 0.1703 
33 0.1426 0.1077 
34 0.1400 0.165)' 
35 0.1350 0,1638 36 0.13t) 0.1617 
37 0.1365 0.159'5 
3R 0.1353 0.1577 
39 0.1340 0.15(, 7 
41 
0,1 31 3 0, U 3 
' 
42 1.1?. 97 0.1514 43 ). i ? t1 0,1503 











2 0.1-554 ( 4? 0.1 0,155d 











56 0.1236 0.1574 
57 0.1236 0.16112 





0 179 00 
. 11.00 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNITS 
SUB-SECTOR: COTTON (NICE 233) U. K. 
Prepared at the Cranfield Institute of Technology. Bedford. 
ý:: ý 
COTTON (EAU) 147 
TABLE 1: TOTAL VALUES OF THE SAUtE )968-73 N= number of positive values) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
N £000 1968100 N £000 1968=100 
1968 52 386,080 100 50 21,939 100 
1969 50 414,989 107 48 20,002 91 
1970 49 425,787 110 46 19,041 87 
1971 48 457,806 119 44 19,588 89 
1972 47 501,179 130 45 26,644 121 
1973 47 590,237 153 45 37,576 171 
TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 
1969 50 8,300 1.886 0.6789 91.1 -128.9 1970 49 8,689 1.799 0.6633 86,4 -130.8 1971 48 9,538 2.115 0.7070 114.0 -121.7 1972 47 10,663 1.999 0.6892 106.3 -124.0 
1973 47 12,558 1.966 0.6836 103.5 -125.1 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
1968 
1969 48 416.7 1.872 0.7112 93.9 -124.2 1970 46 413.9 1.939 0.7095 103.5 -122.3 1971 44 445.2 1.924 0.7535 106.9 -115.4 1972 45 592.1 1.911 0.7399 103.4 -117.7 
1973 45 835.0 1.897 0.7226 102.2 -119.5 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; 
definitions of the four concentration measures 
Are Given on page 
148 
COTTON (EAU ) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS CR) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4 L 0,399 0.428 0.450 0.740 0.639 0.587 CR 56.2 55.0 52.6 57.9 56.6 56.0 
8 L 0.464 0.434 0.411 0.495 0.461 0.433 CR 68.4 68.0 66.3 71.3 70.6 70.8 
10 L 0.411 0,377 0.356 n. 407 0.393 0.396 CR 72.8 73.0 71.4 76.6 75.8 75.5 
12 L 0,359 0.329 0.306 0.365 0.362 0.361 CR 76.6 77.3 76.1 80.7 79.7 79.3 
20 L 0.283 0.272 0.254 0.320 0.308 0.304 CR 86.5 87.8 87.4 90.1 89.5 88.9 
30 L 0.236- 0.244. 0.223 0.294- 0.280 0.270 CR 93,2 94.0 94.1. 95.3 94.8 94.6 
40 L 0.218 0.224 0.210 0 264 0.246 0.234 CR 97.0 97.7 98.0 98.5 98.4 98.4 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 















1st Minimum L 0.399 0.428 0.450 
CR 56,2 55.0 '52.6 
N*M 4 4 ý4 




















3 1 6 
0.577 0.577 0 0.453 . 453 
COTTON (EAU) Cont'd) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES L AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFITS 
149 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.334 0,356 0.541 0.403 0.371 0.375 CR 67.2 56.8 55.3 58.5 58.1 58,0 
L 0.582 0.382 0.378 0.361 0.373 0.426 8 CR 77.8 72.2 73.1 77.3 77.6 76.2 
10 L 0.515 0.353 0.369 0.305 0.348 0.401 CR 81.6 77.4 77.8 84.2 82.9 80.6 
12 L 0.468 0.321 0.340 0.293 0.343 0.373 CR 84.7 81.5 81.8 88.9 86.6 84.2 
20 L 0.389 0.298 0.300 0.388 0.376 0.337 CR 92.4 91.0 91.5 95.7 94.1 92.6 
30 L 0.363 0.281 0.281 0.456 0.383 0.330 CR 96.7 96.2 96.8 98.7 97.6 97.0 
40 L 0.361 0.269 0.302 0.570 0.384 0.330 CR 98.9 99.3 99.4 99.9 99.6 99, G. 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 























0.6096 0.9645 0.6604 0.5513 
N*H 
75.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
7 44 45 45 
1st Minimum L 0.335 0.356 . 503 0.390 0.320 0.318 CR 67.2 56.8 40.0 65.3 67.1 67.1 
N*M 4 4 2 5 5 5 
LS 0.426 0.409 0.533 0.440 0.407 
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FU 0TTPN 
TABLI 4: Crt+1F'LrT. LISTI=. J', tai LIºJ)A CºIRVES Fn; ) 1Q68 
TllýtNýº'J,; Ft 'JET PRººF I T'; 
2 0,5311 () . 01 3 0.4(121 U1.1)ri 
4 0.30; 45 (1.3: 147 
5 0.5(1äf. (), 4(, qJ 
6 0,5()75 0 5C'ta1 
0 . 4? ci7 6(19i) 
R 0.463:. (. 5-31,4 
'0.431 ? 0.55450 






0; 4(, %3 
13 0,3412 0,4551 
14 0.32711 0.4415 
15 0.3123 0.4? 43 
16 0,305s 0,41)6 t 
17 0.3011 0,4022 
1R 0.21) 4-t 0,3056 
19 0.2900 0 
.. 
3923 
2a 0.2M2ä u, 3%137 
21 0.2761 0. Yo 51, 
22 0.2693 0.3-171 
23 0.2. Aä5 0.3, 's62 21, 0.2611 0.3 1,30 1 
25 0.2541 0.3794 26 0,2501, 0.3741 
27 0,2457 0,3671 
28 0.2414 0.3452 
2'? 0,2377 0.36? 0ý 3a 
31 
0.23e, 1 
0,23äG 0,3632 0,3nzh 
3?, 0,2337 0,3015 33 0,233_`1 0,3397 
34 0,2321 0.356x. 35 
36 
02.3()? 
0: 226S 0.3-392 0,3595 
37 0,2257 0,3587 38 0.2243 0.3505 
39 0,2215 0,360? Ao 0.2163 0.: 'j09 41 0.21540 0.3605 
42 0.2115 0,3()33 43 0,2fl 4 0,3640 
44 0.2053 0.3643 45 0.203S 0.3,43 




ct., c.. 15 
Su 
0.202 1 
20611 0 U. 3a5S 
5 1 . O, z0y2. 
0.5469 
(º pýorý 52 0.2142 , 0,000, ) 
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EALI CflrTWN 
T413LE 4t Cltr. +PLUTI: LIST1r: °, OF LINA Crlrrvk FOR 1969 
7Ut4.1 'd.; ý; º, e7 Pk, iFIT:, 
NA 
2 (º, 577'; i), 5ýlpi) 





1). 3 i6?. 0. /, 11? 
A 0. ti, '.;,; G /b3 9 7 0, ß+f, 1 0,4'')65 
R 0.4341 O, 3,11 G 
9 0.39'. )r, O, 3529 
lit 0,37?. s 0 3519 
11 0,3516 0 5306 12 0,3?. » , 0,3 0 
13 (), 3(("1 094 
14 0.? K1(, 0,30111 
15 0.244 0.27.3 





ü. 2 14 
02925 
0.. 2962 
20 O. 271ä O. 2977 
21 0.271t' V. kr-'54 
2C 0.2675 0.? Q46 
23 0.2623 0.7966 24 0.25? `S 
2S 0.255,., 017.973 26 0.2531 0.2064 
27 0,250? 0.2937 
2A 0.2472 0 ,2 (110 09 20 0,245!, 0,23-S3 
3o 0.26. ' 0, ?. ßt07 31 0.241%+ 0,2756 
32 0.2391 0,27? 5 33 O. 237ä 0.2703 
34 0.235it 0.268F', 
35 
36 
0.2346 (). 2A7. 't 
0.2334 0.2691 
37 0.2313 0.2676 3A 0.229 0,7hF; 2 30 0.2267 0.2994 
4i 0.2743, 0.2690 
41 0.2211 0,2747 
4? 0.2141, 0 2793 43 0.2171 . 0.2671 
44 0.216? 0.3fl'ýk 4: 0.2147 0 32A. 3 
46 0.2163 0,343 47 0.2170 0.3597 4R 0.221) 0.5795 
40 0.2241 0.01)tlcl 
51, 0.2274 0,0000 
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LAU cnT TON 
TAB; I. F 4: COP-41II, F: Tr LI STI'1'ý ('F LINDA C'JRVES FOP 1970 
T UgNOVFR NET PROFITS 
N* 
2 0. ''315 U. Sýº; ºlý 
3 0.5314 0.6552 
4 0.4501 0,5rßO;: 
5 0.5()9. '3 0,5; )33 
A 0.40174 [1,41.03 
7 0,449(' 0.460; 'x0 
R 0.411; 1 0,37h0 
9 0.3`164 0,37 64. 
lit 0,3537 3(, 8r's 
11 0.3? 94' 0,3!; 60 
12 0.3051, 0.33'49 
13 0,2846 0.3? 70 
114, 0.274o 0,3160 
I5 0.2Aill 2 0.30V. 
16 0.2567 0,209; 
17 0.25h? 0,2974 
18 0.2542 0,2QQ3 
10 0.2561 0.2', 5 
2,1 0.253-. 1 0.3nnýý 21 0.2501 0,2977 
22 0.2464 (). 2062 23 0,2434 0.2933 
24 0,2392 0.2'; 00 25 0.235. ' 0.291A 
26 0.2321 0,2x: 14 
27 0.2312 0.21 9? 2A 0.22Ae 0,2(; S' 
29 0. ZZS6 0,2x,? 1 
30 0,2234 0,23n7 31 0.7233 0,2,121 
32 0,2235 0,2,415 33 0.2222 0.2, "06 
34 0,2210". 0,2h10 
35 0.2116 0.2 





0,1, x', (03 
0.2x 81 
39 0.211f, 0.2960 4iß 0.2101 0.3010 
41 0.201") 0.30.55' 






45 0,2078 0,3654 46 0.214~ 0,54,13 
47 0.2135 0,000i 4 
49 
0.2161 
0.2193 0.000' 0.01100 
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EAU COTTON 
TABLE 6: CU'-'PLFT; LISTIi! +t OF LlNiºA CURVES Ffl 1971 
TURNOVER NET PPi)F IT, > 
N* 
z 0.4 3 . ti 0.8? CºIJ 
3 0. S7'. i' 0,5110 
4 0,4L 0,411? 4 
5 0.7201 0.31; 61 
6 0.62n; 'ý 0.40A0 
r 0.533h 0,3u11; 
R 0.494, 0.3604 
9 0,4c., o 0.3325 
1 iº 0.4'7? 2 0.3051 
11 0.3154 0.31145 
12 ü. 3653 0.292.0 
13 0.3557 0.2994 
14 0.3401 0,3254 
15 0.322t, 0.3361 
1(1 0.31 r' 0.3430 
1y O. 3127 0.3537 
1.9 0.3191 0.3732 
10 0.320. 0.3821 
2tß 0. '31'ßl, 0ý 3 ,; 3 
21, 0.3190 0.3Y73 
22 0.315<s 0.4050 
23 0.31 tu4S 0.4121 24 0.3057 0.4176 
25 0.3050 04235 26 0. t03s 0: 42. A3 27 0.2995 0.4415 
28 0.2945 0.4486 
29 0.2943 u. 45Qs 
11 0.2930 0 4555 31 0.2Q1! ß . 0,4n91 
32 0.2877 0.4759 
33 0.2u3ä 0.41105 
34 0.27d? e. 4A36 
35 0.2754 0.4377 
36 0.27S4 0,41725 
37 0,21 ,1 0.5059 39 0.2687 0.5336 
39 3.2657 1). 5524 4i) 0.2640 0.57(14 
41 0.2'33 0.6162 
42 i1.26. is 0.6495 
43 0.2 e' 1. ' 0.611114 
44 0.2604 0.9667 45 +. 241:, 0.001(100 
46 0.2e 4: 0.0i)o(1 
47 0.2(, 91 0,0000 49 0.2-31)1 0.0090 
EAU 
TA ; ALE 4: 















14 0.3? A3 
15 0.3ßy:., 
16 0.3o2'! 
17 0.29? tJ 




22 (), 3033 
23 0,30,! 3 
24 0,29,  
25 0,? 94,; 
26 0,2933 
27 0,290? 















45 0,?. 9 
46 0ýý, 147 
(). 24:, ßi 
r. il 'T T (t *J 
(; iIPPLFT; -. l. i`; Ti. i'i +')F CIJPVE% F(II- 1972 
?! FT PROFIT' 
Il, ýiý '! 1 
ýl.! tel15 
0.3; Ut 
ü. ;?. rf1 
o,: 3U54 
0,3 . 11 
0,; 4t ?G 
















0,3 . 31 
0,3., 51 













TABLE 4: Cf}I i 11: 1 , LISTIM (iF LINDA CURVES FOP 1973 
TLJ ts0V;: K PROFIT;, 
N 
2 O. "11 0.531? 3 0, t, 2 o, 4025 




0, .; Sr 
0.31rÜ; 
7 O, 6' , 0,4116 
o 
9 () , 621ý 0,4114 10 (0 , 
3'J ,2 0,4 0 099 
11 0,3t94 0.3,375 
12 0,3614 0.3727 
13 6,35+1. -º 0.3716 
14 0 333 0.3618 
15 0,3176 0.3491 
16 0.3363 
17 0.3047 0.3237 
19 0.31)A3 0.3: i3h 
IQ 0.30º''; 0.3371 2t 0.3v 31 0.3372 
21 0.3(}01 0.33-5() 
2? 0.25'?? 0.332(l 
23 0.2917 0.33511 
24 0. ? fi:, 1) , 0 341% 25 0.28S5 
, 3419 0 26 0,2F37 0.3340 27 0.2ku1 0.3.09 
2A 0.27(, (' 0,3373 
29 0.2141 0.333 3. 0.27u: ) 0.32. 5 
31 0. ? M) 0 0.124,5 
3? 0.2(? 7 0.3? 78 
33 0,253.1 0.3267 
34 0.2550 0.3251 
35 0.2507 0.3237 
36 0.24fý<; 0,3235 







40 0.? 335 0,3101 
41 0.232.1 0.3366 
42 0.232. u 0.3401 
63 0.2343 0,3615 44 0,235, 0.3502 
45 ). 23? 2 0.5593 46 73, l 0011) 00 
47 0.237', 0,0000 
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SUB-SECTOR: HOSIERY & OTHER KNITTED G0003 (NICE 237) U. K. 
Prepared at the Cranfield Institute of Technology, Bedford. 
HOSIERY (EAU) 
157 
TABLE 1: TOTAL VALUES OF THE SAMPLE 1968-73 (N 'w= number of positive values) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
N £000 1968=100 N* £000 1968=100 
1968 60 364,691 100 57 25,904 100 
1969 60 392,215 108 56 23,539 91 
1970 60 431,175 118 51 25,399 98 
1971 60 461,597 127 52 29,692 115 
1972 60 483,018 132 56 33,314 129 
1973 60 583,750 160 57 42,193 163 
TABLE 2: MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 60 6,078 2.535, 0.6937 123.8 -128.4 
1969 60 6,537 2.530 0.6903 123,3 -128.9 
1970 60 7,186 2.583 0.6899- 127,9 -128.5 
1971 60 7,693 2.608 0.6983 130.1 -127.1 
1972 60 8,050 2.496 0.6869 120.5 -129.5 
1973 60 9,729 2.389 0.6841 111.8 -131.0 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFIT BEFORE TAX 
1968 57 454.5 2.065 0.7127 92.3 -129.6 
1969 56 420.3 2.318 0.7329 113.8 -123.6 
1970 51 498.0 2.473 0.7305 139.6 -117.1 
1971 52 571.0 2.248 0.7080 116.4 -122.9 
1972 56 594.9 2.185 0.69x0 103.1 -128.4 
1973 57 740.2 2.263 0.7133 107.4 -126.8 
Note: The mean figures are in thousands of pounds; 
definitions of the four concentration measures 
are given on page 
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TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 01: TURNOVER 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
1 
1973 
L 0,833 0.831 0.877 0.829 0.763 4 CR 52.9 52.3 53.5 54.6 53.8 
L 0.478 0.444 0,498 0.521 0.488 8 CR 69.7 69.5 68.3 69,9 68.7 
10 L 0.504 0.474 0,462 0.506 0,483 CR 72.6 72.7 72.4 73.3 72.1 
12 L 0.462 0,445 0.439 0.476 0.448 CR 75.4 75.5 75.3 76.0 75.0 
20 L 0.327 0.326 0,330 0.346 0.329 CR 84.0 83.6 83.4 84.0 83.4 
30 L 0,253 0.249 0.252 0.267 0.253 CR 90.5 90,4 90.2 90.3 89.9 
40 L 
0.215 0.216 0.210 0.220 0.209 
CR 94,9 94.8 94.8 94.9 94.6 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 























Ist Minimum L 0.478 0.444 0.180 0.184 0.175 0.449 CR 67.3 69.5 99.8 99.8 100 68.4 N*M 7 8 59 58 60 a LS 0.912 0.872 0.339 0.350 0.326 0.776 
ýý_:, 
HOSIERY & KNITTING (EAU) Cont'd) 
TABLE 3: LINDA INDICES AND CO;; CENTRATIO RATIOS (CR) 
VARIABLE 04: NET PROFITS 
159 
N 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
4L 0.550 0.612 0.856 0.622 0.650 0.632 CR 52.8 58,1 62.7 60.2 56.1 56.9 
8L 0.374 0.523 0.734 0.616 0.585 0.508 CR 69.7 71.4 73.4 71.4 67.7 70.0 
10 L 0.341 0.461 0.766 0.556 0,505 0.496 
CR 75.1 75.6 76.6 74.8 71.4 73.4 
12 L 0.332 0.422 0.792 0.486 0.431 0.442 
CR 78.9 79.0 79.3 77.8 74.8 76.5 
20 L 0,308 0.317 0.884 0,329 0.294 0.303 CR 87.3 88.2 88.4 87.0 84.5 86.1 
30 L 0.256 0,266 0.953 0.251 0.220 0.239 
CR 93.1 94.4 95.3 93.9 92.6 93.3 
40 L 0.230 0.251 0.989 0.224 0.201 0.223 
CR 97.0 97.9 98.9 98.2 97.2 97; 2 
SUMMARY COEFFICIENTS OF LINDA CURVES 
























ist Minimum L 0.332 0.512 0,623 0.551 0,506 0,506 CR 78.9 43.6 49.7 43.7 40.5 42.0 
N*M 12 2 2 2 2 2 IS 0.438 - -" - - - 
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TUW1nv H ýýE: r cýaýº ý I.; Ne 
2 1 , '721 ' (1.5124 
3 1,2?. 'i `i 0.7274 
4 0.8 106 0.61 20 
5 0. ' Sui; 0.5 596 
6 0.5416 0.5053 
7 0,4i; (. 'ß U. 5670 
64 1'! 0.522tc 
10 0.4741 0.4607 
11 0.4.5,97 0.4328 
12 0.4445 0,4222 
13 0.43.1ý) n. 4045 
14 0.66 (, r) 0.31,33 
15 0.4107 0.3633 
1 f, 0.39?, 1 0.3443 
17 0.3751 0.3421 
18 0,3583 0.3340 
19 0.3417 0,3251 
24 0.3259' 0.3174 
21 0.3123 0.3126 
22 0.3027 0.3054 
23 0.2948 0.2Q92 
24 0.? it-, 9 0.2914 
25 0,? 81M 0.2983 
26 0.274f) 0.7.832 
27 0.? 6*/5 0.2792 
29 0.2603 0.2751 
29 0.25411 0.2703 
3o 0.267 0.2661 
31 0.2431 0.2621 
32 0.2.9`, 0,2510 
31 0.23! +1 0.2540 
34 U. 2 . U? 0.251? 35 Jfj U, 21r 9.2449 
36 0.22514 0'. 24-9 7 
37 C. 2221, 0.2471 
38 0.2203 0.7491 
39 0.210, ) 017506 4o 0,2155 0.2510 
41 0.2121" 0,2519 
42 0.2094 0.2523 
4.3 0.207"= 0.2518 
44 0.2057 0.250' 
45 0.2035 0.2515 
66 0.2012 0.2542 47 9.19'91 0,2620 
48 0.146+; 0,21,84 
40 0.1945 0,272º3 
50 0.1924 0.2769 
S1 0.191 0.2105 
52 0.1+99 0.2850 
53 0.1p8i 0.2956 51. 0.1862 0,3069 








%a 0,1811 0,0o o iº i 7ciU r. ý, ýtinn 
60 0.1791 0,0000 
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TAt1L E 4t COMPLETE LISTING nF LINDA CURVES FOR 1970 
T 1)iiNnVF, k º. ET r'k0F ITy 
N+ 
2 1 . 87A4 0,622 3 1.1936 0 x031) 
4 0. K7? 1 0,3S5f" 
S 0,747: U, a1"15 
6 0.6192 Q, 7P. 91) 
7 0.54133 0.7122 
8 0,4977 0,6966 
9 0.4654 0.6579 
10 0.4620 0.6275 
11 0.45)7 ä. 5g30 
12 0.4391 0,5576 
13 0,4305 0,5197 
14 0.4204 0.4(ßn3 
15 0.404 ýi 0.4614 
16 0,3930 0.4327 
17 0.3775 0,4083 
18 0.3615 0,3872 
10 0.3452 0.3691 
2( 0,3301. 0,3517 
21 0: 3107 0,33SJ. 
22 0,3092 0,3?, 26 
23 0,2914?,, 0.3177 
24 0.2915 0,3056 
25 0,2A. S5 0,3005 26 0.2770 O, 2oS9 
27 0.2696 0.2,199 
29 0.2641 0,2.846 
29 0,2582 0.278? 
30 0,2521 0,2710 31 0,2453 0.2675 
32 0.231M 0.2638 33 0.2334 0,2592 
34 0.2301 0.254: 2 
3S 0.2? 6ö; 0,2513 




0.215(J 0.2561 0,2570 
39 0.2125 0 2591 44 0.210.3 , 0. Z`_º99 
41 0.2075 0,2614 
62 0.2045 0,7.651 43 0,202cß 0,2735 
4fº 0,2n()º' 0.2x14 45 0.1993 0, Z86tc 46 0,197(4 0,2422 
47 0.19b2 0.30 >7 48 0.194' 0,3414 
49 
5a 0,192A 0 1'+15 0.3706 , 0,42 24 Si 
52 
0.1ß9: t 
0 1846 015150 . 0,000n 53 0.187! 0.0000 54 
5S 
0.1AS9 
0 184? 0.0000 . 0.0000 56 
57 
0.1A24 
x 0106oo 0.1 1' 0.0000 59 0.1807 0.0001) 5 
Z it 
9 0.1801 
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TIJ' OVER ºJF1* PROFITS 
f, 
2 1. fc111 0.551 1 
3 1,14`"iß j 0,5x3 
4 0. A2. "1) r), 6221 
5 o. 646 0.6549 
(t, af: 'ýu 0.61 5#1 
7 0.515', (1 , 6259 8 c' . 521 4 00.6160 4 0.5136 6.5769 
1ýt 0.50: )5 0.551+3 
11 0.4ýs, 33 $2 10 
12 0.47$? u, 6861 
13 0.463tt 0,45,14 
14 0.4413 U. 4;; Ui, 
15 041`ßc 1), 41}78 
16 0.4OAO 0.3M7 
17 0.3921 0,. 3673 
18 0.3754 0.34; P 
19 0.3593 0.319'1 
20 0.34hß' 0.32x4 
21 0.360: 0.317`', 
?7 0.3323 0.3137 
71 0.321: ) i1.3ä70 24 0.31 S. ') q? " ) 
25 0.3661 0.7904 
26 0.2Qý ? 0,2ii1 S 
27 0.277 0.2733 
29 0,? ßu(+ 0,24'1 
20 0.?. 741 0,2583 
30 0,2674 0,2513 
31 0.2%)3 0.2456 
32 0.25: 52 0.2401 
33 0.26+1 0.2374 
34 0.261 ti 0.2335 
35 0.236,1 0.7314 
36 0.2332 0,2302 
37 0.2297 0.2291 
313 0.22! 0.2275 
39 0,2224 0.2259 
44 0.2196 0,2240 
161 0.2164 0,2? 37 
42 0.2134 0,7223 
43 0.2101 ., 2253 
44 0,2055 ), 2276 
45 0.20t t', 0,2346 
46 0.2043 0.7401 
47 0.201(l 0 2654 , 49 0,1993 0 , 2''i1S 49 0.1973 0.2(+27 
50 0.1951 0.2719 
Si 0.1 033 0.2,11 3 
52 0.191,5 0,3; 10 53 0,19: )1 13 41 Cä)()0 54 0,1A86 0,0000 
55 0.1873 0,0000 
56 0.18,, 0,0000 
5? 0.1654 4,0,10,. E 58 0.1)143 0,0000 




TABL E 4: Co NIPLFTt: LISTIN'i OP LINDA C'112VES FO 1972 
T UQNOVER NET PRI)FITs 
N" 
2 1.7209 0.5057 
3 1.0388 0.5312 
4 0.7630 0.6500 
5 0.6686 0.5713 
6 0.5795 0.6187 
7 0.5110 0.040 
R 0.4684 0.5a/. 5 
Q 0.4866 0.5479 
10 0.4832 0.5046 
11 0.4627 0,4663 
12 0.447.: 0.4314 
13 0.4296 0.4024 
14 0.4137 0.3352 
15 0,3944 0,3659. 
16 0,3624 0,3536 
17 0.36-30 0.3390 
1R 0.3541 0.3235 
19 0.3421 0.3086 
20 0,3289 0.2938 
21 0.3230 0.2814 
22 0.3148 0.2694 
23 0,3053 012580 24 0.295>- 0.2523 
25 0,21887 0.2485 
26 0.2609 0.2431 
27 0.2730 0.2376 
28 0.2665 0.2320 29 0.2595 0.7261 
30 0.2520 0 2204 31 0,2464 , 0,2151 
32 0.23"- 0.2090 
33 0.2338 0.2072 
34 0.230" 0.2042 35 
36 
0.2269 
0.2227 0.2020 0.2019 37 0.2192 0.211.00 38 0.2157 0,2018 
39 0.2126 0.2719 4n 
41 
0,209? 
0.2074 0.2013 0.2006 
42 0 . 205,1, 0.2005 43 0.2036 0,2004 
44. 0,2019 0,2n01 i 45 0.1997 0,1092 46 0.1973 0,1091 
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APPENDIX C 
ESTIMATES OF TOTAL SUB-SECTOR SALES 
1. Wool and worsted 
1969 No data available 
1968 ) Census of Production figures available. Figure used 
1970 ) was "sales of goods produced and work done" by 
1971 ) establishments classified to the sub-sector. 
1972 ) Data produced in Business Monitor PQ 414, third quarter 
1973 ) 1974 referring to establishments with 25 or more 
employees. In 1971 (Census) such establishments 
accounted for 95 per cent of total employment. The 
figures for 1972 and 1973 were therefore multiplied by 
100 to give estimates of total turnover of establishments 
95 
classified to the sub-sector. 
Resulting estimates (fm) 
Overall turnover of sub-sector Sample total Sample as _% 
of overall 
1968 559 315.3 56 
1969 - 341.0 (58) 
1970 56t 333.8 59 
1971 530 346.2 65 
1972 626 398.2 64 
1973 835 499,7 60 
2. Cotton 
The main difficulty relates to vertically integrated firms (explained 
in the main text p. ). About 70 per cent of all cotton and man- 
made fibre spun yarn is used for weaving, and in 1968 about 45 per cent 
v 
°;. ý :. ý 
171 
of all weaving capacity was held by vertically integrated concerns and the 
effects of vertical integration varies considerably between firms, 
while some use over 70 per cent of their own yarns and büy little 
yarn from outside, in others less than 50 per cent of yarn production 
is used within the firm and more than 50 per cent of yarn consumption 
is purchased outside. On the other hand, the large vertically integrated 
concerns have a greater proportion of modern looms which they use more 
intensively, so that the 45 per cent of weaving capacity understates 
their share of cloth output. In addition, as much as half of the 
12-14 per cent of sales of cotton and spun men-made fibre yarns going 
to knitting are probably inter-group transactions (since weft-knitting 
of such yarns, as opposed to filament or worsted type, is carried out, 
mainly by firms with Lancashire spinning interests). As a broad 
estimate it is assumed that 40 per cent of all yarns spun on the cotton 
system are used for weaving or knitting by the same company. This 
proportion was deducted from the 1968 Census figure of turnover in 
cotton and man-oade fibre spinning and the residue was added to weaving 
sales to give a combined figure for sales to outside firms by companies 
in the sub-sector. This figure came to £433 oillions and the sample 
total of 52 firms with turnover exceeding £1 million in this sub- 
sector represented 73 per cent of this overall total for about 590 
firms. 
There is very little information about vertical integration since 
1968. If it were assumed that inter-group sales of yarn remained at 
40 per cent theit the percentage of cotton industry turnover represented 
by the sample in 1973 would be 80 per cent. With a greater degree of 
vertical organisation now existing in some major groups, the ratio 









3. Hosiery and Knitwear 
Data are available exactly as for wool and worsted. The ratio for 
adjustment of figures for 1972 and 1973, to include firms employing 
fewer than 25 workers was 1.04: - 
Resulting estimates fm) 
Overall turnover of sub-sector Sample total Sample as % of overall 
1968 437.3 364.7 83 
1969 - 392.2 (82) 
1970 537.6 431.2 80 
1971 533.4 461.6 87 
1972 580.7 483.0 83 
1973 662.3 598.8 90 
0 
APPENDIX D 
RANKING OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
The use of parameters of the Linda curves to compare concentration in 
different variables is valid only if the ranking of companies is 
similar for each of these variables. This has been tested by use of 
rank correlation coefficients. 














































Wage-bill 0.80 0.94 
Net profits 0.66 0.62 0.63 
Cash flow 0.73 0.65 0.70 0.94 
Gross Investment 0.59 0.59 0.67 0.67 0.74 
Equity 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.61 0.64 0.58 
Exports 0.56 0.37 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.45 
Net assets 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.6%,:,, 0.70 0.65 0.91 0.56 
Net cash flow 0.73 0.64 0.69 0.90 0,99 0.73 0.75 0.41 0.69 
2. RANK CORRELATION MATRIX: ENTERPRISES 1973 
Turnover 
Employment 0.76 
Wage-bill 0.79 0.93 
Net profits 0.79 0.61 0.65 
Cash flow 0.54 0.66 0.69 0.53 
Gross Investment 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.50 
Equity 0.80 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.57 0.54 
Exports 0.39 0.24 0.22 0.38 0.53 0.26 0.37 
Net assets 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.55 0.55 0.88 0.33 
Net cash flow 0.82 0.67 0.71 0.89 0.46 0.49 0.82 0.34 0.81 
174 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY UNITS 
COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN LOGARITHMS OF TURNOVER AND NET PROFITS 
(For checking ranking of net profits and turnover: see text p. 
for reasons why this measure was preferred to rank correlation 
coefficients). 
Wool Cotton Hosi_ Combined sub-sectors 
1968 0.753 0.756 0.885 0.735 
1969 0.752 0.761 0.872 0.734 
1970 0.756 0.772 0.825 0.733 
1971 0.765 0.782 0.811 0.739 
1972 0.765 0.795 0.808 0.737 
1973 0.763 0.805 0.859 0.732 
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APPENDIX E 
ADDITIONAL COMPANY INFORMATION 
This Appendix presents in summary form the following information: - 
1. Major acquisitions 
2. Mergers 
3. Financial links between companies 
4. Links between Boards of Directors 
5. Family ties 
]1 MAJOR ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES WITHIN THE SUB-SECTORS 1968.73 
(with reference to more recent developments) 
These are listed with the names of the acquiring companies in alphabetical 
order. The list relates only to the acquisition of companies with annual 
sales turnover of over fl million at the time. The date of "acquisition" 
refers to the year in which a 
. 
majority holding of equity was obtained. 
Turnover in 
Name of Acquiring Co. Name of company acquired Previous Year 
(f000's) 
AGREMIN LTD. (cotton sub- 
sector) 
1973 
WILLIAM BAIRD TEXTILES LTD. 
(cotton and making-up) 
1970 
1971 
BODYCOTE INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
(Holding company in clothing 
and textiles) 
1971 
Clover, Croft & State Ltd. 
(spinners) 1215 
India Mills (Darwen) Ltd. 
(weaving) 3913 
J. H. Buckingham Ltd. 
(clothing group) 6215 
Valdown Jersey Fabrics Ltd. 
(Jersey knitting) 2078 
176 
1971 Philip Brocklehurst Group 
purchased from Slater Walker 
Securities 
(mainly spinning and weaving 1200 
of man-made staple) (approx. ) 
CBR JERSEY HOLDINGS LTD. 
Knitted jersey fabrics) 
1972 Bellami Knitwear Ltd. 
(knitted garments) 1837 
CARRINGTON & DEWNURST LTD. 
merged into Carrington- 
Viyella December 1970) 
1968 Jersey Kapwood Ltd. 
(Warp-knitting) 7596 
COATS-PATON LTD. 
1969 West Riding Worsted & Woollens Ltd. 
(woollen and worsted spinners, 
weavers and k!; itters) 26779 
Dalkeith Knitwear Ltd. 
(knitwear) 1482 
1970 Herbert L. Driver Ltd. 
(knitwear) 2358 
D. Byford & Co. Ltd. 
(knitwear) 5107 
COURTAULDS LTD, 
1968 Prew-Smith Knitwear Ltd. 
(knitwear) 2700 
Clutsom-Penn International Ltd. 
(elastomeric fabrics) 19000 (est) 
Contour Hosiery Ltd. 
(hosiery) 3881 
I. & R. Morley Ltd. 
(hosiery and knitwear) 4161 
Ashton Bros & Co. Ltd. 
(cotton spinning and weaving 
and household textiles) 16033 
Northgate Group Ltd. 
(knitted underwear) 12000 (est) 
177 
Moygashel Ltd. 
(rayon and linen fabrics 
and garments) 22000 (est) 
R. Rowley & Co. Ltd. 
(hosiery and knitwear) 2000 (est) 
1971 C. H. Fletcher Ltd. 
(woven dress fabrics) 1488 
1972 Harwood Cash & Co. Ltd. 
(cotton and man-made fibre 
spinning, knitting & weaving) 6310 
JOSEPH DAWSOI (HOLDINGS) LTD., now DAWSON INTERNATIONAL LTD. 
1970 Blackwood Bros 1355 
Braemar Knitwear 2500 (est) Ballantyne Sportswear 
(knitwear) 
Ballantyne Spinning 
ROBERT GLEW & CO. LTD. 
1972 Emu Wools Ltd. 
(Hand-knitting wools) 2682 
ILLINGWORTN MORRIS & CO. LTD. 
1968 Winterbotham, Strachan & 
Payne 4000 
1971 Woolcombers Ltd. 25000 
John Emsley Ltd. 3600 
(all in sections of woollen 
and worsted) 
LONRHO LTD. 
1969 David Whitehead & Sons Ltd. 
(cotton spinners and weavers) 7400 
NOTTINGHAM NUFACTURING CO LTD. 
1973 Lancaster Carpets and 
Engineering Ltd. 
(Carpet yarn, carpets and 
engineering) 15070 
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SIRDAR L! D" 
1972 John C. Horsfall & Sons Ltd. 
(Hand-knitting wool) 2720 
SPIRELLA LTD. 
1968 R. Greg (Holdings) Ltd. 
(cotton spinning and weaving) 4500 
1970 Horrockses Ltd. 1680 
Dorcas 1490 
(Household textiles) 
Stott & Smith Group Ltd. 1830 
. rt 
5TROUD RI LEY LTD. 
1973 James Drummond & Sons 3000 (est) 
VANTONA LTD. 
1973 Cromer Ring MII Ltd. 3062 
Sne1973 
1975 Min 
,gb Morris acquired majority holding of Troydale Industries Ltd. (see Appendix F). 
1975 S irella acquired almost all equity of Vantona Ltd. 
1975 Tootal acquired Trutex Ltd., shirt manufacturer. 
ýý ý, ý. 
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2. MERGERS 
The principle mergers during the survey period are described in Appendix F 
because they involve the largest companies. They include: - 
(a) The amalgamation of Calico Printers' Association and English Sewing Ltd. 
to form English Calico Ltd., renamed Tootal Ltd. in 1973. 
(b) The merging, financed by I. C. I., of Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd. and 
Viyella International Ltd. in 1970. 
Another merger, not reported in Appendix F, was that which established 
British Mohair Spinners Ltd. from two spinning concerns in 1969, joined 
by a third firm in 1970. The combine, with a total turnover of £12.4 mil- 
lions in 1973 is partly owned by Illingworth Morris and Co. Ltd. 
As well as the large mergers which are reported in the text, there have 
been numerous amalgamations of small firms since 1970 often encouraged by 
the Department of Industry (or its predecessors). One reason for some 
mergers has been economy of floorspace, achieved by capital investment 
and high utilisation through multiple shiftwork. 
3. FINANCIAL LINKS BETWEEN COMPANIES 
In Section IV, the statistical analysis of concentration, an enterprise has 
been defined as a separate unit unless a majority of its equity (with voting 
rights) is owned by another company. (This follows normal U. K. accounting 
practice. ) In most cases the majority holding has been close to 100 per cent. 
There are however several companies in both the enterprise and activity unit 
analyses, which are partly owned by other companies in the sample, by fibre 
producers or by retail groups. These financial links have been identified 
from company accounts (English and Scottish law require that a company 
declare a holding of ten per cent or more of the equity of another company) 
} 
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and in other cases by a search of lists of members (shareholders) also 
held at central registries in London and Edinburgh. As far as ; the second 
category is concerned, the list belo4t refers only to 1973 and to holdings 
of atleast°two -per cent.. -Because there is no published global 
inform- 
ation with which the-detailed results of the search can be compared, the 
list of links may not be exhaustive (certain equity-holdings may have 
escaped the attention of the researchers). 
(a) Minority holdings by one firm in the textile sub-sectors of the equity 
of another 
Courtaulds Ltd.. 
(i) Highams Ltd. - holding of ordinary shares built up to. 29 per cent 
by December 1974 (but Government has requested that this be 
reduced to 25 percent and that voting power not-be used to 
influence policy). 
(ii) Tootal Ltd, -refight per cent of ordinary shares throughout s14 
, 
urvey 
period. Courtaulds represented on the board of Tootal until 1974. 
r4 
Illi_ngworth Morris Ltd. 
Pursued a policy of gradual acquisitions throughout period. At 31st March 
1974 principal equity holdings were: - 
(i) British Cotton and Wool Dyers. ' Association Ltd. ! 36.7 per cent 
of ordinary shares. 
(ii}British Mohair Spinners - 18.4 per cent of ordinary shares. 
(iii) Field Brothers Ltd. - 21.6 per cent of ordinary shares. and 5.1 
per cent of preference stock. 
(iv) George flallinson and Sons Ltd. -'39-per cent of ordinary shares. * 
tle (v) Troydale Industries Ltd. - 26 per cent of ordinary shRares. 
''ä Cl ks. 
ý; ý, 
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(vi) Yorkshire Fine Woollen Spinners Ltd. - 24 per cent of ordinary shares 
and 26 per cent of preference stock. 
In the analysis of, the wool sub-sector firms (ii), (iii), (v) and (vi) have 
been included as separate units along with Illingworth Morris. The combined 
sales of Illingworth Morris and these four associate companies amounted to 
£111 millions in 1973 - 18.5 per cent of, the sub-sector total. 
(vii) Tootal Ltd. - approximately two per cent of ordinary shares; no 
board representation. 
William Baird Group Ltd. 
Joseph Dawson (Holdings) Ltd, now Dawson International Ltd. - 20 per 
cent of equity 1968, increased to 28 per cent 1970 to date. 
Bulmer & Lumb Ltd. 
(via company pension fund), John Haggas Ltd., - holding less-than 
one per cent. 
(b) Holdings by I. C. I. Ltd. 
(i) Carrington-Viyella Ltd. - 64 per cent of ordinary shares but not 
treated as subsidiary in company accounts because of agreement with 
government not to use voting power beyond 35 per cent. 
S -a 
t^5 Sr 
(ii) Lister Brothers Ltd., (woollen and worsted) - 20 per cent of ordinary 
shares. No knowledge of any board representation. 
Tootal-Ltd. - eight per cent of ordinary shares with a representative 
on the board. 
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(c) Holdings by customer grou s 
Marks and Spencer ltd. 
(1) John Spencer Ltd., weaving concern - 33 per cent of equity, company 
liquidated in 1970. 
(ii} Corah Ltd., knitwear company selling most of its output to Marks 
and Spencer - 26 per cent of ordinary shares held by retailers' 
pension fund. 
(iii) Nottingham Manufacturing Co. Ltd. - three per cent of ordinary shares 
held by retailer. 
4. LINKS BETWEEN BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
Individual directors of company (a) are also directors of (b). In most cases 




` I. C. I. 
William Baird 
Illingworth Morris 
Stroud Riley Drummond - No known financial link 
UU Textiles - No known financial link 
Tootal 




(1974, before acquisition) 







These cannot be analysed systematically because of problems of identi- 
fication. Certain family names appear in shareholders' lists e. g. one 
minor shareholder of Carrington-Viyella is William Baird and a Simon 
Courtauld is a minor shareholder in Illingworth Morris. These are merely 
interesting reminders of the long tradition of the textile industry and 
of the important role of certain families. 
Within smaller firms in Lancashire and Yorkshire a number of families 
were found to have substantial investment in a number of companies which 
trades as separately. For example almost all the equity of the Oldham 
Tyre Cord Company (1973 turnover just over £2 millions) is held by one 
of two brothers who also control four other separate cotton textile companies 
(not consolidated in the accounts) as well as engineering, warehousing and 
light aviation concerns. Treated as a single firm, the Dunkerley textile 
holdings yield an annual turnover in excess of £5 millions. 
Historically, many clothing-manufacturing firms in the U. K. were developed 
by religious minority groups - e. g. exiled French protestants, and, especially 
in North-West England, Jews. The importance of Jewish families in clothing 
and in retail4ng is reflected in family ties between companies - often by 
marriage. These ties are reinforced in som¬ cases by investments in equity 
but only of a minor, order. There is no evidence that these family ties 
influence trading by the companies concerned, which are forced by competitive 
conditions to trade on "price and quality and nothing else". 
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APPENDIX F 
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR TEXTILE COMPANIES 
This section describes each 
group" in textile processing 
over, profits, cash flow and 
comparison. These companies 
Courtaul ds 
)f, the five companies which formed an "oligopoly 
in 1973; for each there is an analysis of turn- 





I11 i ngworth tlorri s& Company 
A less detailed analysis is presented of three other groupings; 
Nottingham Manufacturing Company 
William Baird icy . iles/Joseph Davison - 28% of the equity is owned by the 
William Baird Group, 
Vantona/Spirella which were separate companies during the survey period 
but which were combined in September 1975 when Spirella acquired Vantona. 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of the integrated structure of the five major groups, inter-group 
sales account for a large proportion of output at the earlier stages of 
the production process. In order to identify the importance of each stage 
of textile processing to a vertically integrated concern, it would be 
necessary to analyse value added, of which detailed information is rarely 
published. Analysis of sales to third parties tends to overstate the 
importance of later stages in production and distribution. 
Quite apart from commercial security in this competitive environment, this 
is a logical reason for the decision by certain of these big groups not to 
publish a breakdown of sales sufficiently detailed to permit identification 
of the three sub-sectors. For the purposes of this report, it has been 
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necessary to produce estimates in such cases, One of the most useful 
sources for this purpose was a detailed financial analysis of the four 
largest groups produced in May 1973 by the London stockbrokers de Zoete 
and Bevan (Ref. 8). Two months of investigation by the Cranfield research 
team produced results very similar to those of these earlier researchers. 
Comparison of financial results is distorted by a number of factors: 
(a) Figures of net assets and equity are distorted by inflation because 
of which the book value of capital is excessively affected by age. 
Periodic revaluations aggrevate this distortion. 
(b) Depreciation reflects the book value of fixed assets and is also 
affected. This leads to difficulties in comparison of net profits. 
(c) Companies differ in the methods whereby they allocate funds for 
taxation. Because of accelerated depreciation for tax purposes, 
most companies subtract from net profits an amount representing 
deferred tax liability, arising from loss of future tax relief. 
This means some distortion of cash flow figures. 
This last element of distortion is probably the least substantial and 
absolute comparison of the ratio of net cash flow (net profits + depreciation - 
tax) to sales achieved by different companies is believed to be reasonably 
valid. Comparisons of ratios involving net profit, net assets, or equity 
should relate only to variations over time and, even then, the existence of 
possible distortions should be considered. 
Comparative results for five major companies 
(a) Growth of sales 
Sales turnover figures are, of course, affected by inflation, but the 
relative growth of different companies may be compared. 
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U. K. Textile Sales in im. 1973 aS 
1968 1973 % of 1968 
Courtaulds 228 385 168 
Carrington-Viyella 138* 169 122* 
Tootal ? 2+ 95 131 
Coats Paton 78 136 174 
Illi ngworth riorri s 30 83 276 
All other firms in 
textile sample 365 
Two companies in 1968 
+ Adjusted from 13 to 12 months 
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(b} Net cash flow as percentage of total company sales 






Courtaulds 9.2 9.2 8.9 11.0 12.0 13.7 
Carrington-Viyella n. a. n. a. n. a. 5.5 6.0 7.1 
Tootal n. a. 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.9 6.9 
Coats Paton 9.1 7.3 6.8 7.8 8.6 9.7 
Illingworth Morris 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.9 6.4 4.7 
This table shows the stronger position of Courtaulds which benefits partly 
from its position in the more profitable activities in man-made fibre pro- 
duction and also from low taxation payments, explained in the section 
dealing with that company. In the case of Illingworth Morris, the ratio 
of cash flow to sales is somewhat reduced-by the subtraction from net 
profits of payments to holders of minority interests:. 
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It may be observed that the three companies for wn. ich comparable data 
can be assembled all experienced a loss of profitability in the recession 
of 1969/70. Further comments on this aspect were presented in Sections IV 
and Vi. 
(c) Overseas Activities 
In four of the five cases, the proportion of turnover represented by exports 
and sales by overseas subsidiaries has increased. One main reason for this 
was the depreciation of sterling which increased the unit value of overseas 
sales and also, by increasing profitability, gave greater incentive to sell 
overseas but also permitting companies to adapt competitive pricing policies. 
Another factor has been the slow growth of the U. K. market combined with 
price restraint. 
Overseas sales (including exports) as% of total 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Courtaulds 36 39 39 40 45 48 
Carrington-Viyella - - - 17 23 26 
Tootal 40 43 42 47 52 56 
Coats Paton 68 67 70 69 71 74 
Illingworth Morris* 25 28 28 13 15 14 




Of all the companies included in this study, Courtaulds Ltd was 
found to have the largest turnover in the three sub-sectors combined. 
When its world-wide activities, including the production of man-made 
fibres, are considered, Courtaulds has the largest turnover of any 
textile company in the world. 
' The company's world-wide turnover 
in all products in 1973-4 was £957m, U. K. turnover (including exports) 
was £717m and the company employed 125,000 in this country. 
The company originated in silk manufacture but its growth until the 
early 1960's was due mainly to its development of cellulosic fibres, 
viscous rayon and acetate, which the company pioneered in the first 
quarter of the century. Immediately before the 1939-45 war, 
Courtaulds entered into an agreement with I. C. I. Ltd. for the 
establishment of British Nylon Spinners Ltd., with sole British 
rights to nylon production. During the 1950's the company decided 
upon a number of ýolicies with the aim of reversing a declining 
trend in profits. These included (a) commercial development of 
new triacetate yarns and acrylic fibres, (b) "rationalisation" 
of the British rayon industry by acquisition of British Celanese 
and five other rayon firms and closure of certain older rayon 
plants and (c) riversification into packaging and paints. 
By 1960 these policies had pushed profits up to a record level but 
a subsequent drop in earnings led to a sharp weakening of the 
company's share price. In December 1961, I. C. I. made a takeover 
bid, at that time the biggest in British industrial history. This 
1 G. Delanoe: Report on Courtaulds in a series "Analyse des Groupes", 
DAFSA, Paris, December 1974. 
Information taken "A Brief History of Courtaulds, " published by Courtaulds Ltd., in 1969. Subsequent quotations in the next 
paragraphs are from this text. 
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bid failed, leaving I. C. I. at the end of the battle in March 1962 
with 38% of Courtaulds equity capital. In August 1964 this holding 
was exchanged for Courtaulds' 50% interest in British Nylon Spinners 
and I. C. I. agreed to make a further f10m available over the next 
five years. Courtaulds used these funds plus the proceeds from the 
sale of certain other investments to finance (a) the development 
of its own nylon production and (b) (particularly important in the 
present context) forward integration into the textile processes 
which would provide an outlet for its fibres and filament yarns. 
In some cases, Courtaulds co-operated with I. C. I. during the period 
1963-8 in providing Funds to support major textile groups. In 1963 
Courtaulds and I. C. I. both-acquired minority holdings in English 
Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd., (now Tootal, described in 3 below) and in 
Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd. (see 2 below), though the 10% holding 
in the latter was sold to I. C. I. in 1968. Until January 1975 one of 
the directors of Courtaulds was also on the board of Tootal. The more 
significant growth of Courtaulds' textile interests came about through 
direct acquisition on which nearly 1150m was spent over the six years 
1963-9. This left the company with the following approximate 
share of U. K. output in each stage of production in mid-1968: - 
of U. K. output (volume) 
Cellulosic fibres production 
Synthetic fibres production 
Cotton and man-made fibres spinning 
If if to weaving 
Fabric finishing 











Sources: Textile Council, "Cotton and Allied Textiles" (1969), Table 2 
du Zoete and Bevan, "The Major Textile Companies", pp. 16-19. 
A report by the Monopolies Commission into the'supply of cellulosic 
fibres accused the company of operating against the public interest.,. 
As well as proposing tariff reductions and the breaking up of inter- 
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national. cartel agreements, the Commission criticised 
Courtaulds 
transfer-pricing policy and also urged strict Board of Trade control 
over further textile acquisitions. This restriction was one of 
the 
factors limiting the expansion of the company in the three sub- 
sectors during the survey period. 
Courtaulds' share of the combined textile turnover of the firms in the 
sample (excluding fibre-production) remained at about 22% throughout 
the period 1968-73. The company makes almost every kind of product 
within the "cotton industry" and "hosiery and knitwear" ranges and 
through its subsidiary Henry Lister & Co. also has an outlet for its 
acrylic fibre in the wool and worsted industry. Expressed as a 
percentage of turnover, profits on these activities were lower than 
the average for tt. e industry. De Zoete and Bevan's estimate for 
1972-3 was 6.1%, compared with a 1972 average for the total sample 
of 7.7%. This is misleading because of internal purchase of fibres: 
taking fibres and textiles together the margin on turnover in 1972-3 
was 10.5%. 
In its 1974/5 accounts Courtaulds has published a national profit and 
loss account and balance sheet adjusted for past inflation. This shows 
that, with this adjustment, shareholders' funds would have represented 
60 per cent of nee assets in March 1974 and 67 per cent in March 1975. 
These figures show the company to be highly geared but less so than 
would appear from an analysis of the statutory figures. Courtaulds' 
published return on equity (see (c) of the summary table at the end of 
this sub-section) was 33 per cent in 1973/4, one of the highest in 
European textiles: the inflation adjusted figure was. however only 18 
per cent. 
A major factor influencing the company's cash flow position has been 
reduction of taxation partly achieved by inter-subsidiary sales of 
fixed assets in 1971-2. In addition, the company does not have a 
deferred tax account (see p. ). In the financial years ended 
March 1973,1974 and 1975, taxation amounted to only 22 per cent of 
profits before tax (after interest and depreciation). 
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The growing importance of Courtaulds as a multinational company is 
revealed by the growth of sales by overseas subsidiaries from £117m in 
1968/9 to £239m in 1973/4. This rise partly reflects inflation and 
depreciation of the pound but, after correction for these factors, it 
also indicates that restriction of expansion in the U. K. has 
encouraged Courtaulds to seek growth overseas. During the course of 
this investigation Courtaulds have resumed growth in the U. K. textile 
sector with acquisition of shares of Highams Ltd. Holdings of this 
company's equity rose from 0 in December 1972 to 10% in December 1973 
and 29% in December 1974. With an annual turnover of £l8m Highams is one of 
the U. K. 's largest manuf acture w of sheets and bedding and the large 
investment by Courtaulds provides the fibre manufacturer with a more 
secure outlet for polyester and cotton yarns. 
Post scriptum (September 1975) 
Evidence of continued opposition by government to investment by Courtaulds 
in the textile industry is an agreement following a request by the Office 
of Fair Trading that the company will reduce its holding to 25 per cent 
and not use voting power to change policy. 
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COURTAULDS LTD. 
ANALYSIS OF SALES, PROFITS AND CASH FLO', J 
(1) ANALYSIS OF SALES (£m) 
Financial year ended 31st March ... 
*¢ estimates 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
"Cotton-type" spinning 
and weaving* 70 89 85 95 110 135 
Woollen fabrics 7 8 11 12 10 12 
Hosiery, Knitwear & garments 114 123 139 159 148 169 
Other textiles & wholesaling 37 24 31 28 45 69 
U. K. Textile Processing 228 244 266 294 313 385 
U. K. fibre production 149 155 167 160 180 220 
Other U. K. Activities 75 83 83 76 92 112 
TOTAL U. K. SALESM 452 482 516 530 585 717 
Overseas fibres and textiles 77 93 88 33 130 159 
Other overseas sales 47 51 55 58 72 80 
TOTAL SALFS 576 626 659 681 777 956 
(1) Includes exports 
Exports and overseas sales 
as % of total 
(81) (98) (114) (124) (145) (218) 
36 39 39 40 45 48 
193 
COURTAULDS LTD. (Cont'd) 
(ii) ANALYSIS OF PROFITS 
(a) Net Profit Before Interest and Taxation (im) 
Financial year ended 31st March .., 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
U. K. Textiles (est. ) 14.5 14.0 13.7 17.7 20.3 25.2 
Company total 61.5 67.0 55.. 8 64.6 
'88.3 , 
141.0 
(b) Net Profit Before Interest and Taxation as Percentaqes of Sales and 
Net Assets 
% of Sales 
U. K. Textiles (est. ) 6.4 5.7 5.2 6.0 6.5 6.6 
Company total 10.7 10.7 9.1 9.5 11.4 14.8 
% of net assets 14.9,14,6 11.8 12.2 14.6 20.6 
(c) Net ? rofit after Interest but before Tax 
fm 50.9 52.1 42.0 45.5 68.2 116.3 
% of equity 23.6 23.2 18.0 18.2 23.7 33.0 
(iii) CASH FLOW BEFORE AND AFTER TAX 
Before tax 75.3 80.3 73.9 80.5 105.2 158.2 
After tax 52.9 57.7 58.3 74.8 92.9 131.3 
After tax figure as % of sales 9.2 9.2 8.9 11.0 12.0 13.7 
AVERAGE U. K, 
EMPLOYMENT 135,352 137,819 136,331 128,046 124,038 124.475 
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2. CARRINGTON-VIYELLA LTD. 
This company was formed in 1970 by the merging of Viyella International 
Ltd. 
with Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd. The survival. of these two companies 
in merged form was financed mainly by Imperial Chemical Industries. 
In 
February 1975 I. C. I. Holdings'Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. 
jointly owned 64.4 per cent of the ordinary shares of Carrington- 
Viyella Ltd. 
History of Viyella International Ltd. 
In 1894 a long-established cotton spinning firm, William Hollins and 
Company Ltd., registered the trade mark "Viyella" to describe a new 
fabric manufactured from yarns in which wool and-cotton were blended. - 
This new branded cloth proved very successful in shirts and the company 
developed its own weaving-and formed a garment division. By the mid- 
1950's, all processes from purchase of raw rinnterials to wholesaling 
of the finished shirts were carried out by the compar. y. It then faced 
a number of unfavourable developments: loss of exports, excessive 
reliance on one large retailer who was able to force down profit 
margins, the growing popularity of man-made fibres in shirts and 
(allied particularly to the use of nylon) increasing competition 
from warp-knitted fabrics. In 1961, having failed to negotiate a 
satisfactory merger with Tootal Ltd. (see 3 below), Hollins decided 
to diversify by taking over Gainsborough Cornard Ltd. a manufacturer 
of synthetic yarns and warp knitted fabrics. This takeover was 
followed by a reorganisation and rationalisation of the company, 
renamed Viyella International Ltd., under the chairmanship of 
Mr. J. Hyman. 
The growth of Viyella International in the 1960's was directed 
., towards the formation of an International, vertically integrated 
multi-fibre textile group. This growth was financially assisted 
from 1963 onwards by I, C. I., which after its failure to take over 
Courtaulds, was concerned to secure markets for its own output of 
fibres. I. C. I. 's policy was to assist firms which it considered: 
progressive but without acquifihq majority control, (unlike Courtaulds) 
and in 1963 it injected 113m. into Viyella in a combination of 
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equity and long-term'1oans. °- ° 
With this money and with internally generated funds, Viyella Inter- 
national embarked upon a series of acquisitions which increased sales 
from 18m. in 1963 to. £67m. in 1966 and £76m. in 1969. The activities 
of the companies acquired included cotton and man-made fibre spinning; 
texturation and weaving; warp knitting-'jersey fabrics; branded shirts; 
other garments; textile finishing; household textiles, furnishing 
fabrics and tufted carpets. P 
The weakest part of'this vertically integrated group proved to be the 
traditional cotton spinning and weaving activities. When margins 
declined in the man-made fibre activities (e. g. texturation) in the 
late 1960's profits declined and a major managerial crisis developed. 
In December 1969,, in_order to ensure the stability of the company, 
I. C. I. offerez. to acquire Viyella International with the intention 
of merging it with Carrington and Dewhurst Ltd. 
History of Carrington and Dewhurst-Ltd. 4, 
This traditional weaving concern turned entirely to weaving of -: c 
filament artificial fibres in the 1920's and by 1960 was-one of 
Europe's largest weavers of rayon, acetate and nylon filament 
fabrics. 
During the 1960's the company spent £35m. on acquisitions and 
further sums on modernisation and internal expansion. The process 
began with funds acquired from the Cotton Industry Act of. 1959 and 
from the infusion of £lim. in a, 'joint share subscription by: Courtaulds 
and I. C. I. in 1963. Courtaulds did not add any further funds and 
sold its equity holding in 1968. I. C. I. added continually to its 
holdings and by 1970 held 17 percent of the equity, having invested-.,,. -,,. 




Carrington and Dewhurst's expansion programme had three elements (all 
associated with. I. C. I. 's desire to secure the continued growth of a 
market for its fibres within the U. K. ). One objective was expansion 
of filament weaving and by acquisition of two major competitors the 
company increased its share of U. K. output of woven filament fabrics 
to 29 per cent by 1968. A second objective was vertical integration 
forwards from filament weaving to merchant converting, dyeing and 
finishing and the making up of outerwear from woven, filament cloth. ` 
A third objective was diversification into texturation of filament 
yarns, warp-knitting and to a lesser degree, weft-knitting. At the 
same time the, company developed factories in Italy, Belguim and 
Germany. 
A crisis for Carrington and Dewhurst occurred in 1969. Encouraged by 
the 1969 report of the Textile Council and by I. C. I., the company 
decided upon a 128m. expansion programme including a f6m. venture 
for the sale of texturised polyester yarn ("Crimplene") on the 
German market. A number of adverse developments coincided to bring 
the company to the brink of financial collapse: - a trade recession 
at home which led to excess weaving capacity and intensive price 
competition; chaos in the warp-knitting trade which encountered a 
decline in sales after a period of uninterrupted expansion; unexpected 
competition in German where local polyester yarn prices fell by 40 per 
cent and the French devaluation.. Even the British weather turned 
against the company: a drought occurred just after it had completed 
an increase in capacity for production of rainwear garments and fabrics. 
The danger that the company would go into liquidation and that a 
substantial slice of the U. K. market for synthetic fibres might 
disappears forced the intervention of I. C. I. and the merging of 
Carrington and Dewhurst with Viyella International. 
Carrington-Viyella since the merger in 1970 
As the analysis of the two former companies has indicated, Carrington- 
Viyella produces for a variety of final markets. Although an attempt 
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has been made from analysis of accounts of subsidiary. companies to 
divide textile operations into "cotton" and knitting the breakdown 
can be regarded as only approximate because sci; e subsidiaries are 
vertically integrated. 
While maintaining. a broad technical base (spinning, weaving,, weft- 
and warp-knitting, dyeing and finishing) the new company has curtailed 
some less profitable operations and specialised on certain successful 
activities. The latter Include the spinning of yarns blended from 
polyester and cotton-and the development of branded products incor- 
porating such yarns: - sheens and pillowcases, shirts'and menswear. -} 
Vertical. integration has been extended in this reorganisation. 
Contrary to expectations of the late 1960's, the main financial 
difficulties have occurred in texturising (sold to I. C. I. in 1971), 
weft-_ and warp-knitting where. excess.. capacity has still (early 1975) 
not been eliminated. 
The market-orientated policy has led to an improvement in profitability 
as well as substantial expansion of sales. Although 1974 saw a setback 
in profitability, this was less pronounced than that which occurred 
in the textile industry as a whole. 
The position of I. C. I. in relation to the company is affected by an 
agreement between I. C. I. and the Government at the time of the merger. 
Under this agreement, I. C. 1. undertook to reduce its shareholding in 
Carrington-Viyella to no more than 35% as soon as practicable and if 
this has not been completed within 12 months not to exercise more votes; 
than if it had. The holding remains at 64 per cent, probably because 
of the generally depressed state of the stock market in recent years 
and the effect on the price of the shares. The activities of Carrington- 
Viyella Ltd. are not included in the consclidated accounts of I. C. I. 





ANALYSIS OF SALES, PROFITS, CASH FLO'! AND EflPLOYtAFfIT 
(i) ANALYSIS OF SALES (Em) 
Financial year ended 31st December .. 
1971 1972 1973 1974 
Cotton-type activities 102.0 94.1 99.1 n. a. 
Hosiery, knitting and garments 26.0 22.0 39.0 n. a. 
Other textiles 14.4 18.0 16.0 n. a. 
TOTAL U. K. SALES (all textiles)1 142.4 134.1 154.1 168.8 
Overseas activities 10.9 21.0 29.4 33.5 
TOTAL SALES 153.3 155.1 183.5 202.3 
1 Includes Exports 
Exports and o/s sales as % of total 
(15.3) (14.2) (18.9) (22.5) 




(ii) ANALYSIS OF PROFITS 
(a) Net Profit Before Interest and Taxation 
Financi al year ended 31st December 
U. K. Textiles (est. ) 1971. 1972 1973 1974 
U. K. textiles (est. ) 8.6 9.5 12.8 12.1 
Overseas activities` (est. 0.8 -1.0 `°? ý_2.6'' 2.1 
Company Total 9.39. 10.46 15.37 14.51 
(bNet Profit Before Interest and Tax as percentages of Sales and Net Assets 
% of sales 
U. K. textiles 6.0 7.1 8.3 7.2 
Company total 6.1 6.8 8.4 7.2 
% of net assets (total) . 0.7 11.0 14.9 12.5 
(c) Net Profit After Interest but Before Tax 
£ millions 5.84 7.45 12.11 9.02 
% or equity 9.7 12.0 18.1 13.1 
(iii) CASH FLOW BEFORE AND AFTER TAX 
Before tax ,.. äßs 10.66 12.31 17,50 15.28 
After tax 8.45 9.29 »12.98 11.24 
After tax figure as % of sales 5.5 6.0 7.1 5.6 
IMMI )j. 
m EMPLOYMENT 32,717 ' 33,543 33,553 34,016 
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3. TOOTAL LTD. 
Until mid-1973 this company was known as English Calico Ltd., which was 
formed in 1968 by a merger of the English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd. and 
the-Calico Printers' Association. The name Tootal is derived from Edward 
Tootal one of the forerunners of Tootal Broadhurst Lee and Company Ltd., 
acquired by English Sewing Cotton in 1963. 
English Sewing Cotton Ltd. itself was formed in 1897 as an amalgamation 
of a large number of Lancashire thread producers concerned about the 
growing, dominance of J. -P. Coats Ltd. of Scotland. For many years 
ESC's 
thread was marketed by the world-wide- Central. Agency for sewing threads, 
which was created and dominated by Coats. With the dissolution of the 
Central Agency in 1958 ESC became responsible for the marketing of its 
own thread and at the same time turned its attention towards diversification 
into other textile products. 
The concern of Courtaulds and ICI about the future of the Lancashire 
cotton industry was reflected in their combined investment of f 6m. in 
ESC in the early 1960's, together with a promise of a further £4m. if 
required for further development. These funds were used to purchase 
Tootal Broadhurst Lee and Company, a verticall; / integrated group engaged 
in spinning, weaving, knitting, menswear and household furnishings, 
further expansions by ESC prior to the 1968 meranr were in household 
textiles, dress fabrics, fine worsteds, industrial fabrics and knitted 
children's wear. 
Evidence suggests that, as with the Coats-Paton group, diversification 
added little to profits in the short-term and in 1967, the year before 
the merger, the only profitable product of ESC (apart from minor none. 
textile interests) was sewing cotton. In 1968 Viyella International 




The Calico Printers' Association was also formed in the 1890's as an 
amalgamation of many small firms, in this case engaged in printing of 
calico ("grey" cotton cloth used mainly for lightweight apparel). Weaving 
. of calico for printing and subsequent export to Asia and Africa was at 
that time a major activity in central Lancashire but this was the most 
vulnerable of all cotton textile Activities to self-sufficiency and 
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competition in export markets. Printing, piece-dyeing or bleaching and 
finishing were less easily adapted in developing countries and in the 
1950's CPA's main business was in the application of these processes to 
imported grey cloth, either purchasing the cloth itself or operating on 
a commission basis. From this developed a substantial merchanting 
business. A research department set up to develop new textile finishes, 
proved more profitable than either industrial processing or merchanting 
through the receipt of royalties from patent agreements. The most important 
of these related to "Terylene" (a polyester fibre developed experimentally 
in 1941). 
CPA faced two problems in the mid-1960's: (a) the imminent expiry of 
patent agreements which accounted for 73 per cent of total profits over 
the five years 1961-65 and (b) contraction of textile printing as this 
activity developed in overseas textile producing countries. (CPA 
assisted this process with its own overseas subsidiaries). Diversification 
was adopted as a company policy but, as de Zoete and Bevan point out, 
there was little logical connection between some of the new activities 
and CPA's existing vertical structure. Acquisitions included retail 
shops (men and women's fashion wear and department stores), and manufacturers 
of ladies garment and knitwear, warp-knitted stretch covers and men's 
shirts. 
The merger between ESC and CPA to form English Calico made possible joint 
development of production and marketing of apparel and furnishing fabrics, 
the broadening of the range of men's wear products, usage of retail outlets 
to monitor changes in fashion demand and merging of substantial but 
complementary overseas interests. 
It quickly became apparent that more rapid deterioration in CPA's printing 
activities would offset improved profitability on the part of ESC. In 1969 
Courtaulds announced a bid for English Calico - attracted by a low share 
price and believed to be interested in acquiring textile finishing, 
merchanting and ft-tailing. This takeover was aborted by a decision by the 
Board of Trade opposing any further acquisitions of textile processing on 
the part of fibre manufacturers. 
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Between 1969 and 1973 profitability of the English Calico (Tootal) group 
was increased mainly by reorganisation and rationalisation. Despite the 
complete elimination of royalties (683,000 in 1969170) profits rose 
consistently. 
This profitability was achieved by reduction in calico printing capacity 
(by about 60 per cent) accompanied by increased productivity, by disposal 
of certain retailing activities not forming an integrated part of the 
group's textile interests (a policy pursued with greater vigour during 
1974 and 1975) and by further development of branded products in clothing 
and household textiles. 
The most profitable activity remains the production of sewing thread, 
especially overseas. The summary table shows that, although the profit- 
ability of U. K. textile operations was increased substantially during 
the survey period, it still falls behind that of textile operations 
overseas, the most significant part of which is the American Thread 
Company, a long e; -cablished subsidiary of ESC in the United States. 
Courtaulds and ICI continue to hold 8.25 per cent and 8.29 per cent 
of the ordinary share capital of Tootal. One director of ICI and one 
of Courtaulds' sat on the board of Tootal until January 1975. (There is 
no Courtaulds' representation in 1975/6). Although the group, like 
most textile concerns, has been severely hit by the trade recession 
of 1974/5, the reorganisation of the 1969-73 period has left it much 
better equipped to survive these adverse trading conditions. 
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TOOTAL LTD. 
ANALYSIS OF SALES, PROFITS, CASH FLOW AND EMPLOYMENT 
(i) ANALYSIS OF SALES (fm) 
*= estimates 
Year ended January ... 1969 1970 1971 1912 
(13-'mths) 
16 18 20 20 
29 26 26 26 
1973 1974, 
Thread and spinning* 
Woven Fabrics* 
and woven household textiles 
Knitted Fabrics, 
23 n. a. 
29 n. a. 
45 44 46 48 52 58 
Knitwear and Clothing* 28 25 25 29 30 34 
Other Textiles* 5 6 4 4 3 3 
TOTAL U. K. TEXTILES 78 75 75 81 85 95 
Non-textile activities 30 28 29 25 22 23. 
TOTAL U. K. SALES 108 103 104 106 107 118 
(Includes exports) (14) (16) (16) (19) (19) (24) 
Overseas sales (all textiles) 49 49 48 57 76 97 
TOTAL SALES 157 152 152 173 183 215 
Overseas sales + exports 
as % of total sales 40 43 42 47 52 56 
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TOOTAL LTD. (Cont'd) 
Financial year ended January ... 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
411) ANALYSIS OF PROFITS (Because the company was formed during the 
financial year 1968/9, data for that period are not comparable and are 
omitted). 
la) Net Profit Before Idterest and Taxation (£m) 
U. K. textiles 3.9 5.2 6.6 6.4 9.3 
U. K. non-textiles 0.6 0.6 -0.1 1.1 1.4 
Overseas textiles 4.5 4.6 5.4 7.0 10.6 
Total trading 8.98 10.40 11.88 14.47 21.27 
Terylene royalties 0.68 0.20 0.03 -- 
TOTAL NET PROFIT 9.66 10.60 11.91 14.47 21.27 
b) Net Profit Before Interest and Tax as percentages of sales and net assets 
% of sales 
U. K. textiles 5.4 7.4 8.6 7.8 10.0 
Non-textile activities 2.5 2.1 -0.2 5.1 6.0 
Overseas textiles 10.0 10.0 10.1 9.6 11.4 
Company total 6.4 7.0 6.9 7.9 9.9 
% of net assets 11.8 12.9 14.7 16.4 21.2 
_(c) 
Net Profit After Interest but Before Tax 
£millions 
% of equity 
7.16 8.17 9.59 12.12 18.34 




TOOTAL LTD. (Cont'd) 
(iii) CASH FLOW BEFORE AND AFTER TAX 
Before tax 
After tax 
After tax figure as % of sales 
AVERAGE UoK. 
EMPLOYMENT 
11.44 12.32 13.90 17.03 23.93 
7.70 8.34 9.33 10.70 14.72 
5.1 5.5 5.4 5.9 5.9 
27,126 25,106 23,697 20,720 20,001 
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4. COATS PATONS LTD. 
This company's major features are 
(a) its predominantly international nature; in 1973 nearly three-quarters 
of its sales were to customers outside the United Kingdom and 65 per 
cent were supplied by overseas subsidiaries 
(b) specialisation on and a leading supplier of world markets for a limited 
number of major products, chiefly sewing thread and knitting wool yarns. 
The company was formed at the end of 1960 as a holding company for the merger 
of J. and P. Coats Ltd. and Paton and Baldwins Ltd. 
t 
J. and P. Coats is the largest manufacturer in the world of sewing threads, 
made from cotton and synthetic fibres and sold for both industrial and domestic 
uses. Profit marqins are usually high but vary with the prices of fibres, since 
consumer prices tend to be less flexible. Coats' strong position in many 
markets, as well as economies of scale, may explain a margin varying from 13% 
(1969) to 21% (1973) of gross sales. Long-established overseas subsidiaries 
account for over 85% of Coats' sales of sewing threads. 
Paton and Baldwins Ltd. is the largest worsted spinner of hosiery and hand- 
knitting yarns in Europe. Hand-knitting yarns account for about half of the 
output. The company is vertically integrated from wool sorting to yarn 
dyeing and finishing. Coats-Patons Ltd. also operates a chain of retail shops, 
which was extended by the acquisition of S. Bellman and Sons in 1966. These 
market hand-knitting wools (exclusively group) and garments (40% group). 
Associated companies of Paton and 6aldwins Ltd. operate in Australia and 
Canada. 
Since the merger, Coats-Patons Ltd. has extended its activities mainly by 
vertical integration into textile processes using worsted yarns and sewing 
threads. Acquisitions have included: - 
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Knitwear and garments 
1965 Coats-Patons acquired majority holding of Pasolds Ltd. leading 
U. K. manufacturer of children's knitted garments. Total equity 
was obtained by 1971. 
1967 Jaeger Ltd. Joined the Coats-Paton group. This company with an 
annual turnover of ahnut 19m. at the time of acquisition is a major 
supplier of ladies' ki Ited and tailored goods. 
1969-70 Seven smaller knitted goods companies acquired, with a combined 
turnover of about f12m. 
The author estimates the 1973 turnover of Coy' -Paton Knitwear companies in 
the United Kingdom to be about f48 millions and this is equal to about 9 per 
cent of total turnover in the hosiery, knitwear and weft-knitted fabric 
industries. 
Spinning, weaving and warp knitting 
In 1968 Coats-Paton acquired 40 per cent of the capital of West Riding Worsted 
and Woollen Mills Ltd; a majority shareholding was acquired in 1969 and West 
Riding Worsted and Woollen Mills Ltd became wholly owned in 1971. This company 
is itself a broadly-based group including woollen and worsted-spinning 
weaving and fabric-knitting. 
In 1968 the group acquired the textile interests of John Heathcoat Ltd. which 
manufactures a wide range of warp-knitted and woven fabrics. 
Over the period since 1968 the main expansion in Coats-Patons U. K. activities 
has been in knitted garments and fabrics woven on the woollen and worsted 
system. The most profitable activity has remained the production (mainly 
overseas) of sewing thread. (A similar observation was made in the case of 
English Sewing Cotton, within the Tootal group). In the last reported year 
(1974) this product accot-nitad for 43 per cent of turnover and 73 per cent of 
trading profit. In the survey period, overseas activities showed better 
utilisation of capital and higher profit margins on sales. Average return 
on capital employed over the years 1968-73 was 6.0 per cent in the United 
Kingdom and 16.6 per cent overseas. Despite what has been regarded (8) as 
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a deliberate attempt to diversify and, because of taxation conditions, 
to derive more profit from U. K. operations, Coats-Paton continues to 
depend very heavily upon the sales overseas of a narrow product range. 
In spite of its predominance in the sewing "cotton" and knitting 
"wool" 
industries (both of which now use more synthetic fibres than natural 
fibres), 
none of the equity of Coats-Paton (apart from single shares) is 
held by 
the major fibre producers. 
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COATS PATON LTD. 
ANALYSIS OF SALES, PROFITS, CASH FLOW AND EMPLOYMENT 
(i) ANALYSIS OF SALES 
U. K. activities 
Year ended 31st December .. 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Cotton-type spinning 14 15 15 16 17 20 
Wool-type activities 34 62 60 58 59 68 
Garments and knitwear 30 32 37 41 42 48 
Zip fasteners, needles etc. 7 7 7 7 8 11 
TOTAL U. K. 85 116 119 122 126 147 
(including exports) (18) (28) (29) (27) (25) (39) 
Overseas activities 
Textile yarns 91 122 133 129 158 187 
Knitwear and clothing 2 3 14 17 21 24 
Non-textile 32 27 32 35 45 57 
TOTAL SALES 210 268 298 303 350 415 
Overseas sales + exports 
as % of the total 68 67 70 69 71 74 
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COATS PATON LTD. Cont'd) 
(ii) ANALYSIS OF PROFITS 
Financial year ended 31st December ... 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
_(al 















COMPANY TOTAL 25.2 23.4 24.9 31.1 40.6 57.4 
lb) Net Profit Before Interest and Taxation as percentages of sales and net as sr 
% of'sales 
U. K. 7.9 4.2 3.3 4.0 6.0 8.9 
Overseas 14.8 12.2 11.7 14.5 14.7 16.5 
Total 12.0 8.7 8.4 10.3 11.6 13.8 
of net assets 15.2 12.0 11.1 14.2 18.1 22.4 
(C) Net Profit Aftar Interest'but before Taxation 
fm 23.3 20.4 21.0 26.7 37.4 *54.1 
% of equity 20.0 16.9 16.1 20.9 26.5 33.9 
2 
{iii) ANALYSIS OF CASH FLOW 
Before tax (im) 29.6 28.1 29.7 36.2 47.4 64.5 
After tax (im) 19.1 19.7 20.3 23.7 30.1 40.4 
After tax as % of sales 9.1 7.3 6.8 7.8 8.6 9.7 
VE RAGE U. K. 
E PLOY11ENT 29,000 39,000 40,000 35,000 34,000 32,965 
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5. ILLINGWORTH MORRIS LTD. 
(a) INTRODUCTION 
Although the company acquired a cotton spinning and weaving firm (Joshua 
Hoyle and Sons Ltd. ) in 1963 and owns two small knitting firms, the vast 
majority of its turnover is derived from the preparatory processing, 
spinning and weaving of wool and of man-made fibres on the same system. 
Since 1968 the company has followed a continuing policy of investment in 
equity of other woollen and worsted firms gradually acquiring majority 
holdings. As a result, its share of the total market for woollen and 
worsted fabrics increased from 4 per cent in 1968 to 10 per cent in 1973, 
(16 per cent of the wool sample and the largest firm in that sub-sector). 
In 1971 it acquired majority holdings in two companies with turnover of 
nearly £30 millions and as a result of the increased turnover shown in 
consolidated accounts for the following financial year, it became large 
enough to form a fifth member of the "oligopoly" group within the textiles 
industry as a whole. 
The company has a number of distinctive features: 
(i) a majority of the ordinary shares is held by one family, that of 
the chairman M. Ostrer; 
(ii) the capital structure includes very little long-term borrowing; 
the policy of investment in competing companies leading to 
acquisitions. 
(b) OWNERSHIP OF THE COMPANY 
The ordinary share capital consists of f2 millions in voting shares and 
£4.75 millions in non-voting shares. Of the vote-bearing shares, 46 per 
cent are held by Mr. I.. Ostrer and 35 per cent by Mr. M. Ostrer (who also 
holds a majority of the non-voting shares). No other major textile company, 
fibre manufacturer or major customer for textile products has any significant 
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investment in the company. 
(c) CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
The company's balance sheet in March'1974 may be summarised as 
follows: 
000's LO 102 2 -1 IS 
Issued capital stock 9,709 Fixed assets 17,336 
Reserves 13,926 Investments 4,191 
Shareholders' funds 23,635 Advance corporation tax 205 
Minority interests 3,160 Current Assets 43,366 
Long-term loans 436 Current Liabilities (-) 38,467 
& debentures 
26,631 26,631 
The table shows that shareholders' funds amounted to nearly 89 per cent of 
capital employed. The large figures of current assets and liabilities 
reflect the high level of inventories (equivalent to 4 months' turnover) 
financed by bank overdrafts. The complete vertical integration of the 
company may explain this high level of stock holding. 
d) ACQUISITIONS 
Illingworth Morris showed most rapid growth of any of the major companies 
included in the survey. This growth occurred through gradual acquisition 
of equity of other firms. Among firms acquired during the period were: 
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(im) 
Date majority % of ordinary,. Value at date (1) 
Holding acq. (l) shares, April 1975 Equity Turnover 
Winterbottom, 
Strachan & Payne Ltd. 1968 100 2.0 
(Woollen & Worsted 
weavers) 
Woolcombers 
(Holdings) Ltd. 1971 9ý. d 4.5 
(Preparatory processes 
in wool & synthetic 
fibres) 





Since the end of the survey period the company 'as also acquired a, majority 
shareholding in other firms. The only one with a turnover of over £1 million 
was Troydale Industries ltd. (mainly woollen and worsteds) with group sales 
in 1973 of £7.35 millions, mainly in woollen textiles. The holding in 
Troydale increased from 26 per cent in March 1974 to 96 per cent in March 1975. 
As well as the companies in which a majority holding has been acquired, 
Illingworth Morris has increased its holdings in other enterprises some of 
which are also included in the wool industry sample of large firms. In 
April 1975 investments in these companies (at cost) amounted to £3.71 millions 
and income from these investments in the financial year ended March 1975 
was £323,000,8.7 per cent of the accumulated investment and nearly 20 per 
cent of Illingworth Morris's net profits. 
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ILLING-4ORTH MORRIS LTD 
ANALYSIS OF SALES, PROFITS AND CASH FLOW 
(i) ANALYSIS OF SALES (£m) 
Financial year ended March ... 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
1 
Cotton etc. spinning 
& weaving 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.4 2.0 2.2 
Woollen and Worsted 25.2 26.2 24.3 32.1 63.9 80.2 
Knitting 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 
TOTAL U. K. SALES (1) 
Overseas sales 






TOTAL SALES 29.9 30.6 28.8 36.7 70.4 85.6 




Overseas sales and direct exports as % 
of total: 
7.7 8.5 8.0 10.8 23.4 32.2 
4.6 4.8 4.5 4.1 5.7 9.1 
26.0 28.0 28.0 13.0 15.0 14.0 
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Financial year ended March ... 969 1970 1971 1 1973 97 
(ii) ANALYSIS OF PROFITS 
(a) Net Profit Before Interest and Taxation 
Company total 2.18 2.12 1.64 2.24 '6.39 7.97 
Qb) as % of Sales 7.3 6.9 5.7 6.2 9.6 9.6 
as % of net assets See note (2) 
(c) Net Profit After Interest but Before Tax 
£ millions (3) 1.11 1.06 0.67 1.09 3.75 4.47 
% of equity 10.5 9.9 6.1 9.3 . 
25.0 19.4 
(iii) CASH FLOW BEFORE AND AFTER TAX 
Before tax 1.88 1.78 1.43 2.28 5.61 5.92 
After tax 1.36 1.25 1.13 1.77 4.07 3.93 
After tax figure as % 
of sales 4.5 4.1 3.9 4.9 6.4 4.7 
AVERAGE U. K. 
EMPLOYMENT 10,900 10,700 9 , 900 11,300 10,500 9,800 
(2) This company has an unusual balance sheet: in March'1974 long-term 
borrowing amounted to £446,000 and minority interests in subsidiaries 
£3,160,000; bank overdrafts, in contrast, amounted to £25,994,000. 
Relation of profit before interest to net assets (excluding overdraft) 
would, therefore, be misleading. 
(3) After adjustment for minority interests in partly-owned subsidiaries. 
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6. OTHER MAJOR COMPANIES 
The five companies analysed in detail form a distinct oligopoly group 
in 
the textile industries. Ranked by turnover in 1973 the mä3dr firms 
in the 
three sub-sectors combined were; 




















(a) WILLIAM 8AIR0%JOSEflI WON 
William Baird and Co. Ltd. owned 20 per cent of the ordinary shares of 
Joseph Dawson (goldings) Ltd. at the end of 1968 and 28 per cent by the 
end of 1973. The chairman of the William Baird Group is on the board of 
Joseph Dawson (now renamed Dawson International Ltd. ). The turnover of the 
two companies in 1968 and 1973 can be analysed as follows: 
TURNOVER (fm) 1968 1973 
Cotton etc. spinning, weaving 
and making-up into shirts, nightwear 
and childrens' clothing (Baird) 16.2 29.7 
Woollen and worsted spinning 
and yarn dyeing (Dawson) 15.6 32.9 
Knitwear: Baird (interests sold to 
Dawson in 1969) 3.9 - 
Dawso 5.5 16.2 
TOTAL TURNOVER IN RELEVANT SUB-SECTORS 41.2 78.8 
) 
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Whereas Dawson's activities fall almost entirely within yarn production 
and knitting, William Baird also has interests in chemicals and industrial 
engineering, overseas mining and investment. Textiles accounted for 52% 
of group turnover in 1968 and nearly 56% in 1973. Profits over the survey 
period varied as follows: - 
Profit before interest and tax as percent&gý of sales: - 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
William Baird Textiles Ltd. 6.7 4.5 3.6 4.8 4.7 5.1 
Joseph Dawson (Holdings) Ltd. * 17.7 17.4 6.1 7.7 13.3 18.6 
Profit before interest and tax as percentage of'net assets: - 
William Baird Textiles Ltd. 24.9 18.7 14.2 16.0 17.6 21.8 
Joseph Dawson (Holdings) Ltd. * 27.9 29.8 11.3 10.8 23.7 39.0 
* Adjusted for change in accounting period 1970/1. 
In the case of Baird, the contrast between margin on sales and return on 
capital employed is believed to be due to predominance of business with one 
major customer, Marks and Spencer. This business is of a low-margin, low- 
overhead nature. 
Three knitwear companies were sold by Baird to Dawson in 1969 and this is 
believed to have contributed to the-dip in profit margins experienced by 
Dawson"in 1970 and 1971. Dawson supply major retail customers but are 
also engaged in the production of more expensive fashion knitwear, which is 
reflected in the volatility of profits. 
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(b) NOTTINGHAM MUFACTURIflG CO. LTD. 
This is the second largest company in tho hosiery and knitting sub-sector, 
accounting for about 8 per cent of sales in that sub-sector by U. K. Firms 
with over 25 employees. Activities include hosiery, knitted garments, weft- 
and warp-knitted fabrics, dyeing and finishing. In 1973 the firm acquired 
Lancaster Carpets and Engineering, with a turnover of £15 millions and with 
tufted carpets the major product. (This research team subtracted turnover 
and profit figures associated with these activities from Nottingham Manu- 
facturing's accounts in order to derive "economic activity unit" data). 
The firm is one of the major suppliers of Marks and Spencer Ltd. with which 
there are family and financial ties. These include investment by the 
retailers' pension fund (only about 3 per cent of equity) and holdings of 
equity by directors and major shareholders in Marks and Spencer. The retailer 
is not however, represented on the board of the company and sales to Marks 
and Spencer are believed not be be a dominant proportion of total turnover. 
The financial record of the company during the survey peMod is shown below: - 
Sales Profit before interest and tax Turnover (fm. ) (£m. ) % of sales 
19.9 
1968 19.9 4.4 22 
1969 25.3 5.2 21 
1970 29.5 5.8 20 
1971, 33.2 6.4 19 
1972 37.4 7.1 19 
1973* 63.3 9.2 15 
I 
Including Lancaster Carpets and Engineering (£15m turnover, E1.6m profit before tax). 
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A declining ratio of profit to net assets is due mainly to investment in 
nerv assets which, because of inflation and the absence of revaluation, 
has a distorting effect. Because of the distortion the ratio is not 
presented here. 
ýc) VANTONA/SPIRELLA LTD, 
Shortly before the completion of this report, major shareholders of Vantona 
Ltd. accepted an offer by Spirella Ltd. and by the end of September 1975 
Spirella owned 91 per cent of Vantona. The combined turnover of the two 
companies amounts to £70 millions, and the merger will result in another 
addition to the "oligopoly group". 
Vantona Ltd. was in the early 1960's a spinning and weaving group in the 
Lancashire cotton industry. Acquisitions during the 1960's led to forward 
vertical integration into selected household textiles, especially bedding 
and bedspreads. More recent developments include the acquisition of firms 
producing woven and knitted furnishing fabrics, and a wide range of clothing. 
In 1973 Cromer Ring Mill Ltd., a large spinning concern with f3 million 
turnover was acquired. This company was develoaing production of woven 
filament fabrics including tyre cord. 
The following table shout; the turnover and profits of Vantona annually from 
1968/9 to 1974/5. 
Year 
ended March Turnover(fin. ) 
Net profits 
fm. % of 
before 
turnover 
interest and tax 
% of net assets 
1969 11.5 0.88 7.7 17.9 
1970 14.2 1.00 7.0 14.4 
1971 16.6 1.05 6.3 15.2 
1972 19.9 1.58 7.9 19.2 
1973 26.7 2.75 10.3 25.3 
1974 38.3 4.12 10.8 28.8 
1975 41.1 3.34 8.1 22.1 
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Spirella Ltd. Is probably best known by the brand name for corsetry but 
as this market has become static, turnover has been expanded by develop- 
ments in fashion fabrics and (more recently) by acquisition in household 
textiles. Among major, groups acquired are Horrockses Ltd. and Dorcas Ltd. 
The following tables show levels of turnover in each of the product 
divisions in recent years together with the overall profit margi. n.. 
Sales turnover £m) 
Year ended Fashion fabrics Household 
November Foundation garments & spinning Textiles, Total 
1968 2.78 4.14 - 6.91 1969 4.94 4.55 - 9.49 
1970 3.91 4.31 5.86 14.08 
1971 3.18 4.85 11.30 19.33 
1972 3.30 5.58 11.55 20.43 
1973 3.34 8.81 13.61 25.76 
1974 3.41 10.34 15.65 29.40 
Net profit before interest and tax 
£000 s % of sales % of net assets 
1968 523 7.6 24: 0 
1969 536 5.6 17.0 
1970 923 6.6 13.0 
1971 1,268 6.6 14.1 
1972 1,548 7.6 17.2 
1973 2,114 8.2 22.1 





CENSUS OF PRODUCTION 1963 and 1968 
ANALYSIS OF ENTERPRISES 
MLH 413 Weaving of cotton linen and man-made fibres 
Size group No. of Total Net Net Capital 
(No. of Employees) Enterprises Employment Output Output Expenditure 
£m per head £ 
£m 
1963 
1-24 119 1.5 - - - 
25-49 66 2.4 1.8 774 0.1 
50-99 92 6.7 5.0 756 0.2 
100-199 109 15.4 11.4 741 1.0 
200-499 81 24.1 19.3 800 1.8 
500-999 
1000-1999 28 25.0 21.6 866 2.0 
2000 and over 5 12.8 12.5 975 3.3 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 29 1.3 - - - 
TOTAL 529 89.1. 74.0 831 8.6 
1968 
1-24 111 1.5 - - - 
25-49 40 1.5 
., 
1.8 1150 0.1 
50-99 77 5.6 6.5 1166 0.3 
100-199 87 12.4 13.5 1087 1.1 
200-499 46 13.3 18.3 1375 1.9 
500-999 ) 
1000-1999 15 11.3 15.1 1330 1.2 
2000 and over 4 17.0 22.3 1312 6.2 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 30 1.1 - - - 
TOTAL 410 63.7 80.7 1266 11.2 
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2. MLH 412 Spinning and Doubling on the cotton and flax system 
Size group No. of Total Net Net 
Capital 
(No. of employees) Enterprises Employment Output Output 
Expenditure 
fm per head fm 
fm 
1963 
1-24 97 1.3 - - (98)* - 
25-49 38 1.5 1.2 847 (40) 0.1 
50-99 56 4.0 3.4 870 (58) 0.2 
100-199 44 6.6 5.2 786 (55) 0.5 
200-499 55 17.6 12.9 735 (82) 1.1 
500-999 27 18.6 13.9 746 (65) 1.6 
1000-1999 9 12.7 9.8 772 (37) 1.1 
2000 and over 8 41.6 29.2 703 (121) 4.1 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 11 0.5 - 703 (15) - 
TOTAL 345 104.3 77.0 - 9.4 
1968 
1-24 62 0.8 - - (62) - 
25-49 41 1.6 2.2 1330 (42) 0.2 
50-99 42 3.1 4.3 1406 (46) 0.8 
100-199 30 4.2 4.7 1122 (33) 0.9 
200-499 41 13.5 15.4 1143 (57) 2.0 
500-999 17 11.9 14.4 1212 (46) 1.3 
1000-1999 10 13.3 16.1 1207 (31) 4.6 
2000 and over 5 36.9 54.8 1485 (98) 8.8 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 11 0.4 54.8 1485 (13) - 
TOTAL 259 85.6 113.4 - 19.0 




3.1111 414 Woollen and Worsted 
Size group No. of ` Total Net Net Capital 
(No. of employees) Enterprises Employment Output Output Expenditure 
fm per head fm 
EM 
1963 
1-24 515 5.5 - - - 
25-49 130 4.9 6.1 1237 0.2 
50-99 145 10.1 10.1 993 0.5 
100-199 154 21.8 20.2 926 1.2 
200-499 133 39.6 40.9 1034 2.6 
500-999 39 24.9 28.1 1130 1.9 
1000-1999 24 31.1 34.8 1117 2.1 
2000 and over 7 37.3 37.5 1007 3.7 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 44 1.9 - - - 
TOTAL 1191 177.1 185.4 1047 13.1 
1968 
1-24 427 4.5 - - - 
25-49 101 3.8 5.1 1333 0.1 
50-99 115 8,2 11.0 1338 0.8 
100-199 123 17.9 22.8 1275 1.8 
200-499 92 28.0 39. C 1412 3.5 
500-999 30 20.1 30.3 1509 2.5 
1000-1999 13 17.9 28.0 1561 1.9 
2000 and over 9 39.1 54.4 1389 4.1 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 55 1.9 - - - 
TOTAL 965 141.6 200.3 1415 15.6 
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4. D1LH 417 Hosie y and other knitted goods 
Size group No. of Total Net Net 
Capital 
(No. of employees) Enterprises Employment Output Output Expenditure 
000`s fm per head fm 
fm 
1963 
1-24 389 5.1 - - - 
25-49 141 5.0 4.5 891 0.3 
50-99 151 10.5 10.2 970 0.9 
100-199 95 13.5 14.5 1070 1.7 
200-499 64 18.3 15.9 869 1.3 
500-999 32 21.0 20.1 957 1.7 
1000-1999 20 26.7 24.5 918 292 
2000 and over 5 22.6 21.4 948 2.2 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 40 1.8 - - - 
TOTAL 937 124.5 117.6 944 10.9 
1968 
1-24 374 4.8 - - - 
25-49 108 4.1 5.7 1398 0.7 
50-99 122 8.5 12.9 1526 1.4 
100-199 87 12.1 18.6 1529 1.8 
200-499 64 19.3 25.1 1297 2.7 
500-999 28 18.7 23.2 1240 2.2 
1000-1999 15 20.4 30.1 1478 3.6 
2000 and over 7 45.6 74.3 1628 10.9 
Unsatisfactory 
returns 62 1.1 - - - 
TOTAL 937 1 4.7 198.6 1475 24.5 
APPENDIX G: 
5. ° ORDER XIII TEXTILES 
las 
Size group No. of Total Net Net Capital 
(No. of employees) Enterprises Employment Output <, Output Expenditure £m per head fm 
fm 
1963 
1-24 2287 25.9 - - - 
25-49 605 -21.8 21.3 977, " 1.3 
50-99 658. 45.9 42.1 918 3.1 
100-199 494 70.5 64.4 912 5.5 
200-499 404 123.6 116.5 '943 11.0 
500-999 140 95.4 93.9 985 8.1 
1000-1999 72 100.3 99.4 991 8.5 
2000-4999 37 115.0 139.0 1209 12.7 
5000-9999 8 57.5 53.8 936 3.3 
10,000 and over 5 86.1 129.6 1506 14.1 
Unsatisfactory 
returns - 7.4 - - 
TOTAL 749.3 
. 
792.4 1058 70.3 
1968 
1-24 1983 22.8 - - - 
25-49 478 18.0 '22.8 1268 1.8 
50-99 509 35.8 48.8 1363 4.5 
100-199, 381 53.2 67.0 1259 6.7 
200-499 300 92.6 126.4 1364 12.5 
500-999 107 72.7 102.7 1413 10.1 
1000-1999 52 69.7 99.3 1423 13.9 
2000-4999 29 77.2 132.9 1720 13.3 
5000-9999 9 57.3 85.9 1500 7.9 
10,000 and over 6 160.1 331.3. 2070 50.. 6 
Unsatisfactory 
returns - 6.7 - - 
TOTAL. f 666.2 1058,3 1588 125.3 
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PREFACE 
The present volume is part of a series of sectoral studies on the 
evolution of concentration in the member states of the European 
Community. 
These reports were compiled by the different national Institutes and 
experts, engaged by the Commission to effect the study programme in 
question. 
Regarding the specific and general interest of these reports and the 
responsibility taken by the Commission with regard to the European 
Parliament, they are published wholly in the original version. 
The Commission refrains from commenting, only stating that the 
responsibility for the data and opinions appearinglin the reports, 
rests solely with the Institute or the expert who is the author. 
Other reports on the sectoral programme will be published by the 
Commission as soon as they are received. 
The Commission will also publish a series of documents and tables of 
syntheses, allowing for international comparisons on the evolution of 
concentration in the different member states of the Conmfitmity. 
BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
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INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This report describes an investigation into competition in the supply 
of certain components for motor vehicles: - tyres, sparking plugs, and 
accumulators. The study was commissioned by the Directorate for 
Competition of the commission of the European Communities, and is one 
of a series of studies undertaken by the Cranfield School of Management 
and other institutions throughout the European Economic Community. 
For the quantitative analysis, the commission specified a number of 
indices, which were described in detail in the first report prepared 
by Cranfield in this series, concerned with the United Kingdom Paper 
Industry. A summary explanation appears in Appendix A to this report. 
The author would like to thank colleagues at the Cranfield School of 
Management who have assisted in this investigation, particularly Elaine 
Battison, the full-time research assistant until August 1977. The 
School also wishes to record its appreciation of assistance given by 
the British Rubber Manufacturers Association, and by three motor 
manufacturers and some of the companies supplying the three products. 
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SUMMARY OF REPORT 
SUMMARY OF SECTION I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The market for vehicle components consists of two distinct 
segments - "original equipment" (OE) and replacement. Within the OE 
market there is bilateral negotiation of contracts between each of 
a small number of vehicle producers and each of a small number of 
suppliers of each component. In the replacement market there are very 
many ultimate customers many of whom know little about the components 
and are influenced by recommendations of dealers and by advertising. 
For some products there is a captive element in the replacement segment. The 
replacement market generally offers greater profits than the OE sector. 
In terms of volume, the replacement demand for tyres is about 
2.5 times as great as OE demand. For batteries the ratio is about 
2.25 and for spark plugs a figure of 8.0 is estimated. If these ratios 
were calculated for sales turnover, they would be considerably higher. 
The U. K. motor industry is less vertically integrated than those 
in other countries and over half of the OE sales of components is 
derived from only ten companies. The three products studied in this 
report are supplied by separate groups of large companies with 
multinational interests. 
About 37 per cent of the motor industry's output is exported and 
exports were nearly double the value of imports of motor products in 1976, 
though imports have increased at a much faster rate than exports in 
recent years. Parts and accessories accounted for 46 per cent Pf total 
exports of motor products in 1976, compared with 30 per cent in 1964; 
in contrast completed passenger cars continue to be the main element of 
imports. The trends in trade have adversely affected the U. K. 
original equipment market for tyres, batteries and spark plugs. 
In examining the OE demand for components of passenger cars, we explain 
the inherent volatility of new registrations. Superimposed upon the 
fluctuations in sales has been a downward trend reflecting the increased 
penetration of imports and the decline in car exports. 
The replacement demand for certain car components is negatively 
related to new car demand. Sales of batteries and tyres are mainly for 
vehicles aged at least two years old. A period of economic hardship 
can lead to postponement of vehicle scrappage which mayiibenefit replacement 
demand for components. 
There have been substantial changes in the stock, utilisation and 
patterns of replacement of goods vehicles over the past few years, in spite 
of the continuing stable relationship between tonne-kilometres of freight 
and Gross Domestic Product. One of the most significant changes is the 
use of larger vehicles, which has led to lower utilisation of smaller 
vehicles, extended lives and a lower total of new registrations. Lorries 
with unladed weight of 8 long tons (1018 kilograms) or more accounted for 59 per cent of freight movement in 1975 compared with 19 per cent in 1968. Despite a recovery in exports, from a low figure in 1972, total production 
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od goods vehicles has declined annually from 1969 (443,000) 
to 1976 
(339 , 000) . 
The annual utilisation of goods vehicles is about 60 per cent 
greater than that of cars (the 1975. averages were 13,800 km. for 
cars and 22,100 km. for goods vehicles). For tyres replacement sales 
for goods vehicles are a particularly important market segment. 
SUMMARY OF SECTION II, TYRES 
The total market for tyres was static for much of the period 
surveyed. Total production of new car and commercial vehicle tyres fell 
annually from 1972 to 1975, in the replacement market this was due to 
slow growth in car ownership, to a decline in average distances 
travelled per car and to progressive adoption of radial tyres with longer 
life. Radial tyres plus the switch to larger vehicles for longer distance 
work explain a static replacement demand for commercial vehicle tyres. 
For both commercial vehicles and private cars original equipment demand 
has contracted partly because of a decline in vehicle production since 
1972 and partly because more car tyres are being supplied from overseas 
sources to complement c. k. d. exports. 
In terms of constant (1975) purchasing power, the total value of 
sales of tyres fell from £491 millions in 1968 to £449 millions in 1972 and the 
1975 figure was £445 millions. The decline in the real value of sales shows 
that the fall in volume was not compensated by an increase in the prices 
of tyres in relation to the prices of all goods and services. Although the 
ex-Factory prices of radial tyres are now over 20% higher than those of 
corresponding cross-ply tyres, the average life of radials is approximately double that of cross-ply tyres. 
A large growth in imports and exports partly reflects intra-European 
moveme Its by multinational companies. By 1975 European countries 
received 70 per cent of exports and supplied 88 per cent of imports. Competitive imports (that is supplied by companies other than members of the six large tyre companies with production units in Britain) accounted for about 15 per cent of new car tyres bought in the U. K. replacement market in 1975 and about the same proportion of new commercial vehicle tyres. 
Direct exports of car tyres represented 25 per cent of U. K. production in 1975, having increased annually from 1972 to 1975 and almost recovered their 1970 volume. Most of these tyres (75 per cent by volume and 84 per cent by value) are exported to European countries and the leading export markets are countries to which British vehicle parts are sent for final assembly. Such countries, especially Sweden, were also important markets for goods vehicle tyres, exports of which rose sharply both in volume and average value in 1975. Direct exports accounted for '7 per cent by volume and 34 per cent by value of the total output of commercial vehicle tyres in 1975. 
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In 1968 there were seven companies manufacturing new vehicle 
tyres in the United Kingdom; with the financial merging of the 
tyre activities of Dunlop and Pirelli, the number fell to six. 
There are about 70 companies engaged in the retreading of used 
tyres; most of them are too small to be included in official statistics. 
Retreaded tyres represented about 28 per cent of replacement tyres 
on cars in 1975 but the proportion had fallen. For commercial vehicles, 
retreads were more significant - 38 per cent in 1973 and 42 per cent 
in 1975. About 35 per cent of all retreads are supplied by the 
major manufacturers. On page 30 we have listed some competitive dis- 
advantages faced by independent retreaders, which have led to downward 
pressure on prices. 
Manufacture-owned outlets supplied 35 per cent of all tyre sales 
to final customers in the replacement market in 1975. A further 
30 per cent were supplied by independent dealers, some of whom had 
contractual arrangements with manufacturers. The number of independent 
distributors is large and competition in the retail distribution of 
tyres is intense. 
In the replacement market the competition extends also to 
mahufacturers. Car tyres are a volume product: - six size - categories 
account for 75 per cent of all tyres sold and 25 per cent are of a 
single-size. Brand loyalty is low. Competition has taken the form of 
quality improvement (which has led to longer product-life and lower 
sales), advertising, multiple-branding and price-cutting. Advertising, 
in terms of constant purchasing power, was 37 per cent lower in 1974 
than in the previous year but there have been recent indications of a 
recovery, Even in 1976 advertising expenditure by all tyre manufacturers 
amounted (in terms of constant purchasing power) to only 52 per cent of 
the 1969 figure. In 1976 advertising amounted to about 22 pence per 
tyre, or about 3 per cent of the ex-factory price. Multiple-branding 
is used as a method of market segmentation and perhaps also as a defence 
against imports. In the absence of detailed empirical work into the 
structure of prices, the degree of price competition is hard to determine. 
The size of discounts offered at some outlets suggests that part of these 
discounts must be borne by manufacturers. 
Estimates of market shares in 1972,1975 and 1976 replacement sales 
of new tyres show gains by Michelin and an unstable pattern for other 
producers. Four companies (Dunlop-Pirelli, Goodyear, Michelin and 
Firestone) achieved 79 per cent of replacement sales in 1972 and 84 per 
cent in 1976. 
The original equipment market for tyres is volatile partly because 
of interruptions in vehicle production and also because of the very low 
level of inventories held by vehicle manufacturers: for most individual 
size/specification they use two (but only two) sources. Certain links 
between individual vehicle manufacturers and tyre producers continue to be 
reflected in the OE market - Leylandwith Dunlop, Ford with the American 
suppliers etc. Although there is no evidence of collusion, proposals for 
increases in prices, which are bilaterally negotiated, appear to co- 
incide and differences in prices are very small. 
X 
From our own discussions and the results of other surveys, we 
estimate that Dunlop, Goodyear and Firestone together supplied 
76 per cent of the OE tyres for cars and commercial vehicles 
in 1975. 
The ex-factory price of a tyre sold for replacement is estimated 
to be 
about 1.5 times the OE price. 
The most of the financial analysis and all of the concentration 
tables are confined to the larger firms, though the performance of 
three retreading companies is examined. There are three levels 
world-wide and all activities world-wide. 
The analysis for all U. K. activities shows that even within 
the six major companies, a group of three (Dunlop/Pirelli, Goodyear 
and Michelin) formed a distinct oligopoly group, in 1974 and 1975. 
In the latter year they obtained 82 per cent of the combined sales 
of the six firms. The Linda index, which is used to define this group, 
also shows that in each year there was a discontinuity in the 
distribution of profits, 
Analysis of profitability is distorted by questions of transfer- 
pricing relating to subsidiaries of overseas parents. Consolidated 
accounts for world-wide activities of Michelin were first published in 1975 and only for that year is a complete comparison possible. Ratios for other companies in remaining years are presented in the tables. 
The examination of "dynamism" within the U. K. activities reveals increased instability towards the end of the survey period. This 
appears to be due to resurgence of advertising to which not all 
companies had joined. Over the entire period 1969-75 the growth of Michelin's share of industry turnover is the most notable feature. 
From the application of the standard statistical measures prescribed by the Commission to world-wide activities, it is clear that the British company Avon cannot be regarded as a member of the multinational oligopoly. The analysis also shows that net profits and net cash flow were more strongly concentrated than sales turnover and capital stock variables, a conclusion which corresponds with the results of most of this series of studies initiated by the Commission. 
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SUMMARY OF SECTION III. SPARKING PLUGS 
Apart from certain specialist producers, there are now only three 
manufacturers of sparking plugs in the United Kingdom - the Champion 
Sparking Plug Company, A. C. Delco (General Motors) and Ford. Each is a 
subsidiary of a U. S. parent. A. C. Delco supplies plugs to its fellow 
General Motors subsidiary, Vauxhall, and the OE requirements of the Ford 
Motor Company are supplied by its own sparking plug division. Champion 
is the sole supplier to British Leyland and Chrysler. 
Total U. K. production of sparking plugs is estimated to have risen from 
94 millions in 1968 to 112 millions in 1973, but with the decline of car 
and small van production, output fell back to about 94-95 millions in 
1974 and 1975. 
Foreign trade in plugs is quite large in relation to production, partly 
because of shipments by the three major manufacturers, who tend to 
organise their activities on a "pan-European" basis. Competitive imports, 
mainly from Germany, Japan and France accounted for about 11 per cent of 
the U. K. market in 1975. 
The ratio of replacement to OE demand for sparking plugs was about 8 to 
in 1973 and about 10.5 to 1 in 1975. The OE market is effectively tied 
with exclusive dealing arrangements betweeen vehicle manufacturers and 
suppliers of sparking plugs. We estimate that Champion held 66 per cent 
of the OE market in 1975, Ford 26 per cent and A. C. Delco 8 per cent. 
Competition in the replacement market is influenced by links between 
manufacturers and major outlets. Customer loyalty is believed to be low 
and advertising is negligible. Our estimates of market shares in the 
replacement sector are as follows (%): - 
Champion 65, Ford 13, A. C. Delca 12, Bosch 6, and other importers 4. 
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SUMMARY OF SECTION IV. BATTERIES (ACCUMULATORS) 
Revenue from the sale of batteries has fallen in real terms since 1973. 
This is mainly because of improved product life: the number of accumulators 
sold per 100 vehicles at least two years old fell from 43 in 1973 to 33 in 
1976. 
The total market may be divided into three main segments: - (i) original 
equipment, for which "premium" or high quality batteries are supplied, 
94 per cent of them by Lucas and Chloride; (ii) the "traditional" replace- 
ment market where premium and "second-line" batteries (the latter have 
less exacting specifications) are supplied via garages by the four members 
of the British Battery Makers Society (Lucas, Chloride, Haddon-Oldham and 
Crompton-Parkinson) and (iii) the "own label" market where batteries of 
varying qualities and specifications are sold by distributors under their 
own brand-names. 
The third sector has grown in recent years; there are mahy brand-names 
and a large number of suppliers. These are believed to include not only 
the major battery companies but also local producers often with only a 
handful of employees. Some of the batteries in this third sector are 
sold at prices much lower than those of batteries sold via traditional 
outlets. 
Foreign trade in batteries is very small. In 1976 less than 9 per cent 
of U. K. production volume was exported and imports amounted to less than 
6 per cent of batteries sold in this country. 
Original equipment accounts for 25 to 30 per cent of all motor vehicle 
batteries sold. This sector of the market is dominated by Lucas and 
Chloride, with over 90 per cent of all sales. Some traditional supply 
patterns, e. g. between Leyland and Lucas and between Ford and Chloride 
continue. 
In the replacement sector, the multiplicity of outlets and of brand-names is described in some detail in the report. Advertising is negligible and brand-loyalty very low. Estimates of market share must be inexact because it is not possible to identify the suppliers of certain brands. 
We estimate that Chloride and Lucas shared 94 per cent of the OE market in 1975, probably with about 42 and 52 per cent respectively. In the 
replacement market our estimates of market share (%) are Chloride 35, Lucas 17, Haddon-Oldham 13, Crompton-Parkinson 10, others (including importers) 25. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A. THE TOTAL MARKET FOR VEHICLE COMPONENTS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM. 
For the three products examined in this report, as for most 
motor vehicle components, there exist two distinct market 
segments: - original equipment and replacement. In selling 
components for use on new vehicles ("original equipment" or 
OE), a small number of large companies is normally competing 
for orders from the few major vehicle manufacturers in the 
United Kingdom. In terms of economic theory, an oligopoly 
faces an oligopsony. This results in competitive negotiations, 
shrouded in commercial security, and in the establishment 
of 'certain' regular buying patterns, the reasons for which 
are not easy to discern. A general survey of the dealings 
between component manufacturers and vehicle products suggests 
that some of these established links have become accepted 
by the industry because they reduce uncertainty and create 
some stability within the original equipment market. 
The sale of components for the replacement on existing 
vehicles of products which are worn out or damaged is very 
different from the sale of the same products as original 
equipment: - 
1. There is a very large number of ultimate customers, 
in contrast with the dominance of four major vehicle 
manufacturers in the OE sector. There are thousands 
of intermediaries between the component manufacturers 
and vehicle users. 
2. Most of these final customers know little about the 
technical properties of the product and in most cases 
rely on the advice of motor repairers and distributors. 
Advertising influencies the market for some products 
and, especially where safety is involved, surveys have 
revealed fairly low price-sensitivity. 
2 
3. With some products there is a "captive" element 
in the 
replacement market. Even when this is not necessary 
for technical reasons, the customer tends to replace 
certain components with the same branded product 
which was used for original equipment. This may be 
because the vehicle is serviced by the dealer who sold 
it to him or because of uncertainly about possible 
substitutes. 
4. These first three features make the replacement segment 
of the market more profitable than the original equipment 
segment. This has led to (i) the establishment of 
companies who sell only to the replacement segment 
(these were described as "pirates" by the large 
oligopolists); (ii) the production, by all major component 
manufacturers, of replacement parts for vehicles for 
which they do not sell the corresponding OE part - this 
includes vehicles imported into the United Kingdom and 
even non-British vehicles in overseas markets; (iii) the 
establishment by three of the vehicle manufacturers of 
wholesale distribution under their own brand-names of 
components and accessories1 purchased from component 
suppliers. 
B. THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE REPLACEMENT AND ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT 
MARKETS. 
The comparative size of the two segments of the market 
depends upon the life of the vehicles, the distances they travel, 
the rate at which the component deteriorates, the risk of damage 
to the component and the number of vehicles registered. The 
importance of these factors varies between components. 
The word "accessories" is used to describe something which 
is normally added to the vehicle and is not an essential 
compenent. The words "cömponents" and "parts" are used 
here synonymously although they may have different 
connotations in every day use. 
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1. TYRES 
The average new cross-ply passenger car tyre may be expected 
to cover about 22,000 km before requiring replacement and 
the average new radial-ply tyre about 45,000 km. The share 
of radials in the total market was 62 per cent in 1973 and 
69 per cent in 1974, so that the mean tyre life in 1974 
would be about 38,000 km. In 1974 the 14.3 million cars 
and car-derived vans in the U. K. covered a total distance 
of about 195,000 million km, indicating a replacement 
requirement of (195/38 times four) about 20.5 million tyres. 
This expected figure was remarkably close to the actual 
figurel. 
The original equipment market for passenger car and van 
tyres may be somewhat less than five times the number of cars and 
small vans produced in the country (that is in 1974,5 times 
1.627 millions = 8.134 millions). This is because the production 
figures include cars exported in unassembled form (327,000 cars 
in 1974 representing 58 per cent of cars exported); tyres fitted 
to such vehicles are often purchased from overseas sources, 
including firms affiliated to the main U. K. tyre producers. 
For tyres) the ratio of total U. K. replacement sales to OE 
sales is therefore about 5 to 2 in terms of volume. Because of 
the higher prices of tyres sold for replacement their relative 
importance in terms of sales turnover is even greater. With 
commercial vehicles, undertaking greater distances, the ratio is 
almost certainly more pronounced. 
2. BATTERIES (accumulators) 
The life of a battery is influenced partly by age and 
partly by its use and care in its maintenance. Battery 
1 Source of data on vehicle numbers and kilometres travelled: 
Department of Enviroment. The actual figures of tyre 
sales are shown on page 19 below. 
a 
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deterioration is not strongly related to vehicle mileage 
as such. 
Over the past few years this life has been extended by 
technical improvements in the battery itself, e. g. the 
use of polypropylene casing instead of rubber and in 
alternators, giving better charging; other factors which 
may have been important are the relaxation of rules for 
the lighting of parked cars and a series of mild, 
comparatively fog-free winters. The effects of these 
changes are hard to quantify even for companies within 
the industry. 
Foreign trade in batteries is fairly small and most of 
the vehicles exported in unassembled form will have 
batteries from overseas suppliers. Original equipment 
sales are, therefore, likely to be equal approximately1 to 
the sum of U. K. cars and commercial vehicle production less 
unassembled exports. In 1974 this total was 1.8 millions 
. and with the total sales of batteries in the United 
Kingdom at about 5.9 millions, this suggests a replacement 
market of 4.1 millions. With a total vehicle stock of 
15.9 million cars and commercial vehicles, this indicates 
an average life per battery of about 3 years 10 months2. 
As with tyres, the replacement market is more than double 
the size of the OE market for accumlators. In terms of 
volume the current ratio is about 9: 4; in terms of sales 
value, the ratio is much higher. 
3. SPARKING PLUGS 
Sparking plugs are normally replaced after about 19,000 
1 This calculation ignores the use of two batteries by very 
large commercial vehicles. 
2 The estimate of the replacement market is almost identical 
with one reached independently by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit Ltd. (Ref 1. ) 
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kilometres, With about 15 million petrol-driven cars-and vans 
in use in 1974, with an average distance travelled of about 14,300 
kilometres, this suggests a replacement market of about 50,000 
plugs (assuming an average of about 450 plugs per 100 vehicles). 
A further 6-7,000 may be added for plugs used in motor-cycles, 
motor-mowers, agricultural vehicles etc. 
The original equipment market is proportional to the number of 
vehicles produced, less most of the unassembled units exported. 
For petrol driven vehicles in 1974 this total was about 1.5 
million vehicles, or about 6.8 million plugs. 
' 
In the case of sparking plugs, this calculation suggests that 
the replacement market is approximately eight times as large 
as the original equipment market, in volume terms. The OE market 
is regarded as important by the principal manufacturers of 
sparking plugs because there is likely to be some brand loyalty, 
especially during the first year of a vehicle's life when the 
validity of guarantees relating to the ignition equipment is 
considered. Because plugs are a fairly minor cost item, the 
customer may feel it wise to replace plugs with identical brands 
to avoid more significant problems. 
4. SUMMARY OF SECTION 
For the three products considered in this study the United 
Kingdom replacement segment of the market is much larger than 
the original equipment segment. Apart from the value of any 
contribution to fixed expenses achieved by selling at prices 
greater than marginal costs, one of the main motives for manufacturer 
to sell to the vehicle builders is the entry that this gives 
to the more profitable replacement sector. 
1 These estimates are consistent with those of the E. I. U. and of 
one of the spark plug manufacturers. 
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C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE U. K. MOTOR INDUSTRY 
TABLE 1.1 ANALYSIS OF GROSS OUTPUT 1974 
(a) ANALYSIS1BY PRODUCT 
Passenger cars: Home sales 
Exports 
Commercial Vehicles: Home sales 
Exports 
Parts and Accessories (other than those 
included in vehicles shown above) 
Home sales 
Exports 




By vehicle manufacturers 745 
By component producers' 625 
By organisations outside the motor industry 2,115 
3,485 








This table shows the importance to the motor industry of parts 
and accessories (other than those incorporated in complete vehicles). 
These accounted for over 32 per cent of total industry sales in 1974 
and for over 51 per cent of industry exports. The significance of 
foreign trade for components in general and for tyres, batteries and 
sparking plugs in particular is discussed in Section D. 
1 Component producers include all enterprises with no vehicle 
manufacturing capacity but with establishments devoted 
primarily to motor vehicle components. 







In contrast to those in other countries, the British motor 
industry has little vertical integration. Whereas value added 
by the vehicle manufacturers accounted for only 30 per cent of 
sales, the corresponding proportion for German verhicle builders 
was around 47 per cent": A distinctive feature of the U. K. 
motor industry is the existence of large component manufacturing 
groups. Although there are over 2,000 companies within the 
component sector, ten of these account for over half of the 
total value of the OE market for components2. 
In the production of tyres, batteries and sparking plugs, 
large firms with multinational interests predominate and only 
these large companies are involved in the OE segment. These 
are as follows: - 
Tyres: - Dunlop, Pirelli, Michelin, Avon, Firestone, 
Goodyear, Uniroyal. 
Batteries: - Chloride and Lucas. 
Sparking plugs: - Champion (the only source for Leyland and 
Chrysler), A. C. Deldo (the only supplier 
to fellow GM subsidiary, Vauxhall Motors Ltd) 
Autolite (sole supplier to and division of 
Ford). 
D. FOREIGN TRADE 
Table 2 shows the composition of U. K. trade in 1964 and 
in each of the five latest years for which data are available, 
1972 to 1976. 
1 Estimate by author based on data published by Verband 
der Deutschen Automobilindustrie: Tatsachen und Zahlen and 
also an analysis of company accounts for an earlier 
research project. 
2 C. P. R. S. (Ref-2 ), page 7. 
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TABLE 1.2 U. K. TRADE IN PRODUCTS OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY 
(Wider definition than in Table I-1) 
1964 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
EXPORTS (£m-f. o. b. ) 
Cars and taxis: 
assembled 174.4 213.5 234.4 270.6 315.3 454.7 
unassembled 81.2 116.4 138.3 147.9 167.9 176.3 
Goods Vehicles complete 114.7 131.0 168.0 297.0 375.9 
chassis 126.5 17.1 31.9 14.9 24.2 26.4 
Other commercial vehicles 43.3 51.2 67.1 107.4 145.9 
Parts & Accessories 224.3 576.8 703.2 859.4 1151.5 1503.8 
Tractors, Dumpers and 3 237.3 278.7 136 348.3 531.4 596.5 
other products . 
TOTAL EXPORTS 742.7 1319.1 1568.7 1876.2 2594.7 3279.5 
IMPORTS (£m. c. i. f. ) 
Cars and taxis: 
assembled 27.1 324.3 436.9 355.0 513.8 871.0 
unassembled 0.1 - 0.1 0.2 15.4 
Commercial vehicles 2.2 39.0 53.7 91.1 90.1 122.7 
Parts & Accessories 13.0 169.4 224.6 301.6 359.6 552.1 
Other products 15.9 29.6 49.3 70.0 126.4 110.2 
TOTAL IMPORTS 58.2 562.4 764.5 817.8 1090.9 1671.4 
Source: SMMT and Overseas Trade Accounts. 
From the data in this table it can be calculated that, whereas 
in 1964 parts and accessories accounted for 30 per cent of total 
U. K. exports of motor industry products, by 1976 the proportion was 
nearly 46 per cent. This has been due partly to the transfer to 
overseas sources of purchases of parts for British vehicles 
assembled overseas. When the ratio of the U. K. content of such 
vehicles to their complete ex-factory value falls below 50%, the 
vehicle is no longer included in the "unassembled vehicles 
category" and the components exported from the United Kingdom are 
classified as parts and accessories. Among "unassembled vehicles" 
I 
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included in the count, the U. K. content has fallen significantly, 
Within the 1601-2,200cc. category, for example, in 1965 the value 
of the unassembled car exported was over 70 per cent of the 
corresponding value of the completed vehicle; by 1975 this ratio 
had fallen to 61 per cent. 
While completed "passenger cars" represented under 14 per cent 
of U. K. motor industry exports in 1976 (and only 12 per cent in 
1975), they continue to be the main element of imports, 52 per cent 
in 1976. The assembly of foreign vehicles in this country is confined 
to the recently introduced arrangements for the Chrysler Alpine. 
The trends in trade have adversely affected the U. K. OE market 
for tyres, batteries and spark plugs. These products are usually 
among the first items to be supplied from sources in or near the 
country of assembly when vehicles are exported from the U. K. in 
unassembled form. The OE sector has also been reduced by the 
increased penetration by imported cars and commercial vehicles 
(nearly all in completed form) of the United Kingdom market. 
E. COMPONENTS FOR PASSENGER CARS - ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT 
1. NEW REGISTRATIONS OF PASSENGER CARS 
Figure I shows new registrations of passenger cars in each year 
from 1960 to 1975. The volatile nature of demand can be explained 
partly by major changes in the economic environment: - alternation 
ofý expansionary and restrictive policies by governments in the 
1960's which tended to control demand for consumer durables as a 
means of regulating the economy; the rapid growth of the U. K. 
economy in 1972-3 and the effects of recession after the rise in 
oil prices. Purchases of new cars are likely always to be 
highly sensitive to changes in aggregate income because of the 
"stock adjustment effect"1. Current research by the present 
author has shown that new registrations (Q) are related to 
personal disposable income (Y) and the ratio of an index of 
new car prices to the overall index of retail prices (P) by 
the following equation (which relates to Great Britain): - 
The theoretical basis of this concept was set out in a paper by Stone and Rowe in Econometrica 1958. See also C StJ. O'Herlihy: The Demand for Cars in Great Britain, Applied Statistics 1965. 
10 
Q= 959 + 0.034 (Y +4 AY)- 10.48P R2 = 0.927 
(365) (0.004) (2.48) DW = 2.12 
Estimates predicted by the equation are shown alongside actual new 
registrations for 1960 to 1975 in Figure I. (At end of section) 
Forecasts of new registrations in any future year are inevitably 
hazardous. Most' new cars are purchased to replace existing 
vehicles which are then transferred to new owners. Postponement 
of replacement during a recession leads to a potentially larger 
demand in a subsequent year; above-normal replacement leads to 
a rejuvenated car stock and so to a lower level of subsequent 
demand. Although the stock-adjustment model takes this feature 
into account, it requires prediction of year-by-year changes 
in economic activity. New car registrations and consequent 
OE demand for components will remain very difficult to predict. 
2. U. K. PRODUCTION OF PASSENGER CARS 
Because of the increased penetration of the U. K. market by 
importers (14 per cent in 1970,33 per cent in 1975 and 45 
per cent in 1976) and the decline in exports of vehicles, 
annual production of cars has only once (1972) exceeded its 
1964level :- 
TABLE 1.3 PRODUCTION OF PASSENGER CARS IN THE U. K. 
(Department of Industry) 
YEAR No. of cars produced (000's) YEAR No. of cars produced (000's) 
1960 1353 1969 1717 
1961 1004 1970 1641 
1962 1250 1971 1742 
1963 1608 1.12 1921 
1964- 1867 1973 1747 
1965 1772 1974 1534 
1966 1604 1975 1268 
1967 1552 1976 1333 
1968 1815 
N 
1 The Motor Transactions Survey of 1971 showed that the proportion 
was then 92 %. With the greater current level of motorisation, the proportion is almost certainly higher. 
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For producers of certain components, the demand from the OE 
sector is overstated in Table 1.3. because the production figures 
include incomplete vehicles exported overseas in unassembled 
form. Tyres, spark plugs and batteries may not be included 
in all of these unassembled vehicle units. 
F. COMPONENTS FOR PASSENGER CARS - REPLACEMENT DEMAND 
In section B we listed some of the factors which influence 
the replacement demand for the three component products. These 
will be examined in further detail in Sections II to IV. It 
is clear that replacement demand will not be proportional to 
the total number of cars in use, nor to the total distance 
covered by passenger cars. For tyres (especially with the 
growing importance of radials) and batteries, replacement during 
the first two years of a car's life is exceptional. Table 4 
shows the number of passenger cars in use in Great Britainlin 
September of each year annually from 1961 to 1976 and also the 
number aged two years and over. These data are shown graphically 
in Figure II. 
TABLE . 1.4 PASSENGER CARS IN USE IN GREAT BRITAIN 1961-76 
Grand total of which at least 2 years old 
1961 5,979 4,379 
1962 6,556 5,154 
1963 7,375 5,670 
1964 8,247 6,112 
1965 8,917 6,589 
1966 9,513 7,242 
1967 10,303 8,169 
1968 10,816 8,660 
1969 11,227 9,063 
1 Great Britain is used instead of the United Kingdon because 
of incomplete data for Northern Ireland. The total numbers 
of cars licensed for use in Northern Ireland were (thousands): - 
1961 : 135 1971 : 299 1976 : 316 
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of which at Grand total least 2 years old 
1970 11,515 9,436 
1971 12,062 9,801 
1972 12,717 9,892 
1973 13,497 10,166 
1974 13,639 10,637 
1975 13,747 11,251 
1976 14,029 11,703 
It is interesting to compare the growth of cars aged two years 
and over with new registrations. For example, 1972 and 1973 were 
boom years in new car demand but the effect of earlier replacement 
of existing cars and, through changes in the second-hand markets-of 
a higher rate of scrappage, was to reduce almost to zero the growth 
in the number of cars aged two years and over. By contrast, 1975 
was the lowest for new car sales since 1970 but there was an 
abnormally large growth in the number of cars aged two years or more. 
This compensating variation between OE and replacement demand for 
passenger cars means that a recession in the motor industry does 
not necessarily affect all component producers adversely. 
G. GOODS VEHICLES 
There is a fairly close relationship between tonne-kilometres 
of freight carried by road and Gross Domestic Product. For 1962 
to 1976 there was an income-elasticity of about 1.4 (see note 1) 
Although this relationship has remained valid over the 15 year 
period, there have been significant changes in the stock, utilisajion 
and patterns of replacement of goods vehicles. 
Table 1.5 shows tonne-kilometres carried by vehicles in different 
weight categories during the calendar year 1973,1975 (the first was 
a year of prosperity, until the last few weeks; the second a year 
of recession) and compares these data with the results of a 
Ministry of Transport survey covering the twelve months ended 
May 1968. 
1 Loge(Tonne-kilometres) = 1.44(LogeGDP) - 10.95 R2 = 0.95 
(0.09) (0.96) DW = 0.72 
or Q Loge(Tonne, -kilometres) = 1.35( oLoge GDP) R2 = 0.62 (0.29) DW = 1.91 
i 
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TABLE 1.5 ANALYSIS OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT BY ROAD (GREAT BRITAIN) 
Net unladen weight of vehicle(in 
Ion ý 
tons I 
OVER - 3 5 8 ALL 
NOT OVER 3 5 8 - VEHICLES 
1967-8 
Tonne-km. (109) 8.3 28.2 27.0 14.4 77.9 
No. of vehicles (103) 1116 273 99 34 1522 
Tonne-km. per vehicle (103) 7.4 103 273 424 51.1 
1973 
Tonne-km. 18.9 27.3 44.7 90.9 
No. of vehicles 1240 192 143 85 1660 
Tonne-km. per vehicle 13.2 191 526 54.8 
1975 
Tonne-km. 5.6 9.7 22.5 54.0 91.8 
No. of vehicles 1311 162 134 96 1703 
Tonne-km. per vehicle 4.3 60 168 562 53.9 
Source: Department of Transport (Transport 
Statistics 1975) 
Department of Environment (Highway 
Statistics 1971 and 1973). 
This table reveals a number of changes in the pattern of road 
transport, The most significant of these is the use of larger 
vehicles for all but the shortest of journeys. Lorries with unladen 
weight of over 8 tons accounted for under 19 per cent of freight 
movement (in tonne-km. ) in 1967-8; by 1975 this proportion had 
increased to nearly 59 per cent. The table reveals lower utilisation 
of smaller vehicles, which has led to extended lives and to fewer 
new registrations, except in the smallest category. 
1 One long ton = 1.018 metric tons ("tonnes"). 
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TABLE 1.6 NEW REGISTRATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN OF GENERAL GOODS 
VEHICLES 1965-75 (000's 
OVER 1 3 5 8 
Total over 1 tons Grand 
NOT OVER 3 5 8 1i - 
tons or less Total 
1965 23.5 35.4 18.4 77.3 144.1 221.4 
1966 22.3 35.7 24.1 82.1 138.0 220.1 
1967 19.2 28.4 29.2 76.8 137.9 214.7 
1968 19.6 28.0 61.8 81.4 143.6 225.0 
1969 21.6 30.5 36.3 88.4 145.8 234.2 
1970 18.9 25.1 23.7 13.1 80.8 150.8 231.6 
1971 18.4 19.4 19.1 12.8 69.7 160.5 230.2 
1972 22.2 15.9 18.0 14.0 70.1 192.0 262.1 
1973 28.0 14.8 18.3 16.7 77.8 206.0 283.8 
1974 24.3 10.6 12.0 16.5 63.4 165.6 229.0 
1975 22.5 12.4 12.5 13.8 61.2 150.4 211.6 
1976 17.0 14.7 11.9 15.5 59.1 149.3 208.4 
Source: Department of Transport and SMMT. 
In terms of numbers, smaller vehicles (of li tons or less) now 
account for over 70 per cent of new registrations. In terms of 
numbers of batteries this means that they dominate the home-based 
OE market (some large vehicles have two batteries). For tyres this 
dominance is less important because larger vehicles have larger 
tyres and may have six, eight or more wheels. 
The historic preference (encouraged by licensing restrictions) 
for the medium-size goods vehicles in Britain placed U. K. manufacturers 
at a disadvantage, since the pattern of demand overseas included 
greater proportions of larger vehicles for long-distance transport 
and of small vans for local work. Exports of goods vehicles 
(mostly assembled) amounted to £402 millions in 1976,12 per cent of 
all motor industry exports and over seven times the value of imports, 
which were mainly of car-derived vans. 
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Total production of goods vehicles is shown in Table 1.7 
TABLE 1.7 U. K. PRODUCTION OF GOODS VEHICLES 1965-76 (000's) 
Car- derived 
Allocated by manufacturers for vans included 
Home Sales Exports Total in total 
1965 271.5 165.7 437.2 123.1 
1966 250.4 164.0 414.4 103.1 
1967 237.3 129.6 366.9 105.1 
1968 250.3 140.3 390.6 97.4 
1969 273.0 179.5 442.5 114.8 
1970 256.5 177.8 434.3 110.5 
1971 255.7 174.0 429.7 113.6 
1972 258.6 119.4 378.0 112.4 
1973 246.1 140.1 386.2 100.7 
1974 220.6 148.3 368.9 92.6 
1975 181.3 163.7 345.0 80.5 
1976 170.4 168.5 338.9 82.1 
Source: Department of Industry (via SMMT) 
Goods vehicles generally have shorter lives than passenger cars; 
the average life is around 7 years compared with about 10b. In the 
seven years 1970 -6 the new goods vehicle registrations in Great 
Britain were on average equivalent to 14.8% of the number of goods 
vehicles in use; for passenger cars, the corresponding proportion was 
10.3%. During their shorter lives, goods vehicles cover a greater 
distance: - 
Average km. per year (000's) 
1970 1973 1974 1975 
Cars 13.8 14.2 13.6 13.8 
Goods vehicles 22.8 23.8 22.4 22.1 
These figures imply that the average car completes about 
150,000 km before scrappage; the average goods vehicle, in its 
shorter life, about 165,000 km. 
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For tyres, goods vehicles replacement is one of the most 
substantial market segments, especially in terms of value. For 
batteries, of which the life is only partly affected by use, this r 
segment is probably less important. Most goods vehicles (other than 
the smaller petrol-driven vans and pick-up vehicles) use compression 
ignition, so that this market is much less important for manufacturers 
of spark plugs. 
H. BUSES AND COACH OPERATORS 
Bus and coach operators are also significant users of tyres, 
because of the high utilisation and long life of public service 
vehicles. Of the 79,600 buses and coaches' in use in Great Britain 
in 1975,63 per cent were at least five years old. Average distance 
travelled was over 43,000 km, more than three times the distance 
covered by cars. The decline in public transport is reflected in 
the dwindling proportion of total vehicle-kilometres of road traffic 
which were accounted for by buses and coaches: 1.47% in 1975 
compared with 2.40% in 1965. 
1 Excluding public service vehicles with 8 seats or less. 
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A. ANALYSIS OF TOTAL MARKET 
Tyre manufacturing is dominated by a small number of large 
multinational companies. This oligopolistic structure is probably 
the reason for a high degree of commercial secrecy within the 
industry. Because of this, there are discrepancies in the estimates 
of tyre production between data published by the Business Statistics 
Office and those collected by the British Rubber Manufacturers 
Association and published by the International Rubber Study Group. 
These discrepancies are greatest between estimates of production 
of remoulded tyres. 
The B. S. O. figures for the number and value of tyres produced 
in the United Kingdom in recent years are shown in Tables II. 1 and 
11.2. 
TABLE II. 1 NUMBERS OF TYRES PRODUCED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Thousands 
NEW TYRES 1968 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Car & Van cross-ply 18426 13028 9528 7592 6166 
Car & Van radial 6234 14813 17125 16675 17464 
Commercial vehicle 3928 3701 3798 3575 3555 
New car & CV tyres 28588 31542 30451 27842 27185 
RETREADED TYRES 
Car and van n. a. 7270 6867 5584 5759 
Commercial vehicles 800 936 1097 988 1031 
Retreaded car & 
CV Tyres n. a. 8206 7964 6572 6790 
TYRE TUBES 
Car and van 6232 5190 4694 3830 4519 
Commercial vehicles n. a. 2482 2641 2448 2490 
Car and CV Tubes n. a. 7672 7335 6278 7009 
Sources: 1968: Census of Production 
1972-5: Business Monitor Services. 
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TABLE 11.2 ANALYSIS OF REVENUE FROM SALE OF TYRES (U. K) 
(£OOO's) 
1968 1972 1973 1974 1975 
NEW TYRES (COVERS) 
Car & Van cross-ply 57,858 51,038 41,093 41,309 38,608 
radial-ply 23,505 72,505 85,638 105,068 138,505 
Commercial vehicle 66,040 88,816 97,746 120,512 153,958 
Others (mainly tract or 25,383 31,351 35,366 44,018 52,342 
earthmover etc. ) 
TOTAL NEW TYRES 202,786 243,710 260,143 310,907 383,414 
RETREADED TYRES 
Car & Van 12,619 17,510 15,685 14,980 16,797 
Commercial vehicle 8,006 12,658 15,021 17,715 23,000 
Other 1,855 3,098 3,332 4,118 4,867 













TOTAL SALES 240,099 287,768 305,184 361,626 445,339 
Index of total at 100 91 89 91 91 constant purchasing 
powerl 
Sources: As for Table II. 1 
The expression of total sales revenue from tyre manufacture in 
1975 purchasing power shows that the tyre industry had been static 
since 1972 and that the real value of sales turnover was 9 per cent 
lower than in 1968. 
Further analysis of Tables II. 1 and II. 2 requires a breakdown 
This is the total sales figure adjusted by, the general Index 
of Retail Prices (for all items of consumption). The result is 




of production in each category into direct exports and domestic 
demand and of domestic demand into original equipment and 
replacement sales. 
1. U. K. SALES OF TYRES FOR CARS 
Data for complete analysis from government sources are 
available only for 1973 to 1975. These are analysed in table II. 3. 
TABLE II.. 3 ANALYSIS OF SALES OF CAR TYRES 1973-5 
000's OF TYRES 1973 1974 1975 
NEW TYRES: U. K. manufacturers 26,653 24,267 23,630 
sales 
(less) Direct exports -5,220 -5,423 -5,986 
(less) Estimated OE demands -9,285 -8,181 -6,786 
New U. K. tyres for replacement 12,148 10,663 10,858 
(add) Imports +3,754 +4,265 +3,864 
Total replacement sales of 15,902 14,928 14,722 
new tyres 
RETREADED TYRES: U. K. 6,867 5,584 5,759 manufacturers sales 
(less) Exports - 183, - 268 - 101 
(add) Imports + 173 + 297 + 134 
Total U. K. market for 6,857 5,613 5,792 
retreaded tyres 
Total U. K. replacement market 22,759 20,541 '20,514 
Retreads as % of total 30.1 27.3 28.2 
Sources: Business Monitor and Overseas Trade Accounts. 
Discussions with vehicle manufacturers revealed that they rarely use 
imported tyres and it has been assumed in Table 11.3 that all imported 
tyres go to the replacement sector (although it would not affect our 
estimate of the size of that sector if the imports were added higher 
in the table). The estimate of OE demand is equal to (five times 
output of cars and car-derived vans) plus (four times output of 
three-wheeled vehicles). This may be a slight over-estimate because 
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the car and van production figures include unassembled vehicles 
exported overseas; some of these units may not include tyres. 
The estimates of replacement demand are close to those produced 
by other research groups. For years before 1972 it is necessary to 
rely on sales statistics collected by the British Rubber Manufacturers 
Association which tend to be lower than official statistics to varying 
degreesi. For this reason and because of less complete breakdown of 
trade figures, only broad estimates can be given. of OE and replacement 
demand. 
TABLE 11.4 BROAD ESTIMATES OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT AND REPLACEMENT 
MARKET FOR CAR TYRES 1968-75 (inc. imports)- millions of tyres 
Replacement 
OE NEW REMOULDS TOTAL 
1968 10 14 8 32 
1969 9 15 7 31 
1970 9 14 7 30 
1971 9 15 8 32 
1972 10 15 -7 32 
1973* 9.3 15.9 6.9 32.1 
1974* 8.2 14.9 5.6 28.7 
1975* 6.8 14.7 5.8 27.3 
* Figures for these years are more reliable than earlier 
estimates (see Table 11.3) 
The reasons for the variations in OE demand were discussed in 
Section 1. The static nature of replacement demand has been due to 
a number of concurrent developments: - 
(i) Legislation introduced making it an offence to use tyres 
without a minimum tread depth of lcm. This factor would 
cause earlier replacement. 
(P 
1 The BSO was unable, for reasons of commercial security, to discuss 
reasons for this discrepancy. 
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(ii) A levelling out of car ownership, especially since 1973. 
The compulsory testing of older cars, combined with the 
rising costs of vehicle maintenance and repair, appears 
to have led to earlier scrappage. In the period 1970-5 
the number of cars in use which were at least two years 
old rose by 1.81 millions, or 19 per cent. In the 
previous five years the growth had been 2.85 millions, 
or 43 per cent. 
(iii) The progressive adoption of radial-ply instead of 
cross-ply tyres has reduced the rate of tyre replacement. 
The average life of a radial tyre is between 40-45,000 
km., approximately double that of a cross-ply tyre. The 
relative importance of radials in the two market segments 
can be derived from the B. R. M. A. figures: - 
TABLE 11.5 RADIAL TYRES AS PERCENTAGE OF SALES OF NEW TYRES BY 
U. K. MANUFACTURERS. 
OE REPLACEMENT 
1971 42 47 
1972 58 50 
1973 77 52 
1974 87 58 
1975 91 66 
1976 91 72 
Source: B. R. M. A. (Rubber Statistical Bulletin of IRSG). 
The ex-factory price of a radial tyre is higher than that of a 
cross-ply tyre but the difference is insufficient to compensate for 
the longer tyre life: - 
TABLE 11.6 IMPLIED EX-FACTORY PRICES OF CAR TYRES (£). 
Rati o 
Cross-ply Radials Radials/Cross-ply 
1973 4-31 5-00 1-16 
1974 5-44 6-30 1-16 
1975 6-26 7.93 1.27 
Source: Derived from Tables II. 1 and 11.2. 
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The increase in the relative price of radial tyres in 1975 
probably reflects increasing competition in the market for cross-ply 
tyres from imported sources. 
(iv) A fourth reason for the static nature of replacement 
sales of tyres, in spite of growing car ownership, is 
a recent drop in average distance travelled per car, 
In 1975 this was 13,800 km. compared with 14,300 km. in 
1972. This decrease is due partly to increased petrol 
prices but may also reflect the lower average distances 
covered by cars in households with two or more cars. 
The static nature of the replacement market for car tyres is a 
major factor in the decline of sales revenue in the tyre industry 
(measured in constant purchasing power). Whereas in 1968 203 tyres 
were replaced on every 100 cars in use, by 1975 this number had 
fallen to 149. 
2. THE U. K. COMMERCIAL VEHICLE MARKET 
Table 11.2 showed the importance to the tyre industry of 
commercial vehicles. Commercial vehicle tyres (including retreads) 
accounted for 31 per cent of sales value in 1968 and nearly 40 per 
cent in 1975, compared with 39 and 44 per cent respectively for car 
tyres. In numbers of tyres, commercial vehicles accounted for only 
13 per cent of sales in 1975. The contrast is explained mainly by 
the difference in size and specifcation. Marginal costs and, 
therefore, the basis for bilateral price negotiations are much 
higher than in the case of car tyres produced in large volumes. 
In Section I we indicated that although the average life of a 
goods vehicle was shorter than that of a passenger car, the total 
distance travelled before scrappage was, on average, about 10 per 
cent greater. Table 11.7 shows an estimated breakdown of original 
equipment and replacement demand for commercial vehicle tyres in 
the period 1968-76: - 
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TABLE II. 7 BREAKDOWN OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLE TYRE MARKET IN U. K. 
1968-1975. 
Original Replacement 
Equipment New Remoulds Total 
1968 1,700 1,200 800 3,700 
1972 1,022 1,870 936 3,828 
1973 885 1,806 1,097 3,788 
1974 914 1,726 1,054 3,694 
1975 1,156 1,587 1,154 3,897 
Sources: Business Statistics Office and 
British Rubber Manufacturers Association. 
The decline of the OE market for commercial vehicle tyres 
occurred after 1971. After a boom of four years, U. K. production 
of goods vehicles (excluding car-derived vans) fell by 16 per cent in 
between 1971 and 1972. The decline was concentrated in the export 
markets and, particularly, amoung the medium-size trucks which then 
were the heavier products of the volume producers of commercial 
vehicles. 
From Table 11.7 and the earlier Table II. 4 it can be calculated 
that over the three years 1973-5 original equipment purchases 
represented 27.6 per cent of total demand for car tyres and 26 per 
cent of demand for commercial vehicle tyres. 
3. DIRECT TRADE 
(a) GENERAL 
The dominant position of multinational companies, which ship 
tyres between countries according to current demand and 
production conditions, makes it difficult to interpret trading 
patterns. All four of the vehicle manufacturers in the United 
Kingdom are increasingly organising their activities on the 
basis of European integration. The tyre manufacturers with U. K. 
Plants are increasing exports and imports. 
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TABLE 11.8 VALUE OF TRADE IN ALL RUBBER TYRES AND TUBES (fm) 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
1968 14.6 33.4 
1969 13.5 38.8 
1970 13.4 52.5 
1971 15.0 54.6 
1972 25.3 52.5 
1973 26.0 68.4 
1974 48.3 86.4 
1975 56.6 130.7 
Source: Overseas Trade Accounts 
Most of the growth since 1971 has been associated with intra-European 
trade. In 1971 Continental Europe received 61 per cent of exports and 
supplied 89 per cent of imports measured in sterling value. By 1975 the 
first proportion had risen to 70 per cent, the second remained virtually 
unchanged. With the rest of the E. E. C. there was a trade surplus in 
tyre products of 18.4 millions in 1975. 
(b) DIRECT IMPORTS AND THE U. K. MARKET-PASSENGER CARS 
Discussions with the major vehicle manufacturers revealed that none of 
these buys tyres from overseas for use on passenger cars and purchases 
for commercial vehicles are confined to exceptional and specific requirements. 
Some of the tyres purchased from the major domestic suppliers are imported 
from those suppliers'overseas plants. Data from B. R. M. A. make it possible 
to isolate these transfers from competitive imports: - 
TABLE 11.9 IMPORTS OF NEW CAR TYRES 1971-6 
Total By BRMA 
volume (000's) Members Competitive 
1971 2,455 728 1,727 
1972 3,501 1,482 2,019 
1973 3,754 1,766 1,988 
1974 4,265 2,129 2,136 
1975 3,864 1,577 2,287 
Sources: Customs and Excise. B. R. M. A. 
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These data show that the main growth in imports in recent years 
occurred in 1975 although there has been some increase since 1976 
in imports from competitive sources. Some imports from Eastern 
European countries are providing cross-ply tyres at low prices: the 
withdrawal of some British producers from the cross-ply market has 
left a gap which these imports can fill. The age-profile of the 
U. K. car stock remains rather older than those of other European 
countries, especially France and Germany. Owners of older cars 
doing moderate distances at relatively low speeds are unlikely to 
re-equip these vehicles with radial tyres which would outlive them. 
Several research inquiries have shown that owners of newer 
foreign-built cars tend to replace tyres with those supplied by 
British producers. The fact that these producers are, with only 
one exception, simply U. K. branches of multinational companies, 
makes direct importing unlikely on any significant scale. 
Even in 1975 competitive imports accounted for only 11.8 
per cent of the total purchases of tyres by U. K. car owners; when 
retreads are excluded this ratio rises to 15.5 per cent. 
(c) DIRECT IMPORTS - COMMERCIAL VEHICLE TYRES 
Direct imports of tyres for trucks show a very similar pattern: - 
TABLE II. 10 IMPORTS OF NEW GOODS VEHICLE TYRES 1971-5 
Total By BRMA Competitive 
Volume members 
1971 128 24 104 
1972 116 47 69 
1973 202 93 109 
1974 331 82 247 
1975 281 32 249 
Sources: Customs and Excise. B. R. M. A. 
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Although the 249,000 tyres imported from competitive sources 
represented 9.1 per cent of all tyres purchased in replacement 
market and 15.7 per cent of all new tyres (almost identical to the 
car position), these tyres tended again to be at the lower end of 
the market. The average value of an imported tyre was E33.20 
compared with the average value of exported tyres of 140.45. 
(d) DIRECT EXPORTS 
A breakdown of tyre exports into those for cars and those 
for commercial vehicles is available in official statistics 
only for 1969 onwards. 





































Source: Overseas Trade Statistics (Customs & Excise). 
The large increase in the value of commercial vehicle tyre 
exports in 1975 reflects the 31 per cent increase in volume, the 
effect of price inflation and (one must conclude) a high proportion 
among the additional exports of larger, more expensive tyres, 
Sweden was the largest single national export market in 1975. It 
took 20 per cent of all commercial vehicle tyres exported from the 
United Kingdom and accounted for nearly 24 per cent of export value. 
Many of these were probably used as original equipment on new trucks 
assembled in Sweden. 16 per cent of all commercial vehicles imported 
27 
into the United Kingdom in 1975 were Swedish-assembled but, because 
these were mainly large trucks, their value was over 40 per cent of 
that of all commercial vehicles imported. 
Other large markets for commercial vehicle tyres (value 
exceeding £3 millions in 1975) are West Germany, Finland, the United 
States and Australia. European countries accounted for 73 per cent 
of the value of commercial vehicle tyres exported. 
European countries also took the majority of car tyres exported 
from the United Kingdom - 75 per cent by volume and 84 per cent by 
value. Western Germany was the largest single market (possibly 
representing shipments by one of the multinational vehicle manufacturers) 
followed by Sweden, Australia, Turkey, Finland and Belgium. All of 
these are countries to which British vehicle parts are sent for final 
assembly by locally based companies, by subsidiaries of British 
Leyland or by subsidiaries of the three American vehicle manufacturers 
with plants in the United Kingdom. 
In addition to car and commercial vehicle tyre casings, other 
tyre industry exports include tyres for tractors, earthmovers and 
construction vehicles (12.6 millions in 1975); tyres for aircraft 
and motor and pedal cycles (1.5 millions in total); innertubes 
(£5. O millions in 1975), tyre flaps and solid tyres. Exports of 
these last items and of retreaded tyres were relatively insignificant. 
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY 
1. NUMBERS OF COMPANIES MANUFACTURING EACH PRODUCT WITHIN THE U. K. 
The Business Statistics Office shows the number of separate 
enterprises producing each category as follows: - 
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TABLE 11.12 NUMBERS OF FIRMS REPORTING TO B. S. O. 
New car tyres: cross-ply 
radials 
New tyres for goods vehicles 
Retreaded tyres : cars 
goods vehicles 
Inner tubes 
Solid rubber tyres 
1968 1973 1975 
7 6 5 
7 6 6 
7 6 6 
16 18 20 
16 17 19 
7 6 7 
15 8 7 
As Table 11.12 shows, there were only seven enterprises engaged 
in new tyre production in the U. K. (although the number 
of trading companies appeared to be higher because some enterprises 
had subsidiaries trading under separate names). These companies were: - 
Avon Rubber Co. Ltd., 
Dunlop Holdings Ltd., 
Firestone Tyre and Rubber Ltd. (Subsidiary of U. S. Parent), 
Goodyear Tyre and Rubber Company Ltd. "" 
Michelin Tyre Company Ltd. (Subsidiary of French Parent), 
Pirelli Ltd. (Subsidiary of Italian Parent) 
Uniroyal Ltd. (Subsidiary of U. S. Parent). 
As from the Ist January, 1971 Dunlop Holdings Ltd. merged most 
of its activities (including its principal tyre-making subsidiary, 
Dunlop Ltd. ) in a union with Industrie Pirelli SpA. The union has 
a complex structure and for many trading purposes the Dunlop and 
Pirelli activities are separate - for example each has its own 
production and distribution facilities. From a financial standpoint, 
however, Dunlop Holdings Ltd. has a 51 per cent interest in the 
English company Pirelli Ltd. and a 49 per cent interest in Pirelli's 
other EEC activities. The Pirelli parent has a 49 per cent interest 
in Dunlop Ltd., and Pirelli Ltd. and a 51 per cent interest in its 
own activities elsewhere in the EEC. The arrangements for control of 
subsidiaries outside the European Economic Community are more complex. 
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The formation of the Dunlop-Pirelli Union in 1971 explains the 
decrease in the number of companies manufacturing new tyres, from 
seven to six. The official figures showed only five companies making 
cross-ply tyres in 1975 because of the withdrawal of Uniroyal from 
the production of cross-ply tyres. Some of the other multinational 
companies may also be curtailing U. K. production of cross-ply tyres 
and, while they still sell these, supplies are sometimes obtained 
from outside sources. 
2. RETREADING (and remoulding)l 
The retreading process does not require the use of large, 
indivisible items of capital equipment. Worn tyres are acquired 
from garages and distributors at low prices; the old tread is removed 
and the casing is scored for the subsequent addition of uncured 
rubber. The casing is then placed in a mould and the tread is applied 
under heat conditions. 
The major tyre producers all sell retreaded tyres, though some 
of this work is sub-contracted to independents. Although the 
Business Statistics Office reported that 20 companies produced 
retreads in 1975 this does not include firms with no establishment 
employing 25 or more persons. The Retread Manufacturers Association 
has 25 members (these do not include the new tyre producers) and 
there are possibly as many as 50 other small companies engaged in 
retreading. 
Retreaded tyres accounted for 30 per cent of replacement demand 
for car tyres in 1973; 27 per cent in 1974 and 28 per cent in 1975. 
For the commercial vehicle replacement market the proportions were 
rather higher: - 38 per cent in 1973 and 1974, and 42 per cent in 1975. 
The retreading of commercial vehicle tyres is more profitable than 
that of car tyres, because the principal element of cost in 
retreading is labour, which is little affected by the size of tyre. 
Retreading and remoulding are normally undertaken at different 
stages of one process. Retreading is the more common technical 
description but "remoulds" is the term more generally used. 
The terms are used interchangeably in this report. 
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About 35 per cent of all retreaded tyres are sold by the major 
producers of new tyres, partly under their own brand names and 
partly as "second-line" remoulds. The independent retreaders 
have 
to overcome a number of competitive disadvantages: - 
(a) With increasing publicity devoted to road safety and the higher 
vehicle speeds, especially on motorways and dual carriageways, 
of which there were 3,864 kilometres in Great Britain in 1970 
and 6,185 km in 1975, there is consumer resistance to retreaded 
tyres. The issue of a British Standard specification (Au144) 
followed pressure by the Retread Manufacturers Association who 
were eager to improve the image of the product. An official 
representative of the R. M. A. expressed concern about the failure 
of the smaller non-member firms to comply with the standard, 
with resulting adverse publicity. 
(b) The ownership by the main tyre manufacturers of many of the 
retail outlets, described in the next section, makes it 
difficult for independent retreaders to sell their own products 
(as opposed to sub-contract work). Some retreading companies 
have established their own outlets but, because these need to 
stock a wide product range, the economics of this forward 
integration are uncertain. 
(c) Independent distributors are more likely to recommend new 
tyres to customers in doubt about remoulds, partly because 
of higher retail margins but also because of the publicity of 
major tyre companies who advise more restricted use of remoulds 
than that specified in the British Standard. 
(d) The major tyre companies'own branded retreaded tyres are 
likely to be more acceptable than lesser known brands. They 
can also offer "second-line" remoulds in order to appeal to the 
price-conscious segment of the market. Such "second-line" 
products may be advertised by company-owned distributors at 
very low prices; the objective would then be to attract the 
motorist to the distributive outlet where he might be persuaded 
to purchase new tyres or branded remoulds. 
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For all these reasons, there is great downward pressure on the 
price of remoulds produced by independents. Their retail price is 
normally around 40 per cent of that of a new "first-line" tyre of the 
same dimension. The prospects for retreaded tyres are uncertain, 
expecially with the move to radial tyres. The remoulded radial tyre 
has not yet proved popular and the fact that a new radial tyre imposes 
much lower cost per kilometre travelled than the cross-ply tyre 
(see Table II. 6) reduces the economic pressure for the purchase of 
remoulds. More stringent vehicle testing may lead to the scrappage 
of many of the older vehicles used for short distances at modest 
speeds, for which remoulds are most often purchased. 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF TYRES TO THE REPLACEMENT MARKET 
A survey of sales of passenger car tyres by type of outlet 
showed the following pattern in 1975: - 
TABLE 11.13 REPLACEMENT TYRE PURCHASES BY TYPE OF OUTLET, 1975 
Manufacturer owned outlets 35 
Independent dealers 30 
Garages, filling stations etc. 29 
Other (chain stores, mail order etc. ) 6 
Source: E. I. U. (Ref 1) 
The retail distributors of the manufacturers are as follows: - 
Estd. No. of outlets 
Dunlop: National Tyre Service 450 
Pirelli: Central Tyre Company 100 
Goodyear: Tyre Services Holdings Ltd 
Kettering Motor Service Group Ltd. 400 
(and other smaller subsidiaries) ) 
Firestone: Tyre and Auto Services Ltd. Ect. 240 
Michelin: Associated Tyre Specialists Ltd. 360 
Avon: Motorway Tyres and Accessories Ltd. 180 
Sources: Company accounts, EIU and author's estimates. 
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One of the major manufacturing companies, Uniroyal, sold 
its 
outlets to Associated Tyre Specialists Ltd. (the Michelin subsidiary) 
in 1974, a decision which was linked to the withdrawal from cross-ply 
tyre production. 
Outside the subsidiaries of the major tyre producers, there 
are few large distributors of tyres. Only one company, Kennings Ltd. 
a distributor of Leyland Cars, has a national network of tyre depots. 
Many of the independent dealers have fewer then ten outlets. 
One major independent distributor is Esso Ltd., which acts as 
a factor for car components and accessories. Until about 1974, 
Esso obtained its tyres from Uniroyal Ltd. and, when that company 
withdrew from cross-ply production, Firestone and Goodyear became 
the main suppliers. 
Partly because the customer is mobile, there is fairly intensive 
competition in tyre distribution. This has led, since the abandonment 
of resale price maintenance in the mid 1960's, to price-cutting and 
competitive advertising by retailers. It has also induced some of 
the manufacturer-owned distribution companies to reduce the number of 
outlets in order to minimise overheads and to remain competitive. 
One of the interesting features revealed by a survey of 
Bedfordshire outlets is that the manufacturer-owned-distributors do 
not emphasise their ties with that manufacturer's brands. Indeed 
most such outlets also stock the products of other manufacturers 
and, whilst the customer is invited to purchase tyres made by the 
parent company, competitive brands (including tyres at substantial 
discount) are occasionally advertised 
4. THE NATURE OF COMPETITION IN THE REPLACEMENT MARKET 
The EIU reported that 73 per cent of all tyres sold in the 
United Kingdom were within six size-categories and that about 25 
per cent were of one size. A number of research studies has shown 
that there is little brand loyalty among customers for replacement 
tyres. There is intensive competition among a small number of 
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manufacturers of a fairly standard product with static demand. 
There are three main product lines: - remoulded tyres, cross-ply 
tyres and radial tyres, with a further development in steel rather 
than textile-based radial tyres, Competition takes a number of 
forms: - 
(a) Qual it 
We have already pointed out' that one of the reasons 
for the static replacement market for tyres is the 
greater use of radial tyres, which give the motorist 
approximately double the tyre-life of cross-ply tyres 
for an increase of about 30 per cent on price. 
Improvements in quality have occurred through competitive 
pressure and longer life has been advertised as 
an attribute of individual brands. 
It is interesting to note the speech by the managing 
director of Dunlop Holdings Ltd. to the 1977 convention 
of the National, Tyre Distributors Association2, in which 
he suggested that research into production of tyres with 
increasingly long life should be curtailed. Car 
manufacturers and motorists were, in his view, satisfied 
with radial tyres lasting 57,000 to 65,000 kilometres. 
"Expense to make the tyre last longer is neither economic 
sense nor a customer requirement. " 
The need for and obstacles to agreement on product life 
among oligopoly producers of a semi-durable product are 
well documented. 
(b) Advertising 
Estimates of total expenditure on advertising by tyre 
producers are collected and published by Media Expenditure 
Analysis Ltd (MEAL). Data for each of the years 1972 to 
1976 are shown in Table 11.14: - 
1 On page 21 above. 
2 Summarised, with longer quotations in SMMT: Motor Industry 
News Digest, June 1977. 
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TABLE 11.14 ' EXPENDITURE ON ADVERTISING OF TYRES 1972-6 (Press & TV 
(fo0o's) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Avon Tyres 4 42 NIL 33 14 
Motorway Tyres 24 55 31 29 12 
Dunlop Tyresl 624 527 356 889 965 
National Tyre Service 79 68 69 152 167 
Firestone Tyres 287 319 432 229 333 
Albany Tyre Service 44 25 9 10 11 
Goodyear Tyres 431 435 410 415 720 
Tyre Service (Great Britain) 23 41 86 49 88 
Michelin Tyres 372 532 364 458 474 
Associated Tyre Specialists 78 134 72 89 120 
Pirelli Tyres 104 154 121 53 256 
Uniroyal 240 317 6 22 10 
All others 445 388 247 174 275 
TOTAL TYRE ADVERTISING 2,755 3,037 2,203 2,602 3,445 
Source: MEAL digests. 
Over the years since 1969 the value of advertising expenditure 
had tended to fall in real terms: - 
TABLE II. 15 ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE 1969-76. 
Advertising Expenditure (000's) 
Current Index at No. of replacement 
Prices Constant Purchasing car tyres sold Power (est. in millions)_ 
1969 2,914 100 14 
1970 2,158 70 15 
1971 2,737 81 14 
1972 2,755 76 15.1 
1973 3,037 77 15.9 
1974 2,203 48 14.9 
1975 2,602 46 14.7 
1976 3,445 53 15.7(prov) 
1 Including subsidiary companies other than the Rrelli group. 
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Most of the advertising relates to new car tyres for replacement 
and in 1973 this was equivalent to about 20 pence per tyre sold, or 
about 3 to 4 per cent of the wholesale price. 
There is some evidence in Table 11.15 to suggest that advertising 
has a positive income-elasticity: - in the depression years of 1974 
and 1975 advertising expenditure on tyres fell, by over 37 per cent 
in inflation-adjusted terms. 
Table 11.14 also shows how the largest enterprises dominated 
advertising. Including its distributive outlets, the share of each 
firm in the total was as shown in Table 11.16. Some of the brands 
shown in "others" were produced by the large companies (for example 
Kelly-Springfield tyres are produced by Goodyear and Esso tyres were 
produced by Uniroyal until 1974 after which supplies were obtained 
from Firestone and Goodyear). 
TABLE 11.16 SHARES OF TOTAL ADVERTISING 1972-6 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Dunlop-Pirelli 29.3 24.7 24.8 42.0 40.3 
Firestone 12.0 11.3 20.0 9.2 10.0 
Goodyear 16.5 15.6 22.5 17.8 23.5 
Michelin 16.3 21.9 19.8 21.0 17.2 
Uniroyal 8.7 10.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 
Avon 0.9 3.2 1.4 2.4 0.8 
Total of above 83.7 87.1 88.3 93.2 92.1 
Others 16.3 12.9 11.7 6.8 7.9 
100 100 100 100 100 
(c) Brand Names in the Distributive Market 
Multiple brands are a feature of competition within an 
oligopolistic group and their existence may act as a 
barrier to outside firms. "Second-line" new tyres 
represent an attempt by manufacturers to segment the 
market into the price-inelastic segment which remains 
loyal to well-advertised brand-names and the more 
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price-conscious segment. Because tyres are a "concern" 
product (a burst tyre may mean death), loyalty to 
established brands is probably high but research surveys 
show that there is little loyalty to a single brand. 
The effect of advertising and "concern" is, more probably, 
to create preference for any one of the well-recognised 
brands. This would explain marked differences between 
retail prices of first and second-line brands. 
Some examples of second-line brands are listed here: - 
Each of the major companies also sells tyres under its 
own name. 
Dunlop: India, India Remoulds, John Bull, Regent 
Remoulds (Dunlop Remoulds are also sold). 
Firestone: Dayton. 
Goodyear: Lee, Kelly-Springfield. 
Avon: Henley. 
Michelin: Bergougnan. 
Uniroyal: Esso (until 1974), now radial tyres 
under distributors' labels. 
(d) Price Competition in Replacement Market. 
Previous research surveys have revealed relatively little 
about price competition in the tyre industry. Before 1965 
there were price agreements among major manufacturers 
which were facilitated by resale price maintenance. 
With the abandonment of resale price maintenance and the 
diversity of channels of distribution, price and quota- 
fixing agreements would be difficult to sustain. 
Retail prices for identical brands vary by as much as 
30-40 per cent between outlets and, while the margin 
for brokers and retailers combined might represent about 
40 per cent of the full retail price, it is difficult 
to believe that manufacturers are not also offering 
discounts to brokers. 
There is some need for further research into price 
structure but this requires empirical work on a scale 
beyond the current investigation. 
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5. MARKET SHARES IN THE REPLACEMENT SEGMENT 
Most of the market surveys conducted commercially have been 
concerned with the car replacement -a survey of commercial vehicle 
market shares would be more difficult. One of the difficulties in 
interpretation of survey findings is the assignment of second-line 
brands to residual categories. In our own estimates we have tried to 
combine data from two surveys: - 
TABLE 11.17. ESTIMATES OF MARKET SHARE (new tyres, car replacement) 
1972 1975 1976 
Dunlop Pirelli 28 28 26 
Goodyear 25 19 23 
Michelin 14 19 20 
Firestone 12 10 11 
Uniroyal 8 7 3 
Avon 5 5 4 
Others (mainly imports) 8 12 13 
100 100 100 
Notes 
(i) The table understates the Uniroyal market share in 1976 
because the ending of the Esso contract was followed by 
supply to other distributors. 
(ii) It is important to emphasise that all brands are included 
in the estimates for each manufacturer. Although Michelin 
is regarded in some quarters (e. g. by EIU) as market leader, 
when the Dunlop and Pirelli figures are merged and 
"second-line" brands included this is no longer the case. 
6. THE ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MARKET 
Discussions with the major vehicle manufacturers and the trade 
association of the tyre manufacturers revealed the following feautures 
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(a) All vehicle manufacturers keep very low inventories of 
tyres with a maximum of about three days' production 
requirements, except when supply difficulties are 
envisaged (for a specific size or type of tyre). Tyres 
are delivered daily from local depots of the tyre 
companies; schedules of expected requirements are issued 
by the vehicle manufacturers for a few months ahead but 
these do not represent a commitment to the tyre producer 
and are revised continually. This means that the vehicle 
manufacturer transfers to the tyre manufacturer the costs 
associated with variations in production, which result 
not only from variations in demand for particular vehicles 
but also from interruption's in supplies of other components 
or in facility for delivery. 
(b) Dunlop Ltd. may have a slight advantage over its tyre- 
producing competitors through its near-monopoly of wheel 
production for volume cars, other than those of Ford. 
(Ford has its own wheel-producing subsidiary. ) Dunlop 
fits tyres supplied by competitors, as ordered by the 
vehicle manufacturers purchasing the wheels. Wheels for 
some Leyland Cars (mainly outside the former Austin- 
Morris division) are made by Rubery Owen Ltd. and wheels 
for commercial vehicles are made by Guest Keen and 
Nettlefold Ltd. Although none of those interviewed had 
perceived any competitive advantage for Dunlop, it is 
difficult to believe that this could not exist under 
conditions of high demand for wheels. 
(c) Dual sourcing of tyres is now the norm for all the vehicle 
manufacturers. Until 1970 Dunlop was the sole supplier 
to the Austin-Morris division of British Leyland and it 
remains the dominant supplier but like the other manufacturers, 
Leyland buys each size of tyre from at least two sources. 
All three of the vehicle manufacturers interviewed consult 
all six of the main tyre producers at least once a year 
and negotiate prices and volumes. In practice, some 
trading patterns tend to be fairly constant. 
British Leyland obtains 87 per cent of its tyres from 
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three suppliers and Dunlop remains the largest supplier. 
Ford and Vauxhall probably obtain most of their 
requirements from Firestone, Goodyear and Uniroyal. 
Vauxhall normally uses only two suppliers for any one 
tyre size. 
Chrysler buys'from all six main suppliers. 
(d) Although tyre prices are bilaterally negotiated, tyre 
producers tend to ask for price increases of similar 
proportions at round about the same time of each year. 
Under the current U. K. system of price control, the Price 
Commission gives permission to each manufacturer} for an 
average price increase. This means that some common 
adjustment of prices is possible. There is no evidence 
of price collusion, either overt or tacit, but the price- 
leadership which Dunlop has occupied in the replacement 
sector may also occur, at least intermittently, in the 
OE sector, On standard, high volume, tyres price- 
differences between suppliers are generally less than one 
per cent. 
Estimated Shares of the OE Market (by volume) 1975 
These estimates are based on those of the EIU (Ref 1) and the 
results of our own discussions: - 
Per cent of all tyres 








7. RELATIVE PROFITABILITY OF OE AND REPLACEMENT MARKET 
We have secured some statistics on which it is possible to 
base 
estimates of average price of tyres sold to the OE and replacement markets 
in each of the years 1972 to 1976. 
The prices are those of manufacturers and do not include taxes 
or margins paid to distributors. Calculations suggest that for a new 
radial tyre the average price received by manufacturers on sales to 
the replacement market in 1975 was about £9.50 and on sales to the OE 
sector about £6.50. Where the manufacturer controls the distributive 
outlet additional income will, of course, be earned. 
C. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND CONCENTRATION TABLES 
In the analysis of concentration, based on the methodology 
prescribed by the Commission of the European Communities, it has been 
necessary to consider (1) the sharp dividing line between the large 
companies manufacturing new tyres as well as remoulds and the much 
greater number of small enterprises engaged in retreading and (2) 
the multi-national nature of the large tyre manufacturers. 
Because of (1) we have confined the Tables of Concentration to the 
large firms and refer to the smaller retreading companies only in the 
written text. Because of (2) we have omitted certain variables which 
have clearly been distorted by differing accounting policies of the 
multi-national groups in their treatment of United Kingdom activities. 
The variables used and activities covered are at three levels: - 
(1) All Activities in the United Kingdom: for each of the six groups 
(Avon, Dunlop-Pirelli, Firestone, Goodyear, Michelin and Uniroyal) 
tyres are believed to be the majo1 U. K. product but a detailed 
breakdown of turnover is not available in every case. For this 
reason, U. K. activities include the tyre companies' other 
products manufactured in this country. 
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O1 Sales Turnover - no difficulties here: data are taken 
straight from company accounts. 
02 Employment - data are from company accounts. There 
are problems of interpretation because where the company's 
head office is in the U. K. (Avon and Dunlop), the ratio of 
employees to U. K. sales is higher than in the U. K. 
subsidiaries of foreign - based companies. This is because 
of administrative staff with world-wide responsibilities, 
who in turn require more supporting staff. 
03 Wages-Bill - similar comments apply. 
04 Net Profits before tax - although this variable is used 
in the analysis, there are some doubts about the reliability 
of figures for subsidiary companies (e. g. the U. K. branches 
of multi-nationals). Differences between methods of 
allocation of parent company overheads and of accounting for 
depreciation may distort comparisons. Profit figures generally 
have overstated financial performance in recent years because 
of rapid inflation. The use of historic cost accounting 
means that depreciation is understated and time-lags between 
payments and receipts are not allowed for. Not all companies 
are equally affected especially in an industry where the 
timing of rubber purchases is important. 
11 Advertising Expenditure - this is included as an additional 
variable because data were available1and advertising is an 
important aspect of competition in this industry. The data 
are based on MEAL surveys (see above p. 33) but there are 
some important limitations. For example, when a manufacturer 
sells much of his output under the brand-name of a distributor, 
it is possible that he may contribute to the advertising 
costs. No allowance has been made for this. 
Variable 08 (Exports) is excluded from the analysis because 
for multi-national companies this concept has little meaning. 
42 
Variables 05 (cash flow), 06 (capital expenditure), 07 
(equity capital), 09 (net cash flow) and 10 (net assets) 
are excluded because neither Dunlop nor Avon publishes 
separate figures for these variables for the United Kingdom. 
(2) Tyres World-Wide 
Five of the six companies published a breakdown of world- 
wide turnover and profits by product groups for each of the 
years 1969-75. These figures are used in the analysis. 
(3) All Activities World-Wide 
The Michelin group published consolidated accounts for the 
first time during the survey period for the year 1975. 
Complete Tables of Concentration have been prepared only 
for that year. These relate to the following variables: - 
01 Sales Turnover 
04 Net profits before tax 
05 Gross cash flow (=04 plus depreciation) 
06 Gross capital expenditure 
07 Equity (own capital) 
09 Net cash flow (05 - tax) 
10 Net assets (equity plus long-term borrowing) 
1. COMMENTS ON TABLES OF CONCENTRATION 
TABLE 1. relates to U. K. activities and shows the evolution of total 
industry of each of the five variables. Because of rapid inflation 
over the six-year period (94 per cent increase in retail prices) 
we have also prepared Table 1(a) which shows all the totals in 
terms of 1975 purchasing power. (Industry sales, so adjusted, 
are not expressed in volume terms but in terms of a constant 
monetary unit. ) 
Over the six years sales turnover of the sample of companies 
rose in constant purchasing power (c. p. p. ) terms by 14 per cent. 
43 
The largest increase occurred in 1974 and reflects a large relative 
increase in the average price of tyres, which in turn was due to a 
sharp increase in the price of rubber ( the sterling price doubled 
between the first quarter of 1973 and the first quarter of 1974). 
The subsequent fall in the price of rubber benefited the tyre 
producers and led to a substantial improvement'in profits (51 
per cent in money terms, 31 per cent in c. p. p. terms). This 
appears to demonstrate the effectiveness of an outside lever on 
prices within an oligopoly -a kind of , ratchet" effect. As will 
be shown later, the recovery in profits was not experienced by 
all companies. 
The sharp drop in advertising expenditure (46 per cent in 
c. p. p. terms) is typical of manyirclustries over the past few years. 
Advertising expenditure has been fairly volatile in this industry and 
no stable pattern, usually expected in oligopolistic industries, 
has emerged. 
TABLE 2. shows the values of certain summary indices of concentration 
for each variable in each of the seven years. Variables 02 and 03 
(employment and wages-bill) were generally more concentrated 
than sales turnover but this was due to the inclusion in the case 
of Dunlop, the largestsingle firm, of all employees in the U. K., 
including those with responsibility for overseas activities. In 
1971, after the merger with Pirelli, Dunlop's sales turnover was 
48 per cent of that of the six firms combined while it accounted 
for about 56 per cent of employment; in 1975 the figures were 44 and 
53 per cent. 
Except in 1970 and 1971, profits were consistently more 
concentrated than sales turnover. This evidence needs to be treated 
with some care because the profits figures for U. K. activities are 
affected by decisions on the allocation of joint costs etc. which 
are in turn influenced by considerations of comparative taxation. 
The concentration indices all show little change in the degree 
of concentration of sales turnover over the seven years, though 
the merger of Pirelli's tyre interest with Dunlop in 1971 is reflected 
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by a discrete change in all three indices in that year. 
TABLE 3. shows concentration ratios (C2 and C4 ) together with Linda 
indices (L2 , L4 , Ln*h and Ln*m). 
Definitions of these indices 
and a guide to their interpretation has been provided by Linda 
(in Ref. 3 ). These are summarised in Appendix A. 
For sales turnover the concentration ratios increased in 
1971 with the Dunlop-Pirelli merger and also showed an increase 
in 1975. The Linda index suggest that in 1974 and 1975 the three 
largest enterprises formed a distinct oligopolistic group within 
the sample of six firms. 
These three (Dunlop, Michelin, and Goodyear) achieved 82 
per cent of total turnover in 1975: Goodyear's share was 14.6 per 
cent, while the next largest company (Avon) held less than seven 
per cent. 
Net profits appear more concentrated than turnover in each 
year but, because of differences in rankings, this needs to be 
interpreted carefully (even C4 does not refer to the same four firms 
for turnover and net profits in 1969,1970,1974 or 1975). Since 
net profit is a residual and a more volatile variable than turnover, 
greater concentration in any one year must be expected. 
The minimum values of Linda index show that in every year 
except 1975, there was a smaller grouping within the oligopoly 
which comprised firms making greater profits. Dunlop and 
Michelin were members of this group throughout: In 1975 the absence 
of a minimum value of the Linda index (a continuously rising Linda 
curve) occurred because these two firms achieved profits much 
greater than those of any competitors - Dunlop obtained 39 per 
cent and Michelin 54 per cent of all profits earned within the 
industry. 
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Advertising expenditure by each firm was also highly variable. 
Although it appears to be highly concentrated with a smaller group 
of heavy advertisers within the oligopoly, the composition of this 
group changed from one'year to the next. 
Because of the distortion caused by inclusion of British 
based companies along with U. K. subsidiaries of foreign companies, 
interpretation of the concentration ratios and Linda coefficients 
for employment and wages bill is difficult. 
TABLE 4. is a summary of the Linda indices for this sample. The 
coefficient LS (known as an Index of Synthesis) summarises the degree 
of inequality within the oligopoly group of n*m firms. Two main 
features emerge from this table: - 
(i) For employment and wages bill the values of LS are 
consistently higher than those for turnover (01) and 
profits (04). This is because of the distortion 
already described. 
(ii) For sales turnover the value of LS is greater than for 
profits except in 1974. (In 1975 the minimum of the 
Linda curve for profits was at its first point, so 
that LS = Ln*m = Ln*h = 0.702, but this value is not 
shown because it does not satisfy Linda's own 
definition of n*m. )l The principal reasons for the 
lower values of LS when applied to profits is that the 
largest firm (Dunlop) reported a lower profit margin on 
U. K. sales than the group average in every year except 1974 
(see Table 5). 
TABLE 5. shows profitability ratios. Because of the doubt surrounding 
the comparability of the U. K. profits figures the ratios have been 
calculated for world-wide activities also. Some of the results 
call for comment: 
1 See R. Linda: Methodology of Concentration Analysis applied to the 
Study of Industries and Markets, p. 19) 
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Comparison of the ranking of companies by U. K. and 
world-wide profit margins (net profits over sales) 
illustrates some of the difficulties in interpretation 
of subsidiary figures. Rankings are compared in Table 
11.19 below: - 
TABLE 11.19. RANKING OF FIRMS BY PROFIT MARGINS (Rii 
No. of firms for 
which margin calculated 
Avon: U. K. 
World-wide 
Dunlop: U. K. 
World-wide 
Firestone: U. K. 
World-wide 
Goodyear: U. K. 
World-wide 
Michelin: U. K. 
World-wide 
Uniroyal: U. K. 
World-wide 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
4 3 3 1 1 4 6 
5 4 4 4 4 5 6 
3 5 5 2 2 2 3 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
2 2 2 4 5 5 5 
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 3 3 3 4 
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 
- - - - - - 4 
5 4 4 5 4 1 2 
4 5 5 5 5 
,4 
5 
NB Michelin has been excluded from this table until 1975 because 
consolidated accounts for the Michelin group were first 
produced in that year. The company's U. K. profit margin was 
better in each year until 1973 than any other firm in the 
sample. 
R2, R3, R4 Table 5 also shows net profits before tax in relation to 
equity and gross cash flow (net profits before tax plus depreciation) 
in relation to sales and equity again for all activities world-wide. 
On page 3 of Table 5 we have shown two additional ratios, 
net cash flow (profits after tax plus depreciation) as a percentage 
of sales (R5) and of equity (R6). In the author's own view, it is 
k 
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with net cash flow that the multi-national company is most likely 
to be concerned in relating financial strategy to taxation conditions 
in different countries. Net cash flow as a proportion of equity 
shows how the enterprise is using shareholders' investment to 
generate additional funds. Table 11.20 shows how the ranking of 
the six companies varied according to the six alternative ratios 
(applied to world-wide activities) in 1975: - 
TABLE 11.20. RANKING OF SIX COMPANIES ACCORDING TO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
WORLD-WIDE IN 1975. 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 
Avon 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Dunlop 3 4 4 4 4 4 
Firestone 1 3 2 3 2 3 
Goodyear 2 1 3 2 3 2 
Michelin 4 2 1 1 1 1 
Uniroyal 5 5 5 5 5 5 
R1 = Net profits before tax 
Sales turnover 
R3 = Gross cash flow 
Sales turnover 
R5 = Net cash flow 
Sales turnover 
R2 = Net profits before tax 
Equity 
R4 = Gross cash flow 
Equity 
R6 F Net cash flow 
Equity 
TABLE 11.20. shows that in 1975 the two U. K. based firms were ranked 
fourth (on five out of six criteria) and sixth in financial 
performance. However, a closer look at the previous years shown in 
the six parts of Table 5 shows that the pattern has not been 
consistent over the seven years. 
TABLE 6. is a recent addition to the Tables of Concentration as 
presented by the Commission. It shows the absolute changes between 
successive years in each company's share of the total value of each 
of variable x for company i then : 
Si = xi/Exi . where si is the share of company i 
and d1 = (Sj)t+l - (Si)t where t indicates year. 
The index of dynamism (d) - 100, _ 
EZ di 
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Advertising expenditure was excluded from Table 6 because 
its volatility might partly be explained by variations in 
arrangements between certain manufacturers and distributors who 
sold tyres under their own brand names (e. g. ESSO was a heavy 
advertiser and until recently sold Uniroyal tyres, Kennings sell 
a large number of John Bull tyres made for them by Dunlop). 
As might be expected with a residual figure, the shares of 
net profits were much less stable than those of the other variables 
(sales turnover, exployment and wages bill). The mean of indicies 
of dynamism for each variable over the six companies were: - 
01 Sales turnover 1.98 
02 Employment 1.88 
03 Wages bill 2.25 
04 Net profits before tax 25.98 
No single major factor appears to explain the changes in the 
degree of stability within the industry. The increased "dynamism" 
at the end of the survey period appears to reflect more aggressive 
advertising by Michelin. While advertising by Avon and Uniroyal 
was negligible in 1975, that of Firestone and its dtstributive 
subsidiaries was over 40 per cent down on 1974 in £ terms and that 
of Goodyear was down by about 7 per cent, Meanwhile Michelin 
increased advertising by about 23 per cent. Later in 1975, 
Dunlop launched a heavy advertising campaign so that in the year, as 
a whole its expenditure was more than double that of 1974 (see 
Table 11.14). The Dunlop marketing drive continued until 1976 but 
information on its effects is not available. 
TABLE 6(a) shows the percentage shares on which Table 6 is based. It 
is summarised in Table 11.21, which compares "market shares" in 
1969 and 1975. 
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TABLE 11.21. SHARES OF COMBINED U. K. TURNOVER 1969 and 1975. 
(Percentages) 
1969 1975 Change 
Avon 8.16 6.95 -1.21 
Dunlop/Pirelli 48.03 43.51 -4.52 
Firestone -7.36 
6.06 -1.30 
Goodyear 15.69 14.58 -1.11 
Michelin 15.52 24.18 +8.66 
Uniroyal 5.24 4.72 -0.52 
The increase in the market share of Michelin at the expense 
of all the other companies was a continuing process. Michelin's 
share of combined U. K. turnover increased every year during the 
survey period. 
Michelin's strength in the U. K. market is even greater than 
these figures suggest: - 
(i) The company is much less strongly represented in the less 
profitable OE sector than in the replacement market. 
(ii) The Michelin figures do not include the sales of 
Kleber or Semperit tyres imported into the United Kingdom 
from France and Austria respectively. These two brands 
accounted for about 5 per cent of the U. K. replacement 
market in 1975. The Michelin parent company has a 30.9 
per cent participation in the Swiss holding company which 
controls the Semperit and Kleber Colombes subsidiaires. 1 
TABLE 7. shows the main indices Prescribed by, the Commission applied 
to six variables for all activities world-wide in 1975. One clear 
feature is that the smallest company does not form part of the 
world-wide oligopoly - Avon is primarily a United Kingdom company. 
Another feature is that variable 04 (net profits before tax) is 
1 Report of C. G. E. Michelin 1975, page 52 (published only in French) 
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more concentrated than other variables. The value of 
LS shows 
greater inequality of profits than of any other variable. 
Net 
cash flow is, in our view, a more comparable measure of financial 
performance. This also was more concentrated than sales turnover 
and, in most respects, than the two capital stock variables 
c 
(equity and net assets). 
TABLE 8 shows the basic data used in the calculation reported in 
Table 7. 
At the end of the Tables of Concentration are presented two 
of the Commissions three matrices of oligopolistic interdependence 
(Matrix 1 and Matrix 3) for United Kingdom and two more matrices 
(Matrix 1 and Matrix 2) for the world-wide activities. 
For U. K. activities, Matrix 1 shows that the degree of inequality 
among firms was greatest in 1970 with respect to advertising expenditure 
and least with respect to profits. Because variables 02 and 03 
(employment and wages bill) are distorted by the inclusion of both U. K. 
and overseas-based companies, the comparative ranking of net profits 
(04) and sales turnover (01) are of greatest interest. In 1970 and 
1972 there was greater inequality of sales turnover than of net profits, 
in 1974 the position was reversed - inequality of profits was much 
more pronounced. The rankings according to Ln*h and LS are identical 
for each year. 
Matrix 2 is omitted because of absence of an equity variable 
relating to U. K. activities. 
Matrix 3 summarises the ranking of rates of growth of each 
company's share of turnover and combined net profits. The absence of 
rank correlation is clear from the scatter in the tables, though this 
was more pronounced in 1970-1 (when the company with the lowest growth 
of sales had the highest growth of profits) than in the two subsequent 
comparisons. In 1974-5 the correlation between sales - and profit - 
growth, was more. in evidence; company B (Michelin) had the fastest growth 
of both sales-share and profits-share and company A (Dunlop) the least 
growth. 
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For World-wide activities in 1975 Matrix 1 shows that profits 
are more highly concentrated on the basis of LS than is any other 
variable and have the lowest'score'. This . 
finding is consistent with 
other results reported by Lindal. Matrix 2(a) shows comparative 
performance using net profits before tax as the criterion while 2(b) 
takes net cash flow. For reasons already explained, we believe that 
net cash flow more closely corresponds with the objectives of 
multi-national companies. Of. the two U. K. -based companies, the 
Dunlop-Pirelli union ranks fourth and Avon sixth, Goodyear and 
Firestone headed the 1975 performance ranking but on the basis of 
net cash flow, Michelin was a clear leader. 
The Financial Performance of Retreading Companies 
The difference in scale of operations between the six major, 
tyre manufacturers and even the largest of the retreading companies 
led to the exclusion of the retreaders from the concentration tables. 
The results of the three largest retreading companies over the survey 
period are compared in Table 11.22 on the next page with the average 
for the major tyre manufacturers. 
The results for the smallest company, Homerton, appear to be 
typical of those of the large number of small retreading concerns. 
The decline in the real value of sales turnover reflects both the 
declining importance of retreaded tyres and also the downward pressure 
on their prices. The high 'return on equity, in relation to the low 
profit margin, results from the absence of vertical integration - 
value added is small in relation to sales - and low levels of 
capitalisation (retreading is a labour-intensive process). In 
interpretation of the profits figures, it is important to recall that 
these are net of directors' remuneration. In the case of family-owned 
businesses the major shareholders may prefer to take salaries rather 
than dividends. 
The results for all three companies follow a similar pattern. The 
Watts Tyre and Rubber Company is a subsidiary of Watts of Lydney Ltd. 
1 See"Methodology of Concentration Analysis.... " page 43. 
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TABLE 11.22. FINANCIAL RESULTS OF THREE LARGEST RETREADING COMPANIES 
Ondura Hometon Tyre Watts Tyre Average of 
Ltd. & Rubber Co. Ltd. & Rubber Co. Ltd. major cos. in 
tyre industry 
1974 Sales turnover 
(1000) I 3,558 I 1,505 I 4,552 
Sales turnover (Index at constant purchasing power with 1969 - 100) 
1969 100 100 100 100 
1970 119.5 93.8 109.0 106.2 
1971 107.4 87.9 110.1 110.2 
1972 102.5 80.9 105.1 107.9 
1973 95.0 76.6 113.6 111.6 
1974 103.7 70.5 131.0 117.8 
Net Profits as % of (a) sales a nd (b) equity 
1969 (a) 7.0 4.4 6,1 4.4 
(b) 27.0 71.4 13.2* n. a. 
1970 (a) 11.0 1.0 4.0 3.9 
(b) 44.1 14.5 10.8* n. a. 
1971 (a) 9.8 1.6 7.4 4.7 
(b) 34.4 16.2 17.0* n. a. 
1972 (a) 
-0.5 2.1 3.5 4.0 (b) 
-1.8 19.1 13.4* n. a. 
1973 (a) 
-8.3 -2.5 0.5 2.8 (b) 
-40.2 -26.1 9.2* n. a. 
1974 (a) 1.7 0.4 2.4 3.4 (b) 9.3 4.5 18.4* n. a. 
* Figures refer to all activities of parent company (tyres 57% of- sales). 
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with a 1974 turnover of over f8 millions (tyres f4.5 millions). 
This company, which also acts as a tyre distributor, appears to have 
been consistently more successful than Homerton and, except in 
1970 and 1971, reported better results than Ondura. 
Supplementary Comparison of Replacement and OE Markets 
After the analysis of concentration in the total supply of 
tyres using the financial variables we include a further table (No. 9 
on page 77). This shows the values of concentration measures 
derived from the market share estimates for the two distinct markets. 
For replacement, the Linda analysis shows growth of an oligopoly of 
three firms much more equal in strength in 1975 and (especially) 
in 1976 than in 1972. These three firms were Michelin, Pirelli and 
Goodyear. 
In the original equipment sector the Linda analysis also shows a 
three-firm oligopoly though in this case the companies are Dunlop, 
Goodyear and Firestone. 
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TABLE II - 23 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
TURNOVER ($m. ) 
Tyres 
Total World-Wide 
PROFIT BEFORE TAX ($m. ) 
U. K. Tyres 
All Products Total World-Wide All Products 
970 
Avon 103.1 74.6 89.9 3.32 1.65 3.19 42 18 Dunlop/Pirelli 2303 1182 485 79.6 39.6 . 48 3 Firestone 2335 1910 79.7 170.6 124.7 . 82 10 Goodyear 3194 2650 181.7 236.0 208.8 . 84 12 Michelin * 174.0 * . 24 2 Uniroyal 1556 869 68.6 37.2 19.7 . 
LUZ 
Avon 116.7 88.1 104.8 5.03 2.97 5.52 
Dunlop/Pirelli 2747 1461 744.8 96.3 34,6 22.7 
Firestone 2691 2198 96.3 250.0 190.9 0.75 
Goodyear 4072 1383 81.1 354.5 323- 2.40 
Michelin * 233.0 * 17.54 
Uniroyal 1800 1028 79.7 75.8 38.7 0.77 
Avon 135.5 96.7 116.0 5.02 2.92 4.39 
Dunlop/Pirelli 3275 1698 814.6 160.6 53.7 22.1 
Firestone 3155 2535 98.1 285.4 211.6 0.02' 
Goodyear 4675 3975 223.9 328.8 286.0 3.29 
Michelin * 283.4 * 12.84 
Uniroyal 2084 1216 86.7 73.6 33.3 2.33 
fit. 
Avon 159.7 122.2 139.4 -1.12 0.49 -1.24 Dunlop/Pirelli 3982 2102 1025 153.3 61.6 36.9 
Firestone 3939 3015 54.7 231.1 157 -2.97 Goodyear 5453 4526 292.6 316.9 244 0.20 
Michelin 2902 n. a. 485.3 147.0 n. a. 52.4 Uniroyal 2188 1265 94.8 38.2 20.4 6.37 
* Michelin accounts not published in consolidated form until 1975 
Sources: Accounts of companies registered in USA, UK, France and Italy. 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION 
TABLE 1. EVOLUTION OF THE TOTAL FIGURES FOR THE SAMPLE OF ENTERPRISES 
In1uttrv: Tvres (UK activities) Institute: Cranfield School of Management 








Number Index 1969=100 
1969 7 408.4 100 7 98,70Q 100 
1970 7 462.2 113 7 104,300 106 
1971 6 524.8 129 6 100,600 102 
1972 6 549.2 134 6 96,200 97 
1973 6 615.4 151 6 96,300 98 
1974 6 753.3 184 6 96,300 98 
1975 6 903.2 221 6 93,000 94 







of firms £ millions 
index 
1969=100 
1969 7 129.8 100 5 18.98 100 
1970 7 141.8 109 7 17.86 94 
1971 6 153.4 118 6 24.87 131 
1972 6 164.3 126 6 21.77 115 
1973 6 184.6 142 6 17.00 90 
1974 6 211.1 163 5 25.76 1136 
1975 6 259.7 200 5 43.33 228 
*Only profits are included in this Advertising Expenditure (11) total . e. osses are omitted). Thi sum totals for all firms of profits 
No Index and losses in each year were (£m): - Year . irms of f £ millions 1969=100 
1969 7 2.262 100 1969: 18.09 1973: 17.00 
1970 7 1.304 58 1970: 17.86 1974: 25.46 
1971 6 1.873 83 1971: 24.87 1975: 40.35 
1972 6 2.351 104 1972: 21.77 
1973 6 2.649 117 
1974 6 1.963 87 
1975 6 2.428 107 
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VALUES OF VARIABLES IN TERMS OF 1975 PURCHASING POWER 
TABLE 1a 
(All data in Table 1 adjusted by the Index of Retail Prices, with 1975 = 1) 







1969 794.2 100 248.7 100 4.525 100 
1970 844.0 106 255.8 103 2.381 53 
1971 875.1 110 255.8 103 3.123 69 
1972 857.1 108 256.4 103 3.669 81 
1973 886.2 112 265.8 107 3.815 84 
1974 935.7 118 262.2 105 2.438 54 








1969 36.90 100 35.17 100 
1970 32.61 88 32.61 93 
1971 41.47 112 41.47 118 
1972, 33.98 92 33.98 97 
1973 24.48 66 24.48 70 
1974 31.99 87 31.62 90 
1975 43.33 117 40.35 115 
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EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION TABLE 2 
Page 1 
Country: United Kingdom 
Institute: Cranfield School of Management - Bedford 
Sector: Tyres - Economic Activity Units 
Variables (UK activities only): 01 - Turnover 02 - Employees 
03 - Wages Bill 04 - Net Profits 11 - Advertising Expenditure 
All variables except 02 in £ millions. 
No. Mean Coeff. of Gini Herfindahl- Entropy 
of firms Variation Hirschman 
YEAR 1969 
01 7 58.34 0.873 0.410 251.7 - 71.4 
02 7 14,740 1.179 0.502 341.4 - 63.1 
03 7 18.27 1.15$ 0.500 334.5 - 63.6 
04 5 3.80 0.722 0.405 304.3 - 57.0 
11 7 0.332 1.016 0.486 290.3 - 66.3 
YEAR 1970 
01 7 66.03 0.806 0.381 235.8 - 73.1 
02 7 14,900 1.144 0.503 329.8 - 63.8 
03 7 20.01 1.115 0.495 320.3 - 64.6 
04 7 2.68 0.699 0.375 212.8 - 73.5 
11 7 0.175 1.306 0.606 386.4 - 54.2 
YEAR 1971 
01 6 87.46 0.878 0.414 295.2 - 64.3 
02 6 16,800 1.080 0.501 361.1 - 58.0 
03 6 25.56 1.052 0.485 351.0 - 59.1 
04 6 4.33 0.606 0.337 227.8 - 69.3 
11 6 0.312 0.938 0.512 313.2 - 57.2 
YEAR 1972 
01 6 91.5 0.857 0.410 289.2 - 64.8 
02 6 16,000 1.046 0.496 349.1 - 58.8 
03 6 27.4 1.024 0.479 341.5 - 59.8 
04 6 3.63 0.985 0.523 328.2 - 56.3 
11 6 0.392 0.612 0.339 229.2 - 68.3 
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EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION TABLE 2 
Page .2 
Country: United Kingdom 
Institute: Cranfield School of Management - Bedford 
Sector: - Tyres - Economic Activity Units Variables (UK activities only): 01 - Turnover 02 - Employees 
03 - Wages Bill 04 - Net Profits 
11 - Advertising Expenditure 
No. 
Mean Coeff. of Gini Herfindahl- Entropy of firms Variation Hirschman 
YEAR 1973 
01 6 102.6 0.849 0.413 286.7 - 64.8 
02 6 16,050 1.040 0.490 346.9 - 59.1 
03 6 30.8 1.014 0.478 337.9 - 60.0 
04 6 2.83 0.995 0.533 331.6 - 55.0 
11 6 0.442 0.498 0.279 208.0 - 71.8 
YEAR 1974 
01 6 125.5 0.836 0.410 283.1 - 65.0 
02 6 16,050 1.038 0.486 346.3 - 59.3 
03 6 35.2 0.996 0.478 331.9 - 60.3 
04 5 5.15 0.932 0.416 373.6 - 55.0 
11 6 0.327 0.676 0.348 242.9 - 63.3 
YEAR 1975 
01 6 150.5 0.824 0.427 279.8 - 64.5 
02 6 15,500 1.017 0.491 338.9 - 59.4 03 6 43.3 0.977 0.485 325.7 - 60.2 
04 4 10.83 0.896 0.487 450.6 - 38.7 11 6 0.405 0.897 0.483 300.7 - 59.7 
59 
LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) TABLE 3 
Page 1 
Sector: Tyres (UK activities) 
Maximum and Minimum Values of L 
* L and CR = for N 
Size of Max imum Ist Minimum 
2 4 sample N*h L N*m L 
Variable 01 - Sales Turnover 
1969 L 1.373 0.734 7 2 1.373 7 0.530 
CR 58.8 82.5 
1970 L 1.243 0.702 7 2 1.243 7 0.472 
CR 57.0 80.8 
1971 L 1.446 0.827 6 2 1.446 6 0.635 CR 64.7 87.5 
1972 L 1.333 0.825 6 2 1.336 6 0.623 
CR 64.8 87.2 
1973 L 1.237 0.814 6 2 1.237 6 0.633 CR 65.3 88.8 
1974 L 1.176 0.811 6 2 1.176 3 0.811 CR 65.3 87.7 
1975 L 0.900 0.829 6 2 0.900 5 
0.761 
CR 72.3 89.2 
Variable 02 - Empl oyment 
1969 L 1.980 1.015 7 2 1.980 7 0.838 CR 68.6 86.6 
1970 L 1.757 0.989 7 2 1.757 7 0.744 CR 68.5 86.8 
1971 L 1.632 1.007 6 2 1.632 6 0.917 CR 72.7 91.6 
1972 L 1.463 0.989 6 2 1.463 6 0.910 CR 72.6 91.6 
1973 L 1.505 0.970 6 2 1.505 6 0.884 CR 71.9 91.3 
1974 L 1.510 0.963 6 2 1.510 6 0.870 CR 71.9 90.9 
1975 L 1.362 0.950 6 2 1.362 5 0.896 CR 72.0 91.7 
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LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) TABLE 3 
Page 2 
Maximum and . minimum values of 
L 
L and CR for N* = 
Size of Maximum Ist Minimum 
2 4 sample N*h L N*m L 
Variable 03 - Wages Bill 
1969 L 1.963 0.987 7 2 1.963 7 0.683 CR 67.7 86.7 
1970 L 1.738 0.950 7 2 1.738 7 0.725 CR 67.1 86.7 
1971 L 1.726 0.957 6 2 726 1 6 0.863 CR 70.6 91.0 . 
1972 L 1.576 0.968 6 2 576 1 5 0.846 CR 70.6 90.4 . 
1 973 L 1. 570 0.938 6 2 570 1 6 0.849 CR 7 0. 0 90.7 . 
1974 L 1.411 0.937 6 2 1 411 5 0.852 CR 70.6 90.8 . 
1975 L 1.157 0.959 1.157 0.886 
CR 72.3 91.4 6 2 3 
Variabl' 04 - Net Profits Beföre Tax 
1QF4 In gzo n ýr, 






84.6 7 2 0.585 3 0.380 
1971 L 0.576 0.530 
CR 58.1 87.9 6 2 0.577 3 0.457 
1972 L 0.659 0.840 
CR 77.9 97.2 6 3 0.919 4 0.840 
1973 L 0.652 0.860 
CR 78.3 97.7 6 3 0.893 4 0.860 
1974 L 2.036' 0.895 
CR 71.0 93.0 5 2 2.036 5 0.777 
I975 L 0.702 14 49 
93.1 . 100.0 4 4 14.491 No value 
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LINDA INDICES (L) AND CONCENTRATION RATIOS (CR) TABLE 3 
Page 3 
Maximum and minimum values of L 
d CR f N* = L an or 
Size of Maximum Ist Mi nimum 
2 4 sample N*h L N*m L 
Variable 11 - Expe nditure on A dvertising 
1969 L 1.453 0.732 7 2 1.453 4 732 0 CR 63.9 89.0 . 
1970 L 1.839 0.905 7 2 1.839 4 0 905 CR 73.7 95.6 . 
1971 L 0.739 0.717 6 3 0.757 4 0.717 CR 73.8 97.9 
1972 L 0.815 0.413 6 2 0.815 5 0.413 CR 55.4 88.6 
1973 L 0.562 0.423 6 2 0.562 5 0.360 CR 53.4 84.4 
1974 L 0.550 0.291 6 2 0 550 4 0 291 CR 53.1 98.1 . . 
1975 L 1.000 0.658 6 2 000 1 3 655 0 CR 67.6 96.5 . . 
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STRUCTURE OF LINDA CURVES (TYRES - U. K. ACTIVITIES) TABLE 3 
(bis) 
Paffe 1 
N* 01-Sales 02 03 04 - 
ll 
Turnover Employment Wages-Bill Net Profits Advertising 
1969 2 1.373 1.980 1.963 0.638 1.453 
3 0.776 1.347 1.226 0.596 0.842 
4 0.734 1.015 0.987 0.751 0.732 
5 0.626 0.944 0.908 1.270 0.811 
6 0.589 0.838 0.828 0.805 
7 0.530 0.728 0.730 0.760 
1970 2 1.243 1.757 1.738 0.585 1.839 
3 0.726 1.236 1.108 0.380 1.214 
4 0.702 0.989 0.950 0.542 0.905 
5 0.609 0.906 0.875 0.514 1.013 
6 0.537 0.817 0.802 0.520 2.619 
7 0.472 0.743 0.725 0.547 5.024 
1971 2 1.446 1.632 1.726 0.577 0.739. 
3 0.863 1.206 1.121 0.457 0.757 
4 0.827 1.007 0.957 0.530 0.717 
5 0.714 0.975 0.897 0.501 1.305 
6 0.635 0.917 0.863 0.560 3.409 
1972 2 1.333 1.463 1.576 0.659 0.815 3 0.850 1.130 1.085 0.919 0.526 4 0.825 0.989 0.967 0.840 0.444 5 0.702 0.943 0.846 1.609 0.413 6 0.623 0.910 0.850 1.696 0.950 
1973 2 1.237 1.505 1.570 0.652 562 0 3 0.827 1.129 1.037 0.893 
. 
466 0 4 0.814 0.970 0.938 0.860 
. 
0 422 5 0.721 0.917 0.849 1.258 
. 




STRUCTURE OF LINDA CURVES (TYRES - U. K: ACTIVITIES) TABLE 3 (bis) 
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1974 2 1.176 1.510 1.411 2.036 0.550 
3 0.8106 1.175 1.013 1.222 0.390 
4 0.8114 0.963 0.937 0.895 0.291 
5 0.715 0.887 0.852 0.777 1.044 
6 0.628 0.870 0.857 3.285 
1975 2 0.900 1.362 1.157 0.702 1.000 
3 0.761 1.057 0.897 1.572 0.655 
4 0.829 0.950 0.959 14.491 0.658 
5 0.747 0.896 0.886 1.033 
6 0.696 0.924 0.900 1.687 
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SUMMARY OF LINDA INDICES TABLE 4 
01 02 03 04 11 
Sales Turnover Employment Wages Bill Net Profits Advertising 
1969 N*m 7 7 7 3 4 
LN*m 0.530 0.728 0.730 0.596 0.732 
LS 0.771 1.142 1.107 0.617 1.009 
1970 N*m 7 7 7 3 4 
LN*m 0.472 0.743 0.725 0.380 0.905 
LS 0.715 1.075 1.033 0.482 1.319 
1971 N*m 6 6 6 3 4 
LN*m 0.635 0.917 0.863 0.457 0.717 
LS 0.897 1.147 1.113 0.517 0.738 
1972 N*m 6 6 5 4 4 
LN*m 0.623 0.910 0.846 0.840 0.413 
LS 0.867 1.087 1.118 0.816 0.550 
1973 N*m 6 6 6 4 5 
LN*m 0.633 0.884 0.849 0.860 0.359 
LS 0.846 1.081 1.050 0.802 0.452 
1974 N*m 3 6 5 4 4 
LN*m 0.811 0.870 0.852 0.777 0.291 
LS 0.994 1.081 1.053 1.483 0.410 
1975 N*m 3 5 5 No value 3 LN*m 0.761 0.896 0.886 (curve rises 655 0 




PROFITABILITY RATIOS TABLE 5 
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Rl : Profit margin = Net profit before tax x 100 
Sales turnover 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
(a) All activities in the U. K. 
Avon 1.13 3.55 6.03 4.33 4.14 3.18 -0.9 
Dunlop* 4.36 2.43 3.20 3.72 2.63 4.26 4.27 
Firestone 4.65 4.38 5.74 0.77 0.03 -0.62 -5.43 
Goodyear 5.46 5.96 6.68 2.96 1.47 3.22 0.07 
Michelin 9.50 7.38 8.03 7.53 5.00 2.11 10.79 
Uniroyal -3.12 3.26 3.69 0.96 1.10 5.95 6.73 
Pirelli -1.04 0.74 INCLU DED WITH DUNLOP 
OVERALL 4.43 3.86 4.74 3.96 2.76 3.38 4.47 AVERAGE+ 
(b) All activities world-wide. 
Avon 1.23 3.22 4.97 4.31 4.19 3.03 -0.7 
Dunlop* 5.54 4.98 6.51 6.27 4.76 4.95 5.12 
Firestone 9.48 7.31 9.06 9.29 9.05 7.39 6.15 
Goodyear 9.30 7.32 8.86 8.71 7.03 5.41 5.81 
Michelin NOT A VAILAB LE UNTIL 1975 5.07 
Uniroyal 5.25 2.39 4.27 4.21 3.53 3.33 1.75 
(c) Tres world-wide. 
Avon 3.01 7.4 4.53 2.8 2.08 -0.6 
Dunlop* 5.43 7.22 6.69 4.68 4.11 5.07 
Firestone 5.36 8.61 8.69 8.32 5.74 5.17 
Goodyear 7.84 9.59 9.33 7.2 5.1 5.39 
Uniroyal 2.11 4.52 3.46 2.06 1.1 1.3 
* Includes all tyre interest of Pirelli from 1971 onwards. 
+ Total of net profits and losses combined turnover. 
66 TABLE 5 
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Further profitability ratios relating to all activities, world-wide. 
R2: Net return on equity = Net profits before tax X 100 
Total equity own capital") 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Avon 3.31 10.22 16.4 14.43 15.22 13.81 -3.79 
Dunlop* 15.98 15.45 14.1 15.66 12.33 13.11 14.56 
Firestone 20.31 15.4 19.07 19.97 21.03 18.69 14.98 
Goodyear 23.79 17.62 22.24 22.61 19.84 16.45 17.45 
Michelin 5.07 
Uniroyal 15.42 6.9 12.71 12.96 12.15 12.25 6.10 
R3: Gross cash flow in = Net profits before tax + de preciation x 100 relation to sales Sales turnover 
Avon 4.72 6.32 8.04 7.44 7.24 5.64 1.86 
Dunlop* 8.99 8.5 10.14 10.14 8.60 8.39 8.3 
Firestone 13.44 10.76 13.12 13.21 12.84 11.1 10.24 
Goodyear 12.75 11.13 12.5 12.29 10.38 8.68 9.14 
Michelin 12.47 
Uniroyal 8.34 5.64 7.4 7.31 6.39 6.15 4.90 
R4: Gross cash flow in = Net rofits before tax + depreciation X 100 relation to equity o ta equity own capi ta 
Avon 12.72 20.03 26.53 24.87 26.27 25.76 10.09 
Dunlop* 25.94 26.37 21.96 25.31 22.28 22.21 23.58 
Firestone 28.78 22.67 27.62 28.39 29.85 28.06 24.95 
Goodyear 32.61 26.78 31.39 31.92 29.3 26.4 27.44 
Michelin 38.32 
Uniroyal 24.5 16.26 22.05 22.48 21.97 22.63 17.11 




Further profitability ratios relating to all activities, worldwide. 
R5: Net cash flow in = Net profits after tax + depreciation X 100 
relation to sales saes turnover 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Avon 4.4 5.03 6.23 6.24 5.37 4.06 2.06 
Dunlop* 6.4 5.88 7.0 7.26 6.0 5.64 5.49 
Firestone 9.07 7.42 8.63 8.96 9.02 7.89 7.7 
Goodyear 8.27 7.76 8.17 8.31 7.13 6.02 6.29 
Michelin 10.68 
Uniroyal 6.1 4.83 5.7 5.69 5.14 4.7 4.21 
R6: Net cas h Clow in = Net profit after tax + dep reciation X 1 00 
relatio n to equity T otal equity 
Avon 11.86 15.95 20.56 20.88 19.49 18.51 11.17 
Dunlop* 18.46 18.26 15.17 18.13 15.54 14.93 15.6 
Firestone 19.43 15.64 18.16 19.27 20.97 19.96 18.75 
Goodyear 21.16 18.66 20.51 21.59 20.11 18.31 18.89 
Michelin 32.82 
Uniroyal 17.92 13.92 16.98 17.5 17.69 17.28 14.69 
* Includes all tyre interests of Pirelli from 1971 onwards. 
68 
PATTERN OF GROWTH OF FIRMS WITHIN THE SAMPLE TABLE 6 
(Tyre companies - U. K. activities) 










Avon -0.05 -0.30 -0.24 +5.10 
Dunlop -2.43 -1.44 -1.83 -16.11 
Firestone -0.18 +0.15 -0.91 -4.02 
Goodyear +0.68 +0.62 +0.85 -10.69 
Michelin +0.17 +1.34 +1.25 -7.74 
Uniroyal +0.95 -0.66 -0.20 +28.49 
Pirelli +0.85 +0.29 +1.08 +4.97. 
Index of Dynamism 2.66 2.40 3.18 38.56 
1970-1 
Avon -0.36 -0.04 +0.35 +2.34 
Dunlop (of Dunlop+Pirelli) +1.61 -2.82 -2.61 +1.77 
Firestone -0.35 +0.36 +1.02 +4.57 
Goodyear -1.29 +0.58 +0.36 +12.63 
Michelin +0.92 +1.89 +0.86 +2.97 
Uniroyal -0.52 +0.03 -0.01 -24.27 
Index of Dynamism 2.52 2.86 2.61 24.27 
1971-2 
Avon -0.12 -0.26 -0.47 -1.08 
Dunlop -0.94 -1.60 -1.21 +13.15 Firestone +0.18 +0.22 +0.79 -6.55 
Goodyear -0.31 +0.36 -0.05 -9.34 Michelin +1.07 +1.43 +1.13 +6.62 
Uniroyal +0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -2.82 
Index of Dynamism 1.37 2.01 1.93 19.78 
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PATTERN OF GROWTH OF FIRMS WITHIN THE SAMPLE TABLE 6 
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01 02 03 04 
Sales Turnover Employees Wages-Bill Net Profits 
1972-3 
Avon +0.02 +0.25 +0.13 +3.13 
Dunlop -0.64 -0.10 -0.47 +0.04 
Firestone -0.51 +0.19 -0.31 -1.31 
Goodyear +0.07 +0.11 +0.71 -3.12 
Michelin +1.11 -0.56 -0.08 +0.39 
Uniroyal -0.05 +0.11 +0.02 +0.87 
Index of Dynamism 1.20 0.66 0.86 4.43 
1973-4 
Avon -0.11 +0.35 -0.17 -4.46 
Dunlop -0.68 +0.02 -0.99 +12.69 
Firestone +0.06 +0.37 -0.08 -0.06 
Goodyear +0.02 -0.66 -0.23 +6.09 
Michelin +0.68 -0.05 +1.55 -21.96 
Uniroyal +0.01 -0.02 -0.09 +7.72 
Index of Dynamism 0.78 0.74 1.55 26.49 
1974-5 
Avon -0.59 -0.53 -0.49 -7.02 
Dunlop -2.29 -1.32 -1.65 -18.21 
Firestone -0.50 -0.26 -0.37 0.00 
Goodyear -0.28 +1.15 -0.62 -13.78 
Michelin +4.71 +1.46 +3.35 +42.38 
Uniroyal -1.04 -0.51 -0.22 -3.38 
Index of Dynamism 4.71 2.62 3.35 42.38 
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U. K. ACTIVITIES OF TYRE COMPANIES TABLE 6(a 
% DISTRIBUTION OF EACH VARIABLE BY ENTERPRISES 
01 02 03 04 
1969 
Avon 8.16 8.14 7.85 1.99 
Dunlop 43.10 54.76 53.95 40.47 
Firestone 7.36 4.16 5.14 7.37 
Goodyear 15.69 9.89 11.18 18.42 
Michelin 15.52 13.83 13.75 31.74 
Uniroyal 5.24 4.33 3.97 0 
Pirelli 4.93 4.89 4.18 0 
1970 
Avon 8.11 7.84 7.61 7.09 
Dunlop 40.67 53.32 52.12 24.36 
Firestone 7.18 4.31 4.23 3.35 
Goodyear 16.37 10.51 12.03 7.73 
Michelin 15.69 15.17 15.00 24.00 
Uniroyal 6.19 3.67 3.77 28.49 
Pirelli 5.78 5.18 5.26 4.97 
1971 
Avon 7.75 7.80 7.96 9.43 
Dunlop/Pirelli 48.06 55.68 54.77 31.10 
Firestone 6.83 4.67 5.25 7.92 
Goodyear 15.08 11.09 12.39 20.36 
Michelin 16.61 17.06 15.86 26.97 
Uniroyal 5.67 3.70 3.77 4.23 
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U. K. ACTIVITIES OF TYRE COMPANIES TABLE 6(a) 
% DISTRIBUTION OF EACH VARIABLE BY ENTERPRISES Page 2 
01 02 03 04 
1972 
Avon 7.63 7.54 7.49 8.35 
Dunlop 47.12 54.08 53.56 44.25 
Firestone 7.01 4.89 6.04 1.37 
Goodyear 14.77 11.45 12.34 11.02 
Michelin 17.68 18.49 16.99 33.59 
Uniroyal 5.80 3.55 3.57 1.41 
1973 
Avon 7.65 7.79 7.62 11.48 
Dunlop 46.48 53.98 53.09 44.29 
Firestone 6.50 5.08 5.73 0.06 
Goodyear 14.84 11.56 13.07 7.90 
Michelin 18.79 17.93 16.91 33.98 
Uniroyal 5.75 3.66 3.59 2.28 
1974 
Avon 7.54 8.14 7.45 7.02 
Dunlop 45.40 54.00 52.10 56.98 
Firestone 6.56 5.45 5.65 0 
Goodyear 14.86 10.90 12.84 13.99 
Michelin 19.47 17.88 18.46 12.02 
Uniroyal 5.76 3.64 3.50 10.00 
1975 
Avon 6.95 7.61 6.96 0 
Dunlop 43.51 52.68 50.45 38.77 
Firestone 6.06 5.19 5.28 0 
Goodyear 14.58 12.05 12.22 0.21 
Michelin 24.18 19.34 21.81 54.40 
Uniroyal 4.72 3.13 3.28 6.62 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION TABLE 7 
Analysis of World-Wide Figures for Sample of Enterprises 1975 
Industry: Tyres Institute: Cranfield School of 
Unit: Millions of U. S. dollars Management 
Figures refer to world-wide turnover of the six firms producing tyres in 
the United Kingdom. 
01 
Turnover Net Profits 
Cash 
Flow 
I Own 'p' j 
Capital 
Net 
Cash F1 ow 
t 
Total 18,624 887 1,613 5,856 1,203 2l 2 
Mean 3,104 177.3 268.8 976 200.5 
Coeff. of Variation 0.535 0.524 0.629 0.597 0.618 
r 
Gini 0.294 0.289 0.352 0.332 0.343 
Herf-Hirschman 214.3 255.0 232.6 226.0 230.2 
Entropy - 69.5 -63.2 -66.2 - 67.9 - 66.7 
Concentration ratios 
N=1 0.293 0.357 0.3 09 0.310 0.285 0.256 
2 0.507 0.618 0.547 0.571 0.543 0.495 
3 0.718 0.791 0.771 0.732 0.783 0.703 
4 0.874 0.957 0.932 0.888 0.921 0.898 
5 0.991 1.000 0.998 0.995 0.997 0.997 
6 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Linda coefficients 
N°2 0.685 0.685 0.650 0.594 0.554 0.536 
3 0.429 0.573 0.426 0.540 0: 380 0.390 
4 0.369 0.434 0_376 0.415 0.390 0.302 
5 0.343 0.637 0.469 0.388 0.442 0.337 
6 1.109 4.121 1.702 2.896 2.265 
LS 0.456 0.564 0.484 0.484 0.467 0.409 
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TABLE 8 WORLD WIDE ACTIVITIES OF TYRE PRODUCERS 
FINANCIAL DATA FOR YEAR 1975 
(Financial year ended in period 1st July 1974 to 30th June 1975) 
Variable Avon Dunlop & Firestone Goodyear 
Pirelli 
(millions of U. S. dollars) 
Michelin Uniroyal 
01 Turnover 160 3982 3939 5453 2902 2188 
04 Net Profits -1 153 231 317 147 38 
05 Cash Flow 3 259 384 499 362 107 
07 Equity 30 911 1529 1816 944 626 
09 Net cash flow 3 166 289 343 310 92 
10 Net assets 42 2537 2918 2387 3187 1205 
Source: Company accounts. 
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MATRICES OF OLIGOPOLISTIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
Tyre industry :- UK Activities 
(Matrix No. 2 omitted - see p. 50 of text) 
Matrix No. 1 Oligopolistic Inequality 1970 
Ranking 11 2 3 4 5 
Ranking Variable 11 02 03 01 04 
II Variable LS/Ln*h 1.839 1.757 1.738 1.243 0.585 
1 11 1.319 2 
2 02 1.075 4 
3 03 1.033 6 
4 01 0.715 8 
5 04 0.482 10 
1972 
Ranking 11 2 3 4 5 
Ranking Variable 03 02 01 04 11 
II Variable LS/Ln*h 1.576 1.463 1.333 0.919 0.815 
1 03 1.118 2 
2 02 1.087 4 
3 01 0.867 6 
4 04 0.816 8 
5 11 0.550 10 
1974 
Ranking 11 2 3 4 5 
Ranking Variable 04 02 03 01 11 
II Variable LS/Ln*h 2.036 1.510 1.411 1.176 0.550 
1 04 1.483 2 
2 02 1.081 4 
3 03 1.053 6 
4 01 0.994 8 
5 11 0.410 10 
01 - Sales Turnover 04 = Net Profits Before Tax 
02 - Employees 11 - Advertising expenditure 
03 = Wages Bill 
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MATRIX NO. 3 - COMPARATIVE GROWTH RATES 
(see next page for definitions) 
1970 -1 
1c Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Company A B E D F C 
4c 
lc 1.61 0.92 -0.35 -0.36 -0.52 -1.29 
Rank Company 4c 4x 47 16 7 8 6 
16 
1 C 12.63 8 7 
2 E 4.57 3 5 
3 B 2.97 24 5 
4 D 2.34 7 8 
5 A 1.77 29 6 
6 F -24.27 29 11 
1912-3 
lc Rank 12 3 4 5 6 
Company B C D F E A 
4c 
lc 1.11 0.07 0.02 -0.5 -0.51 -0.64 
Rank Company 4c q4., 4x 18 15 
7 6 7 47 
1 D 3.13 8 4 
2 F 0.87 2 6 
3 B 0.39 34 4 
4 A 0.04 44 10 
5 E -1.31 1 10 
6 C -3.12 11 8 
1974-5 
lc Rank 12 3 4 5 6 
Company B C E D F A 
4 c 
id 4.71 -0.28 -0.50 -0.59 -1.04 -2.29 
Rank Company 4ci 4x 24 15 6 7 5 
43 
1 B 42.38 54 2 
2 E 0.00 0 5 
3 F -3.38 7 8 
4 D -7.02 0 8 
I5 C -13.78 0 7 
6 A -18.21 39 12 
76 
1c = Growth (croissance) of share of sales turnover (market share) 
4c = Growth (croissance) of share of net profits 
lx = Share of sales turnover in the first of the two years 
4x = Share of the net profits in the first of the two years 






F - Uniroyal 
The terms used are those of R. Linda. (Reference 3) 
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MATRICES OF OLIGOPOLISTIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
World-wide Activities of Tyre Companies with 
Major Shares of U. K. Market - 1975 
Matrix No. 1 Oligopolistic Inequality 
Ranking I 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ranking Variable 01 04 05 07 09 10 
II Variable LS/Lh*h 0.685 0.685 0.650 0.594 0.554 0.536 
1 04 0.564 3 
2 07 0.484 6 
3 05 0.484 6 
4 09 0.467 9 
5 01 0.456 6 
6 10 0.409 12 
(Rankings are based on unrounded values) 
Matrix No. 2 (a) Comparative Performance (using 
net profits before tax) 
Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 
lr 
Firm c A B D E F 
2r 1r 6.2 5.8 5.1 5.1 1.8 -0.7 
Rank Firm 2r 7x 
x 3939 5453 3982 2902 2188 160 
1 A 17.4 1816 3 
2 D 15.6 944 6 
3 C 15.0 1528 4 
4 B 14.6 911 7 
5 E 6.1 626 10 
6 F -3.8 30 12 
Notes: lr - net profits before tax as % of sales turnover 
2r - net profits before tax as % of equity 
lx - absolute value of sales turnover in 1975 ($106) 
7x - absolute value of equity in 1975 ($106) 
The identity of fines is given on the next page. 
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MATRIX 2 (b) - COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE (USING NET CASH FLOW AFTER 
TAX)_ 
Rank 1 2 3 4 56 
5r 
Firm D C A B EF 
6r 
5r 10.7 7.7 6.3 5.5 4.2 2.06 
Rank Firm 6r 7x 
X 2902 3939 5453 3982 2188 160 
I1 D 32.8 944 2 
2 A 18.9 1816 5 
3 C 18.7 1528 5 
4 B 15.6 911 8 
5 E 14.7 626 10 
16 
F 11.2 30 12 
Firms are coded in descending order of sales turnover in 1975: 
A= Goodyear 





5r = Net profits after tax + depreciation 
Sales turnover 
6r = Net profits after tax + depreciation 
Total equity 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION - TABLE 9 (SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE) 
APPLICATION OF CONCENTRATION MEASURES TO MARKET SEGMENTS 
(Based on market shares shown on pages 37 and 39 of text) 
1. Replacement Market 
1972 
N* sample) 
N Estd. total number 
of suppliers - see No 













6 6 6 
e) 14 18 19 
1.26 1.43 1.53 
0.611 0.636 0.649 
185 169 176 
- 84.8 - 91.5 
CR LI CR LI CR L 
53 0.560 47 0.737 49 0.565 
67 0.555 66 0.452 69 0=406 
79 0.462 76 0.464 80 0.426 
87 0: 447 83 0.465 84 0.598 
92 0.470 88 0.470 87 0.662 
0.506 0.595 0.486 
Note: - the percentage of the market held by the N-N* firms was estimated. The 
assumption that this was shared by firms each holding 1% was consistent 
with the market structure and was used to estimate N and for the calculations 
of V, G, H and E. 
6 2. Original equipment (1975 only) N= N* -- 
Coefficient of Variation = 0.533 Gini coefficient = 0.290 Herfindahl-Hirschman 214 Entropy index - 71.1 
Concentration ratios and Linda indices 
n* =2 3 4 56 
CR 52 76 87 95 100 
L 0.540 0.364 0.428 0.439 0.476 
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III. SPARKING PLUGS 
A. Analysis of Total Market 
The production of sparking plugs in the United Kingdom is now 
more concentrated than that of tyres. The 1968 Census of 
Production listed six manufacturers. Lucas have since withdrawn 
from the production of sparking plugs, and two smaller 
producers were combined within Smiths Industries Ltd. which. 
subsequently withdrew from the U. K. market. Thus there are now 
only three major suppliers - the Champion Sparking Plug Company, 
Autolite (a division of Ford) and A. C. Delco (a subsidiary of 
General Motors. 
Data on production of sparking plugs are rather limited: 
the Business Statistics Office figures relate only to the value 
of turnover. From the evidence of the 1968 Census of Production, 
published trade figures, estimates received from within the 
motor industry and the E. I. U. report (1 ), we have derived 
the following estimates of volume. - 
Table III-1 Volume of Production, Exports and Imports of Spark Plug 
Millions of units 
U. K. production Exports Imports U. K. Sales* 
1968 94.3 37.4 * na na 
1972 102.1 45.1 7.6 64.6 
1973 112.1 57.4 12.6 67.3 
1974 94.5 * 50.9 20.6 64.2 
1975 94.4 * 40.6 8.7 62.5 
Notes: U. K. sales - U. K. production - exports + imports 
* estimated, not published. 
Total revenue derived from the sale of sparking plugs at current 
prices and in terms of 1975 purchasing power is shown in Table 
111-2. 
Table 111-2. Total value of sales of Sparking Plugs 
Sales Value f 000's 
Current At 1975 Estimated 
prices purchasing power average price Year (new pence)* 
1968 10,51iß 21,741 11.2 
1973 18,339 26,420 16.4 
1974 19,031 23,631 20.1 
1975 24,437 24,437 25.9 
* Derived by dividing sales revenue at current prices 
by the total production estimate shown in Table III-1. 
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These tables show that the recession in the motor industry had 
a greater effect on the volume of sparking plugs sold than on 
sales revenue: between 1973-5 the volume fell by 15.8 per 
cent but the "real" value of sales revenue by only 6.8 per 
cent. This is because the decline was mainly in the less 
profitable OE and direct export markets. Unlike the 
corresponding market for tyres, replacement demand for 
sparking plugs has not been reduced by any major extension 
of product life and has risen in proportion to the number of cars 
and light goods vehicles in use. 
Sales of sparking plugs can be divided into three categories: - 
sales to vehicle manufacturers in the U. K. (OE), sales to 
overseas buyers (who may include overseas vehicle manufacturers) 
and sales to the U. K. replacement market. 
An attempt to estimate the prices obtained by manufacturers 
for sales to each of these segments was not successful because 
of insufficient information about the margins of intermediaries. 
The average price per plug exported in 1975 was 18p so that the 
average per plug sold at home was 31.5p but it was not possible 
to separate the two domestic segments. 
B. Foreign Trade 
Interpretation of the foreign trade statistics is 
complicated by the multinational structure of the three major 
companies in Britain. The largest producer is the Champion 
Sparking Plug Co. Ltd., which is a subsidiary of the U. S. 
company with the same name, with other subsidiaries elsewhere 
in Europe. The other two producers, Autolite and A. C. Delco Ltd. 
are parts of the Ford and General Motors companies. Marketing 
and distribution of sparking plugs by General Motors (Europe) 
are organised on a European basis - the company is the 
market leader in France and replacement plugs for French-built 
cars are imported into the U. K. The Ford company's approach is 
believed to be similar. The large volume of international trade 
partly reflects shipments by the big companies. 
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B. Foreign Trade (Cont'd) 
One British manufacturer, Smiths Industries Ltd., makes 
sparking plugs for export only under the KLG brand. Most of 
these are special purpose plugs and the quantities are small 
in comparison with shipments by the three largest producers. 
This company is a large exporter of plant and equipment for the 
manufacture of sparking plugs. 
A recent development has been the growth of competitive 
imports but, because of shipments by Champion, Ford and 
General Motors this is difficult to quantify. From discussions 
within the industry, we believe that competitive imports may 
have reached a peak in 1974 from which there has been some 
decline because of surplus supply of sparking plugs within 
the U. K. 
Table 111-3 shows the volume and value of trade in 
sparking plugs annually from 1972 to 1975 (data for before 
1972 are incomplete): - 
Table 111-3. Trade in Sparking Plugs 1972-5 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
Exports million units 45.08 57.39 50.89 40.57 
f 000 5830 8200 8060 7386 
Imports million units 7.56 12.60 20.61 8.72 
f000 877 1803 3187 1553 
Source: Overseas Trade Statistics 
The destinations of exports show the importance of 
overseas assembly of U. K. -designed vehicles and the "pan-European" 
operations of the large producers. In 1975 over 58% of total 
volume (59% in value) went to Europe, the largest consignment 
(15% of total exports) went to Belgium, where Leyland, Ford 
and General Motors have assembly plants linked with U. K. 
manufacturing units. Other European countries importing large 
volume from the U. K. were the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. 
Outside Europe countries taking more than 2% of total exports 




B. Foreign Trade (Cont'd) 
A breakdown of the origins of imports is not published but 
it is know n that the major sources of competitive imports are 
Germany (Bosch), Japan (NGK) and France (Marechal). Total competitive 
imports in 1975 amounted to about 11 per cent of the U. K. 
replacement demand for plugs or about 6.3 million units. It is not 
possible to determine how much of the contraction of imports 
between 1974 and 1975 was due to changes in the pattern of 
shipments by the three main companies with U. K. plants and how 
much was due to a decline in competitive imports. 
In Europe as a whole the relative strengths of the major 
producers differ from those in the United Kingdom, which are 
described in the rest of this section. General Motors, Bosch and 
Champion are the three largest companies but share less than 
50% of the total market. The French firm Marechal has been 
increasing supply and the Japanese company NGK has also gained 
a growing share of the market. 
C. The Original Equipment Market 
Vauxhall buys exclusively from A. C. Delco (General Motors) 
and Ford from Autolite. Champion is the sole supplier to 
Leyland and Chrysler. 
Because of the capital-intensive nature of sparking-plug 
production, with high investment in expensive plant and 
equipment, pricing raises interesting issues. Marginal costs 
are relatively low and the prospect of some brand-loyalty in 
the replacement sector encourages sparking plug manufacturers 
to seek OE sales. Both the Champion company and overseas 
suppliers have attempted to sell to Vauxhall or Ford offering 
plugs at "give-away" prices. We understand that transfer-pricing 
within General Motors and Ford is based on standard rather 
than marginal costs. 
Stock levels of sparking plugs held by vehicle 
manufacturers average about one week's requirements. This is 
partly because supplies can fairly easily be obtained from 
intermediaries in the replacement market in an emergency. 
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C. The Original Equipment Market (Cont'd) 
Fluctuations in orders create problems for sparking plug 
manufacturers but these are less serious than those of tyre 
manufacturers because there is less product variety and 
stocking is easier. 
In estimating the size of the United Kingdom OE 
market, we have included as petrol-driven vehicles (and therefore 
using sparking-plugs) all cars (ignoring a small number of 
diesel taxis produced by Leyland), car-derived commercial 
vehicles and other goods vehicles with gross vehicle weight 
of less than three tons. The total number of commercial vehicles 
included varied from 200 - 253,000. Cars and goods vehicles 
exported in unassembled form were excluded. 
Assuming an average of 450 plugs per 100 vehicles we 
estimate OE demand as follows: - 
Table 111-4. Original Equipment Sales of Sparking Plugs 
1968 8.3 (million units) 
1972 8.46 
1973 7.43 " 
1974 6.84 
1975 5.37 " 
Market shares in the original equipment market can be 
estimated from those of the four major producers of petrol-driven 
vehicles in the United Kingdom. In both 1968 and 1975 these 
four made 99.4 per cent of all cars produced in the U. K. The 
distribution among the big four of sales of car-derived 
vans and other petrol-driven commercial vehicles or of cars 
exported without sparking plugs but included in the production 
figures cannot be determined with any accuracy. Unless these 
distributions are very markedly different from that of total 
car production, any distortion resulting from the use of the 
latter to indicate purchases of sparking plugs will be slight. 
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C. The Original Equipment Market (Cont'd) 
Table 111-5. Shares of O. E. Market (Percentages) 
Champion Autolite A. C. Delco 
(Leyland & Chrysler) (Ford) (Vauxhall) 
1971 67.4 21.1 11.5 
1972 61.8 28.6 9.6 
1973 65.8 26.2 8.0 
1974 65.8 25.2 9.0 
1975 66.0 26.2 7.8 
Source: SMMT (annual copies of the Motor Industry 
in Great Britain) 
D. The replacement Market 
Vehicle manufacturers normally recommend replacement of 
sparking plugs after 12,000 miles (19,200 kilometres) or twelve 
months of use, whichevever occurs first. Some postponement of 
servicing occurs, especially when vehicles have not been 
intensively used. Sales of plugs tend to vary between about 
3.5 to 4.2 per vehicle in use, whereas rigorous adherence to the 
above recommendation would imply a minimum of around 4.5 plugs per 
vehicle. 
The rapid increases in vehicle servicing charges in recent 
years has led many car owners to undertake much of their own 
maintenance, including t! ie comparatively simple task of 
replacement of sparking plugs. This has affected the pattern 
of distribution: outlets such as accessory shops, petrol filling 
stations and chain stores have gained sales at the expense of 
garages and other vehicle repairers. 
There are a number of links between the plug manufacturers, 
intermediaries and ultimate outlets which affect competition 
in the replacement sector of the market. 
Champion as the sole supplier to Leyland and Chrysler 
has its plugs distributed via the distributor/dealer network 
of those companies under the brand names Unipart and Mopar. 
(Chrysler also distributes Champion plugs with the Champion 
brand name). Lucas, having withdrawn from manufacture several 
years ago, distributes Champion plugs under the Lucas name. 
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D. The replacement market (Cont'd) 
Esso and Shell/BP rely upon Champion for supplies for sale, 
under the oil companies' names, at filling stations. Many of 
the 
Champion plugs distributed in packaging bearing other brand-names 
are marked themselves with the word "Champion", which may encourage 
consumer loyalty. 
A. C. Delco plugs are distributed via the Vauxhall dealer/ 
distributor network and are therefore normally fitted to cars 
and vans serviced by Vauxhall dealers. 
Aütolite plugs are distributed in the same way by Ford 
and are also sold under the Motorcraft label, which Ford uses 
as a medium for selling spare parts for Ford and other cars. 
Motorcraft products are sold under a special arrangement with 
the Texaco oil company on the forecourts of its filling 
stations. 
It is difficult to measure "brand loyalty" in the case 
of sparking plugs because the ultimate customer does not always 
make the brand choice. The first two services of new cars at which 
plugs are changed are usually undertaken under warranty by a dealer 
authorised by the vehicle manufacturer. This means that the 
sparking plugs for a Vauxhall will normally come from A. C. Delco, 
for a Ford from Autolite and for a Leyland or Chrysler car 
from Champion but there is no certainty about this. After this 
the degree of loyalty diminishes as the customer can buy any of 
a number of well-known brands. Much depends upon the outlet 
he chooses. 
Prices vary comparatively little between the well-advertised 
brands and advertising competition is largely confined to technical 
journals, point-of-sale advertising and occasional press 
advertising. Expenditure on advertising by all companies in 1975 
amounted to £103,100, which is about 0.5% of the total value 
of retail sales, excluding tax. 
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D. The replacement market (Cont'd) 
The growth in the proportion of imported cars in use in the 
U. K. has reduced the predictability of market shares. It has probably 
increased the potential penetration of the UK market by overseas 
suppliers of sparking plugs, especially by Bosch. of Germany and 
NGK of Japan. On the other hand, all the domestic producers and the 
distributors selling "own label" products supply sparking plugs 
for imported vehicles. 
The total size of the replacement market was estimated by the 
E. I. U. (1) and their estimates correspond closely with our own desk 
calculations. From 1972 to 1975 these estimates were as follows: - 
Table II1-6. Sales of Sparking Plugs for Replacement 
1972 56.1 million units 
1973 58.9 11 
1974 57.3 " 
1975 57.1 If 
Estimates of market share are very difficult to derive. Even 
direct market surveys are hindered by the fact that many motorists 
do not know what plugs are fitted to their cars - even if they 
purchased them from a chain store themselves. Estimates by the 
EIU (1) do not correspond exactly to those of a manufacturer with 
whom the problem was discussed. A compromise estimate suggests that 
in 1975 the shares of the replacement market were as follows: - 
Table 111-7. Shares of Replacement Sales 1975 
Champion 65 (These estimates are only very 
Autolite 13 approximate) 
A. C. Delco 12 
Bosch 6 
Other imports 4 
E. Financial Statistics 
Only the Champion Sparking Plug Co. Ltd. publishes financial 
data relating to sparking plugs - necessarily because it is a single- 
product enterprise. In 1975 its sales turnover was £15.72 millions 
or 64 per cent of total sales of sparking plugs by producers in the 
U. K. Of the total £4.66 millions was derived from export sales, 
leaving £11.06 millions as turnover from U. K. sales. This 
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E. Financial Statistics (Cont'd) 
represented about 60 per cent of the total sales revenue 
derived by U. K. and overseas manufacturers from sales to 
the U. K. market, slightly lower than its estimated share 
of the market volume might suggest. This confirms a 
comment made to us by two people from within the motor 
industry that Champion is charging lower prices to Leyland 
and Chrysler for OE and for sale via their dealer 
networks than corresponding transfer prices of Autolite 
and A. C. Delco. 
Table 111-8. Champion's Turnover Record 1968 and 
1973-5. 
a 
1968 1973 1974 1975 
Total turnover (£m) 7.18 11.55 12.94 15.72 
% of U. K. producers 68 73 68 64 
Export turnover (im) 2.06 4.97 4.94 4.66 
U. K. Sales (£m) 5.12 6.58 8.00 11.06 
U. K. Sales revenue as % 
of total of all 
suppliers n. a. 56 58 60 
Sources: Company accounts and Tables 111-2 and 
111-3 above. 
Since Champion is a subsidiary of an overseas 
company it is difficult to interpret its financial 
performance because much depends upon the principles 
adopted for transfer pricing and for allocation of 
indirect expenses. 
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F. Statistical Summary of Concentration. 
Absence of financial data prevents the computation of tables 
of concentration for this sub-sector. The indices prescribed by the 
Commission have been applied to the data in Tables 111-5 and 
111-7 with the following results: - 
Table 111-9. Concentration Indices applied to Market Shares 
(measured in volume) 1975 
OE Replacement 
Coefficient of variation 0.729 1.138 
Gini coefficient 0.388 0.516 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 510 459 
Entropy index - 35.8 - 47.7 
Linda coefficients (L) and Concentration 
Ratios (CR) 
n* =L CR L CR 
2 1.26 92 2.50 78 







For the OE market the Linda index suggests a duopoly: 
the largest firm had 66 per cent of the market and the 
second largest 26.2 per cent, leaving the third with 7.8 
per cent. Because of exclusive trading by each of the vehicle 
manufacturers the analysis cannot be used to describe 
competition in this sector - there is none at present. 
In the replacement market the coefficients emphasise 
the predominance of Champion whose share of the market is 




In 1968 the Census of Production revealed that there were 16 
enterprises employing 25 or more people and producing accumulators 
for 
motor vehicle starting, lighting and ignition. By 1976 the number 
had 
fallen to 10 partly because of mergers and partly because some companies 
had withdrawn from this activity. In addition to the firms included in 
the official statistics there is a larger number of very small enterprises 
which produce accumulators, sometimes reconditioned, on a small scale. 
There are three grades of battery available for purchase by 
the motorist: - 
i) The "first-line" batteries produced also for the original 
equipment market and designed to specifications laid down by the vehicle 
manufacturers. These normally carry a two year "guarantee". The retail 
price of such batteries in 1975 varied (according to outlet and 
specification) from about £13 to £25. The manufacture of this grade of battery 
is almost entirely confined to the small group of large companies (now 
only four in number) who together form the British Battery Makers Society 
(B. B. M. S. ) 
ii) Economy or "second-line" batteries also produced by the 
B. B. M. S. Companies to counter competition from non-members. These 
batteries are designed for normal use under British driving conditions 
but do not meet the extremes of use implied by the specification of 
"first-line" batteries. 
Most of these batteries are sold with a one year guarantee. Their 
retail price in 1975 varied from about £8 to £13. 
iii) Low price batteries produced by local manufacturers, 
sometimes using materials from discarded batteries, which are purchased as 
scrap. These batteries are distributed under the retailers brand names and 
varied in price in 1975 from £5 to £10. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF TOTAL MARKET 
Table 1V-1 shows the total number of batteries for motor 
vehicles sold by U. K. manufacturers, the number exported and imported 
and an estimated breakdown of the total U. K. market into original 
equipment and replacement. 
TABLE 1V-1 Volume of Batteries Produced and Traded in 1968-76 
(thousands) 
1968 1973 1974 1975 1976 
U. K. manufacturers 
Output (i) 6200 7050 6120 5570 6140 
Exports (ii) 280 390 400 550 540 
Imports (iii) 50 270 250 250 330 
U. K. domestic 
sales (i) - (ii) 
+ (iii) 5970 6930 5970 5270 5930 
O. E. Sales 2060 1980 1770 1540 1600 
Residual 3910 4950 4200 3730 4330 
Source: Business Statistics Office, 
Overseas Trade Statistics. 
Stocking of batteries, sometimes in a dry state for long periods, 
by intermediaries between the manufacture and the final customer means that 
the'residual' figure does not exactly represent replacement demand but 
comparison with other estimates suggests that the approximation is 
satisfactorily close. 
Estimates of original*equipment sales have been devised by 
subtracting from the sum of all vehicles produced in the United Kingdom 
60% of the number of cars and goods vehicles exported in assembled form, 
because the batteries for such vehicles are more usually supplied from 
within the country of assembly. An allowance has been made for the use 
of dual batteries in some of the largest goods vehicles. 
The value of battery sales by U. K. manufacturers is also 
published by the Business Statistics Office but it is not possible to 
divide the total figure into revenue from OE sales and that from the 
replacement market. Sales revenue figures are contained in Table IV-2 
in which the data are also shown in terms of constant 1976 purchasing power. 
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TABLE IV-2 VALUE OF MANUFACTURERS SALES OF 















Source: Census of Production 1968 
Business Statistics Office (1973-6) 
Note that data refers to establishments with at least 25 employees, except that 
for 1976 this lower limit was increased to 50. The B. S. O. has stated that the 
effect on coverage is minimal; it estimates the percentage of total production 
covered to be about 97 per cent (1). 
It is rather difficult to interpret annual changes in sales of batteries because 
of changes in stock levels of intermediaries- accumulators may be stored in a 
dry state for long periods. 
The number of cars and commercial vehicles in use which were at least two years 
of age from 11.52 millions in 1973 to 13.3 millions in 1976, so that the number 
of replacement batteries sold per 100 such vehicles appears on the evidence of 
Table IV-1 to have fallen from 43 to 33. Since destocking appears to have 
occurred in 1975, this evidence suggests longer battery life. Among reasons 
for this may be the (a) use of better materials in battery construction, 
including the predominance of polypropylene instead of hard rubber cases; (b) 
the use of better systems of charging and improved performance of alternators; 
(c) a series of comparatively mild winters with little freezing fog or snow. 
1 Business Monitor PQ. 369.2,1st qtr. 1977 - page 2. 
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Research into the life of batteries is made difficult by the frequent 
trading of motor vehicles. A substantial proportion of vehicles-owners 
did not purchase their present batteries and many of those who did are 
unlikely to recall the date of purchase. 
Although there has been a decline in the market for batteries, supply has 
become rather inelastic and a possible shortage was mentioned in our 
discussions with motor company buyers and a major battery manufacturer. 
Excess capacity exists in the sense that capital is under-utilised but 
expansion of production might mean extra shifts and recruitment of labour. 
Uncertainty surrounding the life of batteries and the size of the replacement 
market may deter producers from taking such steps, which might be difficult 
to reverse. 
C. Foreign Trade 
Because of their low value to weight ratio and because of their construction, 
it is not economic to transport batteries over long distances except where 
this is justified by unusual specifications combined with economies of scale 
in production. This explains the comparatively small volume of international 
trade - export volume amounted to under 9 per cent of U. K. production in 1976 
and imports to only 5.6 per cent of batteries sold in this country 
The principal destination of exports in 1975 were within Europe, especially 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany and Belguim. Some of these shipments, 
especially to the Low Countries, are believed to be associated with assembly 
in the destination countries of vehicles supplied in knocked-down form from 
the U. K. The same reason accounts for shipments to Iran, the Gulf States and 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, South Africa and Zaire, which are among the major non- 
European destinations. 
Imports are also mainly from Europe; about half of the total comes from 
Germany and France. These include purchases by one of the multinational 
vehicle companies of a small part of its total battery requirements. 
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D. The Original Equipment Market 
Although there are no financial ties between the battery producers and 
the 
vehicle manufacturers, a pattern of supply has been established, whereby 
each of the vehicle companies relies on one or at most two suppliers. 
For British Leyland, Lucas Batteries Limited is the dominant supplier. It 
is part of Lucas Industries Limited with annual sales of over £300 millions 
of electrical equipment for motor vehicles and aircraft. Until fairly 
recently Lucas was the sole supplier to the former Austin-Morris division of 
British Leyland which was the volume-car section of the motor company. Our 
own enquiries suggest that Lucas continues to supply over 85 per cent of the 
total battery requirements of Leyland, the rest are obtained from Chloride 
Limi ted. 
Ford (of Great Britain) bought all its batteries until the early 1970's from 
Chloride but has now organised its material sourcing on a European basis. 
Although Chloride remains the dominant supplier (perhaps over 70%), imports 
from continental suppliers and purchases from Lucas have increased in recent 
years. 
Vauxhall purchases from both Lucas and Chloride but not from any other 
supplier. A policy of "dual sourcing" means that batteries from both 
suppliers are fitted to each range of cars. 
Chrysler also "dual sources" its battery supplies but Lucas and Chloride 
account for over 90% of purchases. ' Occasional purchases have been made 
from Oldham (see below) and Chrysler has also imported batteries from Canada, 
from a company then contemplating the establishment of a manufacturing 
subsidiary in the United Kingdom. 
Our analysis of the OE market indicates that in 1975 Lucas and Chloride shared 
about 94 per cent of this market. Of this Lucas probably accounted for 50 to 
54 per cent and Chloride for 40 to 44 per cent, but these are only tentative 
estimates based on discussions within the motor industry 
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Although sales of batteries for original equipment yield less profit than 
those to the replacement sector, the competitive pressure on prices in the 
latter sector and the virtual duopoly in OE sales mean that the price 
differential is smaller than in other European countries. We understand 
that in Germany prices of batteries for original equipment are much lower 
than the corresponding prices in the U. K. and are less than U. K. standard 
costs of manufacture. Marginal-cost pricing of OE sales in Germany is 
possible because retail prices for replacement are over three times the 
average U. K. level. 
It is not clear why the traditional ties between Lucas and Leyland and 
between Chloride and Ford should continue. The motor manufacturers face 
greater risks of interruption of supplies and the battery makers are more 
vulnerable to changes in policy on the part of the vehicle manufacturers. 
The persistence of the arrangements seems to be part of a detente in 
competition between Lucas and Chloride. 
E. Replacement Sales 
1. The Companies Supplying this Sector 
The major suppliers to the replacement market are: 
Chloride Group Ltd. (Total European sales of automotive products 
mainly batteries, in year ended 31st March, 
1976 were £56 m. ) 
Carlton Industries (via its subsidiaries Oldham International Limited, 
Ltd. acquired in 1972, and Tungstone Batteries Ltd., 
taken over in 1973: total sales of batteries in 
1975 were around £20 millions. ) 
Lucas Industries (via the subsidiary Lucas Batteries Ltd., for which 
Ltd. no sales turnover figures are published and 
estimation is impossible. ) 
Hawker Siddley Ltd. (via its subsidiary Crompton-Parkinson Ltd., which 
does not publish separate figures for automotive 
battery sales. ) 
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These four companies supply most of the premium batteries sold in the 
United Kingdom and also provide economy ranges. Together they form the 
British Battery Makers Society, which acts as a protective organisation 
but is prevented by the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act from price 
fixing. The B. B. M. S. did not co-operate in this investigation, though 
one of the four member companies discussed with us, in broad terms, recent 
developments in this industry. 
As well as these four companies, there are six other manufacturers with 
50 or more employees (identified from B. S. O. information) and a large 
number of small firms. Most of these firms supply batteries for sale under 
the brand names of wholesalers or retailers and, since these brands are also 
supplied by the big four, it is difficult to measure their importance in the 
market. 
2, Brands, consumer loyalty and advertising 
The six major manufacturers' brands sold on the retail market are as 
follows: - 
Chloride : Dagenite and Exide 
Lucas : Lucas and Toplife 
Carlton Industries : Oldham and Tungstone 
Crompton : Own name. 
Most of the batteries are sold under the brand name of the distributor. 
Among the most important are Blue Star sold at the premises of Blue Star 
garage chain; Esso (Voltpak) and the batteries sold by the specialist 
fitting stations, whose main product is tyres - ATS (Associated Tyre 
Services, a subsidiary of Michelin) and NTS (National Tyre Services -a 
subsidiary of Dunlop) are the most significant of these brands. 
Two of the vehicle manufacturers have acted as factors for batteries as 
part of their "all-makes" wholesaling activities. British Leyland 
experimented with the sale of Lucas batteries under their Unipart scheme 
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but this practice has now been modified. Because of production problems 
for Lucas caused by dual labelling, Lucas batteries are now distributed 
by British Leyland via its accredited dealers under the Lucas name. 
Chrysler now sells second-line batteries from Chloride and Lucas as part 
of its Mopart range. Vauxhall is not involved in the wholesaling of 
batteries and Ford supplies only a limited range of mainly Chloride 
batteries for Ford cars, under the Ford name. 
Imported batteries represented only a small proportion of the replacement 
market, foreign trade statistics suggests that this was less than 5 per 
cent. Although some foreign companies supply the British market (e. g. 
Bosch and Varta from Germany), some of the batteries concerned are 
produced on a sub-contract basis within the U. K. (by Chloride and Lucas 
respectively in the case of two firms). 
A car battery is not a "concern" product - it does not affect the 
safety of a car: nor is it an "image" product. Only under extreme 
conditions is it likely to fail without warning and that failure is 
most probable in the early morning in the privacy of the motorist's 
garage. It is a fairly expensive item -a premium battery can cost 
over £20; it is an item on which many motorists are prepared to 
economise. Brand loyalty is low and the market is open to local 
producers of lower quality batteries who, with minimal overheads, are 
able to supply at a low price. 
The main channels of distribution for batteries are: - 
a) Wholesalers and "factors" who supply "traditional"garages and 
vehicle service stations with manufacturers' brands. Some'of 
these wholesalers are agents for individual manufacturers. For 
example, Lucas has about 350 franchised agents for its automotive 
electrical products, out of which 140 are owned by the manufacturer. 
Chloride also has outlets which are either owned or controlled 
through exclusive dealing arrangements. The EIU (1) estimated 
that about 60 per cent of batteries were sold via vehicle repairers 
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who acquired them from independent or manufacturer-owned 
wholesalers. Chloride appears to be the leading company in 
sales via this channel of distribution. 
b) Specialist fitting stations, many of whom buy straight from 
manufacturers, and sell under their own brand names. Blue Star 
Garages, ATS and NTS can be included in this category. The 
economies gained by elimination of intermediaries are at least 
partly passed on to the customer in lower prices. This channel 
of distribution has gained importance in the last few years and 
the EIU estimated that in 1975 25 per cent of batteries were sold 
by this route. 
c) Sales via retail shops have also increased in recent years. Some 
battery producers (e. g. Lucas) have financial interest in retailing 
but most retail chains obtain batteries from a variety of sources. 
This is a market for a "low-interest" product with a variety of channels 
of distribution and a very large number of brand-names, many of which 
cannot be directly linked with particular manufacturers. Advertising 
is much less significant in relation to sales than is the case in the 
distribution of tyres. Advertising has also been widely erratic. The 
MEAL data shows, for example, that Chloride spent £252,000 on advertising 
in 1976 compared with only £1,100 in 1975. Total advertising has varied 
as follows over the years since 1968: - 
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TABLE IV-3 
PRESS & TELEVISION 
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE ON MOTOR 
VEHICLE ACCUMULATORS 1968-76 
Actual % of total Index at constant 
total battery sales purchasing power 
(£000) 
1968 265.0 1.0 100 
1969 150.3 n. a. 54 
1970 396.4 n. a. 134 
1971 309.5 n. a. 95 
1972 224.8 n. a. 65 
1973 113.2 0.3 30 
1974 54.9 0.1 13 
1975 20.1 0.0 4 
1976 276.5 0.4 44 
Source: MEAL and B. S. O. 
One of the interesting features of advertising expenditure has been 
the high proportion of the total accounted for by distributors of brands 
other than those of the four BBMS members. These include firms selling 
cut-price batteries whose main objective in advertising has been to draw 
attention to their prices (e. g. Blue Star). 
TABLE IV-4 TOTAL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE BY COMPANIES 1968-76 (f000's) 
1968-72 1973-6 
Chloride 531.5 348.0 (252m in 1976) 
Lucas 175.4 1.6 
Crompton 37.7 4.5 
Oldham 63.0 nil 
Tungstone 115.3 1.1 
Blue Star 193.3 58.4 
Other 229.8 51.1 
TOTAL 1346.0 464.7 
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3. Market Shares 
It is difficult to determine the sources of some of the batteries 
sold under the brand-names of non-manufacturers. This means that 
any estimates of manufacturers' shares of the replacement market can 
be only approximate. Such estimates are shown in Table IV-5. They 
are based on the results of the EIU survey (1) but have been 
slightly modified on the basis of our own discussions. 
C CONCENTRATION RATIOS 
Two of the major suppliers (Lucas and Crompton-Parkinson) do not 
release any information relating to their sales of batteries. Other 
companies publish figures which also include sales of other products 
and the activities of overseas subsidiaries. 
It has proved impossible to derive any financial data and the only 
variables for which concentration indices can be calculated are the 
estimated shares of volume, in the OE and replacement sectors 







ESTIMATES OF MARKET SHARE 1975 (%) 
OE Replacement Combined 
42 35 37 
52 17 27 
1 13 10 
0 10 7 
5 25 19 
The results of the computations are shrwn in Table IV-6. 
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TABLE IV-6 CONCENTRATION INDICES - VOLUME OF SALES OF ACCUMULATORS 
(ESTIMATES FOR 1975) 
Original 
Equipment 
Coefficient of Variation (V) 1.30 
Gini coefficient 0.63 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (H) 448 
Entropy index (E) -41.4 







CR L CR L CR L 
2 94 0.619 
3 96 4.311 
4 98 3.574 
5 99 3.923 










LS = 0.685 
In calculating these coefficients, we assumed that the maximum number of 
"other" suppliers to the OE market was three. The corresponding number 
for the replacement and combined analyses was 20. These assumptions do 
not affect the concentration ratios and Linda indices shown in the table but 
are reflected in the other coefficients. The variations in V, G, H. and 
E, are interesting to compare. The increase in the number of companies of 
very small size causes H and E to fall, because these coefficients are 
sensitive to the number of firms in the market, which indicates less 
concentration. The dispersion of company size has increased and, since G 
is related to dispersion, this index rises, indicating greater concentration. 
l 
The Linda indices confirm that the total supply of batteries is dominated 
by two firms (Lucas and Chloride) but in the replacement market an oligopoly 
includes the four members of the British Battery Makers Society. 
1 For a fuller treatment of the mathematical properties of the indices see 
"A Study of the Evolution of Concentration in the U. K. Paper Industry", the 
first 'Cranfield' report in this series. 
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Appendix A Definitions and Basic Properties of Concentration Indices 
In this explanation of the main indices specified by the Commission and 
used in this analysis the following notation is used: 
N total number of firms in the industry; 
the value of a variable for Firm i, when firms are ranked 
in descending order with respect to that variable; 
X the aggregate of the variable for the whole industry, that is, 
N 
E Xi 
Pi the proportion of the aggregate accounted for by Firm i, that is, 
Xi 
x 
u the arithmetic mean value of the variable, that is, x N 
(a) Concentration Ratio 
The concentration ratio for R firms within an industry is the fraction of 
the total value of the variable accounted for by the R largest firms 
ranked in descending order of that variable: - 
0R CR _- 
10 
ýýý x iE1 
xi 
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Concentration ratios give only limited information about the structure 
of an industry. With different distributions of the variable, comparison 
of degrees of concentration between different sectors may depend on 
the number of firms chosen. In industry A the top five firms may account 
for 40 per cent of sales and the next five 30 per cent (giving a ten- 
firm CR of 70 per cent). In industry B the five largest firms may 
account for 50 per cent of sales and the next five 18 per cent (giving 
a ten-firm CR of 68 per cent). 
(b) Coefficient of Variation 
This is the standard deviation of the distribution of values of the 
variable as a proportion of the mean 
1 EiXi'u)2 V= 
u N-1 
(c) The Gini Coefficient 
This measure is based on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve plots the 
percentage of total industry turnover on the vertical axis against 
percentage of firms cumulated from the smallest on the horizontal axis. 
Thus the curve is concave (degenerating into a straight line when all 
firms are of equal size). Where a variable other than turnover is used, 
the percentage of firms is cumulated from the firm with the smallest value 
of the variable under consideration. 




It ranges from 0 (all firms equal in size) to 1 (all output in the hands 
of a single firm). The following formula provides a method of calculation 
when the values of the variable are ranked in ascending order 












Fig. 1% of firms cumulated 
from smallest 
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(d) Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
This was suggested by Herfindahl and is defined as the sum of the squares 
of the market shares, i. e. 
N2 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index = i£1Pi 
The index lies between N and 1. Some authors prefer to define it as: 
N2 
H-H = 1000 E p2 
i=1 
i. e. to inflate its value by a multiple of 1000. This convention has 
been adopted by the Commission and is followed in this report. 
The index is related to the coefficient of variation and in other publications 
by the Commission in this series has been defined accordingly: - 
H-H 1000(1/ + 1) 
N 
(e) Entropy 
This is defined as: - 
N 
Entropy Index, E_- 
ZE1 
p2 Zog p2 
If one share is 1 and all others are 0, then E=0 and the degree of 
concentration is maximum. If all shares are equal (=N) then E Zog N 
and the degree of concentration is minimum for that value of N. 
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The entropy index, explained at some length in the Cranfield report on 
the paper industry, has the advantage over other measures of concentration 
that absolute changes in its value may be compared. For example if the 
Gini coefficient moves from 0.3 to 0.5 in one industry and from 0.7 to 
0.9 in another, it cannot be concluded that concentration has increased 
to the same degree. With the entropy index, such a conclusion could be 
drawn. (10) 
(f) Linda Index 
Another measure of industrial concentration is given by Linda. 
_ -i 
AXi 
Qi -i. 1- Ai 
i 
where Ai =x. j£1 
xý and values of x are in descending order. 
K may be any number of firms from 2 to N. (Thus QZ . is the average share 
of the market held by the top i firms divided by the average share of the 
market held by the other (Kri) firms included in the sample). 
The Linda Index is defined as: 
1 Ký1 QZ 
K(K-1) 1 
(i. e. the Linda Index is Kx the average of the Q s). 
The Linda index is designed to measure the degree of inequality between 
the values of the variable included in a sub-sample of K units. 
The Linda Index may also be used to define the boundary between oligopolists 
within an industry and the other firms. The boundary occurs when the value 
of Xk is so large in relation to previous ratios that, in spite of Xk+1 
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averaging, the Linda index rises. If the value of the Linda index (L) 
is greater for (k+1) than for (k) then an "oligopolistic arena" of k 
firms may be identified. 
Mathematically this critical point (km) may be defined as where 
Uk- =0 and 
d22>0 
dk 
A measure of "synthesis" (LS) is inclueded in the Tables of Concentration. 
This represents the mean value of the Linda indices from k=2 to k=km. LS 
is used in further statistical development of the analysis of concentration 
now being undertaken by the Commission. 
The definition of km (NXm in the Tables of Concentration) on this basis 
differs from that used in earlier reports published by the Commission, 
This re-definition follows further analysis of the concepts underlying 
the Linda approach. 
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Appendix B Profile of Major Companies in the Three Sub-Sectors 
This analysis is confined to United Kingdom companies and 
includes the 
following: - 
Tyres: Dunlop Holdings Ltd. 
Avon Rubber Co. Ltd. 
Batteries: Lucas Industries Ltd. 
Chloride Ltd. 
The four other major suppliers of tyres are overseas-based (Firestone$ 
Goodyear and Uniroyal in the U. S. A; Michelin in France). Analysis of 
financial data relating to world-wide activities has been included in 
Section II (pages 54 and 72 ). All the producers of sparking plugs 
are subsidiaries of U. S. parent companies. 
DUNLOP HOLDINGS LTD. 
Dunlop is one of the longest established rubber tyre producers in the 
world. In Section II we described how its share of the U. K. market tended 
to decline during the period 1969-75, although when the associated Pirelli 
activities are included, it remained the largest firm in both the OE and 
replacement markets. 
The establishment of the Dunlop-Pirelli union in 1971 was a fairly complex 
arrangement: 
Dunlop Ltd. (tyres and other products in the U. K. and Europe): 51% of 
equity held by Dunlop Holdings Ltd., 49% by Pirelli S. p. A. 
Dunlop International Ltd. and other Dunlop companies operating outside 
Europe: 60% of equity held by Dunlop Holdings Ltd., 40% by Pirelli S. p. A. 
Pirelli Ltd. (U. K. ): 51% of equity owned by Dunlop Holdings Ltd. and 49% 
by Pirelli S. p. A. 
Industrie Pirelli S. p. A. (Italy): On the formation of the Union in 1971 
Dunlop Holdings acquired 49% of the equity of this company, compared with 
the holding by Pirelli S. p. A. of 51%. In 1972 Dunlop Holdings wrote down 
its holding in this company by transfer from retained earnings so that 
Dunlop shareholders are no longer responsible for any losses incurred and 
the Dunlop Holdings accounts no longer include a proportion of profits or 
losses attributable to Industrie Pirelli, Additional capital for Industrie 
Pirelli, to be subscribed by Pirelli S. p. A., will reduce the Dunlop 
Holdings share of equity to 30%. 
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Other Pirelli activities (outside the U. K. and Italy) 
Dunlop Holdings equity share varies from 13 to 49 per cent and in most 
of the larger companies is 40 per cent or over. 
Certain Dunlop subsidiaries, in India and Rhodesia, are excluded from the 
Dunlop-Pirelli Union. 
Table B1 shows an analysis of sales of Dunlop Holdings Ltd. over the 
years 1971-5. 
Dunlop Holdings Ltd. 
Table B1. Analysis of Sales Revenue by Product and Geog raphical Area of 
Operations - (fm) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
By product 
Tyres 368 401 463 528 615 
Industrial products 68 71 84 114 133 
Consumer products 101 116 142 170 188 
Engineering products 40 38 45 52 57 
Supply group 8 10 16 24 22 
585 636 750 888 1015 
By qeoqraDhical area 
U. K. 252 259 286 345 393 
Rest of Europe 137 154 188 233 265 
N. & S. America 79 93 109 103 119 
Africa 49 53 70 78 105 
Asia & Australasia 68 77 97 129 133 
Total sales revenue 585 636 750 888 1015 
Tyres almost maintained their relative importance as a source of sales 
revenue for Dunlop (63 per cent of the total in 1971; 62 per cent in 1973; 
and 61 per cent in 1975). The United Kingdom accounted for 43 per cent of 
sales in 1971 and 39 per cent in 1975; sales in the American continents 
also declined relatively to those in Africa, Asia/Australasia and continental 
Europe. 
Among Dunlop's consumer products, which contributed much to the growth of 
sales are foam products (bedding etc. ), sports equipment and footwear. 
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Industrial products include textiles, wheels and vehicle suspensions 
and hosing. 
Table B2 shows the sources of after-tax profits of Dunlop Holdings 
Ltd. 
and also relates these to equity capital. 
Table B2. Dunlop Holdings Ltd. - Analysis of Profits by Product and 
Geographical Area (fm)_ 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Profit before interest and tax (a) by product group 
Tyres 30.8 30.0 29.9 29.6 38 
Industrial products 3.4 4.5 7.3 12.2 12 
Consumer products 5.7 6.8 7.9 8.7 8 
Engineering products 2.8 2.6 1.9 4.7 4 
Supply group 1.4 0.7 2.3 4.8 3 
Total 44.1 44.6 49.3 60.0 65 
(b) by geographical area 
U. K. 10.8 12.9 11.7 21.7 21 
Rest of Europe 11.4 8.6 7.0 5.5 7 
N. &S. America 7.9 10.0 9.6 7.0 9 
Africa 6.0 6.5 9.7 10.5 13 
Asia and Australasia 8.0 6.6 11.3 15.3 15 
Total 44.1 44.6 49.3 60.0 65.1 
Add Income from 
minority hold- 
ings etc. 6.9 8.8 6.2 10.0 11.0 
Deduct Interest 12.9 13.5 19.8 26.0 24.1 
Net profit before tax38.1 39.9 35.7 44.0 52.0 
Deduct Taxation 18.3 18.3 19.6 24.4 28.5 
Net profit after tax 19.7 21.6 16.1 19.6 23.5 
Deduct Minority 
shareholders interests8.1 8.2 6.3 9.5 8.5 
Profit attribdtable 
to shareholders of 
Dunlop Holdings Ltd. 11.6 13.4 9.8 10.1 15.0 
Previous line as % 
of shareholders' 
funds. 7.1 9.7 6.2 5.5 7.3 
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From Tables B1 and B2 are calculated the ratio of profits before interest 
and tax to total sales for each of Dunlop's product groups. These ratios 
are shown in Table B3. 
Table B3. Dunlop Holdings Ltd. - Profit Margins by Product Group 
Profits before interest and tax as % of sales turnover 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Tyres 8.4 13.4 6.5 5.6 6.2 
Other products 6.1 6.2 6.8 8.4 6.8 
Total 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.8 6.4 
Table B3 shows that other products became more profitable than tyres 
(Dunlop's major product) from 1973 onwards. The decline in profitability 
of the divisions other than tyres in 1975 may be explained by the trade 
recession; the partial recovery in the profitability of tyre manufacture 
may be explained by price increases. Although the profit margin per £ 
of sales of tyres increased in 1975 it is important to point out that in 
terms of constant purchasing power, tyre sales fell by 6 per cent between 
1974 and 1975 and total profits from tyre sales remained almost unchanged. 
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AVON RUBBER COMPANY LTD. 
Unlike Dunlop, Avon is primarily engaged in the U. K. market. As well as 
manufacturing tyres, Avon owns two distribution companies, Motorway 
Tyres 
and Accessories Ltd. and Motorway Tyres and Accessories (Scotland) Ltd. 
As well as Avon tyres and those sold under the brand name of another 
subsidiary Henley's Tyre and Rubber Co. Ltd., Motorway Tyres distributes 
tyres from outside suppliers. It also distributes batteries and other 
specialist products. 
To facilitate comparison with Dunlop, whose accounts are presented in 
this way, we have combined the figures for tyre production and distribution 
in the following analysis of Avon's turnover and profits: - 
Table B4. Avon Rubber Co. Ltd. - Analysis of Sales by Product and by_ 
Geographical Area (fm) 
Products 1969 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 
U. K. Tyres 22.6 28.4 33.4 41.0 45.9 54.2 
Other U. K. products 10.7 12.2 13.9 15.9 16.9 21.8 
Overseas 3.2 5.8 6.0 7.3 9.1 11.8 
36.5 46.4 53.3 64.2 71.9 87.8 
Overseas activities are concerned mainly with tyres. In 1969 total tyre- 
related sales turnover (i. e. tyre manufacture and distribution in the U. K. 
and overseas -a total of f25.8m) accounted for 71% of total company turnover; 
by 1976 the proportion had risen to 75%. 
Besides tyres, the company's U. K. activities include the manufacture of 
rubber hoses and extrusions, sold mainly to the motor industry, and manu- 
facture of domestic washing machines, dishwashers etc; a wide range of 
other products made from extruded rubber or polymers (from golf grips to 
diving suits and skirts for hovercraft); specialist medical components and 
inflatable dinghies. 
The company's attempts to diversify activities during the past few years 
have been reflected in substantial increases in fixed assets but, because 
of the unfavourable economic conditions, the company's profits tended to 
fall until 1975. In 1976 there was a recovery: - 
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Table B5. Avon Rubber Co. Ltd. - Analysis of Profits 
Analysis of net profit before tax (1000's) 
Products 1969 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 
U. K. tyres -247 2106 937 688 -780 285 
Other U. K. 516 326 964 944 752 1734 
Overseas 111 -142 255 250 57 412 
Investment income 108 18 79 61 474 22 
Total 3 2U 2TZ 1M -SU 24 
Less tax 116 840 996 1019 -144 1457 
Net profit after tax 333 1468 1239 924 -359 996 
Less minority inter- 
ests 6 8 13 -4 21 55 
Net profit attrib- 327 1460 1226 928 -380 941 
utable to equity 
holders. 
% of equity 2.5 11.1 8.6 6.8 -3.0 6.9 
Table B5 shows that the decline in Avon's profits was concentrated in tyre 
production and distribution. The detailed analysis in the company's 
accounts shows that this occurred mainly in the production of remould tyres 
and in the development of the Avon safety wheel (which is included by the 
company in its tyre operations). These are activities into which new 
capital was injected in the early 1970's with a consequently high deprec- 
iation charge. 
Because of the low profits and the need to finance fixed and working capital, 
the company's reserves fell from £9.15 millions in 1971 to £6.22 millions 
in 1975 but there was a rise to £7.03 millions in 1976. The equity capital 
of the company at the end of 1976 was £13.7 millions, compared with £13.1 
millions in 1969. 
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LUCAS INDUSTRIES LTD. 
Lucas Industries Ltd. (formerly Joseph Lucas Industries) is one of a small 
number of large companies in the United Kingdom which produce components 
for the motor industry but do not themselves manufacture vehicles (except 
experimental construction). The 1976 turnover of the company was £719 
millions and the company employed nearly 64,000 people in the U. K. and 
another 14,700 were employed by overseas subsidiaries. 
The Company does not publish a breakdown of its turnover in sufficient 
detail for identification of its battery-manufacturing activities. The 
following table (B6) is an analysis of sales turnover over the years 
1970-76. 
Table B6. Analysis of Sales Turnover - Lucas Industries Ltd. (£millions) 
Index of 
Vehicle Other total at 
equipment products Total constant p. p. 
1970 221 63 284 100 
1971 245 75 320 103 
1972 260 80 340 102 
1973 308 91 399 110 
1974 356 97 453 107 
1975 456 114 570 109 
1976 580 139 719 120 
The last column of Table B6 shows that the growth of Lucas sales turnover 
receded only slightly in 1974 and 1975, and that a substantial expansion 
occurred in 1976 especially in the vehicle equipment section. 
Lucas has also achieved a record of high profits over the survey period, 
as shown in Table B7 which contains certain financial ratios. 
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Table B7. Financial performance of Lucas Industries 
Net profits before interest and tax Net profits after tax 
% of % of attributable 
to equity 
as % of equity 
net assets sales 
1970 9.8 3.9 not comparable 
1971 9.7 5.5 23.2 
1972 11.4 7.4 30.6 
1973 12.8 10.1 37.7 
1974 8.9 4.7 20.9 
1975 13.5 6.3 35.0 
1976 17.2 7.3 55.8 
The total value of reserves attributable to Lucas shareholders rose from 
£48.7 millions at the end of 1970 to £171.5 millions at the end of 1976 
which, after adjustment for inflation, represents a growth of 66.6 per cent. 
How far the very strong financial position of Lucas can be explained by 
its near-monopoly position in the supply of certain vehicle equipment 
(especially electrical components) cannot be determined, because no detailed 
breakdown of product profitability is published. 
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THE CHLORIDE GROUP LTD. 
This company is believed to be the largest producer of rechargeable 
batteries in the world. 
' The company's European activities are split 
into four divisions: - 
Automative which includes lead acid accumulators, all the company's 
dry 
batteries and the wholesaling of electrical products for motor vehicles. 
Industrial which covers batteries for motive power and standby power. 
Systems which includes standby power and portable lighting systems and 
security systems. 
Plastics and Metals which includes lead recovery and refining, battery 
containers and plastic mouldings but also a number of diverse products - 
sanitary ware, bathroom fittings and precision engineering. 
Overseas operations cover the manufacture of batteries for all purposes, 
including automotive. 
Table B8 on the next page shows a breakdown of sales turnover and of 
profits over the four years 1972/3 to 1975/6 (to 31 March in the second 
year). Financial data for earlier years were analysed differently by the 
company. 
The sales figures show a growth of 61 per cent in the real value of sales 
turnover between 1972/3 and 1974/5 with a slight recession in 1975/6, 
probably resulting from the trade recession in the world as a whole. The 
principal growth has occurred in Europe in products other than those 
linked with the motor-vehicle industry, that is batteries other than 
vehicle accumulators. The company's U. K. operations have grown less 
quickly than those overseas, and their contribution to group profits has 
declined. 
The profit margin on European automotive sales was consistently lower 
than the average for other sales. One reason for the unusually low 
profit/sales ratio in 1974/5 was the degree of excess capacity resulting 
from the depressed market for motor-vehicle accumulators. The 1975/6 and 
1976/7 figures appear to confirm that the profit margin on sales is very 
sensitive to capacity utilisation - sales of batteries recovered substan- 
tially in 1976. 
EXTEL report on the company. 
117 
Table B8. Chloride Group Ltd. - Analysis of Sales and Profits by 
product and Geographical Area 
(a) SALES £m)- Year Ended 31 March 




Less intra-company sales etc. 
29.7 34.7 47.8 56.0 
30.0 38.1 103.7 98.6 
29.4 52.1 72.8 60.6 
-42.3 
Total sales turnover 89.1 124.9 182.0 215.2 
Index at constant purch. power 100 128 161 154 
U. K. companies as % of total n. a. 50.0 49.4 44.9 
(b) PROFITS (£OOO) 




Income from assocd. cos. 
Total 
Less Interest 
Net profit before tax 
Less tax 
Net profit after tax 
Less minority interests 
Profit after tax attributable to 
Chloride shareholders (A) 
(A) as % of equity 
% of (A) attributable to U. K. 
activities 
1680 1630 1341 3325 
6727 7103 9616 6744 
3890 6680 8896 11344 
nil 353 897 1401 
12297 15766 20750 22814 
849 2101 4523 3882 
11448 13665 16227 18932 
4217 6520 7267 8659 
7231 7145 8960 10273 
351 593 466 474 
7970 6552 8494 9799 
19.9 14.8 15.0 14.7 
n. a. 56.6 49.5 41.6 
118 
Table B9. Chloride Group Ltd. - Profits before interest and tax 
as percentage of sales 
Automotive products All other 
Financial Year in Europe company activities 
1972-3 5.65 17.9 
1973-4 4.70 15.3 
1974-5 2.81 13.8 
1975-6 5.94 11.4 
1976-7 5.40 13.3 
Source: Company accounts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The terms of reference from the Commission of the European Communities define three 
topics for investigation: the evolution of concentration, in publishing as a whole, a 
more detailed study of concentration in the publishing of newspapers and periodicals and 
another detailed study of the sale of books in schools. This report is divided into 
sections corresponding with these three topics. Section I includes an examination of 
trends in the publishing industry and an analysis of concentration of sales turnover and 
of all the other financial variables specified by the Commission. 
' Section II contains 
a similar analysis of trends in the publishing of newspapers and periodicals (described 
more briefly as the Press). Section III is a report of a survey of stocks and purchases 
of textbooks in British schools in the academic year; the objective of this survey was to 
identify the degree of specialisation by publishers in particular subject areas. 
The details of the methodology prescribed by the Commission are set out in 
R. Linda: "Methodology of Concentration Analysis applied to the Study of 
Industries and Markets" (Commission of the Eur. Comms., Sept. 1976). 
BLANK IN ORIGINAL 
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SECTION I- THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE 
Definition of Publishing 
This study covers two industries as defined by the Business Statistics Office of the 
United Kingdom l: - 
Minimum List Headings 485 and 486: printing and publishing of national daily and Sunday 
newspapers, local newspapers published at least once per week and periodicals issued 
regularly at intervals exceeding 24 hours. 
Minimum List Heading 489 (part): publishing of books, maps, music, religious tracts, 
almanacs etc. 
As far as possible, printing activities not directly associated with the publication of 
these products have been excluded. These excluded activities are job and contract printing, 
production of banknotes, stamps, tickets, playing cards and similar printed matter. Where 
these activities are undertaken on the same premises as the production of published matter 
(e. g. job printing by a newspaper company) it has not always been possible to exclude 
them but any distortion is believed to be small. 
A. ANALYSIS OF SALES AND PRODUCTION OF PUBLISHED P1ATTER 
1. Statistical Analysis 
Table I-1 Analysis of Publishing Sales in Recent Years 
Value of sales (£ millions) at current prices. 
Press 
Copy Sales Advertising Books Other Total 
1968 227 255 127 31 640 
1970 272 320 161 42 795 
1973 362 496 222 73 1153 
1974 430 521 272 78 1301 
1975 531 548 332 98 1509 
1976 613 652 391 119 1775 
Sources: Census of Production 1968 and 1973 
Business Monitor 1970,1974,1975 and 1976 
(The 1970 figures are adjusted for incomplete coverage on the 
basis of the two sets of figures published in the Business Monitor 
Series for 1971, quarter 4) 
Figures relate to establishments with 25 or more employees. 
Condensed version of definitions given as prefaces to reports on 1973 Census of Production for PA 485/6 and PA 489 (Business Statistics Office 1976). 
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Table I-1 shows newspapers and periodicals account for a dominant part of sales revenue 
from publishing in this country and that sale of advertising space is the major source 
of 
income for the Press. 
Inflation seriously distorts comparisons over the period 1968 to 1976. Correction 
for 
inflation can take two forms: 
a) adjustment to constant purchasing power, which is useful for comparison of the"real" 
value of expenditure on published material or the "real" value of company sales, or 
b) adjustment by a price index relating to published matter, which is useful for measuring 
changes in the volume of production. Both adjustments are shown in Table I-2: - 
Table 1-2 Indices of Publishing Sales Turnover 1968-76 
a) in terms of constant purchasing power - deflator used: 
Index of Retail Prices (all items) 
b) in terms of production volume (derived by manipulation of data published in the 
Business Monitor series) 
(a) (b) 
1968 90 n. a. 
1970 100 100 
1973 114.3 117 
1974 111.3 113 
1975 103.9 96 
1976 104.9 99 
Table 1-2 shows a substantial rise in activity in publishing between 1970 and 1973; over 
this period the volume of production rose by 17 per cent and the real value of total 
sales by over 14 per cent. During the recession from 1973 to 1976 the real value of sales 
turnover fell sharply and there was an even greater fall in the volume of production. 
This difference was due to an increase in average price per copy of newspapers and 
periodicals approximately 1.3 times that in the index of all retail prices. 
Employment in the printing and publishing industries has been much more stable than 
production. It is not possible to isolate the printing and publication of books; in 
Table 1-3 are set out production and employment statistics for (i) newspaper and 
periodical publishing and (ii) all other printing and publishing. Books and other 
published matter accounted for 37 per cent of sales in the latter sub-sector in 1976. 
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Table 1-3 Production and Employment in Publishing 1970-76 
(Second quarter of each year) 
Newspapers & Periodicals Other Printing and Publishing 
Production Employment Production Employment 
(1970=100) (000s) (1970=100) (000s) 
1970 100 149 100 226 
1971 98.2 146 95.8 220 
1972 104.5 139 100.2 212 
1973 119.1 138 103.5 212 
1974 117.0 149 105.1 208 
1975 99.1 136 99.3 206 
1976 101.5 131 99.4 196 
Source: Business Statistics Office and Dept. of Employment. 
From Table 1-3 it may be calculated that in the production of newspapers and periodicals, 
output per person employed in 1976 was only 15 per cent higher than in 1970 and was 10 
per cent lower than in 1973. Overmanning in the Press was one of topics emphasised in 
the recent investigation by the Royal Commission on the Press. 
' The prospects for a 
significant increase in labour productivity with a highly organised skilled labour force 
and a background of heavy unemployment appear rather slender and negotiations in this 
respect seem to have progressed only slowly. 
In other printing and publishing, increases in labour productivity have also been slow - 
in 1976, it was only 15 per cent greater than in 1970 and was less than 4 per cent 
greater than in 1973. Increases in labour costs in relation to sales revenue have con- 
tributed to the decline of profitability in the publishing industry in recent years. 
2. Overseas Trade in Published Matter 
Exports and imports of newspapers and periodicals are fairly small in relation to the 
value of U. K. sales. In 1975, exports amounted to only £27 millions, or about 5 per 
cent of the value of production. The main destination countries were Australia, New 
Zealand and the Irish Republic. Imports amounted to £llm. and were mainly from E. E. C. 
countries, especially Italy (£4m. ) or from the U. S. A. 
Report published by HMSO, July 1977. 
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In the case of books, foreign trade is more significant. Table 1-4 shows exports, 
home 
sales of U. K. producers and imports annually from 1970 to 1975. 
Table 1-4 Value of Trade in Books 1970-75 (fm. ) 
Home sales * U. K. 
Exports+ Imports + of U. K. producers market 
1970 46.9 22.6 95.8 118.4 
1971 59.7 25.9 107.8 133.7 
1972 69.7 29.6 133.8 163.4 
1973 72.2 31.6 142.1 173.7 
1974 81.7 39.3 172.2 211.5 
1975 101.8 51.2 218.0 269.2 
Sources: Overseas Trade Statistics and Business Statistics Office. 
+ Exports are valued f. o. b. ("free on board" value on leaving the U. K. port) while 
imports are valued c. i. f. (value on arrival at the U. K. port, including carriage, 
insurance and freight). 
* This column is derived by subtracting from sales by U. K. publishers the sales of 
books exported directly or known to be destined to export. Because of time lags, 
the total value of this export production exceeds the value of exports shown 
by 
Overseas Trade Statistics. The sum of columns (1) and (3) of this table is 
consequently less than column (3) in Table I-1. 
The books exported from the U. K. are more expensive in relation to weight than those 
imported. In 1975 the f. o. b. value of exports was 0.178 pence per gram while that of 
imports was 0.113 pence per gram. This is partly because imports include a higher prop- 
ortion of children's books with larger print but the principal reason is the predominance 
among exports of literary, technical and scientific books. 
The largest single market for exports is the U. S. A., the destination of 23 per cent (by 
value) of books exported in 1975. Other English-speaking countries accounted for much 
of the rest. The U. S. A. was the source of 40 per cent (by value) of books imported. 
Trade with other E. E. C. countries was less important, presumably because of language 
differences. 
Whereas U. K. publishers exported 30 per cent (by value) of their total production of 
books in 1975, imports from overseas represented only 19 per cent (again by value) of the 
U. K. market. Trade in books is influenced by widespread international agreements, the 
subject of considerable commercial security. However the predominance in the U. K. of 
British books (suggested by this statistical analysis) is also clear from our survey of 
educational publishing: the use of American texts appears to be widespread only in more 
specialist areas of advanced study. 
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3. Further Analysis of Sales of Books 
In Section II of this report we examine in some detail the segmentation of the total 
market for newspapers and periodicals and in Section III we report on our survey of text- 
books used in schools. The market for books is very diverse and, because the topic is not 
covered elsewhere In this report, we have set out in Table 1-5 an analysis of sales of 
books by U. K. publishers in 1971,1973 and 1975. 
Table 1-5 Analysis of Book Sales by Value (f millions) 
Hard-back 1971 1973 1975 
School textbooks 15.5 19.7 28.1 
Technical & Scientific 33.7 37.6 54.0 
Fiction, literature & 
classics 23.4 28.0 41.2 
Childrens 15.7 17.6 26.9 
Other 39.5 49.9 80.7 
Paper-back 
School textbooks 14.2 17.2 28.2 
Technical & Scientific 5.0 7.5 11.8 
Fiction, literature & 
classics 18.4 23.1 40.7 
Children's 4.4 7.0 10.3 
Other 9.7 14.0 18.3 
TOTAL 179.5 221.6 340.1 
Source: Business Mon itor Series 
The proportion of sales turnover accounted for by paper-backs rose from 28.8 per cent in 
1971 to 32.1. per cent in 1975. The data in Table 1-5 reveals no other substantial 
changes in the composition of book sales over the four year period. 
B. CONCENTRATION IN PUBLISHING AS A WHOLE 
Methodology 
The methodology for the measurement of the concentration has been laid down by the 
Commission of the European Communities. 
' A summary of this methodology is given in 
Appendix A of this report. 
The analysis of concentration is based on two sets of data relating to samples of firms 
in the industry studied. The first of these refers to sales by establishments within the 
United Kingdom of the products of that industry; data are collected for sales turnover 
and any other variables from a list specified by the Commission for which data are 
available. 
See R. Linda, op. cit. 
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This level of investigation is concerned with the Economic Activity Unit and the criterion 
for inclusion of any undertaking in the sample of companies studied is a minimum level of 
sales from U. K. establishments of the relevant products in a key year. In the present 
study, the firms included are the first 60 of a larger sample ranked according to sales 
turnover from published matter in 1970. Another firm which was formed in 1970 and became 
i larger than some of these 60 was added to the sample from 1971 onwards. 
The second set of data relates to all activities in the U. K. and elsewhere of any enter- 
prise included in the first sample, for which sales of the relevant products from U. K. 
establishments account for more than 50% of total world turnover in a given year (1970). 
The term "enterprise" is defined here as in the official definition of the Business 
Statistics Office: - "a business consisting of one establishment, or of two or more 
establishments under common ownership or control. " Effective control is deemed to occur 
when any single person or institution or an identical group of persons and/or institutions 
has an absolute majority of voting shares. 
The difference between the Enterprise and Economic Activity Unit (EAU) approaches is 
demonstrated by the inclusion of the S. Pearson group in both (publishing of books, news- 
papers and periodicals accounted for 61 percent of group turnover in 1970) but the 
inclusion of Reed International Ltd. only in the EAU analysis(U. K. publishing accounted 
for 41 per cent of 1970 turnover). 
Because Reed International is the firm with the largest publishing activities in the 
United Kingdom, its necessary exclusion from the Enterprise analysis means that more 
meaningful conclusions about concentration in publishing can be drawn from the EAU 
approach. However, for the EAU analysis, it was possible to obtain data for only two of 
the ten financial variables specified by the Commission. This is because companies with 
interests outside publishing normally provide a breakdown by product only for sales turn- 
over and net profits. 
In order to study the concentration of other financial variables and to compare the 
relative financial strengths of the companies concerned, it is necessary to refer to the 
Enterprise analysis, even though some of the firms with the largest publishing interests 
are excluded. 
The results of the EAU analysis for each of the calendar years are presented and discussed in the following part of the text, (Sub-sections 1-3). The more extensive tables for the Enterprise analysis produced by the Commission's own computer are described in Sections 4 and 5 below. 
Another of the 60 firms was formed in 1969 and is not included in 1968. 
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1. Trends in Sales Revenue and Profits - Economic Activity Units 
Table 1-6 shows the total values of sales and net profits before tax for the sample of 
firms annually from 1968 to 1975. The third column of data refers to the total of profits 
and losses by EAU's, the fourth column shows the total of profits only. 
Table 1-6 Turnover and Profits 1968-75 (Total of EAUs) 
No. of Sales Total profits Total of No. of 
firms turnover + losses profits profit-making firms 
(£ mill. ) (£ mill. ) (f mill. ) 
1968 59 577.1 60.03 60.11 56 
1969 60 630.6 52.91 53.35 52 
1970 60 695.0 43.62 48.31 53 
1971 61 741.5 59.81 61.00 59 
1972 61 851.7 94.12 94.12 61 
1973 61 999.9 100.54 100.54 61 
1974 61 1151.7 77.95 81.18 59 
1975 62 1368.2 93.44 96.76 61 
N. B. Profits = net profits before tax, attributable to publishing 
Source: Company Accounts. 
Comparison with Table I-1 shows that the sample of around 60 firms accounts for the 
majority of sales turnover in publishing represented by establishments with 25 or more 
employees. The percentage covered by the sample was about 90 per cent throughout the 
period. 
The data in Table 1-6 can better be understood in terms of constant purchasing power. 
Table 1-7 shows changes in each of the three totals in index form. 
Table 1-7 Indices of Turnover and Profits at Constant Purchasing Power 
(total OT LAUS) 
(Deflator used is Index of Retail Prices - all items) 
Sales turnover Profits + losses Profits only 
1968 100 100.0 100.0 
1969 103.6 83.5 84,2 
1970 107.3 64.7 71.7 
1971 104.7 81.2 82.7 
1972 112.3 119.2- 119.2 
1973 120.7 116.7 116.7 
1974 119.8 77.9 81.1 
1975 114.6 75.2 77.8 
Since 1968 the most profitable period for the publishing industry was the consumer boom 
of 1972 and 1973, when advertising revenue for the Press was at its peak for this survey 
period. The average profit margin in relation to sales was also at its peak in these 
years: - 
-18- 
Table 1-8 Net Profits before Tax as Percentage of Sales 
(Total of EAUs; losses included in average) 
1968 10.40 1972 11.05 
1969 8.39 1973 10.06 
1970 6.28 1974 6.77 
1971 8.07 1975 6.82 
2. Some general comments regarding g 
Concentration in Publishing 
The combination in a single set of calculations of the Press and the publishing of 
books 
tends to distort slightly the analysis of concentration. Only four of the 61 firms 
incl- 
uded in the EAU analysis had significant sales of both books and newspapers/periodicals. 
These were: - 
S. Pearson and Son Ltd. (owners of the Financial Times, Westminster Press, Longmans and 
Penguin Books Ltd. ); 
Reed International (Mirror Group newspapers and the International Publishing Corporation 
with its book-publishing interests in Butterworth and Hamlyn); 
The Thomson Organisation (the Times, the Sunday Times, regional newspapers, a range of 
periodicals and books published by Nelson, Pelham, Hamish 
Hamil- 
ton, and other subsidiaries; 
Scottish and Universal Investments Ltd. (a major newspaper publisher in Scotland and 
owner of Holmes McDougall, book publishers). 
Some indication of the distortion is provided by analysis of the EAU data for 1968 and 
comparison with the Census data for that year. The five-firm concentration ratio for each 
product range were as follows (our own EAU data): - 
Publishing in total 59.5 per cent of the totals 
Newspaper & Periodicals 66.9 for the sample of 
Other publishing 42.8 59 firms. 
The Census of Production for 1968 gave the five-firm ratio for published books as only 
32.2 per cent. The discrepancy between this and our own estimate for books and other 
publishing is explained by the fact that 23 of the 59 firms in the 1968 sample did not 
publish books at all. This means that the sample included only 36 publishers of books 
and, while we are satisfied that these were the 36 largest publishers, the structure of 
book publishing was - and remains - fairly atomistic. The 1968 census showed 88 
separate enterprises employing 25 or more people, and there was a large number of book 
publishers operating on an even smaller scale and accounting for 14 per cent of book sales. 
' 
Even in the newspaper/periodical sub-sector the concentration ratios overlook the existence 
of a large number of small companies not included in our sample. Data are published on the distribution of these companies and these are analysed in Section II below. 
1 Census of Production 1968: Enterprise Tables and Industry Report No. 143. 
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3. Standard Concentration Ratios and their Interpretation 
Tables 1-9 to I-11 show values of the standard concentration ratios for turnover and 
profits annually from 1968 to 1975, applied to the EAU data. 
Table 1-9 Concentration of Sales Turnover 1968-75 (EAU) 
Number of Mean Coeff. of Gini Herf. - Entropy 
firms (f000) Variation coeff. Hirschman 
1968 59 9,782 2.273 0.705 104.51 -129.62 
1969 60 10,509 2.241 0.698 100.38 -131.48 
1970 60 11,584 2.187 0.693 96.42 -132.76 
1971 61 12,157 2.072 0.677 86.77 -136.16 
1972 61 13,962 1.946 0.665 78.46 -138.69 
1973 61 16,391 1.864 0.656 73.33 -140.42 
1974 61 18,881 1.857 0.662 72.94 -139.97 
1975 61 22,430 1.861 0.660 73.17 -139.85 
Cnncentratinn ratin fnr n firms Linda Indax fnr n firme 
n 4 8 10 20 4 8 10 20 
1968 52.90 69.39 72.99 85.53 0.631 0.464 0.450 0.311 
1969 52.36 67.95 72.04 84.99 0.609 0.448 0.418 0.297 
1970 49.69 67.23 71.52 84.72 0.629 0.424 0.391 0.279 
1971 47.66 65.65 69.92 82.87 0.588 0.393 0.370 0.269 
1972 45.75 64.05 68.29 82.00 0.546 0.365 0.349 0.248 
1973 44.56 62.84 67.10 81.39 0.530 0.351 0.339 0.234 
1974 44.36 62.85 67.45 82.23 0.530 0.341 0.326 0.232 
1975 45.14 63.40 68.12 81.97 0.522 0.339 0.321 0.252 
Table 1-9 shows a distinct decrease in concentration in publishing from 1968 to 1973. 
All the indices show a progressive annual decrease over this period. After 1973 there are 
indications of stability. From Table I-11 below, which shows critical values of the 
Linda index, it will be seen that this Index shows the existence in each of the years 
1968 to 1973 of an oligopoly group of seven enterprises. Table I-11 also shows that their 
combined share of industry sales fell from 67.2 per cent in 1968 to 60.2 per cent in 1973. 
The seven companies concerned and their individual shares of the market over the complete 
seven year period are shown in Table 1-12. 
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Table I-10 Concentration of Pre-Tax Profits 1968-75 (EAU) 
Number of Paean Coeff. of Gini Herf. - 
Entropy 
firms (f000) Variation Coeff. Hirschman 
1968 56 1073 2.201 0.708 104.39 -128.7 
1969 52 1026 1.923 0.702 90.37 -129.0 
1970 53 911 1.563 0.662 64.97 -137.3 
1971 59 1034 1.721 0.675 67.16 -139.3 
1972 61 1542 1.431 0.636 49.98 -146.9 
1973 61 1648 1.461 0.619 51.41 -148.1 
1974 59 1376 1.691 0.626 65.42 -143.8 
1975 61 1596 1.922 0.675 78.26 -137.3 
Concentration Ratio for n firms Linda Index for n firms 
n 4 8 10 20 4 8 10 20 
1968 51.02 66.10 71.70 87.26 0.828 0.457 0.374 0.263 
1969 48.85 67.23 74.15 89.02 0.606 0.360 0.294 0.261 
1970 42.10 61.89 69.10 86.56 0.437 0.267 0.230 0.191 
1971 41.42 61.57 68.26 84.83 0.504 0.279 0.245 0.194 
1972 36.10 54.50 61.34 81.52 0.304 0.234 0.203 0.159 
1973 35.73 53.97 59.51 79.02 0.425 0.275 0.244 0.160 
1974 40.24 56.28 61.88 79.00 0.615 0.342 0.290 0.191 
1975 48.06 63.15 68.50 82.76 0.530 0.385 0.333 0.251 
N. B. In the measurement of concentration in dices only positiv e profits 
are inc luded (loss es are omitted entirely from the compu tation). 
Table I-11 Critical Values of the Linda Index (EAU) ah 
LN*m NNm LN*m CRN*m LS 
1968 2 1.142 7 0.4428 67.24 0.6740 
1969 2 1.1039 7 0.4465 65.52 0.6732 
1970 2 1.2544 7 0.4099 64.91 0.6831 
1971 2 1.1412 7 0.3730 63.32 0.6319 
1972 2 1.0565 7 0.3457 61.62 0.5839 
1973 2 0.9303 7 0.3431 60.20 0.5443 
1974 2 0.9225 47 0.1532 97.36 0.2565 
1975 2 0.8614 6 0.3519 56.84 0.5499 
Net profits before tax (04) 
1968 
1969 2 0.8643 12 0.2744 79.09 0.4653 
1970 2 0.5846 12 0.2182 74.27 0.3336 
1971 2 0.9331 23 0.1808 88.33 0.3037 
1972 2 0.5126 15 0.1634 74.43 0.2515 
1973 2 0.7452 34 0.1275 92.68 0.2182 1974 2 1.1029 37 0.1333 94.96 0.2634 1975 2 0.8299 14 0.2747 75.70 0.4226 
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Table 1-12 Shares of Industry Sales of Seven Largest Companies 
% of total publishing sales in year stated 
1968 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 
IPC/Reed 26.3 25.6 25.3 23.2 21.1 19.6 19.4 18.9 
Thomson 11.5 11.6 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.6 10.5 11.0 
Assocd. News 7.9 7.6 7.1 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.1 
Beaverbrook 7.2 7.6 7.3 7.1 7.0 6.6 6.3 5.9 
Pearson 6.5 5.5 6.7 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.0 9.1 
Telegraph 4.1 3.9 3.7 4.1 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.4 
News Intl. 3.7 3.8 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.9 
67.2 65.5 64.9 63.3 61.6 60.2 60.0 60.3 
The main reasons for the comparative decline of some of the largest publishing companies 
are changes in the relative importance of different sectors of the Press. The circulation 
of the more popular daily newspapers fell during the survey period and there was also a 
sharp drop in the circulation of many of the general interest magazines. These changes are 
discussed in Section II which is concerned with concentration in the Press. 
It is important to emphasise that the ranking of net profits is different from that of 
sales turnover. The seven largest companies in terms of sales accounted for 67 per cent 
of turnover and 60 per cent of profits in 1968 ; by 1973 the proportions had fallen to 
60 and 44 per cent respectively. In the difficult years of 1974 and 1975 some of the 
largest companies made losses. 
In the analysis of market shares we have calculated the Index of Dynamism also defined by 
the Commission. 1 For sales turnover and net profits the values of this Index in each 
year were as follows :- 
Table 1-13 Index of Dynamism (EAU) 
Sales turnover (01) Net profits (04) 
1968-9 3.46 12.91 
1969-70 3.78 15.90 
1970-1 4.28 17.85 
1972-3 3.17 14.85 
1973-4 3.03 16.44 
1974-5 3.85 36.03 
p 'alt - alt-1 ' 100 
"Lait 
fait-1 
See R. Linda, op. cit. 
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Because net profits represent a balance between flows, their distribution would 
normally 
be expected to change much more than that of sales turnover. The Index of 
Dynamism for 
sales turnover is unusually low. The progression away from concentration 
indicated by the 
analysis of the concentration indices has been a steady one. 
An investigation of the possibility of a statistical relationship between size and profit 
margin (net profits as percentage of sales versus absolute size of sales) produced no 
significant correlation. This computation was undertaken both with data for individual 
years and with averages for the eight years. The reason for this absence of correlation 
is believed to be the compensating for economies of scale on the one hand by the relative 
decline of those particular activities (especially general periodicals and "popular" 
national newspapers) which are carried out by the largest publishing groups. 
4. Analysis of Other Financial Variables - Enterprise Tables 
The enterprise analysis is based on data for world-wide, all-product operations of those 
enterprises of whose turnover at least 50 per cent is derived from publishing activities 
in the United Kingdom. The principal companies included in the EAU analysis but excluded 
from the Enterprise Tables are the following :- 
U. K. publishing 
turnover 1975 (Em) 
British Electric Traction Ltd. 
British Printing Corporation Ltd. 
Granada Group Ltd. 
Reed International Ltd. 













Reed International obtained nearly 19 per cent of publishing sales in 1975 (26 per cent 
In 1968 - see Table 1-12 above) and the other four companies obtained a combined share 
of 4.5 per cent. The exclusion of Reed International from the Enterprise analysis affects 
the interpretation of the Tables of Concentration. 
Table 1 shows the growth of the total for all enterprises in the sample with positive 
values of the variable concerned in any one year. It is interesting to note that the 
total value of sales turnover rose more quickly after 1972 than the total of the wage-bill. 
This may seem a paradox for an industry in which rising labour costs are blamed for 
increasing financial difficulties. Much of the explanation lies in the inclusion in sales 
turnover of that from overseas operations, the sterling value of which has appreciated 
with the devaluation of the pound. The effects of devaluation are also evident in the 
data for total exports. 
On page 3 of Table 1 we include two variables not listed in the Commission's standard 
specification. These are 9- Net cash flow (Profit after tax plus depreciation) and 10- Net assets or total capital (Total assets minus current liabilities). Net cash flow is 
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particularly volatile ; if losses as well as profits were included this instability would 
be even more evident. 
Table 2 shows the values of the mean of each variable, the coefficient of variation. the 
Gini, Herfindahl-Hirschman and Entropy measures of concentration in each of the years 
1968-1974 (with data added for 1975 in the case of all variables except 06, gross additions 
to fixed assets). Most of the coefficients show sales turnover to be the least 
concentrated of the ten variables in each of the eight years. This result, which casts 
doubt upon the increasingly-accepted theory that sales revenue maximisation is the primary 
objective of business, is consistent with results of most of the other studies undertaken 
by and for the Commission of the European Communities in this series. 
Exports are more concentrated than the other variables mainly because exporting is 
confined principally to book publishers and some of the companies included in the analysis 
do not publish books. 
The concentration of equity capital (07- also known as "shareholders' funds") is understated 
in these Tables because some enterprises have significant minority holdings in others and 
the total value of equity is consequently over-stated. These inter-company holdings are 
confined mainly to the Press sub-sector and, since they also affect companies not included 
in the Enterprise analysis, they are listed in full in Table II- in the next section. The 
total value of the double-counted equity in the Enterprise analysis was f8.0 millions in 
1975. While this is only 1.5 per cent of the total figure for equity capital in that year, 
the degree of concentration is under-stated in that control is in a smaller number of 
groups. The implications for competition are discussed in Section II. 
Table 3 shows the concentration ratios and Linda coefficients for each of the ten 
variables in each of the seven years. For sales turnover, the Linda coefficients indicate 
the existence of an oligopoly group of six enterprises in 1968 and of five enterprises 
from 1969 onwards. A similar distinct size-group is shown for the first four years in 
the Linda analysis of employment and, throughout the period, in the analysis of wage-bill. 
It is interesting to note that, except in occasional years, no oligopoly groupings are 
identified for any of the other variables. Although the concentration of sales turnover 
is less than that of the other variables, there appears to be a distinct oligopoly 
"threshold" for this variable which is not observed for any of the others. 
The three "matrices of oligopolistic interdependence" which follow the Tables of 
Concentration are described by Linda in some detail' and only brief comments on 
interpretation are set out in this text. 
1 R. Linda, op. at. pp 38-76 
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Matrix No. 1 shows the ranking of each of the ten variables according to two criteria - 
the 
values of Lh*h and of LS (see Appendix A). The "score" in the body of the matrix 
is the sum of 
of the two rankings. The total "scores" of the variables over the eight years can 
be used 
to rank them according to their comparative inequality. In the case of profits, the 
total 
score is 80 while that for sales turnover is 95. This appears to lend some further 
support to Linda's finding' that the distribution of profits is generally more concentrated 
than that of sales turnover, though the evidence is less strong than corresponding evidence 
from other studies. 
In only two of the eight years (1969-1976) exports again appear as the variable with the 
greatest inequality of distribution. The reason for this (the fact that many newspaper 
companies have negligible exports) has already been explained. 
Matrix No. 2 is presented for only two years. (1968 and 1973), chosen to illustrate the 
entire period. The symbols used in this matrix are as follows :- 
Rank 1- ranking of enterprises according to performance ratio 2r 
1r = net profits before tax 
total saes turnover 
Rank 2= ranking of enterprises according to performance ratio 2r 
2r - net profits before tax 
equity capital 
1x@ ranking by sales turnover 
7x- ranking by equity 
The score in the matrix for each firm is the sum of Rank 1 and Rank 2. Where a company is 
among the top 13 according to one performance ratio but not according to the other the total 
score (the addition of the two rankings) is shown in parentheses at the end of the column 
or row. 
The numbers representing each firm are merely for identification (Because some of the most 
profitable companies in the survey period were very small, the use of alphabetic codes to 
designate size proved impracticable). 
Few conclusions can be drawn from Matrix 2 :- 
(a) The rankings by the two criteria vary substantially. A major reason for this is the 
existence of minority interests in some of the publishing companies ; another is variation in the amount of "gearing" (i. e., the extent to which companies use long-term loans as 
opposed to equity capital). Diversity of policy regarding asset revaluation during the 
period of rapid inflation may also have distorted the equity figures. 
1 R. Linda, ibid. p. 45 
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(b) The relationship between size and performance is very weak, as we have already 
explained on page 13 above, because economics of scale have been offset by changes in the 
composition of market demand. 
A complete statistical investigation, in which each of the following regression calculations 
was undertaken, yielded no statistically significant correlation. 
net profit before tax / sales turnover v sales turnover 
  / equity v equity 
11 of It / net assets v net assets 
cash flow before tax / sales turnover v sales turnover 
of 11 11 .. / equity v equity 
of  / net assets v net assets 
cash flow after tax / sales turnover v sales turnover 
/ equity v equity 
"" ". "" "" / net assets v net assets 
Matrix No. 3 shows the ranking of firms based on growth between successive years of sales 
turnover (Rank 1, with the growth shown as 1 c) and of net profits (Rank 4 with the growth 
shown as 4c). 
The growth rates are expressed as absolute changes in the company's percentage share of the 
total value of the variable achieved by all companies. For example, company 53 held 
1.38 per cent of sales turnover in 1968 and 2.43 per cent in 1969, so that lc for 1968-9 
was 1.05. In the case of profits, only positive values are used for derivation of the 
total. 
1X= company's share of turnover in the earlier of the two years. 
4Xa company's share of profits in the earlier of the two years. 
The score in the matrix is the sum of the two rankings. As in Matrix 2, if a company falls 
within the first 12 according to one ranking but not according to the other, its "score" is 
shown at the end of the column or row in which it appears. 
This matrix has been constructed on the basis of the EAU data. because these more 
meaningfully represent publishing activities. The analysis confirms the earlier textual 
observation that smaller companies have tended to grow at the expense of larger ones in 
this industry, in spite of the mergers which have taken place and are described in Section II, 



























TABLES OF CONCENTRATION - ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
Please refer to p. 13 for 
interpretation of pp. 17 - 38. 
The Total Values of the Variables (Page 1) 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION - ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS 
Table 1 The Total Values of the Variables (Page 2) 
No. of Total Value Index 1968 e 100 
Year firms £m. Unadjusted At constant purch. power 
Variable: 04 Net Profits before tax 
1968 42 56.5 100 100 
1969 38 53.7 95 90 
1970 40 57.6 101 91 
1971 45 68.7 121 99 
1972 46 108.1 191 145 
1973 46 119.9 212 148 
1974 43 90.6 160 96 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION - ENTERPRISES 
Table 1 The Total Values of the Varia bles. (Page 3 
No. of Total Value Index 1968 = 100 
Year firms fm. Unadjusted At constant purch. power 
Variable: 07 quay Capital are o ers funds) 
1968 44 257.9 100 100 
1969 45 278.6 108 102 
1970 44 300.4 116 104 
1971 46 342.8 132 108 
1972 46 404.1 156 11.9 
1973 46 460.9 178 125 
1974 45 486.9 189 113 
1975 45 542.7 210 102 
Variable: 08 E xports 
1968 44 34.9 100 100 
1969 45 36.9 105 100 
1970 45 44.3 126 113 
1971 46 51.7 148 121 
1972 46 60.4 173 132 
1973 46 78.0 223 156 
1974 45 99.2 284 170 
1975 45 134.8 387 187 
variable: 09 et Cash flow 
1968 43 48.1 100 100 
1969 42 44.8 93 88 
1970 42 50.6 105 94 
1971 45 57,8 120 98 
1972 46 85.1 176 135 
1973 45 84.0 174 122 
1974 43 64.8 135 81 
1975 42 128.4 267 129 
Variable: 10 Net assets 
1968 44 342.9 100 100 
1969 45 348.2 101 96 
1970 45 388.9 113 101 
1971 46 443.9 129 105 
1972 46 529.3 154 117 
1973 46 606.0 176 123 
1974 45 677.9 198 120 
1975 45 771.1 225 109 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION ENTERPRISES 
Table 2 Standard Concentration Measures (Page I) 
No. of Coefficient Concentration indices 
Variable firms Mean of Variation Gim Herf-Hirsch. Entropy 
Y ear: 1968 
01 44 10.88 1.680 . 647 85.0 -129.4 
02 44 2.60 1.715 . 673 87.6 -126.9 
03 44 3.39 1.789 . 692 93.3 -124.2 
04 42 1.35 1.797 . 684 98.4 -123.5 
05 43 1.59 1.814 . 690 97.5 -123.7 
06 44 0.41 1.582 . 674 77.9 -128.5 
07 44 5.86 1.805 . 675 99.3 -124.9 
08 44 0.79 2.068 . 747 117.2' -115.8 
09 43 1.12 1.991 . 715 112.8 -119.4 
10 44 7.79. 2.256 . 711 135.3 -116.9 
Y ear: 1969 
01 45 11.60 1.642 . 643 80.3 -131.3 
02 45 2.64 1.685 . 672 83.5 -128.5 
03 45 3.71 1.757 . 691 88.9 -125.8 
04 38 1.41 1.609 . 673 92.0 -122.3 
05 43 1.55 1.694 . 694 90.0 -123.6 
06 45 0.59 1.821 . 703 93.8 -124.1 
07 45 6.19 1.749 . 675 91.9 -126.9 
08 45 0.82 1.927 . 718 102.5 -121.3 
09 42 1.07 1.813 . 710 99.7 -120.7 















ABLES"" 05- CONCENTRATION 'ENTERPRISES 
Concentration Measures Pa e2) 
No. of Coefficient Concentration indices 
firms Mean of Variation Gini Herf-Hirsch. 
Year: 1970 
45 12.96 1.594 0.636 76.9 
45 2.73 1.689 0.672 83.7 
45 4.34 1.762 0.695 89.2 
40 1.44 1.885 0.706 111.0 
43 1.63 1.897 0.718 104.5 
45 0.61 1.862 0.721 97.1 
44 6.83 1.753 0.672 90.5 
45 0.98 2.258 0.741 132.6 
42 1.20 2.030 0.735 115.8 













01 46 13.48 1.554 0.616 72.7 -135.4 
02 46 2.62 1.712 0.672 83.7 -192.3 
03 46 4.65 1.764 0.695 87.5 -126.3 
04 45 1.53 1.913 0.695 101.3 -124.5 
05 45 1.82 1.835 0.683 94.9 -126.4 
06 46 0.51' 1.614 0.692 76.7 -128.5 
07 46 7.46 1.891 0.677 97.4 -126.9 
08 46 1.13 2.316 0.745 135.4 -115.4 
09 45 1.29 1.954 0.696 104.7 -124.0 
10 46 9.66 2.311 0.706 134.9 -119.1 
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TABLES * 0F " CONCENTRATION"ENTERPRISES 
TAh1P_ 2 Standard Concentration Measures _(Page 
) 
of No Coefficient Concentration indices 
Variable . firms mean of Variation Gini Herf-Hirsch. Entropy 
Y ear: 1972 
01 46 17.80 1.639 . 633 78.4 -133.1 
02 46 2.82 1.830 . 686 92.5 -126.8 
03 46 5.49 1.796 . 700 89.9 -125.5 
04 46 2.35 1.756 . 664 86.9 -129.9 
05 46 2.71 1.743 . 662 85.9 -130.2 
06 46 0.73 1.629 . 689 77.7 -128.7 
07 46 8.80 1.934 . 682 100.8 -126.3 
03 46 1.32 2.581 . 752 163.0 -111.4 
09 46 1.85 1.862 . 675 95.1 -127.8 
10 46 11.52 2.336 . 711 137.4 -118.6 
Y ear: 1973 
01 46 21.53 1.683 . 636 81.5 -132.4 
02 46 2.84 1.864 . 689 95.2 -126.1 
03 46 6.31 1.810 . 703 90.9 -125.0 
04 46 2.61 1.763 . 663 87.4 -129.7 
05 46 3.02 1.751 . 657 86.5 -130.3 
06 46 1.21' 1.882 . 721 96.6 -123.0 
07 . 46 
10.03 1.895 . 670 97.7 -127.7 
08 46 1.70 2.628 . 762 168.2 -109.9 
09 45 1.87 1.868 . 667 97.6 -127.3 
10 46 13.19 2.310 . 707 134.8 -119.1 
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No. of Coefficient Concentration indices 
Variable firms Mean of Variation Gini Herf-Hirsch. Entropy 
Year: 1974 
01 46 25.00 1.658 . 639 81.5 -131.7 
02 46 2.93 1.832 . 676 94.7 -126.7 
03 46 7.47 1.799 . 697 92.1 -124.9 
04 44 2.06 1.687 . 644 87.4 -129.4 
05 44 2.73 1.601 . 643 81.0 -130.3 
06 46 1.41 1.579 . 680 75.9 -129.2 
07 46 10.58 1.903 . 659 100.4 -127.7 
08 37 2.68 2.330 . 699 173.8 -109.3 
09 44 1.47 1.855 . 656 101.0 -126.4 
10 46 14.73 2.263 . 707 133.1 -118.5 
Year: 1975 
01 45 30.38 1.649 . 627 82.7 -131.7 02 45 2.64 1.656 . 657 "83.1 -129.4 
03 45 8.86 1.815 . 689 95.4 -124.4 
04 43 2.52 1.751 . 661 94.6 -126.1 
05 43 3.07 1.727 . 657 92.6 -126.5 
06 - not available - - - 
07 45 12.06 1.873 . 671 100.2 -125.7 
08 36 3.75 2.199 . 732 162.2 -105.7 
09 42 3.06 2.982 . 779 235.6 - 97.6 
10 45 17.14 2.114 . 686 121.5 -121.7 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION - ENTERPRISES 
Table 3 Linda indice's (L) and Concentration Ra tios (CR) Pa e1 
No. of finns = 4 8 10 Nh L Nm L 
Variable: 01 Sales Turnove r 
1968 CR 51.7 68.5 72.8 2 . 690 6 . 361 
L . 420 . 405 . 377 LS- 0.472 
1965 CR " 72.5 2 . 785 5 . 340 
L 











2 . 626- 5 
LS=0.449 
. 306 
TPT- R 45. z b4.4 b9.4 z .. 919 , 
L . 402 . 340 . 309 LS= 0.551 
2 48.0 65.6 70.1 3 . 573 5 . 363 
L 
. 448 . 364 . 344 
LS= 0.472 
[973 CI 49.3 66.1 0.6 3 59T- 5 . 398 
L 
- -- 
. 478 . 376 . 354 LS= 0.507 
T974 CR 49.5 66.0 71.2 3 . 571 5 . 404 
L . 470 . 373 . 334 LS= 0.498 
T975 t 
L . 464 . 377 . 343 LS= 0.488 
Variable: 02 Employment 
1968 CR 53.2 69.0 74.0 2 . 513 5 . 356 
L . 399 . 406 . 355 LS=0.422 
T969 C "5 68.8 73.9 2 . 543 6 . 358 











2 . 522 b 
LS=0.427 
. 352 
'1971'_"'_"` . 382 
L . 419 . 382 . 327 LS= 0,449 
T977- C. R 52.9 69.3 74.2 2 . 649 7 . 
L . 508 . 413 . 366 15= 0.509 
T1373 CR- 53.7 70.3 75,0 2 .6 5 
L 
. 523 . 415 . 376 LS= 0.379 
T[g74 CR 53.0 69.1 73.9 2 . 704 17 . 276 
L 
. 558 . 428 . 382 
LS= 0.411 
50.3 67.8 73.3 2 . 548 13 . 268 L 
. 461 . 366 . 321 15= 0.376 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION ENTERPRISES 
g 
Table 3 Linda indices e L and Concentration Ratios CR Pa 2 
No. of firins= 4 8 10 N h L Nm 
L 
Variable: 03 Wa ge bill 
1968 CR 55.8 72.1 76.5 2 . 686 5 . 
348 
L 
. 366 . 423 . 
387 LS= 0.460 
TM M 54.1 71.9 76.6 2 . 693 5 . 
347 
L . 354 . 362 . 350 
LS= 0.459 
1970 CR 53.7 72.2 77.0 2 . 694 5 . 
326 
L . 360 . 366 . 346 
LS= 0.455 
197-TR 52.7 71.6 76.3 2 . 648 5 . 
320 
L 
. 368 . 353 . 341 
LS= 0.456 
R 53.3 71.5 76.7 2 . 525 5 . 
343 
L 
. 392 . 368 . 339 
LS= 0.441 
T973 53.6 72.5 77.4 2 . 506 5 . 
327 
L 
. 385 . 360 . 349 
LS= 0.425 
53.9 71.9 77.0 2 . 501 5 . 
354 
L 
. 411 . 371 . 
348 LS= 0.437 
1975 _CR 54.3 71.9 77.2 2 . 537 5 . 
385 
L 
. 467 . 394 . 357 
LS= 0.477 
Variable: 04 Net rofit before tax 
1968 CR 54.7 70.7 76.5 2 . 687 5 . 
483 
L 
. 533 . 407 . 
346 LS= 0.571 
52.3 71.8 78.8 2 . 542 11 . 267 
L 
. 478 . 335 . 
283 LS= 0.388 
54.6 73.7 79.8 3 . 859 11 . 
332 
L 
. 641 . 386 . 339 
LS= 0.517 
7T- ZR I 2.1 - 70.6 76.5 2 1.203 23 . 249 
L 
. 580 . 380 . 332 
LS= 0.394 
Yý 49.4 65.2 71.1 2 1.052 30 . 202 
L 
'- . 
515 . 378 . 319 
LS= 0.321 
ý 50.5 66.7 71.9 2 . 847 31 . 196 
L 
. 510 . 393 . 347 LS= 0.319 
48.2 67.2 73.4 2 1.205 11 . 297 L 
. 541 . 340 . 298 LS= 0.491 T575 '+ M b'4.1 69.4 -74.1 - .2 32 . 206 L 
. 536 . 377 . 363 
1 
LS= 0.329 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION ENTERPRISES 
Table 3 Linda indices (L )_and Concentration Rati os (CR) Paae 3 
No. of firuns = 4 8 10 Nh 
L Nm L 
Variable: 05 Cash flow 
1968 CR 54.1 70.7 76.6 2 . 682 11 . 313 
L . 543 . 
405 . 340 
LS= 0.460 
1969 51*7 71.9 78.4 2 . 512 11 . 262 
L . 474 . 
309 . 280 
LS- 0.377 
1970 CR 53.6 73.1 79.5 2 . 781 11 . 307 
L . 610 . 
362 . 315 
LS= 0.482 
1971 CR 51.1 69.6 74.8 2 1.040 22 . 243 
L . 561 . 
369 . 342 
LS- 0.381 
1972 CR 49.5 65.1 71.1 2 . 943 31 . 200 
L . 512 . 383 . 
319 LS- 0.314 
1973 CR 50.5 66.5 71.6 2 . 785 31 . 199 
L . 508 . 394 . 
348 LS- 0.317 
7974 CR 47.0 67.5 73.7 2 . 976 11 . 264 
L . 475 . 300 . 
277 LS= 0.433 
1975 C 52.9 69.4 74.5 2 . 980 10 . 348 
L 
. 475 . 375 . 
348 LS' 0.495 
'- -ý Variable: 06 Gross ca pi al ex enditur 
1968 CR 49.8 69.2 75.1 2 . 554 4 . 321 
L . 320 . 289 . 
278 LS- 0.433 
T5 
L . 466 . 359 . 
368 LS- 0.515 
T97 54.2 73.3 79.6 2 . 669 11 . 302 
L 
. 501 . 358 . 
313 LS- 0.419 
47.1 69,6 75.6 2 . 546 6 . 279 
L . 376 . 271 . 
264 LS= 0.383 
47.5 67.7 75.2 2 . 561 10 . 246 
L 
. 407 . 277 . 
246 LS- 0.369 
T97 - 51.9 72.1 77.9 2 . 786 16 . 267 
L 
. 543 . 344 . 
315 LS` 0.396 
Tý! 47.0 68.3 74.1 2 . 582 9 . 273 
L 
. 387 . 284 . 




TABLES OF CONCENTRATION ENTERPRISES 
Table 3 Linda indices ( L) and Concentration Ratios CR (Page 4 
No. of firms = 4 8 10 Nh L 
Variable: 07 E quity Cap tal 
1968 CR 52.8 70.6 75.9 2 . 896 
L 
. 669 . 389 . 
351 
1969 CR . 0* 53 69.7 75.3 2 . 
82 
F 
L . 497 . 384 . 339 
50.3 69.8 75.7 2 . 87 
L . 524 . 331 . 303 
TIM CR 51.5 69.7 75.2 2 . 94 
L 
. 597 . 374 . 337 
CR 51.6 69.5 74.7 2 1.063 13 . 313 
L 
. 629 . 392 . 355 
LS= 0.503 
50.7 68.9 73.8 2 1.156 7 . 383 
- 
L 
. 606 . 384 . 352 
LS= 0.656 
TM --CR 50.0 68.7 74.0 2 1.426 13 . 309 
___l 
L 
. 661 . 358 . 336 
LS= 0.529 
1575 52.5 71.0 76.0 2 1.139 12 . 326 
L 
. 554 . 353 . 347 
LS= 0.504 
Variable: 08 Exports 
1968 CR 56.8 73.3 78.9 2 1.071 19 . 259 
L 
-- 
. 633 . 453 . 380 LS= 0.438 T969 CR 53.6 69.5 75.4 2 . 953 3 . 
628 
L 
. 629 . 426 . 355 LS= 0.790 
1970 CR 57.8 72.2 77.3 2 1.301 23 o26 
L 
. 810 . 523 . 436 LS= 0.469 1971 M- 57.9 71.9 77.2 2 1.262 3 . 866 L 
. 900 . 536 . 439 LS= 1.064 
60.1 72.7 77.6 2 1.698 3 1.074 
L 1.085 . 619 . 503 
LS= 1.386 
1973 c 60.5 74.8 79.2 2 1.807 24 . 278 L 1.031 . 582 . 512 LS= 0.561 1974 61.1 75.1 79.3 2 2.002 24 . 283 L 1.001 . 602 . 529 LS= 0.582 
66.0 79.2 83.5 3 1.076 23 . 354 L 0.841 . 604 . 530 LS= 0.541 
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TABLES OF CONCENTRATION ENTERPRISES 
Table 3 Linda indices (L) and Concentration Rat ios (CR) (Pagg, e5 
No. of firms = 4 8 10 Nh L Nm L 
Variable: 09 Net cash fl ow 
'1968 CR 57.3 73.6 79.1 2 . 781 11 . 350 
L . 616 . 441 . 381 
LS= 0.519 
T9&9 C 54.7 73.7 80.3 2 . 574 11 . 291 
L 
. 517 . 349 . 307 
LS= 0.419 
1970 56.4 74.7 81.2 2 . 875 11 . 330 
L 
. 649 . 395 . 340 
LS- 0.530 
1971 C 52.7 70.4 76.2 2 1.068 22 . 263 
L . 646 . 404 . 350 
LS= 0.411 
1972 --- CR 50.9 67.0 72.7 2 1.032 27 . 222 
L . 589 . 391 . 
337 LS= 0,359 
1973 CR 52.7 67.7 73.4 2 . 913 5 . 512 
L . 572 . 434 . 359 
LS= 0.693 
T974 51.8 68.8 74.8 2 1.044 10 . 344 
L . 652 . 412 . 344 
LS= 0.564 
T97 5 71.3 81.9 84.9 2 1.520 33 . 411 
L 1.226 . 842 . 777 
LS= 0.680 
Variable: 10 Net assets 
1968 CR 59.7 73.6 78.3 4 . 936 13 . 417 
L . 936 . 560 . 474 
LS= 0.624 
1-969 CR 60.2 73.4 78.0 3 . 824 13 . 409 
L 
. 672 . 540 . 471 
LS= 0.568 
19/U CR 58.5 73.3 78.2 3 . 995 36 . 255 
L 
. 786 . 519 . 441 
LS= 0.411 
19/1 UR 58.2 72.5 76.9 3 1.088 36 . 241 
L . 873 . 537 . 
473 LS= 0.424 
T972 CR 57.9 72.3 76.9 3 1.144 34 . 253 
L 
. 912 . 534 . 
465 LS= 0.436 
Tß7"C 57.9 72.6 77.4 3 . 08 38 . 245 
L . 876 . 518 . 449 
LS= 0.415 
T974 CR 58.9 74.3 78.3 2 1.055 11 . 446 
L 
. 784 . 486 . 471 
LS- 0.654 
T. 475- 55.7 71.2 76.8 2 1.082 12 . 371 
L 
. 776 . 458 . 394 
LS- 0.606 
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SECTION II 
EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION IN THE NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICALS INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 1968-1975 
Definitions : 
Newspapers :- national daily and Sunday newspapers and local newspapers appearing at least 
once per week. 
Periodicals :- national publications issued at regular intervals exceeding 24 hours. 
These definitions, which are used both within the industry and by government and other 
statistical services, are based on practical considerations. Local weekly publications 
are generally of newspaper dimensions (broadsheet or tabloid) and their production is 
similar to that of national dailies. National periodicals are of widely different sizes, 
paper qualities and methods of printing and production. 
A. GENERAL SURVEY OF TRENDS IN THE U. K. PRESS 
1. Total Revenue Table II-1 shows total revenue derived from sales of newspapers and 
periodicals by companies with 25 or more employees from 1968 to 1975, in terms of current 
prices and in the form of an index at 1968 purchasing power. 
Table II-1 Press - Total Revenue 1968-75 
Sales o copy Advertising Tota l Index of total 1968-100 
fm fm fm (inflation adjusted) 
1968 227 255 482 100 
1970 272 320 592 110 
1973 362 496 858 124 
1974 430 521 951 118 
1975 531 547 1078 108 
Sources : Census of Production, Business Monitor 
Table II-1 shows the importance of advertising as a source of revenue varying from a peak 
for the five years shown of 57.8 per cent in 1973 to a low of 50.8 per cent in 1975. The 
dependence upon advertising varies considerably between different kinds of publications :- 
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Table 11-2 Analysis of Revenue by Kind of Publication (1975) 
Total Newspaper turnover 
% advertising turnover 
% advertising 
category (fm) (fm) 
National Sundays 106.8 43.8 87.1 52.0 
National dailies 252.0 36.4 187.9 48.9 
Local weeklies 119.4 81.5 97.8 84.0 
Other regional 
papers 279.2 60.4 229.9 66.8 
All newspapers 757.4 53.3 602.7 61.9 
Periodicals 
specialist 116.6 59.9 93.2 64.0 
other 203.6 36.0 162.1 39.4 
TOTAL 1 1077.6 1 50.8 1 858.0 1 57.8 
Source : Business Monitor 
Note that "specialist" periodicals are more accurately described 
by the Business Statistics Office as trade, technical and 
professional periodicals. 
2. More Detailed Analysis of Advertising 
Advertising is usually divided into two categories - display and classified, although 
the distinction is sometimes arbitrary. 
Table II-1 shows an analysis of advertising over the survey period. The forms described 
as "other" include (i) advertising in trade and technical journals (as opposed to general 
periodicals) and (11) company reports and accompanying publicity material. 
Table 11-3 Total Advertisin4 by Tvoe 1968-75 (£m 
1968 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Displ ay 
Adver u sing 
Press 193 270 322 328 360 Television 129 176 210 203 236 Other Media* 27 34 40 48 53 
Total display 349 480 572 579 649 Classified 98 150 213 228 218 Other 46 61 73 80 86 
Total "'- ---- - - - 
advertising 503 708 874 900 967 
Source : Advertising Quarterly (Advertising Association), 
Summer 1976 Table 5 
*posters, public transport, cinema and commercial radio 
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Display advertising is not dominated by any individual industry or group of industries. 
About 63 per cent in 1973 and 60 per cent in 1975 was accounted for by manufacturers' 
and suppliers' consumer advertising the rest being by government bodies, charities. 
financial institutions and retailers. 
The press share of display advertising has remained between 55 and 60 per cent since 1963, 
television ownership having reached saturation level by that date. Commercial radio first 
became legal only in 1973 and its impact on local press advertising may not yet be 
l. 
apparent 
Display advertising has proved very sensitive to changes in economic conditions. In real 
terms it has varied as follows over the survey period :- 
Total display Total dis pla, y advertising 
advertising at 1970 purchasing power as s Domestic Production 
(fm) 
1968 391 0.94 
1969 395 0.93 
1970 373 0.85 
1971 374 0.83 
1972 410 0.87 
1973 451 0.89 
1974 394 0.78 
1975 355 0.70 
Source : Advertising Association (figures in column 1 deflated 
by Index of Retail Prices) 
The volatility of display advertising in relation to Gross Domestic Product may be 
demonstrated by a regression equation which relates the year-by-year growth of display 
advertising to the year-by-year growth of GDP over the years 1961-75 :- 
A Loge (Display advertising) = 2.61 (ALoge GDP) - 0.064 
(t=3.90) R2= 0.54 
D. 11. = 1.88 
This equation suggests that a zero increase in GDP would lead to a 6.2% decline in display 
advertising ;a 5% increase in GDP would lead to a 6.5% increase in expenditure on display 
advertising. 
Classified advertising is especially important for some categories of newspaper (described 
below). Three topics dominate classified advertising - recruitment, property sales and 
motor-cars (especially second-hand). Recruitment advertising is very sensitive to changes 
in the labour market and expenditure fell (even without adjustment for inflation) between 
1973 and 1975. In the first of these years, recruitment advertising of £105 millions 
accounted for 57 per cent of all classified advertising ; in 1975 only £75 millions was 
Commercial broadcastt from Radio Luxembourg and from "pirate" off-shore transmitters have 
been in operation for many years. 
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spent, representing only 41 per cent of total classified advertising. 
1 
A multiple regression equation again based on year-by-year changes was found 
to explain 
70 per cent of variations in classified advertising over the period 1961-1975 :- 
ALogeC = 4.12k Loge GDP - 0.238 
ALoge U-0.042 
(2.54) (1.93) 
R2 = 0.70 D. W. = L. 75 
t values are shown in parenthesis 
U=% rate of unemployment 
C= expenditure on classified advertising 
(Collinearity between the independent variables (r = 0.64) reduces slightly the predictive 
reliability of this equation ; it also explains the rather hig h standard error 
for the 
second independent variable. ) 
The volatility of advertising in relation to economic changes is a continuing element 
in the newspaper environment. The decline in the real value of advertising expenditure 
between 1973 and 1975 is undoubtedly a major cause of the sharp decline in the real value 
of newspaper and general publishing profits between these two years. With a recovery 
in the economy, both display and classified advertising would probably rise sharply. 
The prices charged for advertising ("media rates") are also sensitive to economic 
conditions, so that variations in advertising expenditure are not fully reflected in the 
volume of advertisements. Published indices for the Press do not take into account any 
privately negotiated discounts but it is clear from evidence presented by the Royal 
Commission that competition to sell advertising space, between newspapers and also 
between the Press and other media depressed media rates in 1974 and 1975. The commission 
estimated that in 1975 some newspapers were selling advertising space at a loss, in cost. 
This calculation takes into account the need for publishers to maintain a balance between 
advertising and editorial material - the sale of more advertising space may mean the need 
for more editorial matter, with additional costs of paper and printing. 
3. Trends in Circulation 
(a) Newspapers 
There is much more information available in collated form about the circulation of 
newspapers than about that periodicals. Table II-4 shows the total for each category 
of average circulation per issue in January to June of each year listed 
1 
Royal Commission on the Press : Final Peport 1977, paragraphs 5-28 and 5-29. 
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Table 11-4 Newspaper Circulation 1968-75 (000's) 
1968 1970 1973 1975 
National dailies 15,263 14,868 14,549 14,322 
Regional dailies 10,511 10,318 9,954 9,770 
National Sundays 24,177 23,691 22,017 20,772 
Regional Sundaysl 3,262 3,171 3,123 3,041 
Local weeklies 13,337 12,994 12,730 12,276 
Source : Press Council annual reports. 
Table 11-4 shows a decline in circulation in all five categories. In percentage terms 
the decrease over the entire period for each category was as follows :- 
National dailies 6.1 
Regional dailies 7.0 
National Sundays 14.1 
Regional Sundays 6.8 (approximation only) 
Local weeklies 8.0 
The total population of the United Kingdom increased by 1.6 per cent over the seven year 
period and the decreases represent reduced purchases per person and per household. A 
number of factors have contributed to this decline :- 
(i) An increase in the prices of newspapers in relation to the general level 
of living costs. Whereas the general cost of living at the first quarter of 1976 
was 2.51 times that of ten years earlier, for national daily newspapers the 
corresponding ratio was 4.37 and the price increases for other newspapers were 
fairly similar. The increased prices of newspapers reflected substantial 
increases in the costs of newsprint and ink (the largest cost components), 
aggravated by currency depreciation. This is probably the most important factor. 
(ii) Changes in working hours and in the hours of television transmission which 
have enabled people to see television news programmes in the early evening. 
This has affected evening papers most severely but there has also been some 
effect on morning papers. 
(iii) Greater use of motor vehicles for travelling and especially commuting. 
(iv) Increasing competition from local radio, operated by the BBC from 1962 
and by commercial radio companies from 1973. 
1 An estimate has been made of the circulation of the Sunday Post(Glasgow) by reference to 
the National Readership Survey. The owners do not publish the circulation. (see overleaf) 
We extended the analysis to specialist periodicals. Among trade, technical 
distinguished 
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(b) Periodicals 
Circulation data for consumer magazines have been partly collected by Reed 
International 
Ltd (IPC) and have been published by the Royal Comnissionl Total sales appear 
to be 
very sensitive to economic conditions :- 
Table 11-5 Gross Annual Circulation of Consumer Magazines 
(milliona) 1965 1970 1973 1975 
General interest 985 935 975 871 
Adult women's 560 493 487 457 
Young women's 47 77 74 65 
Teenage 87 84 178 80 
Children's 482 518 446 329 
2160 2108 2160 1802 
A further sharp decline in sales of general interest magazines appears to have occurred 
in 1976.2 
Circulation of some of the major journals of opinion (the Listener, Spectator, 
New 
Statesman, etc. ) has also fallen sharply in recent years and some large specialist 
magazines, concerned with motor cars, household maintenance and hobbies have also shown 
a decline. 
Periodical publishing is a very competitive activity with a high rate of "births and 
deaths" (launches and closures). In the consumer magazine sector no fewer than 830 new 
titles were launched in the years 1968 to 1974 and there were 700 closures. The total 
number of titles at the end of 1974 was about 1,200. 
We extended the analysis to specialist periodicals. Among trade, technical 
and professional publications there are equally remarkable birth and death rates. The 
total number of titles at the end of 1974 was 3,283 ; over the previous seven years 1,107 
titles had been born and 859 had died. The 1961-2 Royal Commission on the Press 
commented that periodicals were "much more ephemeral than newspapers. They cater for 
constantly changing fashions and habits and they come and go with frequency which, if it 
were found in the newspaper press would indicate an alarming instability. (l) 
As will be demonstrated in sub-section H below, the publishing of periodicals as a whole 
is more highly concentrated than most other sections of the Press. Most of the titles 
included in the figures of births and deaths were produced by smaller companies, some of 
them perhaps aiming to take advantage of a market which they recognised as ephemeral. 
2 See Royal Commission on the Press : Research Series 6- Periodicals and the Alternative Press Cmnd. 6810-6 (HMSO) (1) Royal Commission on the Press 1961/2 Report, Cmnd 1811,1962, paragraph 13. 
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B. MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPERS BY CATEGORY 
1. National Dailies 
The following newspapers were included in this category in 1968 and 1975 :- 
Table 11-6 National Daily Newspapers 1968 and 1975 
Average circulation per issue (1000's) * 
1975 circulation 
1968 1975 as % of 1968 
Daily Express P 3853 2894 75 
Daily Mail 
g) 
2095 1730 83 
Daily Iii rror P) 5034 4018 80 
Daily Sketch P) 915 closed - 
Daily Telegraph Q) 1407 1353 96 
Financial Times (Q) 156 186 119 
Guardian (Q) 281 336 119 
Morning Star 55 43 78 
Sun P 1066 3435 322 
Times (Q) 401 327 82 
15263 14322 94 
* Circulation figures are based on the first half of each year and are obtained from Press 
Council annual reports. 
The Royal Commission on the Press sub-divided the national daily newspapers into two groups- 
the popular dailies (marked P in Table 11-6) and the quality dailies (marked Q)1 , 
The differences between these two categories in terms of intellectual appeal or education 
and social class of readers are by no means clear-cut. For example, of people whose 
education finished at the age of 19 or over (mostly university graduates) 19 per cent read 
the Daily Express regularly and 15 per cent read the Daily Mirror, while the Guardian and 
the Times were read regularly by 16 and 13 per cent respectively. On the other hand, 
under 5 per cent of those whose education ended at 15 or less read any of the four quality 
dailies. 2 
Besides their smaller circulation and more limited appeal, three other features distinguished 
the "quality" from the "popular" dailies (i) the relative importance of advertising and 
sales of copy as a source of revenue (ii) their higher prices and (iii) their greater size. 
(i) In 1973, at the peak of the advertising boom, 70 per cent of the revenue of the four 
quality dailies was derived from advertising, mainly classified ; for the four popular 
dailies then published the proportion was 36 per cent. In 1975 the two corresponding 
proportions were 58 and 27 per cent. The quality newspapers have occasionally emphasised 
their role as advertising media in publicity aimed at potential readers. 
The Morning Star, the official organ of the British Communist party cannot easily be 
assigned to either category. 
2 Source : National Readership Survey 1974-5 (JICNARS) 
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(ii) Partly because of their smaller circulations and consequently higher unit costs, 
partly because of their greater size, the quality newspapers are more expensive. 
At the 
end of 1975 cover prices were as follows :- 
Daily Express 6 pence Daily Telegraph 7 pence 
Daily Mail 6 pence Financial Times 10 pence 
Daily Mirror 5 pence Guardian 10 pence 
Sun 5 pence Times 10 pence 
(iii) The average number of standard pageslin each newspaper in 1974 was as 
follows 1- 
Daily Express 16.8 
Daily Mail 17.2 
Daily Mirror 13.1 
Sun 13.5 
Source 
Daily Telegraph 30.9 
Guardian 23.2 
Financial Times 33.7 
Times 30.0 
Royal Commission : Interim Report Cmd. 6433,1976 
Over the survey period the total circulation of the quality newspapers declined from 
2.245 millions in 1968 to 2.202 millions in 1975 ; that of the popular newspapers 
declined 
from 13.018 millions to 12.120 millions between the same years. 
In 1968, the Daily Mail and General Trust Ltd., owned two popular dailies - the Daily 
Mail 
and the Daily Sketch. The Sketch closed in 1970. The other company with two national 
dailies was the International Publishing Corporation Ltd., which owned the Daily Mirror and 
the Sun. The latter of which had earlier been the Daily Herald was threatened with closure 
in 1969 when the title was acquired by the Australian-control led. company, News of the World 
Organisation Ltd., (now News International Ltd. ). The International Publishing 
Corporation merged later in 1969 with Reed Ltd., to form Reed International Ltd. After 
the demise of the Sketch and the re-emergence of the Sun under new ownership, each of the 
national dailies is now separately owned with no significant financial links between owners. 
The redesigned Sun newspaper is much more competitive with the Daily Mirror than its pre- 
decessor. A tabloid, with emphasis on "light" material and photographs, the circulation 
of the Sun trebled over the first three years of its redesign. The battle for sales with 
the Daily Mirror is a major feature of competition in the newspaper industry. 
The term "national" is here used to describe newspapers with circulation throughout the 
United Kingdom. In Scotland and Northern Ireland sales of U. K. papers are smaller than 
those of newspapers published in those two parts of the U. K. Scotland may indeed be 
lA 
standard page contains 2540 cm2 and is roughly equivalent to one broadsheet page or two tabloid pages. 
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regarded as having its own national newspaper market. IPC (now Reed International), 
the Thomson Organisation (owners of the Times) and, until 1975, Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., 
all puboished separate newspapers in Scotland which were similar to their English 
counterparts. ' 
2. National Sundays 
For the same reasons and on the same criteria as with the national daily newspapers, the 
national Sundays are classified into "popular" and "quality" categories. Table 11-7 
lists the titles, shows the categorisation (P or Q) of the Royal Commission and also 
circulation in 1968 and 1975. 
Table 11-7 National Sunday Newspapers 1968 and 1975 
Average circulation per issue (000's) 
1968 1975 1975 as % of 1968 
News of the World (P) 6919 5560 80 
Observer (Q) 903 761 84 
People/Sunday People' (P) 5533 4219 76 
Sunday Express (P) 4238 3786 89 
Sunday Mirror (P) 5138 4284 83 
Sunday Telegraph (Q) 713 757 106 
Sunday Times (Q) 1461 1396 99 
* Circulation fig ures are the average per issue in the first half of each year and are 
taken from Press Council annual reports. 
+ Change of title only 
The three "quality" papers are distinguished from the other national Sunday newspapers by 
their more limited appeal - fewer than 5% of those whose education ended at 15 (who 
themselves represent 67 per cent of the total adult population) read any one of the three. 
They also derive a much higher proportion of their total revenue from advertising (74 per 
cent compared with 38 per cent for popular Sundays in 1973 ; 66 compared with 31 per cent 
in 1975). They are dearer to buy and they are much bigger, although much of the extra 
space is taken up by advertising, for which the largest paper (the Sunday Times) is bought 
by many of its readers. 
Circulation of the Scottish Daily Express has been included with that of the Daily 
Express throughout this section. 
- 64 - 
The decline in sales of Sunday newspapers may be partly due to a sharp increase in cover 
prices during the period 1970-6 when the prices of some papers more than trebled. 
On the 
other hand, the comparative changes in circulation do not reflect comparative changes 
in 
prices. It is possible that changing social habits and the greater coverage of news on 
television have also contributed to the decline of the reading of newspapers on 
Sundays. 
Of the titles listed, Reed International (via the subsidiary International Publishing 
Corporation) own the Sunday People and the Sunday Mirror ; News International Limited 
own the News of the World ; Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., own the Sunday Express and 
the 
Thomson Organisation, the Sunday times. The Sunday Telegraph was introduced in the early 
sixties to complement the Daily Telegraph. The Observer is the only Sunday newspaper 
without an associated national daily. 
Note on the Regional Coverage of National Newspapers 
Before going on to describe the regional press, it is important to emphasise that 
regional variations are included in the content of national newspapers. All of the 
popular dailies except the Sun are published in Manchester as well as London as also is the 
Guardian. All Sunday newspapers except the Observer are published in the two cities. 
The northern editions vary, sometimes considerable, from the London editions in terms of 
coverage of regional news. Even in different editions from the same printing works, 
local variations are included. The writer has read widely different accounts of the same 
football match by buying two copies of the same newspaper issue, in the home town of each 
of the two opposing sides 
3. Reiional (or Provincial) Dailies 
These include morning and evening newspapers. The distinction is important because 
morning regional newspapers tend to cover larger areas than their evening counterparts, 
which tend to be confined to specific large or medium-size towns and their suburbs. The 
regional morning press also tends to resemble the "quality" rather than the "popular" 
national dailies, in its appeal and format. Another interesting difference is that a higher 
proportion of copies of morning papers are delivered to homes. 
Examples of the difference in areas covered are provided (i) by the morning Liverpool 
Dail_,., y, Post, which sells throughout West Lancashire, Cheshire, the Isle of Man and North and 
mid-Wales (60% of sales are in Hales), compared with its sister evening paper the Liver ool Echo which sells mainly in Liverpool and the Merseyside conurbation ; (ii) by the Yorkshire Pos_ which sells throughout northern England and the sister Yorkshire Evening Post 
which is essentially an evening paper for the Leeds area. 
- 65 - 
London evening papers are sometimes classed as part of the national press because both were 
regarded as sister papers to national dailies :- the Evening Standard was, until mid- 
1977, 'produced by Beaverbrook Newspapers at the same premises as the Daily Express ; the 
Evening News is produced by the Daily "flail group. This classification does not reflect 
the newspapers" geographical coverage, which is becoming increasingly confined to Greater 
London. 
Table 11-8 shows changes in the circulation of regional morning and evening papers over the 
period 1968-75, with separate details for major regions. 
Table 11-8 Combined Circulation of Reg ional Dailies 1968 and 1975 (000) 
Mornin 1968 1975 1975 as % of 1968 
England and Wales 1004 (13) 905 12) 90 
Scotland 910 (5) 1059 5) 116 
Northern Ireland 115 (2) 122 2) 106 
Total U. K. 2029 (20) 2086 (19) 103 
London 2026 2) 1133 (2) 56 
Rest of England 5642 
ý62) 
5519 (68) 98 
Wales 282 3) 267 4 95 
Scotland 722 (7) 551 6 76 
Northern Ireland 214 (1) 178 1) 83 
Channel Islands 33 (2) 36 (2) 109 
8899 (97) 7684 (102) 86 
Source : Press Council annual reports - circ ulation data are average 
per issue in first half of each year. 
Notes : Estimated circulations of the Nottingham morning and evening papers 
have been included. 
The numbers of titles are shown in parenthesis 
The most dramatic feature of Table II-8 is the decline of the two London evening papers. 
Among reasons for this are the decrease in the number of people living and working in the 
central London area ; the launching of new titles in some towns on the fringe of London, 
such as Watford, Luton, Guildford and Southend ; the early development in London of local 
radio from the BBC and since 1973 from two commercial radio stations ; the introduction 
of earlier closing times for offices enabling people to get home to see television news. 
Similar trends have affected evening newspapers in other conurbations. 
The relative importance of regional and national newspapers in different parts of the 
United Kingdom is discussed in Sub-Section G below. 
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4. Regional Sundays 
These are important mainly in Scotland where two newspapers the Sunday Mail, published 
by the Reed group with a Jan-June 1975 average circulation of 752,000 and the Sunday 
Post, 
whose owners (D. C. Thompson Ltd. ) state only that its circulation is over one million - 
we estimate it, on the basis of the National Readership Survey to have been about 
1.7 
millions in 1975. Other, more local Sunday newspapers, are published in Birmingham, 
Plymouth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Belfast. A Sunday newspaper launched in the 
Channel 
Islands in 1970 did not survive a year and a similar venture on the Isle of Man 
in 1973 
survived only a few months longer. 
5. Local weeklies 
It is difficult to trace the number of titles or to describe the areas covered because 
within any area of, for example 400 km2 there may be an apparently large number of 
competitive newspapers which are in fact local variations of one basic version, with a good 
deal of common material. 
Local weekly newspapers are essentially vehicles of advertising, which provides over 
80 per cent of their sales revenue. Competition from "Free-sheets" which are not 
included in the circulation data in Table 11-4 and from local radio has affected 
circulation but the general conclusion of the Royal Commission on the Press is that this 
sector of the Press is likely to show expansion with the recovery of the recruitment, 
property and automative markets expected to follow from general economic recovery in the 
United Kingdom over the next few years. 
The growing importance of national chains in the publishing of local weekly newspapers 
is described in Sub-Section D below 
C THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
In the United Kingdom very few copies of newspapers are distributed by pout ; this 
method (combined with regular subscription) is largely confined to specialist periodicals 
and learned journals. Most purchasers of newspapers obtain them from retailers, who 
arrange delivery to homes and/or sell in shops or in streets. 
I. Distribution of National Newspapers and Periodicals 
About three quarters of all quality papers and over half of the populars are delivered to homes early in the morning. ' The proportion varies considerably among titles : for 
example, about 45 per cent of sales of the Daily Mirror are delivered to homes whereas for the Sun the percentage is only around 31. 
1 
Source : The British Newspaper Industry (Jordan Dataquest Ltd., 1976) 
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The publishers arrange and cover the cost of transport from the two publishing centres, 
London and Manchester, to warehouses of wholesalers. The wholesalers handle all but a 
very small percentage of national newspapers. Distribution is mainly by rail and some 
sorting of newspapers by wholesalers takes place on trains as well as at depots closer to 
destination retailers. The number of wholesalers' depots is indicated by the fact that 
the Mirror Group supplies its daily newspaper to 660 such depotsl. 
Three firms dominate the wholesaling of national daily newspapers and consumer periodicals 
- W. H. Smith (Holdings) Ltd., John Menzies Ltd., and Surridge Dawson Ltd., with 36,24 and 
8 per cent of the total market. 
2 These three firms own over half of the wholesale 
depots and all three have extensive retail interests. All three have increased their 
shares of wholesaling through recent acquisitions. John Menzies has a monopoly of 
newspaper wholesaling in Scotland and is the sole wholesaler in 32 English towns ; 
W. N. Smith and Surridge-Dawson are the sole wholesalers in 22 and 23 towns (respectively) 
in England and Wales. 
The wholesaling of national Sunday newspapers is handled by a largely separate system 
with some direct supply to small retail agents. The retail outlets of the big three 
wholesalers are, for the most part, closed on Sundays and their involvement in the 
distribution of Sunday newspapers is much less. There may be as many as 5,000 independent 
wholesalers or wholesalers/retailers of Sunday newspapers. 
2. Distribution of Provincial Newspapers 
The pattern of distribution of provincial newspapers was estimated by the recent Royal 
Commission as follows :- 
Table 11-9 Distribution of Provincial Newspapers 1975-6 
Morning Evening 
dailies dailies Weeklies 
Average percentaged delivered via 
Wholesalers and retailers 62 1 25 
Retailers direct 38 91 72 
Newsvendors (street) negligible 41 
Direct delivery 11 42 
1 Royal Commission on the Press, 1974-77, Appendix F, paragraph 8. 
2 Ibid., para. 9. 
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The table shows the difference between the evening newspaper, where fast delivery 
is 
important in ensuring the attractiveness of the product, and the morning newspaper where 
there are a few hours to spare. Another reason for the greater proportion of 
direct 
delivery of evening newspapers is that the area covered is smaller' and the quantity 
supplied to any individual retailer is greater. 
Weekly newspapers normally have a high penetration in a limited area with a high proportion 
of delivered copies. 
The proportion of copies of provincial evening newspapers delivered to homes is 
surprisingly high. Evidence given to us by two major publishers of evening newspapers 
in widely separated parts of the country showed the percentage to be 60 per cent in one 
case and 70 per cent in the other. 
3. Newspaper Retailers 
In 1971 there were 32,566 shops in the United Kingdom selling newspapers and periodicalsl. 
Of these about 85 per cent are owned and run by one family2 but national and regional chains 
of newsagents have extended in recent years and the three large wholesalers have also 
increased the numbers of their retail outlets. 
Some publishers of provincial newspapers have acquired newsagent shops, some of them not 
identified by name with the publisher. Individual companies have pioneered this 
development. Discussions regarding the reasons for this forward intergration suggest 
that, while it may have been partly motivated by the desire to guarantee security of 
outlet, this is no longer a prime consideration. Retail newsagents normally sell 
confectionery, tobacco, stationery and a range of other goods. By developing this range 
newspaper companies may be able to promote the casual sales of their papers and by 
promoting newspapers may be able to increase casual sales of other products. Newsagents' 
shops offset the volatility of advertising revenue. 
The newspaper companies with whom we discussed the matter said that management of the 
shops was kept distinct from that of newspapers and that competitors' publications were 
supplied on the same basis as the company's own. One company with no shops reported that 
ownership of outlets by its competitors did give them trading advantages over it in dealings with other retailers. Such competitors were better able to restrict suppliers 
to such retailers and could use this as a threat to secure promotion of their publications. 
I Census of Distribution 1971 quoted in ibid., paragraph 13 2 National Federation of Retail Newsagents 
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4. Distribution Margins 
Although resale price maintenance is illegal in the United Kingdom, and no exemption has 
been made by the Restrictive Practices Court with respect to newspapers and periodicals, 
newspapers are almost without exception sold to the final customer at the publishers' 
recommended prices. One reason for the absence of discounts by retailers is the practical 
impossibility of a small percentage cut in the retail margin, on a newspaper. For example, 
on a newspaper with a cover price of 6p the retail margin would be 1.68p - to reduce the 
price to 5p would imply a reduction of nearly 60 per cent of the margin. 
However, discussions in the industry suggested to us that de facto collective agreements 
exist between national associations of publishers (the Newspaper Publishers Association 
and the Periodical Publishers Association) and those of retailers and wholesalers. 
Retail margins of national newspapers are uniformly 28% - an attempt by the Mirror Group 
to reduce the margin by 1 per cent in 1968 led to boycotting by newsagents. The 
Restrictive Practices Court declared this boycott to be illegal but the Mirror Group 
ultimately was forced to restore the former margin. 
Wholesale margins average about 8 per cent of final price with some variation according 
to the amount of sortinq undertaken by the wholesaler and the publisher. 
For the provincial press average wholesale margins are 8 per cent of cover price and those 
of retailers around 29 per cent. Variation is slightly greater for weekly papers than 
for dailies. 
D. THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEWSPAPER AND PERIODICAL PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 
1. Selection of Sample 
The Census of Production 1968 listed 715 enterprises in the United Kingdom as engaged in 
this industry. This total included 548 firms with fewer than 100 enoloyees and 
obviously producing only one or two titles with limited circulation. At the other 
extreme. 32 companies accounted for 76 per cent of employment and 83 per cent of value 
added in the industry. 
For the purposes of this study we have included all the 35 publishers of newspapers and 
periodicals who were included in the EAU analysis for total publishing, described in 
Section 11 . These accounted for 94.2 per cent of the annual circulation of newspapers 
in the United Kingdom in 1975 compared with 91.8 per cent in 1968. For periodicals 
1 
See page 16 above. 
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the coverage is lower, at about 70 per cent, partly because of the large number of small 
independent periodicals but partly also because of periodicals published by non-commercial 
organisations, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation. The accounts of these 
organisations are not published in sufficient detail to facilitate calculation of turnover 
and profits derived from publications. 
The total value of sales turnover from printing and publishing of newspapers and 
periodicals of the firms within our sample was f 1009.7 millions in 1975, equal to 93.7 
per cent of the estimate by the Business Statistics Office of Press Turnover from firms 
with at least 25 employees. (presented in Table II-1 above). For 1968 the coverage was 
91.6 per cent. The concentration indices presented below relate to the sample of firms 
not to the total population. 
Table II-10 presents a list of the firms in the sample and shows the U. K. circulation 
of their newspapers in each of the following categories :- national dailies, national and 
regional Sundays, regional dailies and local weeklies. 
1 
Table II-10 also shows our own calculation of the retail value of their sales of 
periodicals during 1975. For any one periodical, annual retail sales value is calculated 
as follows :- (the average circulation per issue) times (the average retail price per 
issue) times (the number of issues in the year). For the enterprise with more than one 
periodical the total figure is simply the sum of the annual retail sales values of 
individual titles. The use of annual retail sales value instead of circulation overcomes 
the problem of comparison of periodicals costing as much as 75p with those costing as 
little as 10 p. 
The final column in Table II-10 is the value of turnover obtained from the printing and 
publishing of newspapers and periodicals, including advertising revenue. In most cases 
this has been derived directly from the published accounts of the company concerned ; 
in the case of three smaller companies whose 1975 accounts had not yet been filed with the 
Registrar of Companies we were forced to estimate turnover on the basis of 1974 figures 
and subsequent changes in circulation. 
2. Approach to Analysis of Concentration 
From Table II-10 the different emphasis of individual large companies can be observed. 
Circulation data obtained from the following sources : - 
Press Council Annual Report 1975 
Royal Commission 1974-77 Final Report Appendix A Newspaper Press Directory 1975 
The circulation of the (Glasgow-based) Sunday Post is estimated as explained on page 66. 
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The Reed International is by far the largest company with widespread interests, it is 
important in newspapers, mainly through large-circulation popular papers like the Daily 
Mirror (its national daily) ; the Sunday People, the Sunday Mirror, the Glasgow-based 
Sunday Record and the smaller Plymouth Independent which together enable it to predominate 
in Sunday newspapers. Its only "regional" daily is the (Scottish) Daily Record, by far 
the most popular daily paper in Scotland. Its only involvement in local weekly 
newspapers is in the rural areas of South Devon. The Reed subsidiary, International 
Publishing Corporation' accounted for exactly half of the periodicals published by our 
sample companies and, since this sample accounted for about 70 per cent of the total 
periodicals market this means that its share of the total was around 35 per cent. 
2 This 
estimated share is consistent with the Royal Commission's own assessment, 
2 
which was made 
simultaneously with, but completely independently of our own research. In terms of total 
turnover from newspapers and periodicals, Reed International obtained a 23.0 per cent 
share of the market in 1975, compared with 29.8 per cent in 1968. 
Although Reed is a leading company in most sections of the Press (except local weeklies) 
this is not true of the other companies and it is more meaningful to discuss competition 
in the context of product markets. 
For national daily and for Sunday newspapers the competitive situation has already been 
described on pages 61/63 above. 
From Table II-10 it is possible to identify the companies with the greatest involvement 
in regional daily newspapers. In regional dailies these are the Daily Mail group, the 
London Evening News and thirteen evening papers in the East Midlands, S. Wales and the 
West Country, in addition to the Thomson Organisation (strongly represented in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, S. Wales and in certain distinct areas of England). 
The other leading companies are also strongly concentrated in a number of separate parts 
of the United Kingdom and it is more fruitful to discuss concentration by region, which we 
do in Sub-Section F below. where concentration indices are applied to each of six regions. 
The publishing of local weekly newspapers remains the most atomistic section of the industry 
although some enterprises, especially Westminster Press (subsidiary of S. Pearson), News 
Internation, Scottish and Universal Investments have extended their ownership substantially 
See "Periodicals and the Alternative Press" Research Series 6 
Cmnd. 6810-6 (1977) paragraphs 42 to 47. 
2 During 1977 the name of this subsidiary has been changed to the Reed Publishing 
Group Ltd. 
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in recent years and this has been the subject of investigation by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission. This market segment is analysed in greater detail in Section 
G. 
We have already pointed to the dominant position of Reed in the supply of periodicals. 
This is analysed further in Section H, where concentration indices are applied to the 
penultimate column of Table II-10. 
3. Links between Companies in the Sample and Interests in Small Press Companies 
Although not more than 50 per cent of the equity of any of the 35 companies in our sample 
is owned by any other company within or outside the sample, there are several financial 
ties between the 35 firms. 
First, a majority of the equity capital of two of the companies, BPM Holdings Ltd. (the 
holding company for The Birmingham Post and flail Ltd., and three weekly newspaper 
subsidiaries) and Yattendon Industrial Trust Limited (which through its subsidiary 
Coventry Newspapers Ltd., publishes evening newspapers in Coventry and Cambridge and 
weeklies in Cambridgeshire) is owned by one family, that of Lord Iliffe. Members of 
the family are on the boards of both companies and there is another common director. 
Outside our sample, BPM Holdings hold 25% of the equity of North Wales Newspapers Ltd., 
a publisher of one evening paper and nine weekly newspapers in Wales. One director of 
BPM Holdings Ltd., also sits on the board of North Vales Newspapers Ltd. 
S. Pearson and Son Ltd., through its subsidiary Westminster Press Ltd., held 28.3 per cent 
of the BPM Holdings Ltd. Two of the directors of Westminster Press were on the board 
(of seven) directors of BPM Holdings Limited, one of them the Chairman of Westminster 
Press. This holding and representation existed throughout the period 1968-75. S. Pearson 
and Son also owned, through its subsidiary the Financial T imes Ltd., 49.9 per cent of the 
Economist Newspaper Ltd., another firm in the sample ; and shared with Reed International 
the equity of Throgmorton Publications Ltd., publisher of the three weekly journals for 
investors. Through its Westminster Press subsidiary it also has a 59.8 per cent holding 
in Catholic Herald Ltd., publisher of a weekly national newspaper for Roman Catholics. 
The Daily Mail and General Trust Ltd., controls (by 50.6 per cent equity holding) Associated Newspapers Group Ltd. (to which our sample figures relate) which in turn has 
a 23.5 per cent holding in Bristol Evening Post Ltd., another firm in our sample. 
These and other holdings by companies in the sample in other newspaper or periodical 
publishers are listed below :- 
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Name of ultimate parent (A) 
(included in the sample) 
British Electric Traction Company Ltd. 
Daily Hail and General Trust Ltd. 
BPN Holdings Ltd. 
Liverpool Daily Post and Echo Ltd. 
S. Pearson and Son Ltd. 
Reed International 
Partly-owned companies (S-another sample co. ) 
Name % of equity 
United Newspapers Ltd. (S) 5.7 
Bristol Evening Post Ltd. (S) 23.5 
Reading Newspaper Co. Ltd. 32.5 
North Wales Newspapers Ltd. 25 
All leading newspaper companies <1 in England 
Economist Newspaper Ltd. (S) 49.9 
BPP1 Holdings Ltd. (S) 28.5 
Throgmorton Publications Ltd. 50.0 
Catholic Herald Ltd. 49.8 
Throgmorton Publications Ltd. 50.0 
Several smaller periodical companies 
In the analysis of concentration we have recognised the practice adapted by Companies Acts 
in the U. K., whereby companies declare in sales turnover in consolidated accounts the total 
sales of all subsidiaries in which they have a controlling interest (greater than 50% of the 
vote - entitling equity). Net profits before tax, however, include income from minority 
holdings. With the terms of reference prescribed by the Commission and with current 
practice of financial reporting in the U. K., we were unable to avoid the double-counting of 
those profits made by one company in our sample which were then remitted to another as 
dividents. 
The double-counting is confined to less than 2 per cent of combined profits. 
4. Competitive Media and Investment in them by the Press 
Another activity may be said to compete with the press in either or both of two respects: - 
as a medium of communication of news, information, opinion 
or entertainment 
(ii) as a medium for advertisement. 
The government radio and television services, compete mainly in respect (i) ; hoardings 
and transport companies with advertising on vehicles compete only in respect (ii) commercial 
television and radio are the main media which compete in both respects. 
ýaý Television 
By the end of 1975 there were 17.4 million television licences current in the U. K.. 1 which 
A television licence entitles a household to operate at least one television set. 
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means that 90 per cent of households hold a TV licence. Surveys have shown that average 
viewing time per head of population exceeds 15 hours per week. 
' 
The British Broadcasting Corporation transmits two national networks, one of them BBC2 
includes no regional variations and is used for educational broadcasts and more serious 
programmes ; the other (BBC1) has variations for eleven regions in news and current 
affairs programmes. In Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, variations from the London 
broadcast are quite extensive, especially in Wales. Only a few remote and mountainous 
regions are now out of range of BBC television transmitters. 
Commercial (or "independent" television was introduced in 1955. It comprises 15 
regional programme companies under contract to the Independent Television Authority which 
allocates transmitters. The ITA has now become the Independent Broadcasting Authority. 
A public body, it is responsible for surveillance over commercial television and radio. 
News of regional level is provided by the programme company and coverage of national 
and international news is provided by Independent Television News Ltd., jointly financed 
by the programme companies. IBA transmitters have a widespread coverage similar to that 
of the BBC and, in general, independent television attracts wider average audiences than 
the public network. Regional news coverage is also similar to that of the BBC. 
(b) Radi o 
There are four national radio networks, two of which combine during certain periods of the 
day. All four are operated by the BBC. BBC Radios 1 and 2 respectively broadcast 
modern "pop" and light music with regular short hourly bulletins of news and other 
information (weather reports etc. ). Only one of these alternatives is broadcast at any 
one time by the allocated network of Very High Frequency transmitters and, the AM 
transmissions are not universally receivable. 
BBC Radio 3 carries serious music and other "minority interest" programmes, mainly on 
VHF but with a medium-wave transmitter in central England and another medium-wave relay 
in central Scotland. 
BBC Radio 4 in England has become a national news and current affairs network, most of 
its programmes are devoted to news bulletins, discussions and documentaries. Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland each has its own substitute for Radio 4 (Radio Scotland etc. ) 
which carries many Radio 4 programmes but devotes as much as 50% of time to more local 
material. The VHF transmitters allocated to Radio 4 and its non-English equivalents are 
used for regional broadcasts. 
1 Britain 1974 : An Official Handbook (HMSO), page 21. 
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The BBC has 20 local radio stations in England ; the first eight were opened in 1967. 
These broadcast programmes of local interest for as much as 12 hours per day - at other 
times they broadcast one of the national networks. Most relay the major news bulletins 
from Radio 4. Those local transmissions usually have a range of 40 miles, on VHF and 
common AM frequencies. 
Local commercial radio began in the United Kingdom in 1973 and by 1975 there were 13 
commercial radio stations again broadcasting from low-power transmitters, using VHF and 
common AP1 frequencies. They share a national news service (Independent Radio News) and, 
as well as popular music, broadcast a fairly large volume of local news, information and 
discussion. 
To illustrate the news broadcasts available on television and radio let us take a man in 
Swansea, South Wales at 1730 hours on a weekday. Within 90 minutes he has the following 
news programmes available :- 
BBC Wales : National BBC Television News (from London). 
General and Welsh regional news in Welsh. 
Welsh Regional news in English. 
Inde endent Television: Independent Television News (from London). 
(regional) General and Welsh regional news in Welsh. 
Welsh regional news in English. 
BBC Radio 1: News summary 
BBCRa io to 11 
BBC Radio 3: 11 
Swansea Sound : General news (from IEN in London). 
Local news in English. 
Local news in Welsh. 
In spite of this abundance of news on radio and television, Swansea's evening newspaper 
has maintained its circulation over the eight years to 1975. 
(C) Involvement of the Press in Commercial Television and Radio 
The Royal Commission on the Press of 1961-2 regarded control of a television company Ly 
a single newspaper company (the Thomson organisation then owned 60ä of Scottish Television) 
is cortrary to the pubic interest, but did not oppose minority holdings. 1 This new 
was shared by the government appointed Filkingtor Committee on Broadcasting which 
reported in 1960. The Television Act 1964 empowered the Independent Television Act 
(with the approval of the Hume Secretary) to terminate a programme contract if it 
believed that the public interest was threatened by newspaper shareholdings. 
The jTA required Thowson to reduce its holdings in Scottish Television to 25 per cent by 
1968 and, although the statutory power as such has nsver been used, the threat of it is a 
brake on further press control of television contractors. 
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The Independent Broadcasting Authority Act of 1973 required (i) that the owners of any 
newspaper with extensive circulation in an area and/or of which the financial position 
would be materially worsened must be offered a shareholding by any company proposing 
to 
establish local commercial radio in that area. 
(ii) that no newspaper company with substantial local circulation should have a 
controlling interest in a local radio station. (The IBA has interpreted this to mean 
121% for a newspaper with a monopoly of local news but allows bigger percentages for 
national newspaper groups). 
Holdings by newspaper publishers in commercial television and radio stations at 30 
June 
1975 are listed in Appendix B. 
1 
The largest single holding by any major company which publishes newspapers is that of 
British Electric Traction (via its subsidiary Rediffusion Television Ltd. ) in Thames 
Television Ltd., the London region 'londay-Friday contractor. BET's holding is 50 per 
cent of the equity - 49.99 per cent of voting shares and 50.02 per cent of non-voting. 
Although its weekly newspapers account for about 10 per cent of the circulation of weekly 
newspapers in the area served by Thames Television, it has no financial interest in local 
or national daily papers and is not regarded by the IBA as a newspaper publisher for the 
purposes of the restrictive legislation. 
Other individual press holdings in excess of 20 per cent of the 
voting equity of commercial television companies are : - 
Anglia Television : Guardian and Manchester Evening News Ltd. (20.9 per cent. ) 
Associated Television : Reed subsidiaries (29.6 per cent) 
Border Television : Cumbrian Newspapers (23.8 per cent) 
(non-sample company) 
Scottish Television : Thomson Organisation (25.0 per cent) 
Southern Television : Daily Mail & General (37.5 per cent) 
D. C. Thomson (25.0 per cent) 
Excluding the BET holding the total holdings by all press companies of the total equity 
of commercial television contractors in11975 amounted to 18.0 per cent, of which 17.2 per 
I Source : Press Council Annual Report 
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cent was held by companies in the sample. 
the percentage rises to 25.5. 
When British Electric Traction is included, 
In commercial radio press holdings mounted to 23.6 per cent of total equity, of which 
18.8 per cent was held by companies in the sample. When BET's indirect holdings in 
Capital Radio are included, the percentage rises again to 25.5. 
Loan capital has also been supplied by Press Companies to commercial television and 
radio, in approximately the same proportions as equity investment. 
E. ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL CONCENTRATION 
In sub-section (1) are presented the analyses of concentration, using the standard indices 
of the Commission for turnover and profits from the printing and publishing of newspapers 
and periodicals in 1968,1973 and 1975. An analysis of the national circulation of 
newspapers in 1968 and 1975 appears in sub-section (2). 
t. Analysis of Turnover and Profits 
Table II-11 shows the total value of turnover, profits excluding losses and profits plus 
losses for the sample of press companies in 1968,1973 and 1975. The total turnover of 
the sample is also shown as a percentage of the value of Press turnover published by the 
Business Statistics Office. 
The factors which have influenced sales turnover, especially the drop in advertising since 
the peak in 1973 were discussed in sub-section A above. The rise in the real value of 
profits between 1968 and 1973 and the subsequent sharp decline demonstrate the consequences 
of volatility of sales revenue for companies with a high proportion of fixed costs. A 
newspaper proprietor can reduce output only to a limited extent : the sharp drop in 
advertising means an inevitable decrease in sales revenue per issue and per copy sold. 
Table 11-12 shows the values of the concentration indices for sales turnover and profits 
in each of the three years. 
(a) Sales Turnover (01) 
In 1968 the Linda analysis shows the existence of an oligopoly group of seven enterprises 
which together accounted for 76.7 per cent of total turnover. The largest single firm 
was the International Publishing Corporation (during 1969 this was acquired by Reed 
International) with 29.8 per cent of total turnover followed by the Thomson organisation 
with 13.5 per cent. Other members of the oligopoly group were, in order, the Daily 
Mail group, Beaverbrook Newspapers, Daily Telegraph, S. Pearson and News International. 
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Table II-11 Total Value of Turnover and Profits - Press Sample 
1968 1973 1975 
Variable 01 Sales Turnover 
Number of enterprises 35 35 
35 
Total value (£ millions) 441.5 757.1 
1009.7 
Value as % of BSO total 91.6 88.2 
93.7 
Index at constant purch. power 100 119 
110 
Variable 04 Net Profits before Tax (Losses EXCLUDED) 
Number of enterprises 33 34 34 
Total Value (£ millions) 50.9 77.3 62.9 
Index at constant purch. power 100 106 60 
Net profits and losses before Tax 
Number of enterprises 35 35 35 
Total Value (f millions) 50.8 77.3 60.4 
Index at constant purch. power 100 106 57 
The last company held 4.8 per cent of the market, while the next largest company in the 
industry held only 2.8 per cent. 
In 1973 sales turnover was much less concentrated than in 1968. This was partly due to 
the acquisition of the Sun newspaper by News International' but also reflected the gains 
by companies in the regional press through the greater importance of classified 
advertising. The relative decline of the popular dailies and of certain consumer 
magazines was also a factor. The concentration ratio for the four largest companies 
fell from 61.6 to 49.8 per cent and that for eight companies from 79.5 to 71.9 per cent. 
The decrease in the Linda index L8, shows much more equal distribution of turnover among 
the eight companies. No minimum in the Linda curve occurs until the tenth enterprise, 
so that the "oligopolistic arena" now contained ten companies, with 77.6 per cent of total 
turnover. IPC (by then part of Reed International) remained the largest but its market 
share had fallen to 21.5 per cent. The nine other companies arelBeaverbrook, News 
International, Daily Mail, S. Pearson, Daily Telegraph, United Newspapers, D. C. Thomson and 
the Guardian and Manchester Evening News. (2)The three newcomers to the oligopoly group 
were principally regional newspaper publishers and other enterprises with large regional 
See page 62 above 
2 The circulation of the Manchester Evening News was greater than that of the Guardian 
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Table 11-12 Table of Concentration Indices - Press Activities 
1968 1973 . 1975 (EAU-Press) 01 04 01 04 01 04 
No of firms 35 33 35 34 35 34 
Mean value (0001s) 12615 1542 21632 2273 28849 1850 
Coeff. of Var. 1.916 1.777 1.485 1.171 1.551 1.320 
Gini 0.693 0.671 0.616 0.546 0.624 0.600 
Herf. - Hirschman 133.4 126.0 91.6 69.7 97.3 80.7 
Entropy -112.1 -113.6 -123.7 -130.6 -122.1 -125.3 
n* =4 CR 61.6 57.6 49.8 43.9 50.7 49.8 
L 0.544 0.689 0.533 0.383 0.533 0.364 
n* -8 CR 79.5 75.3 71.9 64.3 73.4 70.3 
L 0.437 0.436 0.319 0.291 0.327 0.281 
n*h 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Ln*h 1.227 1.074 0.874 0.651 1.011 0.560 
CRn*h 41.9 42.4 33.9 26.8 34.4 29.9 
n*m 7 21 10 6 7 11 
Ln*m 0.429 0.283 0.301 0.276 0.327 0.262 
CRn*m 76.7 96.7 77.6 57.6 70.3 79.1 
L5 0.672 0.445 0.455 0.426 0.559 0.344 
For definitions of the terminology see Appendix A or 
Reference (1) 
Variable 01 - Sales Turnover 
04 s Net profits before tax 
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newspaper interests - Thomson, News International and S. Pearson had moved 
towards the 
top of the list. 
By 1975, with the recession in advertising, concentration increased again but remained 
less than in 1968. The oligopoly group of seven firms indicated by the Linda index 
comprised the following :- Reed International (still the largest with its market share 
recovered to 23.0 per cent), the Thomson organisation, Daily Mail, Beaverbrook, News 
International, S. Pearson and the Daily Telegraph - the same seven as in 1968 but with 
changed order. Their share of total turnover was 70.3 per cent and the lower Linda 
index 
(and LS) shows much greater equality within the oligopoly group. 
Net Profits (04) 
In 1968 the ranking of profits and turnover was closer than in subsequent years :- 
First eight companies in order of - 
Sales turnover 







D. C. Thomson 
Net Profits - before tax 





D. C. Thomson 
Beaverbrook 
Liverpool Daily Post and Echo 
The three largest companies accounted for 52.2 per cent of sales turnover and 50.7 per 
cent of profits. For turnover L3 was 0.778 and for profits L3 was 0.867, because 
the third firm (Daily Mail) achieved a lower margin on sales than the first two. Overall, 
profits were much less concentrated than turnover in 1968 and in each of the other two 
years. 
In 1973 the ranking of profits and turnover differed considerably :- 
First eight companies in order of 













Daily flail & General 
Reed International 
Guardian & Manchester Evening News 
Liverpool Daily Post & Echo 
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The most remarkable aspect of the column on the right is the relatively high profit-ranking 
of the companies with extensive interests in regional newspapers. This has already been 
attributed to the high level of demand for classified advertisements. Overall, profits 
in 1973 were much less concentrated than in 1968. The Linda index shows a distinct size 
threshold at 6 enterprises which together accounted for 57.6 per cent of total profits. 
Within the six the distribution of profits was very even - even though it is the 
average of only five instead of 20 coefficients, the LS index is lower than that for 1968. 
In 1975 the concentration of profits had increased again but it is important to emphasise 
that some of the largest companies were not among those with the largest profits. The 
Thomson Organisation, the company with the second largest Press turnover made a loss on its 
press activities ; Beaverbrook Newspapers came fourth in order of sales turnover but with 
a margin of only 2.6 per cent on sales, compared with an average for the sample (including 
losses) of 6.0 per cent, it was ranked in the ninth position. The seven firms identified 
as within the "oligopoly" group on sales turnover accounted for 70.3 per cent of turnover 
and 55.5 per cent of profits 
The financial difficulties of some of the largest concerns has led to changes within the 
industry since 1975. During 1977 the Beaverbrook newspaper, the Evening Standard 
(London evening paper) was almost closed and Beaverbrook was acquired by another company, 
Trafalgar House Investments Ltd. Difficulties within the Reed publishing activities 
are receiving publicity at the time of writing (November 1977). One of the problems 
facing the largest, London-based, companies has been the attempt to introduce new labour- 
saving technology into a declining activity with a predominance of highly-paid skilled 
labour. The industrial relations history of the Press in recent years has been somewhat 
stormy and disputes have not been confined to large companies. However, it appears that 
the large Fleet Street printing houses are less able than most of the smaller provincial 
companies (or subsidiaries) to avoid disputes and to apply new technology. 2 
2. Analysis of Circulation (Copies Sold) 
The published data on newspaper circulation may be used to examine the concentration of 
communication via newspapers. How many newspapers does each company sell to the public 
each week. 
We have collected data from a variety of sources3 to establish average circulation per 
issue of each of the following categories of newspaper in 1968 and 1975 : - 
national daily 
national and regional Sunday 
regional and local weekly 
regional daily 
'The Thomson loss has not been deducted from the total for the other six, i. e., Thomson's 
profit is taken as zero. 2The industrial relations history is fully described by the Royal Commission 1974-7 in its 
interim (1976) and final (1977) reports. 
3press Council Annual Reports, Royal Commission on the Press, Newspaper Press Directory 
(Benn), direct questionnaires to companies. 
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Because magazines and other periodicals are so diverse in size and content, their 
circulation figures are less meaningfull than those of newspapers (which are 
fairly 
standard) and periodicals are therefore dealt with separately in sub-section H 
below. 
In order to derive average weekly newspaper circulation per company, the data 
for 
national and regional daily newspapers were multiplied by six, except where it was 
known 
that no Saturday edition was published Weekly and Sunday circulation figures were 
included without adjustmentl. 
All of the companies included in Tables II-10 to 11-12 which publish newspapers are also 
included in Table 11-13 but those which produce only national periodicals are excluded. 
The analysis of circulation shows the existence in 1968 of a distinct oligopoly group of 
four firms - IPC, Beaverbrook, Daily Mail group and the Thomson organisation, with a 
combined share of 71.7 per cent of the market. By 1975 the oligopoly, as identified by 
the first minimum of the Linda index comprised five enterprises - Reed, (having acquired 
IPC), News International (which took over and developed the Sun newspaper), Beaverbrook, 
the Daily Mail group and the Thomson organisation. These five firms combined share of 
the market was also 71.7 per cent. Much of the apparent decline in concentration is due 
to the changed position of IPC/Reed, whose share of total circulation fell from 29.4 per 
cent in 1975 to 22.0 per cent in 1968. 
Table 11-14 summarises the interests of the companies in the oligopoly groupings in each 
of the main categories. 
Table 11-14 Newspa per Circulation of "Oli gopolists" (000) 
National Regional All Local Weighted 
(a) 1968 
dailies dailies Sundays weeklies Total 
IPC 6,100 527 11,479 40 51,281 Beaverbrook 3,853 848 4,238 0 32,444 Daily Mail & Gen. 3,010 2171 0 480 31,566 Thomson Organisation 401 1462 1,711 323 13 212 News Internationall 0 41 6,191 245 , 6,682 
(b) 1975 
Reea International 
News Internation l 











Daily Mail & Gen. 
Thomson 1,730 1641 
, 0 488 
23,597 
20,714 
327 1495 1592 393 12,917 
1Not in oligopoly in 1968. 
2London Evening Standard, Mon-Fri only in 1975. 
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Table 11-13 Table of Concentration - Aggregate for each company of average weekly 
circulation of newspapers 
1968 1975 
Sum total for sample (000's) 179,317 168,909 
% of total for all companies 91.8 93.8 
Number of companies 26 28 
Sample mean 6897 6032 
Coefficient of variation 1.77304 1.55 
Gini coeff. 0.71795 0.691 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 159.3716 121.5 
Entropy -98.0929 -106.3 
n* =4 CR 71.7 64.1 
L 0.565 0.364 
n*=8 CR 85.9 83.8 
L 0.559 0.395 
n*h 2 2 
Ln*h 0.732 0.698 
CRn*h 46.69 37.84 
n*m 4 5 
Ln*m 0.565 0.364 
CRn*m 71.7 71.7 
LS 0.696 0.476 
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Comparison between Tables 11-13 and 11-12 shows the much greater concentration of 
newspaper circulation than of press turnover. There are two reasons for this :- 
(a) 
most of the lower-circulation newspapers and periodicals are more expensive than 
the 
most popular newspapers and (b) the popular press relies on advertising for a much 
lower proportion of its revenue. Both these aspects were described in sub-sections 
A 
and B above. 1 
In spite of the apparent variety of publications, the involvement of the largest press 
companies in both national and regional newspapers means that about 67 per cent2 of all 
newspapers (national, regional or local) in the United Kingdom are published by only 
five 
enterprises. Two of the five (news International and the Thomson Organisation) are 
owned by overseas parent companies. 
F. REGIONAL MARKETS 
The analysis of regional markets takes two forms. First, the variable "aggregate weekly 
circulation for each company" has been calculated for each of six parts of the United 
Kingdom and the standard concentration indices of the Commission applied to it. Secondly, 
in order to complement corresponding studies in other member countries of the Community, 
we have calculated concentration ratios for individual titles of newspapers in each of 
the six regions. 
In seeking to measure "aggregate weekly circulation for each company" we were obliged to 
find some way of allocating the circulation of national newspapers between regions. For 
this purpose, the National Readership Survey 19753 was used. This shows the distribution 
of readers of each title by each of six survey regions listed below : - 
Total population aged 15+ ( 1975 ) 
London and South-East 14. b millions South-West England & Wales 5.4 " 
Midlands 6.7 
North-West 5.0 
North-East and North 6.1 
Scotland 3.8 
The boundaries of these regions are shown on a map which appears as Appendix C to this 
report. 4 
Data on Northern Ireland are not available. The Royal Commission suggests that the 
circulation of U. K. newspapers in Ulster is less than that of the provincial daily papers, 
of which the combined circulation in 1975 was 300,000. If this is true, then less than 
2 per cent of the U. K. circulation of national newspapers is in Northern Ireland. 
I Pages 62 and 56. 2 Takes into account 93.8 per cent coverage of sample. 3 Published by the Joint Industry Committee. 
4 On page 111 below. 
5 Royal Commission 1974-77, Final Report para 3-18 
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For estimation of the circulation of national newspapers in the six parts of Great Britain, 
listed above, Northern Ireland sales have been ignored and the U. K. circulation has been 
allocated between the six "regions" in proportion to the results of the Readership Survey. 
Table 11-15 shows the estimated circulation of newspapers of each of the four categories 
in each of the six geographical areas and in Northern Ireland. Sales of newspapers 
published for one region are assumed to be confined to that region except that allowance 
is made for sale of the Scottish Sunday Post in North-East and North-West England. 
Discrepancies between the combined circulation figures in Tables 11-15 and LL-8 are 
explained by differences in sources. 
' 
Table 11-15 Circulation of U. K. and Reg ional Newsp apers 1975 
National Regional Local 
Region dailies dailies Sundays weeklies 
London & S. E. 5811 2257 7882 4235 
S. W. & Wales 1835 937 2928 1370 
Midlands 2337 1731 3656 1301 
North-West 1767 1219 2764 1313 
North & N. E. 1869 1640 2964 1063 
Scotland 703 1610 3043 1217 
N. Ireland neg. 300 93 
Other islands neg. 36 neg. ) 463 
Total U. K. 14322 9730 23330 10962 
Some distortion arises because some regional newspapers circulate in adjacent areas of 
other regions, e. g., the Liverpool Daily Post, included here in North-West England, 
circulates extensively in North Wales and in the Isle of Man. These adjacent areas are, 
however, thinly populated and this mitigates the distortion. 
Table 11-16 requires careful interpretation because of the varying coverage by our 
sample companies of each regional market. The true concentration ratio CR4 can be 
obtained by multiplication of the ratio shown in the table by the percentage of total newspa 
newspaper circulation covered by the sample. The resulting figures (the proportion of 
all newspapers which were published by the four largest companies) follow on page 89. 
1 The discrepancy for local weeklies between Royal Commission estimates and those of the Press Council are discussed by the Royal Commission in Research Paper 5 (Cmd. 6810-6) 
1977. 
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Table 11-16 shows the standard concentration indices of the Commission applied to 
aggregate average circulation per company in each territorial division. 
Table 11-16 Table of Concentration - Estimated aggregate circulation of newspapers bregio n 1979 
London 
& S. E. 
Wales 






Sample total (000's) 52587 19961 28423 18962 23090 16895 
No of firms 16 11 14 13 11 12 
Mean 3287 1814 2030 1459 2099 1408 
Coeff. of Variation 1.26 0.84 1.00 0.87 0.74 1.08 
Gini 0.627 0.470 0.540 0.469 0.417 0.566 
Herf. -Hirschman 161.7 155.0 143.1 134.6 141.1 181.0 






















67.0 65.2 75.9 
0.343 0.368 0.412 
90.7 95.7 98.2 
0.329 0.330 0.682 
2 2 2 
38.1 38.5 47.1 
0.729 0.698 0.954 
n* m 4 7 5 4 5 6 
CR n*m 77.5 94.6 79.9 67.0 76.6 95.3 
Ln*m 0.319 0.333 0.308 0.343 0.304 0.336 
LS 0.436 0.396 0.389 0.510 0.460 0.527 
Sample total as % of 
grand total g 87.0 95.4 96.8 86.8 91.7 90.6 
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Region Conc. Rates (4 firms) Names of Firms and % share 
London & S. E. 67.4 Reed . ý 3 e e k N ews . 1) Daily Mäil (13.9) (16 In 
Wales & S. W. 69.7 Reed Mail 9 y ) 
N ews Int. Be (12.8) (17.2) averbrook 
tiidl ands 67.5 Reed (19.7) News Int. (18.4) 
Daily Mail (16.7) Iliffe family(12.7) 
North-West 58.2 Reed P13 o 6 v 
N ews 
p" i12.1) Int. Lvrpj (1380) 
North & N. E. 59.8 Reed (14.7) 2 nt 
Unite d (11.4) News (13.1) Thomson 
Scotland 68.6 Reed (27.4) o 4 
Be ave 
Univ. 
(13.1) rbrook (13.9) Scot. & 
This list together with the information in Table 11-16 shows considerable concentration in 
each region but, apart from the market leadership of Reed in all six areas, there is 
considerable difference in the ranking of companies in different regions. 
Table 11-17 is a table designed by the European Commission to show the evolution of 
competition among leading newspaper titles in each region. It shows that the Daily 
Mirror continued to lead in daily newspapers in 1975 (though it was not profitable - the 
Mirror Group section of Reed International made a loss in that year) ; the share of the 
Mirror was considerably reduced in all areas, mainly because of the advance of the Sun. 
In Scotland, the Daily Express was published from Glasgow as the Scottish Daily Express 
until 1974. Since then, a Scottish edition has been published from Manchester. As a 
result the Glasgow-published Daily Record, owned by the Reed Group and a sister paper to 
the Daily Mirror has taken over the position of leadership in the Scottish market. We 
estimate that newspapers published in Scotland accounted for nearly 70 per cent of 
Scottish daily newspaper circulation in 1975 ; these include the evening papers of the 
large cities. The Glasgow Evening Citizen, published by Beaverbrook, closed in 1973, 
despite a circulation of 167,000 in 1972. This has resulted in increased sales for the 
rival Evening Times. 
Further observations on regional concentration 
The Royal Commission has published a Research Paper on regional concentration. 
1 This 
does not aim to provide global statistical measurement but examines a number of specific 
topics. Among these are the decline in competition at local level, i. e., evening 
newspapers serving restricted areas and among local weeklies. The decline of freesheets 
as advertising itself declined from 1973 is another aspect of this. Between 1961 and 
1974 eleven newspapers were launched and nine were closed. The launches were mainly in 
1Royal Commission on the Press (1974-7) : Concentration of Ownership in the Provincial 
Press. 
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expanding commuter towns or were redesigned versions of established papers. All of the 
closures resulted in cities or towns like Birmingham, Leeds, Nottingham, Bristol, 
Manchester, Edinburgh and Glasgow having only one evening paper. In most cases, the 
newspaper was owned at the time of closure by the same company as the surviving rival 
though in some cases it had been acquired only a few years earlier. 
Local monopoly in provincial daily and weekly newspapers means a monopoly of local 
advertising. To check whether this affected advertising rates the Royal Commission 
undertook a detailed survey and while they were able to find factors which significantly 
influenced advertisement prices, the existence of competition was not among these 
factors. 
G ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGISLATION AND LOCAL NEWSPAPERS 
The 1965 Monopolies and Mergers Act introduced and the 1973 Fair Trading Act continued 
specific provisions with respect to the Press. Transfers of controlling interest 
(25% or more) in individual titles require the consent of the Secretart of State for 
Prices and Protection who must (except in certain circumstances) refer the proposed 
transfer to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The Secretary of State may give 
consent without reference to the Commission when he is satisfied that the title to be 
acquired is not economic as a separate newspaper and must give consent if he is satisfied 
that such an uneconomic newspaper will no longer be produced as a separate title. (This 
means that the legislation has not prevented two owners of evening newspapers from 
acquiring rival titles which were making a loss and closing them - in Coventry in 
1965 and Glasgow in 1974). Reference to the Monopolies and Mergers may also be waived 
when the circulation of the affected title is less than 25,000 or if the case is one of 
urgency, so that delay might threaten the survival of the paper. 
The transfer of the Sun from IPC to News International (then the News of the World 
organisation) was not referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, on grounds of 
urgency. The take-over by the Thomson Organisation of the Times in 1966 is the only 
case involving national newspapers considered by the Monopolies Commission. Five cases 
involving local weekly newspapers were considered during the period covered by our study. 
The acquiring companies were all national chains :- Thomson, S. Pearson (Westminster 
Press), News International (Berrows), Daily Mail and General (Associated Newspapers) and 
Scottish and Universal, Investments (G. Outran). 
Concentration in the local weekly press has increased substantially since 1961 but most 
of the changes took place before 1968. Our own estimates of changes between 1968 and 
1975 are shown in Table II-18. 
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Table II-18 Otimership of Local Weekly Newspapers 1968-75 
(Companies with aggregate circulation in 1975 of over 200,000 are listed) 
% of national circulation 
1968 1975 
BPM Holdings and other Iliffe interests 1.7 2.2 
British Electric Traction 1.4 2.0 
County Newspapers 2.4 2.4 
Daily Mail and General 4.6 4.5 
East Midland Allied Press 1.9 1.9 
News International 2.3 2.7 
Scottish and Universal 1.9 3.1 
S. Pearson 7.0 11.6 
Thomson Organisation 3.1 3.6 
United Newspapers 2.1 2.7 
F. Johnston 1.9 2.0 
The Concentration ratio for the four largest firms in 1968 was 17 per cent ; by 1975 
it had increased to nearly 23 per cent. 
Although the tendency for the ownership of local newspapers to be concentrated in 
national chains may give rise for concern, the current level of concentration is still 
very low. 
This national product-group approach is inappropriate in our view. In any one town the 
regional daily and local weekly newspapers may be owned by one single company which in 
many cases is also a publisher of a national daily. Many people buying each of these 
newspapers may be unaware of their common ownership - they may unknowingly be relying 
upon one single company for all their news and Press opinion. In practice the large 
chains are committed to the principle of editorial independence ; nevertheless, the 
potential danger that Press monopoly could be abused remains for the future. 
H. CONCENTRATION OF PERIODICAL SALES 
It has already been pointed out that the publishing of periodicals is organised on a much 
more atomistic basis than that of newspapers. For this reason and also because the BBC, 
whose Radio Times has a circulation of over 3 millions per week, could not be included in 
our sample of companies, this sample covers only about 70-75 per cent of the total sales 
value of periodicals in the U. K. 
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The variable used for analysis of concentration is the total value of annual retail sales 
of periodicals for each firm. This is the sum of the products for each periodical of 
its cover price, its average circulation per issue and the frequency of issue in 1975. 
The process of data-searching and manipulation was a lengthy one and the research was 
confined to 1975. The results, summarised in Table 11-19 are rather surprising :- 
Table 11-19 Table of Concentration - Annual Retail Value of Periodical Sales 1975 
Sum total of sample £152.6 millions 
Number of firms 19 
Mean value £7.03 millions 
Coefficient of variation 2.007 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 264.5 
N* 48 
CR 73.6 87.0 L 1.178 0.742 
Gini coefficient 0.677 
Entropy - -85.14 
N*h =2 N*m 12 
59.4 95.6 
2.212 0.551 
LS = 0.964 
The surprising finding is the dominant position of Reed with 48.5 per cent of the 
market followed by Independent Television Publications (publishers of TV Times) with 
11.1 per cent. Since our sample covers 70/75% of the total market, the Reed share of 
that total is about 34-35 per cent. 
The Royal Commission estimated the Reed share of consumers' expenditure on consumer 
magazines to have 35 per cent in 1975 and pointed out that this represented a decrease 
of about 10 per cent since 1965.1 Reed's share of sales of trade, professional and 
scientific journals is almost certainly less than 35 per cent but a precise estimate 
cannot be derived. Reed had 120 consumer magazine titles and 90 specialist periodicals 
in 1975. 
The other companies important in the periodicals, according to our own survey results are 
D. G. Thomson, with consumer magazines and accounting for 8.7 per cent of the sample total; 
Daily Mail and General Trust with only three weekly magazines but with 5.5 per cent of 
the sample ; and Morgan-Grampian with four consumer titles and 33 specialist periodicals 
and with 4.5 per cent of the sample. 
The periodicals market is very volatile and intensely competitive, in the sense that 
market shares within individual segments have changed rapidly. 
1 Royal Commission 1974-7 Periodicals and the Alternative Press, paras. 42-47 
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SECTION III - SURVEY OF CONCENTRATION IN THE PUBLISHING OF 
SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1975 school textbooks accounted for 16.6 per cent of the total value of books sold 
by U. K. publishers. We were asked by the Commission of the European Communities to 
include in this report a survey of concentration in the supply of compulsory and 
recommended books (i. e. textbooks). 
Before the description of the survey and its results, it is necessary to point out that 
the system whereby textbooks are supplied to pupils in the United Kingdom. In the case 
of schools administered by public local educational authorities (LEA) where 96 per cent 
of the total school population is educated, books are invariably supplied by the school 
on a loan basis to pupils; they remain the property of the school. This reduces the 
size of the total market for school textbooks. Having purchased books for all members of 
an age-group which is studying a particular subject (in a large school and in the case of 
a common subject like English this might mean 200 books), the school is under economic 
pressure not to change the textbook used in a subsequent year. Under a system where 
pupils purchase their own books, perhaps with the assistance of grants and with the 
support of a second-hand book market, the school is more free to adopt new texts. 
In independent schools (4 per cent of the school population) the system varies from one 
similar to that in the LEA sector to one where pupils are invited to purchase books on a 
list supplied to them by the school, which might specify "compulsory" and "other 
recommended" texts. Some independent schools operate a mixture of the two systems. 
In the further and higher education sectors (mainly for students aged 18 and over) the 
requirement that students buy their own books is fairly general and this is one reason why 
the sales of "technical and scientific" exceed those of school textbooks by about 17 per 
cent, despite the relatively small number of students. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY 
Schools were divided into eight categories reflecting the varying structures of education 
in different local education authority areas: 
Age range 
Category 1 LEA Primary 5-9 
reference 2 LEA Middle 9- 13 
3 LEA Secondary Comprehensive 11 or 13 - 18 
4 LEA Secondary non-selected 11 or 13 - 16 
5 LEA Secondary selected 11 or 13 - 18 
6 Independent Pre-preparatory 4-8 
7 Independent Preparatory 8- 13 
8 Independent Upper 13 - 18 
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Note: comprehensive = covering all ability range, no academic selection 
selected = with pupils who have been selected by examination or other criteria 
non-selected = with pupils who, as a result of examination or other criteria, have 
not been selected for other schools. 
When the age-range spanned by the school was greater than that in the category (e. g. some 
independent schools covered the 8- 18 age-range; some LEA primaries took children from 
5 to 11; some LEA schools in transition covered 9 to 18), the school was asked to confine 
its response to the specified age-range for the category. 
Table III-1 shows the subjects for which schools in each category were invited to complete 
questionnaires relating to stocks of textbooks in use in the academic year 1976-7 and 
purchases for use during that year. Textbooks which independent schools listed for 
obligatory purchase by their pupils were also listed and included as purchases. The 
number of schools in the sample following this practice for most of required books was very 
small. 
Table III-1 Coverage of Subject by Category 
x= questionnaires relating to subject sent to 
schools in category at head of column 
12 3 4 56 7 8 
English x x x x x x 
Mathematics x x x x x x 
Economics/Comm. x x x x 
History x x x x x x 
Geography x x x x x 
French x x x x x 
Other mod. languages x x x 
Latin x x x 
Physics x x x x 
Chemistry x x x x 
Biology x x x x 
Music x x x x x x 
Religion x x x x x 
Reading x x 
Arithmetic x x 
"Science" was included in some questionnaires for categories 2 and 7 but, since it became 
evident that, in the age groups concerned textbooks were not a major means of teaching, 
this was subsequently abandoned. 
For Reading and Arithmetic, 100 questionnaires were sent to LEA primary schools and 54 to 
independent pre-preparatory schools. The intention had been to use progressive random 
sampling until statistically significant results were derived for each of these two subjects. 
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The response rate was low and, for these subjects, as with elementary Science, the 
definition of a textbook created problems both for the teachers completing the 
questionnaires and for the Cranfield staff administering the survey. Other teaching 
devices - visual aids, constructional and mechanical devices are also used; series of 
reading books are used in rotation with the same class and it is difficult to distinguish 
between occasionally used books and "textbooks". 
For other subjects, questionnaires were sent to 40 schools within each of the categories of 
school indicated by x in Table III-1. For example, for History 240 questionnaires were 
sent out, to schools in each of six categories. 
After a pilot survey, questionnaires were designed and sent to each of 140 local education 
authorities in England, Scotland and Wales with a request for permission to distribute them 
to schools in their areas. Of these, only six refused permission and two others suggested 
amendments to the questionnaires to make them more appropriate to schools administered by 
them (these amendments secured a good response from these schools). 
Schools were finally selected from alphabetical lists' on a systematic sample basis (every 
nth school). Each individual school was requested to complete questionnaires for two 
subjects, so that the total number of schools approached within each category (40 times the 
number of subjects included in the survey for that category) divided by 2. 
Table 111-2 shows the total number of schools approached in each category and the number 
which returned questionnaires at least partly completed. 
Table 111-2 Numbers of Schools Approached and Responding in Survey 
Numbers of schools 
Approached Returning with questionnaires 
at least partly completed 
1 LEA Primary 100 13 13 
2 LEA Middle 160 32 20 
3 LEA Secondary Comprehensive 240 76 31.7 
4 LEA Secondary non-selected 200 55 27.5 
5 LEA Secondary selected 260 116 44.6 
6 Independent Pre-prep. 54 7 (13) 
7 Independent preparatory 176 32 18.2 
8 Independent upper 260 59 22.7 
1450 390 
LEA middle and secondary schools from the Education Authorities Directory; independent schools from the Dept. of Education & Science's list of approved independent schools; LEA primary schools from local telephone directories. 
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The total number of pupils in responding schools were LEA schools : 198,770; Independent 
schools : 33,490. While this represented a very small proportion (2 per cent ) of the 
total school population of Great Britain, the sample would have been sufficiently large and 
cross-sectional to permit conclusions to be drawn if certain statistical limitations had 
not become obvious. These are described in sub-section C. 
Coverage by Subject 
Individual schools were unable to complete questionnaires for particular subjects, for 
example when the subject was not included in the standard curricula. This meant that the 
total number of subject-questionnaires received was substantially less than twice the 
number of schools which responded. The number of complete and usable questionnaires for 
each subject is shown in Table 111-3: - 
Table 111-3 Numbers of Schools Included in the Analysis 
of Textbooks for Each Subject 
Subjects State School Independent Total 
History 48 15 63 
Maths 47 12 59 
Geography 42 12 56 
French 39 15 54 
Physics 37 9 46 
Religion 34 11 45 
English 33 11 44 
Biology 34 9 43 
Chemistry 34 9 43 
Music 35 4 39 
Latin 19 13 32 
Economics 20 4 24 
Reading 16 6 22 
Arithmetic 7 6 13 
German 26 7 33 
Spanish 12 2 14 
C. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Table 111-3 shows that for some of the subjects questionnaires were returned by very few 
schools. One of the problems to be faced in analysis of results from this kind of survey 
is the establishment of sample error. What from this survey is the reliability of the 
results? 
The sample size lies between two alternative estimations. First one could regard each 
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purchasing decision as a sample unit: this would increase the sample size 
to a very 
respectable level. It would however be invalid since purchasing 
decisions are not 
independent: there are complementary and consecutive textbooks which appear as 
individual 
titles. In addition, teachers at one school may have a preference for one particular 
approach to a subject which may mean interdependancies between purchasing decisions, not 
obvious to the recipient of a completed questionnaire. Existing stocks will inevitably 
influence the decisions. 
Secondly the sample size might be viewed as the number of schools completing 
questionnaires for each subject but this would be too stringent for estimation of sampling 
error since it assumes that all purchases of textbooks for each subject at a school are 
completely interdependent. 
No precise answer can be given to this problem but it is reasonable that the sample size 
for estimation of standard errors of estimates derived from the sample data could be at 
least 1.5 times the number of completed questionnaires for each subject. 
D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS - TOTAL MARKET 
From details of purchases by each school and by using catalogues and other guides, we 
were able to calculate for each subject the retail value of sales by each of 92 
publishers to schools in our sample. The total value of these sales (at retail prices and 
therefore including distributors' margins) was £141,400. 
In the estimation of market shares', simple proportions of this total are not acceptable 
because the sum for all subjects of the retail sales of each company reflects the 
composition of our sample, which was not weighted in accordance with the importance of the 
subjects. It would also include no correction for uneven response rates. 
The weighting of subjects in proportion to the number of pupils taking examinations was 
also considered but rejected, because the textbook requirements of scientific subjects at 
the school level of study are lower than those of more literary subjects. On the other 
hand subjects which are developing (like the sciences) or subjects which are being taught 
in new ways (like mathematics and even Latin) may also require more textbook expenditure. 
It was decided to weight the percentages achieved by each company of retail sales value for 
each subject by an estimate of the retail value of purchases per member of the school 
population. The number of pupils included in this ratio was the total number in the 
relevant age-group, not the number studying the subject. When a school reported that it 
did not provide courses in the subject concerned but it fell within a category appropriate 
to the subject the total number of children in the relevant age-group (normally the total 
in the school) was taken into account. The final weight was calculated as follows: - 
1 "Books in Print" (UK edition) was very valuable for this purpose 
- 99 - 
Expenditure on subject 
Total no. in schools (or age-division) 
x Proportion of total school 
population in age-group concerned 
Pupils in independent schools accounted for 14 per cent of all pupils in sample schools, 
compared with a national independent to total ratio of around 5 per cent. Following an 
initial computation which used weights uncorrected for this different composition, it 
was decided to test whether a correction would be worthwhile. This would have taken the 
form, for subject i 
Wi = 0.04Wi (independent)+ 0.96Wi (LEA) 
The weights were virtually unaffected and, in view of the small sample of independent 
schools for some subjects, no correction was subsequently made. 
The only weight which did require correction was that for Latin; since only independent 
and state secondary selective schools were invited to reply for this subject its 
importance for the total school population would have been overstated without further 
correction. The weight for Latin was derived by multiplying the weight derived on the 
basis of independent and selective schools by a factor of 0.25. 
The resulting final weights are shown in percentage terms in Table 111-4. 
Table 111-4 Subject Weights for Combination of 
Retail Value of Textbook Sales 1976-7 
S 
Mathematics 16.0 Biology 4.9 
Reading 13.5 Religion 3.7 
Arithmetic 13.5 Chemistry 2.0 
Geography 11.5 German 2.0 
History 9.2 Music 1.6 
French 7.8 Economics 1.4 
English 6.5 Latin 1.0 
Physics 5.1 Spanish 0.3 
These weights (Wi) clearly give a high weighting to primary school books. This result is 
not unexpected because all schoolchildren learn Arithmetic and Reading and these are two 
areas in which innovation has been considerable in recent years. Physical wear of books 
in primary schools may also be greater. 
Developments in the teaching of mathematics, especially the more widespread adoption of 
modern mathematics, explain the high weight given to mathematics. On the other hand, 
while English is essentially a literary subject purchases of major literary works are 
likely to be confined to wear-and-tear replacements. 
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The market share of each company j, with percentage share Sij of the sales value of 
subject i was defined as 
Sj = £WiSij for i=1 to 16 subjects 
Zvi- 
and j=1 to 92 companies 
The standard indices of concentration were applied to Si and are summarised in Table 
I11-5 
Table 111-5 Table of Concentration - Adjusted Share of 
Value of Purchases by Companies 1976-7 
Number of enterprises 92 
Mean value 1.038 (% of total) 
Coeff of variation 2.515 
Gini 0.816 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 76.32 
Entropy - 135.2 
n* 48 10 n*m = 19 n*h =2 
CR 45.8 63.3 69.3 CRn*m = 88.1 CRn*h = 31.5 
L 0.555 0.342 0.294 Ln*m = 0.189 Ln*h = 0.724 
LS = 0.337 
Names of four leading companies and % share 
Subsidiaries of S. Pearson 18.6 
(Longman, Ladybird, Penguin, Oliver & Boyd) 
Schofield & Sims 12.8 
Addison-Wesley 8.7 
Heinemann (subsidiary of Thomas Tilling) 5.6 
The interests of two of the four companies - Schofield and Sims and Addison-Wesley are 
almost entirely confined to books for primary schools. The S. Pearson subsidiaries cover 
the entire range, though (mainly through the Ladybird series) they accounted for 38 per 
cent of the value of purchases of reading books by the 22 schools in the sample which 
reported on reading. 
The concentration ratios demonstrate the fragmented structure of the market for textbooks. 
The absence of any minimum of the Linda index until the nineteenth firm shows that there 
is no effective "oligapolistic arena". The atomistic structure of book publishing, 
already described In Section I is reflected in the pattern of supply of school textbooks. 
E. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SUBJECT 
Table 111-6 shows the four firm concentration ratios for each of the 16 subjects, (a) for 
retail value of sales revenue and (b) for stocks of textbooks in current use. The stocks 
figures summarise cumulative purchases over a period of years and may also indicate the 
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likelihood of replacement purchases in the future. 
Table 111-6 
Subject (Weight) 
















































CR4 Names of TWO Leading Companies 
96.8 Addison-Wesley (64), Schofield A Sims (26) 
88.4 Addison-Wesley (43), Schofield &, Sims (43) 
78.0 John Murray (30), Pearson (23) 
73.8 - Pearson (31). John Murray (23) 
58.5 Oxford (16), Heinemann (11) 
62.4 Pearson (34), Heinemann (13) 
63.3 Macmillan (22), Pearson (14) 
51.7 Macmillan (16), McGraw-Hill (13) 
57.6 Schofield & Sims (20), S. Pearson (17) 
47.5 Pearson (19), Schofield A Sims (11) 
70.7 Pearson (30), Hodder A Stoughton (18) 
(inc. affiliates) 
77.1 Pearson (36), Hodder & Stoughton (22) 
46.2 Pearson (16), Oxford (14) 
50.9 Macdonald (15), Pearson (13) 
83.8 Oxford (33), Hodder & Stoughton (28) 
61.5 Oxford (27), E. J. Arnold (20) 
52.1 Pearson (32), Scottish & Univ. (9) 
55.4 Pearson (35), A&C Black (8) 
86.4 Cambridge Univ. Press (67), Pearson (7) 
72.0 Cambridge Univ. Press (29), Pearson (28) 
47.9 Cambridge Univ. (16), Blackie (13) 
58.5 Cambridge Univ. (23), Pearson (18) 
59.0 Oxford (33), Eulenburg-Schott (12) 
71.7 Oxford (37), Pearson (16) 
79.6 John Murray (30), Pearson (17) 
87.2 Pearson (36), Heinemann (23) 
98.7 Schofield A Sims (54), Pearson (38) 
77.9 Pearson (37), Schofield & Sims (18) 
44.9 Hulton Educ. (14), Pearson (14) 
38.6 Hulton Educ. (12), Pergamon (10) 
100 Ilarrap (58). Pearson (18) 
96.2 Harrap (71), Hodder A Stoughton (28) 
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Table 111-6 shows that the market for textbooks for certain individual subjects is led by 
companies other than the large general publishers. Of the leading two companies in each 
subject area, only S. Pearson, Heinemann (subsidiary of Thomas Tilling), Macmillan, 
Hodder and Stoughton and Scottish and Universal Investments are included in the general 
publishing sample. John Murray, Harrap, Schofield and Sims, Addison-Wesley, Hulton 
Educational and Macdonald all had sales turnover of under £3 millions in 1975 but, by 
specialisation in one or two specific subject areas they were able to gain the 
predominant share of the market in those areas. 
The Oxford and Cambridge University Press organisation were not included in our 
financial analysis because they do not publish accounts. McGraw-Hill is the only 
American company in the list of leading publishers in each area - if the analysis had 
been extended to higher education, this position would have changed substantially. 
Table 111-6 also shows that the supply of textbooks for individual subjects is more 
concentrated, in every subject except religious education, than the educational market 
as a whole. This again reflects specialisation. In some cases a distinct oligopoly may 
be said to exist - in the sale of books for Arithmetic, Reading, Biology, Physics, French, 
German, Latin and Spanish four firms accounted for over 70 per cent of books sold to 
schools in our sample. 
The survey of educational publishing provides a view of concentration only at a single 
point in time. It would be interesting to analyse data over a longer period to see how 
market shares changed with fashions. product innovations, advertising and prices. The 
analysis of stocks provides some guide as to cumulative purchases and the study has been 
of value in providing a benchmark for future assessment of concentration, but major 
conclusions cannot be drawn from a single survey of fairly limited size. 
0 
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Appendix A Definitions and Basic Properties of Concentration Indices 
In this explanation of the main indices specified by the Commission and 
used in this analysis the following notation is used : 
N total number of firms in the industry ; 
Xt the value of a variable for Firm i, when firms are 
ranked in descending order with respect to that 
variable ; 
X the aggregate of the variable for the whole industry, that is, 
N 
-Xi Zel 




the arithmetic mean value of the variable, - that is, X 
N 
(a) Concentration Ratio 
The concentration ratio for R firms within an industry is the fraction 
of the total value of the variable accounted for by the R largest 
firms ranked in descending order of that variable :- 
CR 100 R 
M iä1 ýi 
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Concentration ratios give only limited information about the structure 
of an industry. With different distributions of the variable, comparison 
of degrees of concentration between different sectors may depend on 
the number of firms chosen. In industry A the top five firms may account 
for 40 per cent of sales and the next five 30 per cent (giving a ten- 
firm CR of 70 per cent). In industry B the five largest firms may 
account for 50 per cent of sales and the next five 18 per cent (giving 
a ten-firm CR of 68 per cent). 
(b) Coefficient of Variation 
This is the standard deviation of the distribution of values of the 
variable as a proportion of the mean 
V=1 E(Xi-u)2 
u N-1 
{cý The Gini Coefficient 
This coefficient ranges from 0 (all firms equal in size) to 1 (all output 
in the hands of a single firm). The following formula provides a method 
of calculation when the values of the variable are ranked in ascending 
order xJ, xj +1,... xN) IN 
NXE (j-l)F .- jF 
j-1 =1 17 i ýxk 
F. _ (d) Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index j k=N-j+1 
This was suggested by Herfindahl and is defined as the sum of the squares 
of the market shares, i. e. 
N 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index E P. 2 
Z=1 -Z 
The index lies between 1 and 1. Some authors prefer to define it as : A 
N 
H-H 1000 E Pie 
ia1 
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i. e. to inflate its value by a multiple of 1000. This convention has 
been adopted by the Commission and is followed in this report. 
The index is related to the coefficient of variation and in other publications 
by the Commission in this series has been defined accordingly :- 
H-H 1000 V2 +1) 
N 
(e) Entropy 




Pi Zog P. 
71 
t=1 
If one share is 1 and all others are 0, then E-0 and the degree of 
concentration is maximum. If all shares are equal (-1 ) then E" -log N 
and the degree of concentration is minimum for that valu of N. 
The entropy index, explained at some length in the Cranfield report on 
the paper industry, has the advantage over other measures of concentration 
that absolute changes in its value may be compared. For example if the' 
Gini coefficient moves from 0.3 to 0.5 in one industry and from 0.7 to 
0.9 in another, it cannot be concluded that concentration has increased 
to the same degree. With the entropy index, such a conclusion could be 
drawn. (10) 
(f) Linda Index 
Another measure of industrial concentration is given by Linda. 
.= K- -i z 
where A. =1E 7 J. 1 
Ai 
1 -A 
and values of x are in descending order. 
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K may be any number of firms from 2 to N. (Thus Q. 
is the average 
share of the market held by the top i firms divided by the average share 
of the market held by the other ( 
K-Z ) firms included in the sample). 
The Linda Index is defined as : 
1 K-1 
K(K-1) Qi 
(i. e. the Linda Index is 1 times average of the Qzs R 
The Linda index is designed to measure the degree of inequality between 
the values of the variable included in a sub-sample of K units. 
The Linda Index may also be used to define the boundary between oligopolists 
within an industry and the other firms. This boundary occurs when the 
value of xk is so large in relation to previous ratios that, in 
Xk+l 
spite of averaging, the Linda index rises. If the value of the Linda index 
(L) is greater for (k+l) than for (k) then an "oligopolistic arena" of k 
firms may be identified. 
Mathematically this critical point (km) may be defined as where 
dL =0 and d2L >0 
a 
dk2 
A measure of "synthesis" (LS) is included in the Tables of Concentration. 
This represents the mean value of the Linda indices from k=2 to k=km. LS 
is used in further statistical development of the analysis of concentration 
now being undertaken by the Commission. 
The definition of km (N*m in the Tables of Concentration) on this basis 
differs from that used in earlier reports published by the Commission. 
This re-definition follows further analysis of the concepts underlying 
the Linda approach. 
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In certain of the concentration tables and matrices, reference is made to 
Ln*h, which is the maximum of the Linda index within the entire sample. 
Usually this maximum occurs at n**2, in which case Ln*h is simply the 
ratio of the largest to the second-largest value of each variable. 
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APPENDIX B 
1. TELEVISION 
HOLDINGS BY NEWSPAPER COMPANIES IN COMMERCIAL TELEVISION AND RADIO 
30th JUNE 1975 
Name of TV contractor and 
issued equity in £'s (voting/non-voting) 
Anglia Television 
(77,000 1,023,000) 


















Thames Television Ltd. 
(500,000 3,500,000) 
Trident Television Ltd. 
(153,106 3.340,364) 
Ulster Television Ltd. 
( 88,750 511.250) 
Westward Television Ltd. 
( 20,000 964,933) 
Press holdings of issued equit 
(% of voting/non-voting), 
East Midland Allied Press (2.0/0.6) 
Eastern Counties Nwspapers 9.4/6.4) 
Guardian & Man. Evg. News 20.9/3.7) 
Non-sample companies 0.5/0.3) 
Reed International (29.6/21.2) 
Beaverbrook ( 8.0/ 5.5) 
BPM Holdings (5.0 / 0.9) 
Scottish & Univ. 13.9/19.1 
Non-sample companies 
(29.3/25.2 
Non-sample companies (28.8/ -) 
Non-sample companies (2 . 0/2.0 
) 
Nil 




News International (9.6 / 38.2 
Daily Telegraph (8.9 / 6.9 
Observer 8.9 / 5.2) 
Economist 3.8/ 2.2) 
Non-sample companies 2.3 / 0.5) 
Thomson Organisation (25.0/24.2) 
Daily Mail and General (37.5/ - 
D. C. Thomson (25.0/ 
British Electric Traction (49.9/50.0) 
(see note at end of TV list) 
United Newspapers (8.2/ 5.3) 
Non-sample cps. (1.2/ 0.7) 
Non-sample cos (6.2 / 1.6) 
Beaverbrook 0.05/0.04 
Bristol Evg. Post 0.05/0.04 
Reed International 0.02/0.02 
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NOTE The BET holdings in Thames Television are not listed by the IBA as press holdings 
in television because BET is not primarily a newspaper company. Nevertheless, the 
company does supply around 10% of local weekly newspapers in the area covered by Thames 
Television. 
Share of total equity owned by sample companies 
(excluding BET)   17.2 per cent 
Share of all Press companies (excluding BET)   18.0 per cent 
Share including BET 25.5 per cent 
2. RADIO 
Name of Radio Company . and Equity in 
Press holdin s of issued equity 
s votin non-votin of voting/non-voting) 
London Broadcasting Company Daily Mail & Geri. 15.9/ - 
(1,249,125 nil) County Newspapers 3.7/ 
Non-sample co. 0.1 /- 
Capital Radio Beaverbrook ( 5.2/ - 
( 429,356 nil) Observer ( 5.2/ - 
B. E. T. (17.0/ - Non-sample co. (11.4/ - 
Radio Clyde Beaverbrook 10.0/15.0 
( 600 300,000 ) Scot. & Univ. 12.0/12.0 
Reed International 6.5/ 6.5 ) 
Non-sample cos. 3.5 /3.5 ) 
Birmingham Broadcasting BPM Holdings 10.0/15.0 
( 50,000 300,000 ) News International 2.0/ 2.5 
Midland News Assoc. 1.0/ 2.0 
Non-sample cos. (ýA. 0/ 6.7 ) 
Greater Manchester Ind. Radio Daily Mail & Gen. 2.5/ 2.5 
(130,000 130,000 ) St. Regis 11.1/11.1 
Guardian & Man. Ev. N 10.1/10.1 
Non-sample cos. 12.2/ 9.7 ) 
Metropolitan Broadcasting (Tyne/West) Thomson Org. 15.4/ - (330,000 nil) S. Pearson 2.3/ - Prtsmth & Sund. 2.3/ - 
Swansea Sound Daily Mail & Gen. (12.44/ -) ( 15,000 nil) 
Radio Hallam United Newspapers . O/ - (220,000 nil) Non-sample cos. 
N 
. 0/ - 
Ra dio City (Merseyside) Liverpool Post & Echo 11.0/15.0 
(100,000 200,000) Thomson Organisation 2.0/ 2.5 
Non-sample cos. 11.0/16.0 
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Radio Forth Ltd. Thomson Organisation 
(135,000 -)D. C. Thomson 
Non-sample cos. 
Plymouth Sound Ltd. Bristol Evening Post 
(1000,000 -) Reed International 
Sound Broadcasting (Teeside) Thomson Org. 
(25,000 100,000 ) Portsmouth & Sund. 







( 8.0/ 8.0 
Sample companies only (exc. BET) 18.8 per cent 
Sample & non-sample cos. (exc. BET) 23.6 ii 11 






c. ww.. r 
fw+uw+1 ýM 
C: ß°1y =. "°; l 
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APPENDIX D PROFILES OF MAJOR COMPANIES 
In 1975 six companies formed an "oligopolistic arena" as defined by the Linda curve. 
These 
were Reed International, the Thomson Organisation, S. Pearson and Son, Associated 
Newspapers (Daily Mail and General Trust), News International and Beaverbrook Newspapers. 
Apart from Reed International, these companies had at the end of 1975 an unusual common 
feature -a controlling (or a very large minority) interest was in the 
hands of one 
family: - 
Thomson Organisation Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Thomson Equitable Corporation 
Ltd. of Canada. The Thomson family trusts owned a majority of the equity of the Canadian 
parent. 
S. Pearson and Son Ltd., which owned 63.6 per cent of the publishing firm Pearson Longman 
Ltd., is largely owned by the family of Viscount Cowdray. The Cowdray family's 
proportion of issued voting shares appears to fall short of a majority ( it is around 45 per 
cent ) but this gives effective control. 
The Daily Mail and General Trust Ltd., which owns 51 per cent of the publishing firm 
Associated Newspapers Ltd., is jointly controlled by Viscount Rothermere and his son, the 
Hon. Vere Harmsworth, who hold 56 per cent of the voting capital. 
News International Ltd., is effectively controlled by '1r. Rupert Murdoch and his family, 
whose company News Ltd. of Australia holds 48.3 per cent of the voting capital. 
Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., was until the 1977 takeover by Trafalgar House Investments 
controlled by the Beaverbrook Foundation and the family of Lord Beaverbrook, the Aitken 
family with about 75 per cent of equity. 
The activities of the three largest of those companies - Reed, Thomson and S. Pearson 
(combined turnover 39 per cent of the industry) are discussed further in this Appendix. 
The other three members of the oligopoly grouping are essentially newspaper publishing 
companies: their activities have been extensively analysed in Section II of the main 
report. 
1. REED INTERNATIONAL 
This company was formed in 1969 when the Reed group acquired the International Publishing 
Corporation. Total turnover and net profits before tax in 1975 amounted to £1063.6 millions 
and £37.4 millions respectively. Printing and publishing accounted for 24.1 per cent of 
turnover and 19.9 per cent of profits. Other activities include paper and paper products, 
decorative products and building materials. 
The company's share of combined sample turnover declined from IPC's 26.3 per cent in 1968 
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to 18.9 per cent in 1975. This was due to a number of factors including the sale of the 
Sun newspaper to News International in 1969 and the emergence of the Sun as a major 
competitor for the Daily Mirror; the decline of some of IPC's general consumer magazines 
and a decline in the circulation of popular newspapers in general. 
Attempts by the Mirror Group to reorganise production have met with resistance and Reed's 
publishing activities have never since recovered their 1968 level of profitability. 
Net profits Der cent of Turnover IPC/Reed publishing activities 
1968 7.1 1972 : 4.5 
1969 4.8 1973 2.6 
1970 1.8 1974 2.2 
1971 : 5.0 1975 4.0 
Of the total publishing turnover of £292.6 millions in the year ended March 1976, 
newspapers accounted for £106.2 millions. consumer magazines for £81.5 millionst. business 
periodicals for £44.6 millions and books for £26.6 millions. 
2. THE THOMSON ORGANISATION 
This company expanded its holdings of U. K. newspapers in the 1960's, though some of the 
titles then acquired were subsequently closed as uneconomic. The group's activities 
in publishing include the Times and Sunday Times newspapers (17.6 per cent of company 
turnover but making a loss in 1975). Scottish and regional newspapers (22.6 per cent of 
turnover but also recording a loss in 1975) and other publishing (magazines, hooks and 
classified telephone directories - "yellow pages"), which made a profit of 7.7 per cent on 
sales. 
The Thomson Organisation's losses on its publishing activities reflect the decline of 
classified advertising, which is the principal source of revenue both for "quality" 
national newspapers and for the regional press. 
Over the eight years covered by the study, the Thomson Organisation's return on sales of 
published matter varied as follows. These variations reflect the prosperity of regional 
newspapers until the recent recession. 
Net profits per cent of Turnover of The Thomson Ornanisation's publishinn activities 
1968 11.7 1972 : 11.0 
1969 9.5 1973 : 12.9 
1970 10.0 1974 : 10.6 
1971 : 7.7 1975 : -2.2 
The company's share of sample turnover in 1975 was 11.0 per cent, compared with 11.5 per 
cent in 1968. 
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Thomson's non-publishing activities, which account for 40.1 per cent of turnover, include 
a large travel organisation with a wholly owned airline, Britannia Airways. 
3. S. PEARSON AND SON LTD. 
Pearson Longman Ltd. the publishing subsidiary has interests in all categories of 
newspapers and in books. Our study has shown that its leadership in the local weekly press, 
which it has furthered by acquisitions during the study period. We have also indicated on 
the evidence of the purchases of 390 schools, that the company is the market leader in the 
supply of educational books. 
The paperback subsidiary, Penguin Ltd., developed a wide range of economical paperbacks 
many concerned with scientific and technical subjects. 
A breakdown of the total turnover of S. Pearson and Son in 1975 (£184.6 millions) shows 
publishing activities accounting for 59 per cent, of which provincial newspapers accounted 
for over half. Book publishing produced 11 per cent of total turnover. 
Other Pearson activities include merchant banking and the administration of investment 
trusts. 
Mainly because of its provincial newspaper acquisitions, Pearson's share of total turnover 
in publishing (from our sample) rose from 6.5 per cent in 1968 to 9.1 per cent in 1975. 
Profits of publishing activites as percentages of sales varied as follows: - 
Net profits per cent of sales turnover - Pearson publishin4 activities 
1968 6.3 1972 11.3 
1969 6.0 1973 11.7 
1970 5.4 1974 7.7 
1971 : 7.1 1975 5.5 
As with the corresponding figures for Thomson newspapers, the boom and subsequent 
recession in classified advertising revenue are reflected in these results. 
